Ukraine’s February Campaign Against High-Value Russian Targets
The final month of winter became one of the most productive periods for Ukraine’s Defense Forces in their campaign against high-value Russian military assets, particularly air-defense systems. These operations stand out by their systematic nature. Throughout February, Ukrainian forces targeted multiple components of Russia’s layered air-defense network—from short-range tactical systems protecting frontline units to strategic air-defense assets.
These successes are not measured solely by the destruction of equipment worth tens or even hundreds of millions of dollars. More importantly, the strikes have created noticeable gaps in Russia’s air-defense architecture—gaps that Moscow’s defense industry is unlikely to close quickly given production constraints and the impact of international sanctions.

Tor-M1 SAM system
Strikes Against TOR Air-Defense Systems
February saw a series of successful strikes against TOR-family short-range surface-to-air missile systems, which Russian forces widely use to protect ground units and critical infrastructure near the front line.
The first such operation took place on February 11, when units of Ukraine’s Unmanned Systems Forces conducted a strike using Middle Strike attack UAVs. The operation destroyed four air-defense systems, including three Tor-M2 systems and one Osa SAM system.
Three of the systems were struck in occupied areas of Donetsk region, while another TOR was destroyed in Kherson region.
Later, on the night of February 20, operators from the 1st Separate Center of the Unmanned Systems Forces conducted another strike against Russian air-defense positions, destroying three additional TOR systems in the occupied part of Zaporizhzhia region.
During these operations Ukrainian forces employed FP-2 strike drones armed with 60-kg warheads, which proved highly effective against the lightly armored vehicles used by Russian short-range air-defense units.
The estimated value of the three TOR systems alone is approximately $75 million.
The following night, Ukrainian forces continued their operations, destroying two additional TOR-M1 systems—one on the outskirts of occupied Donetsk and another near Mariupol.
In total, at least nine TOR-series air-defense systems were reportedly destroyed during February, representing a notable reduction in Russia’s short-range air-defense coverage in several sectors of the front.
ANTEY-2500, Triumf and other strategic air-defense assets
Ukrainian operations in February were not limited to short-range systems.
On February 17, Ukrainian forces reportedly struck an S-300VM (Antey-2500) surface-to-air missile system in Donetsk region. The S-300VM is among the most capable missile-defense systems in Russia’s inventory, designed to engage both aerodynamic and ballistic targets.

S-300VM Antey-2500 SAM system
The S-300VM Antey-2500 is also one of the most expensive and technologically sohisticated air-defense systems fielded by Russia. Depending on configuration—including launchers, radar systems, and missile stocks—the cost of a battalion-level set is estimated at $120–150 million, with some estimates placing the baseline price of a single system at roughly $100 million.
Export contracts provide additional context. For example, Russia’s 2014 contract with Egypt for the delivery of Antey-2500 systems, together with associated equipment and replacement parts, was reportedly worth approximately $1 billion.
For comparison, a single interceptor missile used by S-300 family systems is estimated to cost at least $2 million.
Later in the month, Ukraine’s Unmanned Systems Forces reportedly tracked down and destroyed a radar station associated with an S-300V system in Donetsk region. Such radars are responsible for detecting and tracking both aircraft and ballistic targets, effectively serving as the sensor backbone of the air-defense system.
On the night of February 25, Ukrainian Special Operations Forces conducted one of the most significant strikes of the month in occupied Crimea.
According to Ukrainian reports, the operation damaged a launcher belonging to an S-400 Triumf long-range air-defense system, destroyed a 92N6E fire-control radar, and eliminated a Pantsir-S1 short-range air-defense system that had been deployed to protect the position.

S-400 Triumf long-range air-defense launcher vehicle
The strike effectively disabled a key element of Russia’s air-defense network on the Crimean Peninsula.
The S-400 Triumf is widely regarded as the most advanced medium-to-long-range air-defense system currently fielded by Russia, representing the next generation of systems following the S-300 family.
The cost of a full S-400 battalion is commonly estimated at $600–625 million. A typical battery includes a command post, long-range surveillance radar capable of detecting targets at distances of up to 600 km, and 8–12 launchers. Interceptor missiles for the system are estimated to cost between $2 million and $4 million each, with the 40N6E long-range missile being the most advanced variant.
According to Russian specifications, the system can engage aerodynamic targets at ranges of up to 400 km and ballistic targets at ranges of up to 60 km, with engagement altitudes ranging from 10 meters to roughly 30 km. The system is reportedly capable of tracking up to 300 targets simultaneously and engaging up to 36 of them at once, guiding as many as 72 missiles concurrently.

92N6E multifunction fire-control radar (NATO reporting name “Grave Stone”)
However, a critical component of the S-400 system is the 92N6E multifunction fire-control radar (NATO reporting name “Grave Stone”), which Ukrainian forces reportedly destroyed during the strike. This radar performs target tracking and missile guidance functions, making it one of the most essential components of the entire system. The cost of a single radar unit is estimated at $150–200 million, and without it the battery cannot conduct effective engagements.
Operations in Crimea
In addition to strikes against Russian air-defense assets along the front line, Ukrainian military intelligence conducted a series of operations targeting high-value military equipment in occupied Crimea.

Nebo-U long-range radar
Several of these operations were attributed to the “Prymari” (“Ghosts”) unit, a special operations element within the Main Intelligence Directorate (HUR) of Ukraine’s Ministry of Defense.
During February, Ukrainian forces reportedly struck multiple targets on the peninsula, including a Pantsir-S1 short-range air-defense system, a Nebo-U long-range radar, and a BK-16 landing craft.
In March, Ukrainian intelligence officials released additional details regarding the results of these operations, confirming further damage to a number of Russian naval and aviation assets stationed in Crimea.

