Ukraine Disrupts Russia’s Spring Push — Outlook for the Front in May

Russia is steadily burning through its reserves in battles for tree lines, turning the front into a grinding war of attrition. This analysis examines the real cost of Russian assaults in April 2026.

By late April, the information domain had taken on a pendulum-like quality—swinging between claims of a decisive “turning point” in favor of Ukraine’s Defense Forces and bleak assessments of a near-critical situation on the ground. Neither extreme captures the full reality.

In fact, the operational picture is far more complex: layered, dynamic, and resistant to simple black-and-white interpretations.

Working with expert assessments, Ukrinform examines several key questions: What does the front actually look like today? What is happening along the main axes? How much does a single square kilometer of Ukrainian territory now cost Russia? And what trends are likely to shape the campaign in May?

ILLUSION OF BREAKTHROUGH OR STRATEGIC STAGNATION: ASSESSING THE SPRING CAMPAIGN

Analyzing combat dynamics in March and April 2026, Oleksandr Kovalenko of the Information Resistance group argues that Russia’s spring offensive has fallen well short of the ambitious operational goals set by its General Staff.

“I would not speak of any turning point on the front,” he notes. “Rather, the opposite: conditions in the combat zone are currently as unfavorable as possible for Russia’s spring–summer offensive. In plain terms, the spring phase has effectively failed. That is already a fact. The initial stage, which began in the second half of March—around the 17th—produced no meaningful results along any sector of the line of contact.”

According to Kovalenko, Russian forces have been unable to move beyond limited tactical gains. Their advances largely consist of seizing isolated tree lines, open terrain, or small, heavily damaged settlements.

“These results are entirely inconsistent with the scale of a large combined-arms offensive expected to achieve operational—or certainly strategic—objectives,” he adds.

The underlying trend becomes even clearer when viewed through the lens of territorial dynamics. Between January and February 2026, Russian forces captured approximately 231 square kilometers. The pace then dropped sharply: 138 square kilometers from February to March, and roughly 155 from March to April.

Kovalenko highlights a stark contrast with 2025: “They are now capturing in a month what they took in a week last summer—June through August. At that time, the rate reached 130–150 square kilometers per week. Today, the same figures are spread over an entire month. And by all indications, April will not exceed roughly 150 square kilometers. This points not to a breakthrough, but to stagnation—on the Russian side.”

At the same time, Oleksandr Kovalenko cautions against euphoria: “Despite effective counterattacks since late January, Ukraine’s Defense Forces have not yet achieved a breakthrough capable of triggering a cascading collapse of Russian defenses across a broad front. Assessments therefore need to remain measured and rational.”

In his view, Ukraine is posting tangible gains—but not of a scale that could end the war this year or decisively alter its trajectory in the near term.

“In 2026, the war is more likely to center on shaping conditions for a future turning point. —either toward the end of this year or in the next,” he adds.

GEOGRAPHY OF HOTSPOTS: POKROVSK, KOSTIANTYNIVKA, HULYAIPOLE, AND THE NORTHERN LINES

Shifting from a macro-level view of the theater to specific sectors reveals a far more intricate picture: high-intensity fighting where even limited tactical gains or losses can carry broader operational consequences. The heaviest pressure points remain in Donetsk and Zaporizhzhia regions.

Pavlo Lakiichuk, head of security programs at the Strategy XXI Center for Global Studies, characterizes current Russian actions as preparatory. In both the eastern and southern axes, Russian forces are attempting to secure favorable lines for a potential larger offensive—contingent on the availability of sufficient reserves. If those reserves fail to materialize, many sectors could shift into static defense.

“The Pokrovsk–Myrnohrad axis in southern Donbas is currently the hottest sector,” Lakiichuk notes. “Russian forces are concentrating there, building depth for a northward push. So far, this has taken the form of two narrow salients that they are trying to expand—but without success. Ukraine’s Defense Forces are effectively targeting the flanks, disrupting the plan and forcing the enemy to funnel additional troops into these constrained corridors.”

Kovalenko broadly concurs, describing the Pokrovsk–Myrnohrad agglomeration as having entered a phase of operational stagnation. Russian forces are struggling to fully isolate Myrnohrad or establish comprehensive control over northern Pokrovsk. Under these conditions, a breakthrough toward Dobropillia or the opening of a Druzhkivka axis remains unlikely.

