The Kremlin’s Missile Blackmail: Raising the Stakes or Masking Strategic Weakness?

Following the massive combined attack on Kyiv on the night of May 24, Russia effectively signaled the possibility of a new wave of strikes against the Ukrainian capital. Moscow urged foreign nationals to leave the city immediately and advised residents to stay away from administrative and military facilities. Ukraine’s Foreign Minister, Andrii Sybiha, responded swiftly, stressing that the threats were intended solely to intimidate the Western diplomatic corps and that such blatant political blackmail would not achieve the Kremlin’s objectives.

That assessment soon proved accurate.

Despite Moscow’s apparent attempt to sow fear and uncertainty, European diplomatic missions in Kyiv displayed a united front and firmly rejected the provocation. The French Embassy described Russia’s calls to evacuate the capital as entirely unacceptable and “incompatible with Russia’s international obligations.”

“Above all, these demands demonstrate how rapidly Russia’s war of aggression is approaching a dead end,” the embassy said.

The Polish Embassy likewise confirmed that it would continue operating in Ukraine, while Poland’s Foreign Ministry issued a strongly worded statement warning that any attack on diplomatic missions would be viewed as a deliberate act of hostility, carrying consequences under international law and further discrediting Russia’s status as a permanent member of the UN Security Council.

Germany adopted a similarly firm stance, reaffirming its commitment to supporting Ukraine. Meanwhile, the European Union’s Ambassador to Ukraine, Katarína Mathernová, underscored the broader significance of Moscow’s threats:

“Threats against diplomats and international organizations are not a sign of strength. They are a sign of desperation. The more aggressive and menacing the Kremlin becomes, the clearer it is that Putin’s regime understands it cannot break either Ukraine’s resilience or the support of its partners.”

Even China, which traditionally maintains a cautious and measured position, responded by calling on the “relevant parties” to refrain from further escalating hostilities.

Faced with such a unified international response, Russian officials quickly began to soften their rhetoric. Most notably, Andrey Kartapolov, chairman of the State Duma Defense Committee, publicly insisted that Russia had no intention of striking either the Office of the President of Ukraine or the Verkhovna Rada, arguing that neither institution constituted a “decision-making center.”

The episode raises a broader question: what actually lies behind the Kremlin’s latest threats? Are they a symptom of the Putin regime’s growing weakness, an attempt to compensate for the lack of military success, the opening phase of a more brutal stage of the war, or simply another effort to raise the stakes ahead of potential negotiations?

What Is This — and What Is the Goal?

Political analyst Volodymyr Fesenko argues that Moscow’s actions should primarily be viewed as a large-scale information and psychological operation rather than a signal of any fundamentally new military strategy.

“For now, this appears to be a large-scale Russian information and psychological operation. I would even describe it as a form of ‘psychological warfare’ being conducted through the Russian Foreign Ministry. While the threats are formally directed at Ukraine, their real audience is the Western diplomatic corps in Kyiv and, more broadly, the United States.

That conclusion is based on both the source of the statement and its intended recipients. The warning did not come from Putin himself, which would have signaled the highest level of escalation. Nor did it originate from the Russian Defense Ministry, Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov, or Russia’s Security Council. Instead, it came from the Foreign Ministry, making it, in effect, a message aimed at the diplomats working in Kyiv.

The statement carries an official tone and was issued at a sufficiently high level to attract attention, yet it is still largely perceived as a propaganda maneuver—albeit one accompanied by the very real risk of renewed missile attacks on the Ukrainian capital. It is also worth noting that Russia has resorted to similar threats before,” Fesenko argues.

The analyst believes the operation was designed to trigger fear among Ukraine’s partners and create the impression of an impending escalation.

“The Kremlin is trying to intimidate the international community—and, in particular, the diplomatic corps in Kyiv—with the prospect of a major escalation and regular large-scale strikes on the capital. The goal was to provoke panic. Had ambassadors and diplomats begun leaving Kyiv en masse, as they did in February 2022, it would have been interpreted as a sign of fear of Moscow and an acknowledgment of Russia’s dominance in the war. And if ordinary residents had followed suit and started leaving the city, the effect would have been even greater. Russia would have secured a significant political and psychological victory without firing a shot,” he says.

