As the war in the Middle East is threatening to expand and concerns are raised that it may draw international focus away from Russian military aggression against Ukraine, as well as diminish the stockpiles of missiles critical for Ukraine’s air defenses, Ukrinform sat down with European Commissioner for Defense and Space Andrius Kubilius to discuss this and other challenges facing Europe, Ukraine’s most prominent supporter.

The discussion touched upon the elements of European defense readiness, lessons to be drawn from Ukraine’s war experience and the ways Ukraine could contribute to strengthening European defense architecture and ramping up its physical defense against external threats. The Commissioner also spoke about the critical importance of EU’s loan for Ukraine for 2026-2027, the scenarios of war in Ukraine, and commented on Hungary’s criticism of European support for Kyiv in fighting off Russia’s onslaught.

UKRAINE LOOKING INTO DEVELOPING MISSILE SYSTEMS TOGETHER WITH EUROPEAN PARTNERS

- In your numerous speeches, you emphasize the need for Europe to achieve material, institutional, and political defense readiness. I would like to dwell on each aspect for a moment. In a recent interview, you announced that you have a “missile tour” planned for this week, during which you will visit European manufacturers, including to accelerate the transfer of missiles to Ukraine. What’s the purpose of this visit? Also, given the limited production volumes of missiles for Patriot systems, are you in contact with the Gulf states so that they could consider assistance to Ukraine following Kyiv’s offer to help with drone interceptors?

- Gulf states do have stockpiles of missiles. But for them, these stockpiles are now also needed very much. What we see is that in some cases, Gulf countries, and even United States, are looking for Ukrainian experience of how to fight enemy drones with much more cost-effective means, not to shoot each drone with a PAC-2 or PAC-3 missile.

So that's one thing. Definitely we understand the challenges now in general that the Ukrainian air defense and European air defense are facing. Because some European member states like Cyprus are facing also possibility of whatever attacks from Iranian side. And that is why my missile tour is becoming even more obviously needed.

It will not resolve all the problems, but we want really to focus on looking into, first of all, effective solutions to supply capabilities to Ukraine. Ukraine is one of our clear priorities. And you know that we are preparing the EUR 90 billion loan, of which EUR 60 billion is slated for defense assistance. And the Ukrainians are very clear about their priorities: it's drones, extended range 155 ammunition, and missiles.

On drones, although it’s always a challenge, Ukrainians are very good and strong. On ammunition, the situation is more or less alright. We had a good meeting with European industries, although of course there are always challenges and problems, including on the security of supply of components. But definitely the biggest problem is missiles.

And it's a structural problem, not just a problem in this moment. We need to ramp up both production of existing systems and missiles, but also we need to look into how we could develop new systems, maybe together with Ukrainians.

I was talking last week with Ukraine’s Defense Minister Mikhailo Fedorov, who is now looking into possibilities also of developing Ukrainian missile systems together with some European partners.

So that's our purpose – to go around to understand the situation to learn about the possibilities, and to urge both national governments and industries to move ahead.

National governments can look into their stockpiles. Maybe there are some reserves which we can try to buy using the Ukraine Support Loan.  And this loan is crucial now. It's not only because Ukraine needs to have EU financial support starting from April, but also because the loan is creating new possibilities to try to find how we can guarantee much more stable weapons supplies to Ukraine.

- By the way, are Norway and the UK in the game in the context of your efforts to reach out to industries and governments?

- Norway is a very big part always in our eligibility criteria when we're talking about EU funds. With the UK, indeed, we failed with SAFE loans, but I think that we shall maybe find the ways to have some kind of more stable agreements.

Also, I should remind you that within the Ukraine Support Loan, we have a cascade principle where we first of all shall look what Ukraine is able to produce itself in terms of their needs, then, if there is no production of some sort of weapons in Ukraine, we shall look into European production, and if it’s not there either, then there is possibility of derogations and going to other suppliers.

UKRAINIAN ARMY COULD PLAY IMPORTANT ROLE IN DEVELOPING EUROPEAN ARMY CAPABILITIES

- Speaking of institutional readiness, you insist on the need to have a single European armed force that could replace the US military in the event of their withdrawal from the continent. As one of the options, you mentioned the use of at least part of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, well-trained in battles with the aggressor, as an important element. How do Brussels and European capitals view this idea?

- First of all, I am trying to raise what I call “big questions” publicly in order to start discussions. And it leads me to understanding that in order to find the best answers to those big questions, like how to replace American capabilities, both material ones and also military forces, how to develop the European Defense Union, which would include the UK, Norway, Ukraine, in order to have all the benefits from the Ukrainian battle-tested experience, and plenty of other issues, even related to how to make the European defense industry more competitive, more able to produce what is needed on a big scale – on all those questions, I see the problem that the European Union lacks a good platform where to discuss those issues and to find the answer.

The Council of 27 members, of course, has all the rights to make decisions, but it's not the best place to have a deep discussion.

That is why I propose to come back to the idea, which was originally initiated by Emmanuel Macron and Angela Merkel back in 2017-2018, of so-called European Security Council, which would be five big member states, as well as around three rotational members, and EU institutions. And that is what started to be discussed very intensively in different corners of Europe, especially in the European Parliament, where the German CDU passed a special resolution on that.

