Right after the European Parliament approved the resolution on the fourth anniversary of Russia’s full-scale invasion, reiterating European support for Ukraine, Ukrinform sat down with the Member of European Parliament, Michael Gahler, from the European People’s Party Group (Christian Democratic Union of Germany), a member of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, to reflect about the big war raging in Europe.

The conversation also touched upon the possible formats of Ukraine’s accession, the defense role of Ukraine for the entire Europe, the ways to proceed with decision-making in favor of Ukraine despite vetoes of individual member states, the ways to proceed in communication with Russia if needed, and how to eliminate fears of some in the EU about Ukraine joining the bloc.

IF ORBAN IS NOT REELECTED, FICO AND BABIS WILL NOT DARE OPPOSE THE EU LINE

- In your speech in the European Parliament on the fourth anniversary of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, you slammed the people in Europe who help Putin, now with two things – blocking the loan for Ukraine and further sanctions on Russia. What kind of signal does it send both to Ukraine and to Russia, from your perspective?

- I think Orban and Fico have no standing in Germany, and in the largest part of Europe. I think everybody knows where they stand, and we regret that we have this mechanism of decision making. We have to be very creative now to bypass it, and we will find the way.

And if anything goes wrong, we would then do it outside the EU Treaty, with the Coalition of the Willing. Of course, this would be a measure of last resort. Outside the EU, outside the treaty, there’s no veto.

I’m actually surprised how it is even possible for Hungary to block the 90 billion loan. In the first place, it implies that Hungary, Czech Republic and Slovakia are not involved anyway, it’s the framework of what we call enhanced cooperation, which is within the Treaty.

But in the end, I’d like to assure you that Ukraine will get the money in time, no doubt. And we hope that after the 12th of April, when Orban is gone, Fico alone or Fico and Babis, they won't dare to oppose the EU line.

TRUMP SHOULD EXERT PRESSURE ON PUTIN, WHICH IS NOW MISSING

- Do you think the US may at some point move to put pressure on the countries like Hungary to change its stance toward Ukraine if they want Europeans to pay a bigger role in the European security and defense, and in helping Ukraine?

- Definitely not, because Trump is rather going to support Orban in his campaign, but I hope that will even backfire, because for people, even in Hungary, the natural feeling gives you the impression that Trump is not really predictable, reasonable, or accountable, and if such a person supports Orban, that is not a good advice, but we will see.

What we need is that Trump exerts pressure on Putin. That is what is missing, and that is why Putin still drags on and is not even prepared for a ceasefire.

Ahead of the Alaska meeting with Putin he spoke with our leaders and they all agreed that a ceasefire is the first thing to be done, and then he met Putin, after which there was no talk about ceasefire. Ceasefire came off the agenda, and I think that is a tragedy.

The effects of such policies will be reflected, but the midterms are only in November. In the meanwhile, we will find ways and means to apply the sanctions and to transfer the funds that have been agreed on.

AWARENESS OF THREAT IS GROWING AS RUSSIAN HYBRID ACTIONS SHOW WAR PREPARATIONS

- Given that this is a really sad date today, the question is about the perception of this war and the perception of potential conflict by citizens in the EU, as well as politicians. How has it transformed?

- I think the awareness that this is not over, that this is a systemic conflict between democracy and dictatorship, has risen. This is including in the wake of cyber attacks and other things that happen throughout Europe.

I have seen a map of German railways and attacks on technology there. It's almost nationwide, and this is not a coincidence. I think the majority of all these things, they have a Russian background, they are checking also, when some rail line has been disrupted, where we redirect trains. I think that is part of hybrid warfare in the real sense of preparing for war. They want to see how we react, and whether there’s an escape route if one railway is blocked. This information is not too much communicated to the general public but I was told that some companies constructing private bunkers have an enormous amount of orders, which is growing still. So many people now think it is time to prepare for the worst case scenario.

There are also some brochures being circulated on how citizens should prepare, what they should have at home, and step by step, this awareness that there is something looming is increasing.