However, Fesenko argues that the operation failed outright due to the unified response of Ukraine’s partners and the calm reaction of Kyiv residents. He also draws attention to what he sees as a significant nuance in China’s response, suggesting that Beijing’s message was directed primarily at Moscow rather than Kyiv.

“The statement was formally addressed to both sides in the conflict—which is typical of Chinese diplomacy. But the threats came from Russia. In that sense, it appears that the warning was aimed first and foremost, albeit indirectly, at Moscow,” he says.

Fesenko also highlights the American dimension of the operation, linking it to the Kremlin’s efforts to pull the Trump administration back toward a negotiating framework more favorable to Russia.

“Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov personally called U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio and asked him to pass the Russian warning directly to President Donald Trump. That alone reveals the primary target of this information campaign—the President of the United States.

The Kremlin is deeply dissatisfied with the disappearance of what might be called the ‘spirit of Anchorage’—a period when Washington was perceived as pressuring Ukraine to make concessions, including the withdrawal of Ukrainian forces from parts of Donbas. Moscow clearly hoped to frighten the United States with the prospect of a broader escalation and, in doing so, revive peace negotiations on terms more advantageous to Russia.

Instead, the effort appears to have produced little effect. Rubio’s response was notably restrained, essentially signaling that Russian threats were nothing new. Trump, for his part, did not react publicly at all. At the moment, the U.S. administration appears far more focused on developments surrounding Iran than on revisiting Russia’s preferred negotiating agenda,” Fesenko says.

Fesenko also argues that the intimidation campaign is aimed not only at foreign audiences but at Russia’s domestic public as well, where frustration is mounting over the absence of significant military victories. In his view, the rhetoric may also serve as a political and informational cover for a real increase in aerial attacks at a time when Ukraine faces persistent shortages of interceptor missiles for its air defense systems.

“Russian society is becoming increasingly dissatisfied with a war that has dragged on for far too long. There are no major successes on the battlefield, and strikes against Ukrainian cities no longer impress even the most ardent supporters of the war. The Kremlin therefore feels compelled to demonstrate strength, stage ‘retaliatory strikes,’ and cultivate the image of relentless escalation,” Fesenko says.

Military analyst Oleksandr Kovalenko of the Information Resistance group, however, cautions against interpreting the Kremlin’s statements as evidence of a fundamentally new stage of the war.

“What we are seeing is not an emotional outburst or some dramatic turning point. Rather, Russia is returning to a pattern of systematic missile and drone attacks. This is not a new phase of escalation so much as the resumption of a familiar tactic: large-scale combined strikes carried out on a regular basis, roughly once a week.

Such attacks involve hundreds of drones and dozens of missiles of various classes. In some cases, a single raid can include more than 500 aerial attack assets,” Kovalenko explains.

In his assessment, the strike on Kyiv the previous day was a textbook example of this approach. Far from being a spontaneous act, it reflected a deliberate and methodical campaign designed to sustain pressure on Ukraine through recurring waves of missile and drone attacks.

“It was not a spontaneous attack. Preparations took roughly a week. We observed a similar pattern before the so-called ‘May truce,’ when large-scale combined strikes were launched at intervals of approximately one to one-and-a-half weeks. Against that backdrop, many of these statements appear to be an attempt to inflate the significance of events—to assign them a greater strategic or even catastrophic meaning than they actually possess.

Above all, this is an exercise in intimidation and information pressure, not evidence of a fundamentally new phase of the war,” Kovalenko argues.

In his view, the recurring rhetoric about “leveling Kyiv to the ground” has little practical basis.

“Once again, Russia is returning to a familiar model—systematic aerial terror. We have seen this before.”

Political analyst Serhii Fursa offers a different perspective, interpreting the Kremlin’s behavior through the lens of Vladimir Putin’s political and psychological predicament. In his assessment, the Russian leader finds himself trapped between mounting expectations at home and the absence of meaningful military achievements on the battlefield.

“What are we witnessing today? The behavior of a man who can no longer achieve the result he wants and therefore resorts to aggression to compensate for his weakness. Over the past several weeks, virtually every major Western publication has carried reports about growing frustration inside Russia—about a Kremlin elite disappointed by the lack of progress and a society increasingly weary of a war that has dragged on for years.