So that's my first step. We need to move on from the stage when we are only raising the questions and sometimes finding some ideas. For example, the idea of a European army had been discussed 10 years ago in Europe by Jean-Claude Juncker, by Macron, by Merkel, but things were not moving ahead. So now the priority is to find the best way how we can start to deliver on those big issues, including on the European army, or European Rapid Reaction Force, or whatever you call it, which would replace the American troops now stationed in Europe.

- So theoretically, coming back to my question about the Ukrainian forces, theoretically this is simply uncharted waters and we just don't know how it might happen, is that correct?

- That's correct. For the time being, yes. As you have said, I was publishing my thoughts on some of those questions, reminding that President Zelensky and Prime Minister Schmyhal at the time were proposing to use the Ukrainian Armed Forces as a possible entity which can play a very important role in development of those European army capabilities.

IMPORTANT TO CALCULATE HOW MUCH FAILURE TO ENLARGE WILL COST EUROPE

- Another, wider angle of this question. We have heard a lot about the gradual accession of Ukraine, but just recently we learned that EU ambassadors insist that the EU should stick to the merit-based principle regarding candidate countries and no date should be announced for Ukraine’s accession. This raises concerns that the Ukrainians could be frustrated that the momentum is not being utilized in full. Do you think the option is viable of Ukraine’s defense sector first becoming integrated into Europe in some form, maybe the European Defense Union, something that has not yet shaped up, before Ukraine actually becomes member of the EU?

- I think that all the options are viable. In European Union, it’s always quite difficult to predict how discussions move, why they move, and what will come out of them. Now, definitely, it's very important to look for different possibilities, different options of how enlargement can happen, not only with Ukraine, but also with other countries.

And I think that those discussions will continue. Critical opinions about any kind of ideas also are part of the discussion. I would not say that because of some particular discussion suddenly we should stop to discuss the topic of how to make enlargement successful in general.

It's very important always to discuss not only how much enlargement with Ukraine will cost politically, financially, and economically for the European Union but also how much non-enlargement will cost.

I had a very good discussion with Norwegians, who produced a very interesting paper on two military scenarios: how much it will cost for Europe if our support is not increasing and the outcome could be that the Russians could start to prevail more and more, and then what it would it mean for Europe. How many millions of refugees would flow to Europe, how much we would need to spend additionally on our own defense? And the numbers are impressively big. And the second scenario was that we are increasing our support to Ukraine, and Ukraine starts to prevail, and in such a way Ukraine manages to achieve peace, convincing Putin to sit down and to negotiate peace. And in this scenario, the price is eventually two or three times less costly than the first one.

There are countries which are saying that Ukraine is not ready or that the European Union is not ready for enlargement. We can discuss all those arguments, but at the end we need to ask ourselves the question: if Europe is not enlarging, what are the consequences?

- As for political defense readiness, is the EU preparing to take defense-related decisions quicker and more effectively, perhaps, indeed, in the format of the European Security Council?

- These discussions are gearing up, but it will take time. I see the logic in arguments of the experts who are saying that, in order to develop our defense readiness, it's not enough just to raise additional funds and to invest them into production. If we shall not find the best ways, how we are organizing ourselves if Americans diminish their presence.

For example, there’s been plenty of discussions about so-called European pillar of NATO. If you listen to national leaders, chancellors, prime ministers, and presidents, who were speaking at the Munich Security Conference, almost everyone was speaking about that pillar, about the need to develop our independent capabilities and so on.

EU’S PRIORITY SHOULD BE TO DEVELOP CONVENTIONAL DEFENSE, NOT NUCLEAR DETERRENCE

- In the context of the need for European defense autonomy, how do you assess Macron's initiative to expand the European nuclear deterrent system in response to Russia's nuclear build-up?

- Of course, this is more a topic for member states to decide. We are not, as European Commission, participating too much in that.

But what I'm always reminding that Americans are quite strongly declaring that they are ready to keep their nuclear umbrella for Europe for a foreseeable period of time. What they are asking is for us to be ready to take responsibility on conventional defense. And I think that our priority now really should be conventional defense.

We need to learn really how to become much stronger on this, how to build our material capabilities, how institutionally to organize ourselves, how to learn to fight as Europe, not just as a combination of 27. So, at least for me, this is priority.

But if member states really see the need also to discuss and to develop some kind of nuclear capabilities, that's really crucial, that's important. We understand where we are as Europe in terms of nuclear deterrent and nuclear defense capabilities. Really, we are quite heavily behind both of Russian nuclear stockpiles and, of course, the United States.

But again, we need to be realistic that now we need to invest very heavily into conventional capabilities.

- Speaking of the 360-degree defense of Europe, we see how the threats you mentioned earlier, including the drone threat, have already affected the southern flank, in particular Cyprus. In your opinion, can or should the Ukrainian know-how and experience in countering this danger be used by the EU?

