Trump’s visit to China offers an opportunity to discuss the shifting global agenda and the potential consequences of a meeting between the leaders of the world’s two superpowers. Reports on the visit will inevitably emerge—some detailed, others brief. Yet it is equally clear that the full scope of the agenda and many of the issues discussed will not be disclosed publicly, at least not immediately. Even so, certain conclusions and assumptions can already be drawn.

To discuss these issues, Ukrinform spoke with Oleh Shamshur, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of Ukraine.

Ukrinform: We met last year, and even then there were early signs of new realities emerging in foreign policy—signals of profound change. Since then, events have accelerated dramatically, and today the scope of this discussion has become much broader.

If we look at 2026, it has largely been shaped by the actions—or, more precisely, the campaigns—of the U.S. president. The year began with the lightning operation in Venezuela, followed by the Trump Peace Council, then his distinctive mediation efforts in Russia’s war against Ukraine, and finally his own war in Iran. When Putin invaded Ukraine, many observers argued that it marked the beginning of a transformation of the world order. With Trump’s return to power, there were now two leaders openly challenging the existing system. But have new rules already emerged? Has a new order truly taken shape?

Oleh Shamshur: In my view, a new order is still in the process of forming. Tectonic shifts are underway in global politics and international relations, and it remains entirely unclear where they will lead. Naturally, one would hope that the forces of democracy and stability prevail in this confrontation, but that outcome is far from guaranteed. The final configuration of the world order is still unknown. What can already be said, however, is that Trump is effectively trying to position himself as the director of the universe—that is, as the man capable of resolving every major issue himself.

Some dismissed it as mere political theater. But this should be taken very seriously, because it aligns closely with Trump’s psychological profile. A few weeks ago, The Atlantic published an article examining how Trump sees his role in the world—his sense of mission, even messianism, if you will. And he genuinely appears to believe in it.

From the very beginning, Trump articulated a worldview built on different rules for different players: one set for the powerful—for figures like himself, Putin, Xi, or Erdoğan—and another for smaller and weaker states such as Ukraine, Canada, or even Europe as a whole. In this framework, smaller powers are expected to recognize the interests of the great powers and, accordingly, know their place.

Trump’s actions have largely reflected this approach. Even ahead of his visit to China, he repeatedly acknowledged that serious disagreements remained and that the talks would be difficult and protracted. Yet at the same time, he insisted: “Xi is my friend, he’s a great person, we’ll work everything out.” It would be a mistake to dismiss this simply as negotiating tactics. Trump genuinely believes he can persuade anyone and that, in the end, others will act according to his logic and principles.

UI: The real question is whether Comrade Xi sees it the same way—which is far from certain. This is a meeting of equals, although Trump clearly imagines himself as the more equal of the two. Regardless, it is a major event with the potential to affect the entire world.

Trump began his presidency with sweeping tariff wars. He launched them aggressively and on a grand scale, but over time many of those initiatives either faded or had to be revised. China became perhaps the clearest example: Trump ultimately failed to secure any decisive breakthrough.

Moreover, he was forced to ask Xi to postpone the visit because, by mid-March, the war was still ongoing. The conflict in Iran, meanwhile, has not truly ended either. Victory has been declared several times, but no final resolution has been achieved. Against this backdrop, does China now approach negotiations with Trump from a position of greater confidence?

OSh: There is indeed a broad consensus among observers that Xi and China enter these talks from a position of considerable strength. ‘And there are several reasons for that.

“First, there are the tariff wars. Trump genuinely believed tariffs could solve virtually every problem; the word itself has been central to his worldview since the beginning of his business career. He was convinced that economic coercion would compel China to back down. But Beijing prepared for this confrontation in advance and effectively countered Trump’s offensive by restricting U.S. access to rare-earth minerals—resources that are now critical across nearly every advanced industry.

At the same time, the standoff underscored just how deeply dependent the U.S. economy remains on China, something America’s largest business leaders quickly recognized as well. Trump also witnessed turbulence in financial markets triggered by the tariff measures, and ultimately he was forced to retreat.

During their meeting in Malaysia, Trump and Xi agreed to a temporary tariff truce, but that arrangement is now close to expiring. It is obvious that the central issue in the upcoming talks will once again be tariffs. Most observers expect only limited progress—perhaps an extension of the truce or an agreement to keep tariffs at levels acceptable enough to avoid destabilizing global markets.

Economics will almost certainly dominate the negotiations. Washington wants expanded access for American agricultural exports, while sales of U.S. liquefied natural gas and oil are also expected to be on the agenda. Another major issue is a large-scale deal involving Boeing aircraft purchases.

From Beijing’s perspective, beyond maintaining manageable tariff levels, the key objective is securing greater access to advanced American technologies. There is also speculation that artificial intelligence will feature prominently in the discussions, including possible coordination mechanisms and broader ‘rules of the game’ in what is becoming one of the world’s most strategically important sectors.