“This is due to the high density of forces on both sides,” he explains. “Any deep penetration risks being rapidly severed—creating a salient that can be cut off.”

Further north, Kostiantynivka and the Sloviansk–Kramatorsk agglomeration form the next major epicenter. Russian forces continue attempts to reach the heights around Chasiv Yar. As Lakiichuk notes, while frontal assaults across the agglomeration persist, Ukrainian forces are systematically applying pressure on the flanks, undermining attempts to advance from the north.

Denys Popovych, a defense analyst, outlines the broader strategic intent: capturing the agglomeration by late summer. The offensive is advancing from the east (via Siversk) and from the south.

“Kostiantynivka is the southern gateway to Sloviansk and Kramatorsk,” he explains. “If it falls, the entire agglomeration faces pressure from the south. To the north lies Lyman. Should Lyman be captured, Sloviansk would also be threatened from that direction. However, the situation around Lyman has remained unchanged over the past month—we are holding the line, and the enemy has made no gains there.”

Popovych remains skeptical of Russia’s timeline: “They aim to seize the Sloviansk–Kramatorsk agglomeration by the end of summer, but given their current tempo and casualty rates, that objective appears unattainable.”

Regarding the importance of holding this region, Denys Popovych adds: “This area has been fortified since the start of the Anti-Terrorist Operation in 2014. That is precisely why it cannot be lost—the enemy could ‘gnaw’ at it for years. In theory, it could be taken, but the issue is the cost-to-benefit ratio. Under current trends, that process could take years.”

On the southern axis—particularly the Hulyaipole and Oleksandrivka directions, which analysts treat as a single sector—the intensity of fighting is second only to Pokrovsk. According to Oleksandr Kovalenko, Russian forces have concentrated significant combat power here, including units of the 5th Combined Arms Army and elements of the 29th and 36th Armies, operating along a narrow frontage of roughly 15 kilometers. Their objective is to push toward Hulyaipole, advance beyond Zaliznychne into the interfluve between the Haichur and Verkhna Tersa rivers, and establish a bridgehead for a future offensive toward Zaporizhzhia. For Ukraine, timely reinforcement of this sector remains critical.

Pavlo Lakiichuk specifies that Russian forces are attempting to outflank the Orikhiv sector. The immediate goal is not the rapid seizure of Orikhiv, but rather a westward push through the rear of Ukraine’s fortified line to widen the offensive zone. “Heavy meeting engagements are ongoing, with Ukrainian forces counterattacking continuously and containing enemy reserves,” he notes.

THE MATH OF DEATH: WHAT DOES A SQUARE KILOMETER “COST” IN 2026?

A defining characteristic of the current phase is the near-industrial scale of Russian losses. With approximately 200 assault actions conducted daily, Russian command has effectively defaulted to an infantry-centric model. This “mass infantry” approach carries a quantifiable—and rising—cost.

As Oleksandr Kovalenko explains: “Russian forces are sustaining extremely high losses relative to territorial gains. During the third week of April alone, they captured roughly 41 square kilometers while losing 7,480 personnel—about 182 casualties per square kilometer. In practical terms, that’s the equivalent of two to three company-level units  expended for every square kilometer gained.”

The second week of April showed a somewhat lower density—around 122 personnel per square kilometer—but the broader trend remains sharply negative. Data indicates a steady escalation in the “cost of ground.” In January–February 2026, the figure stood at 137 killed and wounded per square kilometer (231 km² taken at a cost of 31,710 casualties). By February–March, it had risen to 189; by March–April, it reached approximately 209.

Kovalenko assesses that the final April figure is likely to stabilize at around 200 casualties per square kilometer: “Compared to 2025, the rate of advance has dropped nearly fourfold, while losses have remained at the same—or even higher—levels.”

This inflation in losses reflects a deeper doctrinal shift. Following the depletion of armored vehicles and main battle tanks during 2023–2024, Russian forces have, since 2025, transitioned to an infantry-dominant operational model.