- I think that Ukrainian experience is very crucial. My own conclusion about experience of Ukrainian defense, from which we still need to learn a lot, is that although you might have weapons but if you are not developing what Ukraine has managed to achieve, which I call an “ecosystem” involving weapons, operators, innovators, everything in a very dynamic circle, and especially if the war is going to last for a longer period of time, that will become a big challenge.

PUTIN IS LOSING FRIENDS AND THE WAR IS MAKING RUSSIA WEAKER

- If the war in the Middle East continues, oil prices will continue to rise, which will mean an increase in Putin’s income to finance aggression. What additional steps do you consider necessary at the European Union level to minimize these risks, including for Ukraine?

- What we have been doing to diminish Putin’s possibility to raise additional funds for his war is sanctions, of course. And sanctions against the shadow fleet are very important because the majority of money which Putin is getting is from export of oil and gas, and that's what we need to prevent, especially now that the prices for oil and gas, for the time being, are increasing. But I am not so sure that it will really continue in the same way for a long period of time. We shall see. We had some discussions in the College of Commissioners, and it's difficult to predict. Let's see how it goes.

However, oil and gas prices are not the only consequences of the Iran war. There are also, in some way, political consequences for Putin, which are, in my view, quite negative.

At the end, it appears that Putin is losing his friends, one by one: Assad, Maduro, now Khomeini… And we can see clear evidence that the war against Ukraine is making Russia much weaker.

HUNGARY’S RHETORIC ABOUT WAR AND THEIR INTENTION TO BOOST OWN DEFENSE DON’T MATCH

- I don't like using the term “Putin’s friends in Europe” but there are leaders who view the ongoing war in Ukraine differently. Recently, Hungarian foreign minister Peter Szijjarto once again accused Brussels of what he calls the intention to “continue this senseless and hopeless war, which brings new deaths, new suffering and a new hunt for people every day.” Why do you think the Hungarian political leadership stubbornly does not see the threat from Russia to the EU and its own country? After all, Russia’s ambitions do not end with Ukraine, and I am not sure that Hungarians would be happy to one day be forced into the ranks of the Russian occupation army.

- I think it's pure politics. Also, with a dose of populism. Of course, there’s an election campaign is going on. Sometimes, really, it's sad that some language is really unfair from what we can here.

But at the same time, Hungarians asked for SAFE loans, quite a big amount. They are among the five countries who asked most. And these SAFE loans are used by member states to develop their defense capabilities. When SAFE loans were introduced, that was done in order to assist member states in developing their defense capabilities against whom? Against Russia in general.

So, there’s a mismatch between their rhetoric and the reality. The reality is that they want to invest into their defense capability. If you think that Putin is your friend and you’re absolutely sure that you are safe, then why are you investing in your defense?

This is one question. Second, why say that Brussels is continuing the war if Brussels is doing everything to support Ukraine? Then what does it mean to end the war according to the minister's proposal? Not to give support to Ukraine? It means that Ukraine would need to surrender. Is that the proposal?

But is Hungary ready to apply to itself the same standard? If you are attacked by a bigger enemy, you simply should surrender, because that is a way for peace? I don't think this is fair.

SITUATION WILL CHANGE IF PUTIN’S NARRATIVE THAT HE IS PREVAILING IN THE WAR IS DESTROYED

- Returning to those two scenarios of the war: to put it bluntly, it’s either Ukraine that prevails or Russia. Do you think that Europe is ready for the latter scenario?

- I think we are increasing our support. Until now, my understanding is that support from European Union member states and from the US during the Joe Biden administration was around EUR 20 billion from each side, so in total it was around EUR 40 billion per year.

After the Americans decided not to give any more financial support, we managed to provide EUR 40 billion last year.

Now for the years 2026 and 2027 we have a EUR 90 billion Ukraine Support Loan, of which EUR 60 billion is for defense aid. Ukrainians want EUR 40 billion to be provided already this year, and the remaining EUR 20 billion – next year.

On top of that, within the Ukraine Defense Contact Group, some member states recently declared, at least what I saw in public, that they individually were ready to provide support Ukraine worth up to EUR 35 billion or EUR 36 billion. It means that, in general, support for Ukraine from the EU side this year could amount to around EUR 70 billion. So it's quite a substantial increase.

As I was talking recently with authorities in Kyiv, including with Defense Minister Fedorov, he was quite optimistic, and he was saying that this such kind of support really can be a breakthrough for Ukraine.

They have a very clear plan of what they want to achieve. They want to make sure that Putin is unable to continue the war. This includes increasing their monthly casualties from 30,000 to 50,000. I expect that the situation in this war will start to change. If now Putin still is able to create a perception that he is prevailing in this war, that perception could change quite rapidly and significantly.

Even now we’re hearing that Ukraine’s forces are gaining back territory from Russia. Those are very important achievements because Putin has been playing on psychology of his people, being able to keep this perception that he's winning. In Russia, nobody will ask a simple question of how much land Russia gained for the cost of 1 million casualties or more.

So, if that perception is diminished or destroyed, things can change very rapidly.

Ievgen Matiushenko, Brussels

Photo: Ievgen Matiushenko