For Putin, such perceptions are dangerous. In an authoritarian system built around a single leader, weakness is not merely undesirable—it can become a political threat in itself,” Fursa argues.

According to him, the Kremlin’s options for demonstrating strength are increasingly limited. The Russian army remains bogged down on the battlefield, while more ambitious escalatory scenarios carry significant risks.

“Can Putin answer these criticisms through military success at the front? Not really. Russian forces have largely stalled. Can he dramatically escalate by confronting NATO directly? That would be extraordinarily risky. Opening a second front while struggling on the first would make little strategic sense.

As for launching a new offensive from Belarus, that scenario also appears problematic. “It’s hardly a promising plan to send the same forces through heavily mined forests. He has no new soldiers, and the Belarusians are hardly eager warriors. They certainly have no desire to die for an aging Kremlin strongman. And Lukashenko is resisting as well,” Fursa says.

According to Fursa, highly publicized aerial attacks have become perhaps the only remaining instrument through which the Russian dictator can project an image of strength.

Member of Parliament and media analyst Viktoriia Siumar largely shares that assessment, arguing that Russia’s increasingly aggressive rhetoric reflects its inability to achieve meaningful breakthroughs on the battlefield.

“Following the effective failure of its spring-summer campaign, the terrorist state appears to be moving toward a new level of terror against peaceful Ukrainian cities.

The rapid development of Ukraine’s drone technologies, the creation of effective kill zones, and Kyiv’s growing advantages in command, control, and communications—particularly through the use of Starlink—have made it increasingly difficult for Russian forces to advance. The fact that, after more than four years of war, Russian troops continue to struggle around places such as Mala Tokmachka in the Zaporizhzhia region will undoubtedly become part of military history. It will stand as a chapter of humiliation for a nuclear power that once promised to capture Kyiv in three days.

That is precisely why Russia feels compelled to raise the stakes,” Siumar says.

In her view, the Kremlin is pursuing two parallel objectives: degrading Ukraine’s growing drone capabilities while simultaneously creating a climate of heightened tension that could strengthen Moscow’s position in any future negotiations.

“From Putin’s perspective, destruction in the Ukrainian capital serves as a desirable backdrop for diplomacy. Russia has never been accustomed to approaching negotiations without violence. It views bloodshed as leverage.

That is why we are likely entering a difficult period, one that could see a further escalation of attacks against civilians. At the same time, there remains a possibility that this phase may ultimately become the final and most desperate attempt to alter the course of this terrible war,” Siumar argues.

Her assessment reflects a broader view among many Ukrainian analysts: that Moscow’s escalating threats are driven less by confidence than by frustration, as the Kremlin seeks to compensate for limited battlefield gains through pressure on the rear, psychological intimidation, and the deliberate targeting of civilian morale.

The head of the Ukrainian Ground Forces Reserve Council, Ivan Tymochko, likewise argues that Moscow’s increasingly aggressive rhetoric is designed less to project strength than to mask weakness.

“The Kremlin has employed similar information campaigns before, including during discussions of an alleged large-scale Russian offensive in 2025. We were told that Putin was going all in, that Ukraine would have to surrender Donetsk Oblast because Russian forces would break through the defenses and soon be standing at the gates of Kyiv.

And what do we see now? A failed spring campaign. Russian forces are struggling not only to advance but, in some sectors, even to hold their positions. In parts of the Zaporizhzhia and Dnipropetrovsk sectors, they are retreating rather than moving forward,” Tymochko says.

Military analyst Pavlo Narozhnyi sees the Kremlin’s threats of intensified strikes against Kyiv in a similar light, interpreting them as a sign that Russian vulnerabilities are becoming increasingly difficult to conceal.

“Their oil refineries are burning. Ukrainian strikes against Russia’s energy infrastructure and defense-industrial facilities are inflicting real damage. What we are seeing now is an attempt to intimidate us. This has always been one of Putin’s preferred tactics,” Narozhnyi argues.

What Should We Expect?

Looking ahead, Volodymyr Fesenko believes the most likely scenario for the coming weeks and months is a renewed Russian effort to escalate the war while attempting to regain momentum on the battlefield.

“The Russian military’s spring offensive has effectively failed. As a result, the General Staff is pinning its hopes on a second attempt during the summer. Putin still wants either a military victory or, at the very least, gains significant enough to strengthen Russia’s negotiating position.