That, in my view, will form the core of the talks.

UI: It appears that the world’s two superpowers have reached a fragile equilibrium—finding ways to compete in trade and technology without directly undermining each other’s fundamental interests. And regardless of the outcome, Trump will almost certainly present the visit as a victory, especially with executives from major global corporations accompanying him and the prospect of Boeing contracts looming in the background.’

The implication is that Washington and Beijing are increasingly focused on managing coexistence, while devoting less attention to broader geopolitical crises. Still, Trump may privately raise the issue of nuclear weapons. He has attempted this before, although Xi Jinping has shown little interest. China likely believes it still needs more time before it can engage the United States as a true nuclear equal. For now, the strategic balance remains tilted toward Washington, which is one reason Beijing continues to value Russia as a counterweight to American nuclear power.

At the same time, it will be impossible to avoid foreign-policy flashpoints altogether. The war in Iran continues, as does Russia’s war against Ukraine. Taiwan remains a central issue, and North Korea continues to provide increasingly active support to Russia.”

So political matters will likely be overshadowed by economic concerns.

OSh: In my view, absolutely. The central issue is the economy. Nuclear arms control may come up, but the positions of the two sides are fundamentally opposed. More broadly, however, I believe there will be two major political topics.

The first is the war in Iran. This issue is particularly complicated because China supports Iran and has invested heavily there. Iran is central to several of Beijing’s major foreign-policy and infrastructure projects. For that reason, China has a vested interest in preventing Iran’s defeat. And that reality will inevitably complicate the discussions.

That being said, China’s position on Iran is far from straightforward. On one hand, Iran remains an important—arguably indispensable—regional partner for Beijing. On the other, China is heavily dependent on energy supplies from the Persian Gulf, even if it possesses sufficient reserves to weather disruptions for a significant period.

Beijing therefore has a direct interest in reopening the Strait of Hormuz. As the world’s largest exporter, China also depends on the uninterrupted functioning of global trade routes and maritime commerce.

As a result, Iran will undoubtedly be part of the discussions, but the issue is exceptionally complex. The two sides share certain interests, yet profound disagreements remain, making compromise far more difficult.

The second major political issue is Taiwan. Naturally, from Ukraine’s perspective, the key question is whether Russia’s war against Ukraine will feature in the talks at all. But I have not seen any serious analysis suggesting Ukraine will be a major item on the agenda. Even if it appears on the agenda, it will likely remain on the margins of the talks.

UI: As for Iran, there are arguments—supported by a number of facts—that China may be virtually the only country besides Russia to have benefited strategically from the Gulf conflict. One area where Washington and Beijing clearly share common ground is the Strait of Hormuz: both countries seek to ensure open sea lanes and uninterrupted passage for commercial traffic.

That shared interest could potentially become the basis for broader understandings.

The war in Iran has also become an object of intense scrutiny for the Chinese military establishment. Chinese analysts are closely studying the course of the conflict, particularly the apparent vulnerabilities exposed in the air-defense systems of countries equipped with some of the most advanced American weaponry. Beijing will undoubtedly incorporate those lessons into its own strategic planning.

OSh: There is every reason to believe that China’s position regarding Iran and the war itself is highly complex. As I said earlier, it is neither one-dimensional nor entirely unambiguous. There are several layers to it.

First, from an objective standpoint, it benefits China when the United States becomes overstretched and, to some degree, discredits itself by acting as a source of instability. The deeper Washington becomes entangled in this conflict, the more advantageous it is for Beijing strategically. At the same time, China cannot allow Iran to suffer a total defeat. Iran remains a key partner, one in which Beijing has invested heavily, and it plays a critical role in several major Chinese geopolitical and economic projects.

Second, China is carefully observing how the conflict is unfolding and drawing practical lessons from it, particularly for the future modernization of the People’s Liberation Army.

Beijing is also watching the Strait of Hormuz closely through the lens of other strategically important maritime chokepoints in the seas surrounding China—areas that China itself could potentially seek to control in the future.

Overall, it will be extremely interesting to see how events develop. If the parties manage to reach some form of understanding regarding the Strait of Hormuz, it would undoubtedly constitute a major breakthrough with significant implications for the global economy.

At the same time, one must remember that the negotiations ultimately involve Iran. And, as Trump himself has acknowledged, it remains unclear who exactly can negotiate on Tehran’s behalf or to what extent various interlocutors truly represent a unified Iranian position. That makes the discussions even more unpredictable than they already appear.

UI: From my perspective, whatever understandings may be reached regarding Iran, they are unlikely to be made public immediately, because Tehran itself would first need to be persuaded.