Ka-27 naval helicopter
According to updated information, the list of damaged targets included the Project 22460 patrol ship Okhotnik, a Project 1496M1 naval tug, and a Project 16640 support vessel. Ukrainian sources also reported the destruction of a Ka-27 naval helicopter, a Forpost reconnaissance UAV, and an additional radar element associated with an S-400 air-defense system.
Taken together, the destroyed and damaged equipment is estimated to exceed hundreds of millions of dollars.

Project 22460 border patrol ship Okhotnik
Naval and UAV Losses
Among the assets reportedly struck was the Project 22460 border patrol ship Okhotnik, operated by the Coast Guard of Russia’s Federal Security Service (FSB). These vessels belong to a relatively modern class of second-rank patrol ships designed for maritime security operations.
The estimated cost of a Project 22460 vessel is approximately $35–45 million, based on procurement contracts from the 2010s. By 2024, a total of 14 ships of this class had been built. Production of the later vessels in the series experienced delays due to sanctions affecting engine supply chains.
A distinctive feature of the Okhotnik-class patrol ships is their relatively compact size combined with the presence of both a permanent helicopter landing deck and an enclosed hangar, enabling the operation of a light helicopter such as the Ka-226 or unmanned aerial vehicles. This capability allows the vessel to monitor and patrol large maritime areas more effectively.
Another notable loss reported during the operations was a Forpost reconnaissance UAV, along with its strike-capable variant Forpost-R. These platforms are among the most technologically sophisticated reconnaissance UAVs in Russian service.

Forpost reconnaissance UAV
The Forpost system is a licensed derivative of the Israeli IAI Searcher Mk II UAV, with an estimated unit cost of $6–7.5 million. Russia initially purchased two Searcher II drones in 2009 for approximately $12 million, which subsequently served as the basis for domestic production.
Operationally, the Forpost operates at the operational-tactical level, conducting deep reconnaissance missions. Its operational radius is estimated at 250–350 km, depending on configuration and ground control systems. The UAV can remain airborne for 16–18 hours, and its operating altitude of 5–6 km makes it difficult to engage with conventional man-portable air-defense systems (MANPADS).
The upgraded Forpost-R variant can also carry light precision-guided munitions (KAB-20) for surgical strikes, while simultaneously providing target designation for guided artillery and missile systems.
Because of its high cost and reliance on Western and Israeli microelectronics, the Forpost remains a relatively scarce platform within Russia’s UAV inventory. Each loss therefore creates a temporary surveillance gap for Russian forces in the affected sector, particularly as sanctions complicate rapid replacement.
Notably, in 2025, Ukrainian forces reported successful interceptions of Forpost UAVs by domestically developed interceptor drones at altitudes exceeding 4 km, highlighting the continued evolution of Ukraine’s counter-UAV capabilities.
MINUS TWO MLRS
The enemy’s rocket artillery also suffered noticeable losses in February.
On the 21st, Ukrainian drone operators destroyed a Tornado-S multiple launch rocket system at its firing position. This MLRS is the most powerful system in Russia’s rocket artillery lineup, a modernized version of the 300-mm Smerch with a strike range of up to 120 km. It is considered a direct competitor to HIMARS, although it has its own specific features.

Tornado-S multiple launch rocket system
The system is equipped with satellite navigation equipment (GLONASS), which makes it a “precision-guided” weapon. At the same time, the cost of just one guided Tornado-S rocket is estimated at $300,000–$500,000, while the launcher itself, with its electronic systems, costs more than $15 million.
The uniqueness and significance of destroying this MLRS lies in the fact that it is a limited-production system. Before 2022, Russia possessed as few as about 20 units of this weapon. Even with increased production rates, their total number remains critically small for a frontline that stretched.
Moreover, it is known that the guidance unit of Tornado-S rockets critically depends on Western microchips, making the rapid replacement of destroyed systems virtually impossible under sanctions.
Thus, the destruction of each such launcher deprives the enemy of the ability to strike our rear logistics hubs and headquarters at long distances. In addition, these systems are regularly used by the Russian army to shell Ukrainian cities — including Kharkiv, Zaporizhzhia, Sumy, Kherson, and Nikopol.
Another strike against the enemy’s rocket artillery was carried out on February 24 — in the Zaporizhzhia direction, a Uragan MLRS was destroyed.

9K57 Uragan MLRS
The 9K57 Uragan MLRS is a Soviet-era 220-mm multiple launch rocket system. In Russia’s artillery lineup, it occupies an intermediate position between the Grad (122 mm) and the Smerch / Tornado-S (300 mm) systems.
Although the Uragan is not as technologically advanced as the Tornado-S, its destruction creates tactical gaps in the enemy’s defensive or offensive formations.
THE FINAL TRIO

Pantsir-S1 surface-to-air missile system
On the same night of February 24, Ukrainian forces carried out a series of precision strikes targeting various types of Russian equipment. In particular, a Buk-M1 surface-to-air missile system was destroyed in Donetsk region, while a Pantsir-S1 and a Malakhit radar station were struck near Novofedorivka in currently occupied Crimea.
Another Pantsir-S1 was hit on the territory of the Azovstal metallurgical plant in Mariupol on February 27, the penultimate day of winter.

Buk-M1 surface-to-air missile system
Thus, if we summarize only the confirmed episodes of February, the total value of the enemy’s lost weapons and military equipment amounts to hundreds of millions of U.S. dollars. However, the more important outcome is different: the systematic degradation of Russia’s air defense. Without its “eyes” in the form of radars and without a densely layered air defense network, the Russian army becomes far more vulnerable to further strikes.
Judging by the intensity of such operations, the Ukrainian hunt for high-value targets of the Russian army is only gaining momentum.
Ivan Stupak, Kyiv
Representative photos from publicly accessible sources