At the same time, the Kremlin’s ambition to seize the entirety of Donbas in the near term appears highly unrealistic. That is why Moscow is simultaneously increasing its emphasis on the air campaign against Ukraine. Yet even there the situation is becoming more complicated for Russia, while Ukraine’s capabilities continue to grow,” he says.

Fesenko also points to several potential diplomatic scenarios that could emerge later in the year.

“If the United States succeeds in concluding its negotiations with Iran, there may be an attempt to revive peace talks in some form of trilateral format, potentially with the involvement of figures such as Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner. However, if territorial concessions once again become the central issue on the agenda, there is little reason to expect meaningful progress.

Any negotiations focused primarily on borders rather than a ceasefire are likely to end in the same deadlock we have seen before,” Fesenko argues.

Aftermath of Russia’s missile and drone strike on Kyiv (May 24, 2026).

Fesenko believes that a genuine opportunity for renewed diplomacy may not emerge until the autumn—and only under a specific set of circumstances.

“If Russia’s summer offensive fails; if Ukrainian strikes deep inside Russia are able to trigger fuel shortages in certain regions and further erode Moscow’s ability to sustain the war; if sanctions pressure continues to increase; if the United States shifts its emphasis from territorial issues to securing a ceasefire; and if Washington begins applying pressure to Russia rather than Ukraine, then a real opening for meaningful negotiations could appear,” he says.

For now, however, military experts caution that Ukraine should prepare for further large-scale attacks.

Pavlo Narozhnyi warns that Russia retains the capacity to carry out several more strikes similar to the massive assault launched on May 24.

“Will there be another attack of this scale? I am more than convinced there will be. We should also expect the continued use of ballistic missiles. Everyone is aware of Ukraine’s challenges regarding interceptor missiles for Patriot systems. We will also see large-scale Shahed drone attacks,” he says.

Narozhnyi is more skeptical about the likelihood of Russia employing its Oreshnik missile system against Kyiv.

“The Russians are reluctant to use it against the capital because it is not a precision weapon. It covers a large area and lacks accuracy. Its submunitions are released at high altitude and can strike virtually anything—the Chinese Embassy, the U.S. Embassy, diplomats, foreign nationals, or employees of international companies based in Kyiv. The political risks would be enormous,” he argues.

Meanwhile, Ivan Kyrychevskyi, a serviceman with the 413th Separate Unmanned Systems Regiment “Raid” and a defense analyst at Defense Express, believes Russia has embarked on what amounts to a prolonged campaign of attrition.

“This is clearly not a one-time operation. Unfortunately, Russia is capable of sustaining this effort over an extended period—potentially for several months, perhaps even up to half a year. If we reduce all of the Kremlin’s statements to their common denominator, the objective remains unchanged: to inflict the maximum possible damage and casualties.

At the same time, there is an important difference compared with 2023. Ukraine’s ability to strike targets deep inside Russia has grown substantially. Deep-strike and medium-range drone capabilities have expanded, giving Kyiv tools it simply did not possess on the same scale a few years ago,” Kyrychevskyi says.

A similar assessment is offered by Serhii Beskrestnov, better known by his call sign “Flash,” a communications specialist and adviser to Ukraine’s defense ministry. He agrees that Russia retains the technical capacity to repeat large-scale missile and drone strikes in the near future.

“We understand that, like any major military power, Russia maintains strategic missile reserves for contingencies. The key question is not whether those reserves exist, but how willing the Kremlin is to spend them specifically on attacks against Kyiv,” Beskrestnov says.

Taken together, the assessments of Ukrainian political and military analysts suggest that Moscow’s latest threats should be viewed less as a sign of imminent strategic breakthrough and more as a combination of psychological pressure, political signaling, and a continuation of Russia’s long-running air campaign. While the prospect of further large-scale strikes remains very real, most experts interviewed see little evidence that the Kremlin has acquired fundamentally new military options. Instead, they argue, Moscow is attempting to compensate for stalled battlefield progress by escalating pressure on Ukraine’s rear, intimidating foreign partners, and strengthening its bargaining position ahead of any future negotiations.

Myroslav Liskovych

Kyiv, Ukraine