Killed Russian occupying forces

“In 2026, this trend is only intensifying,” Kovalenko notes. “We are no longer dealing simply with a ‘meat-grinder’ approach, but with a broader resource crisis—particularly a shortage of artillery, which remains a key tool of warfare. Under these conditions, Russian offensives increasingly take the form of ‘man plus drone’: maximum reliance on manpower combined with mass use of unmanned systems.”

This evolution leads to a structural vulnerability: growing dependence on human resources. Without expanded mobilization, sustaining current operational tempo will become progressively more difficult as losses accumulate.

The situation is further complicated by a slowdown in the pace of covert mobilization in Russia.

Journalist and active serviceman Pavlo Kazarin notes that the Kremlin’s financial incentive model is beginning to falter: “The number of new contract soldiers has dropped by 20% compared to the same period last year. Instead of 90,000 recruits in the first quarter, the Russian army secured only 70,000—despite steadily rising pay.”

MAY OUTLOOK: WHERE THE FOCUS OF THE WAR WILL SHIFT

Looking ahead to May, analysts do not expect major operational surprises. The Russian command is likely to continue pressing known pressure points, attempting to convert numerical advantages into limited tactical gains.

Oleksandr Kovalenko outlines the priority axes:

“The main directions of Russian activity are clearly defined. First is the Hulyaipole axis, followed by the Pokrovsk–Myrnohrad agglomeration, Kostiantynivka, the eastern flank of the Sloviansk–Kramatorsk bridgehead, and the Kupiansk direction.”

Secondary efforts will likely persist along the Lyman axis—where Russian forces aim to reach the eastern bank of the Oskil River—as well as around the Stepnohirsk and Orikhiv bridgeheads. At the same time, Kovalenko highlights an additional risk along the state border in Sumy, Kharkiv, and potentially Chernihiv regions.

According to his assessment, Russian forces are increasingly relying on a strategy of incremental pressure—“gnawing” at small border settlements. Given the sheer number of such localities, it is impractical to maintain strong garrisons everywhere. This creates opportunities for Russian sabotage and reconnaissance groups (DRGs) to conduct raids, using them as instruments of psychological pressure to offset stagnation on the main front.

“That is why in May they will most likely aim for at least limited operational or operational-tactical results,” Kovalenko explains. “One key scenario is an attempt to initiate full-scale urban combat for Kostiantynivka.”

He adds that Russian forces are likely to employ infiltration tactics in the city’s industrial and southern districts, replicating patterns previously observed near Pokrovsk. Simultaneously, they will continue efforts to entrench themselves near Kupiansk, attempting to substantiate last year’s claims of having “captured” the city.

Kovalenko expects the primary offensive emphasis to shift toward the Hulyaipole direction, where Russian forces are shaping conditions for a broader push. “At the same time, the Pokrovsk–Myrnohrad agglomeration will most likely remain in a state of stagnation, without sharp changes in dynamics,” he notes.

Summarizing the broader operational picture, Mykola Malomuzh, Head of Ukraine’s Foreign Intelligence Service from 2005 to 2010, underscores the effectiveness of Ukraine’s defensive approach:

“Ukraine’s Defense Forces have reached a sound operational model across all key sectors, including Pokrovsk–Myrnohrad, Kostiantynivka, and especially Hulyaipole. These are the most intense and demanding sectors—but also the most effective in terms of inflicting losses on the enemy.”

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April 2026 marks a transition in the Russian–Ukrainian war to a phase of acute attrition of Russia’s offensive potential. The absence of any strategic breakthrough, the sharp decline in the pace of territorial gains, and the simultaneous surge in the cost per square kilometer—now exceeding 200 personnel—point to a clear conclusion: the Kremlin’s reliance on “infantry wave” tactics is failing to deliver operational results.

At the same time, Ukraine’s Defense Forces—despite lacking the resources for a large-scale counteroffensive—are effectively pursuing a strategy of asymmetric attrition, systematically degrading Russian reserves.

The months ahead, particularly with anticipated heavy fighting for Kostiantynivka and continued efforts to contain Russian forces near Hulyaipole, will demand significant endurance. Yet the underlying loss dynamics increasingly work against Russia’s ability to sustain offensive momentum.

A decisive turning point has not yet materialized, but the aggressor’s stagnation is becoming an evident and irreversible “clinical” fact.

Myroslav Liskovych, Kyiv