OSh: Exactly. An agreement would first have to be finalized, and there would need to be confidence that Iran is prepared to accept it before anything could be publicly announced. That is probably how Xi would approach the issue. But knowing Trump’s political style, one cannot exclude the possibility that, while flying back aboard Air Force One, he posts a message declaring that the talks were excellent, that a deal has been reached, and that he has won.

UI: Turning to Taiwan, Taipei somewhat disappointed the United States when its parliament—where the opposition holds a majority—failed to approve the defense budget at the originally proposed level and instead significantly reduced it. That sparked frustration among U.S. officials, Trump among them. And the reaction is understandable: first, Taiwan is a strategic partner; second, the weapons in question were meant to be American-made.

More broadly, Trump appears to believe—or at least publicly claims—that he can continue relying on what he says was Xi Jinping’s personal assurance: that as long as Trump remains president, China will not move against Taiwan. So what should we expect on Taiwan if the positions of both sides are already well known and unlikely to change?’

OSh: This goes directly to Trump’s emotional nature and his tendency to make decisions based on his immediate perceptions and instincts. Most experts—including many within Trump’s own foreign-policy circle—support maintaining the traditional U.S. position on Taiwan without changes.

At the same time, concerns persist that Taiwan could become a bargaining chip in a broader geopolitical deal. That is precisely what many observers are worried about today. Trump has already demonstrated a willingness to discuss virtually all aspects of U.S. arms sales to Taiwan. Since the Reagan era, however, this issue had effectively been untouchable. Taiwan was regarded as a partner tied to the United States through shared security interests, not as a subject for transactional bargaining. Whether that principle will hold remains to be seen.

The second issue is that Xi is widely expected to push for at least a verbal shift in the American position on Taiwan. Currently, the U.S. position is that Washington does not support Taiwan’s pursuit of formal independence. Xi would prefer the language to go further—toward an explicit statement that the United States opposes Taiwanese independence.

What may appear to be a minor diplomatic nuance could, in reality, have profound implications both for Taiwan and for the broader international system. If Trump were to endorse such wording, it would inevitably alter perceptions of American commitments in the region.

And Taiwan is not only a geopolitical issue. The island remains the world’s dominant producer of advanced semiconductors. In practical terms, whoever controls Taiwan controls the global supply of cutting-edge chips—a fact Trump himself undoubtedly understands.

UI: There is also another figure Trump continues to describe as a “good guy”. And it’s about Putin. ‘In one form or another, Russia will inevitably remain part of the conversation—not only because the war against Ukraine continues, though for us that is the most important issue, but also because Russia has increasingly become a kind of center of gravity for pariah states. China surely understands this and may seek to clarify how closely it wishes to align itself with countries such as Iran and North Korea.

OSh: I would suggest that China is carefully monitoring the evolution of relations between Russia and North Korea. That said, however, Beijing does not appear to be overly concerned or fundamentally unhappy about it. Certain aspects may cause discomfort, but overall, both the Russian and North Korean leaderships appear to remain within boundaries China considers acceptable. They understand how far they can go without Beijing’s tacit approval. That is the first point.

Second, the three major issues—the economy, the war in Iran, and Taiwan—are so strategically important that both sides may prefer to set aside other contentious matters that could lead to uncomfortable exchanges. I believe the probability of that is quite high.

And when it comes to Russia, what exactly is there to discuss in depth? China has already made clear that it cannot allow Russia to be defeated, and Beijing will maintain that position for as long as doing so serves its interests. At present, there are no serious factors making such a policy disadvantageous for China. Trump, meanwhile, continues to do everything he can to preserve the option of engaging with Putin as a partner. Xi sees this perfectly well, which is probably why neither side has much incentive to dwell extensively on the issue.’

UI: In summary, this meeting is enormously important not only for the two superpowers and their leaders, but also for the wider world—including Ukraine, which continues its armed struggle against Russia. With that in mind, we should not expect Beijing to deliver any substantive decisions regarding the war in Ukraine. Nor should the world anticipate dramatic geopolitical breakthroughs or outcomes capable of reshaping the international system overnight—except perhaps for a potential acceleration of efforts to resolve the conflict in the Persian Gulf.

OSh: That is how I see it as well. It is equally important to note that the outcomes of this visit and the negotiations between Washington and Beijing carry major implications for the global economy. The more stable and predictable the economic relationship between the two superpowers becomes, the better it will be for the world economy as a whole. At the same time, security issues are clearly not Trump’s primary focus right now. Above all, he is seeking agreements with China on economic matters.’

UI: That is entirely understandable, especially as September and the U.S. elections are drawing ever closer. Domestic political pressure on Trump is increasing, his approval ratings are slipping, and public dissatisfaction is growing alongside gasoline prices. He therefore needs visible successes—including major achievements in dealings with the Celestial Empire.

The key question now is what these talks will ultimately deliver.

Ihor Dolhov led this conversation

Photos: Danylo Antoniuk / Ukrinform

The conversation can be watched in full on Ukrinform's YouTube channel