It requires political leadership from top, including the respective heads of government in all our countries to make it clear that the threat is actually there, and that it is not limited to Ukraine.

In parallel, the support is rising for increased defence expenditure, for reinstating conscription in Germany, which is now at 63 percent. This wouldn’t be the case if people didn’t have a feeling there’s a need to do it.

EUROPE SHOULD IMPROVE ITS MILITARY MOBILITY

- Speaking of these railway routes, what do you think about the problem of military mobility of the European NATO allies? Is this problem being addressed properly?

- In the current financial framework, which is until 2027, only a billion euros was allocated to this end, which is nothing. But now, of course, we have military mobility as one of the major prerequisites to have credible deterrence.

If we are not able to move our troops, we are not able to have this credibility. I always suggested that the transport politicians and defence politicians join forces because everything that we strengthen, deepen, and broaden, of course, should be seen as dual use.

If there is a bridge strengthened to carry a 40-tonne tank, it can also carry a 40-tonne truck for normal civilian use, so I think this need for military mobility to be enhanced also profits the civilian sector in normal times.

When we think of the West-East route, where things would need to be transported from the ports or certain airports eastwards, if you look at how many bridges we have over the Elbe, the Oder, the Vistula, and the Bug, there are not that many. This infrastructure could be easily destroyed or paralyzed if we don’t, on the one hand, strengthen them, but also if we don’t have additional ones and other ways of getting the mobility done.

There are also administrative hurdles. Currently, allegedly, for having a NATO maneuver, it takes to get all the permissions which would take 46 days. They want it to be done in three days.

But while we need three days to administer the troops, the Russians have already three days to march on. So I think we need to have extra-exceptional rules where all requirements for normal civilian times can be bypassed. There’s still not yet full awareness to this end.

Also, we need to improve training of our troops in real terms. We all saw reports how a single Ukrainian unit of 10 drone operators invited to participate in a NATO exercise in Estonia paralyzed a much larger NATO force training there.

It was only a training exercise and nobody was killed, but in real war, they would have been. If NATO continues to train in the old way, we are really lucky that we have the Ukrainians on our side because they know how to fight.

EU IS ALREADY STARTING TO FACTOR UKRAINE’S ARMY IN OWN DEFENCE POSTURE

- As Andrius Kubilius said, while NATO soldiers will be filling papers, Russian soldiers will be filling the Suwalki Gap… We heard a lot about the idea being floated of Ukraine’s gradual accession into the EU in the context of the ongoing peace talks led by the United States. Do you think that defense is precisely the area where Ukraine should have its integration frontloaded before everything else is completed?

- On the very day when the state of war ends, when there’s a ceasefire, at this point, this security guarantee must be activated. It cannot be activated before because then we would be obliged to go into war as well. That is what we do not want. That is clear.

But once the war formally ends, my suggestion is to activate this security guarantee that is alike Article 42.7 of the EU Treaties. If you compare the two texts, Article 5 of NATO and 42.7 of the EU Treaty, you will be happy to have the latter because it's far more binding and obliging than Article 5.

In theory, if everybody agreed, we would take Ukraine in as a member, but activate as a first step this security chapter. But of course that would require unanimity so it would take one voice against to object. So if this is not possible, I would suggest to do it the other way, because we can’t leave Ukraine out in the cold.

This could be a sort of the Coalition of the Willing decision, with 26 only, or 25 countries, who would apply the same guarantee as foreseen in Article 42.7 but outside the Treaty, as long as there is still opposition to have it inside.

And in my mind, that would then also mean that we also already de facto are starting to factor the Ukrainian army in our defence posture. Whether the Americans are there or not, remains to be seen. And that means we cannot go on planning while ignoring Ukraine's strength, only having them on our side at this moment informally. But all our defence planners in the NATO headquarters, they learn so much from Ukraine currently, as we speak, taking all the insights and the experience of Ukraine to our own planning and also training.

And accordingly, the defence posture would be having a big hole if we did not include Ukraine into that. Without Ukraine, we cannot, currently, defend ourselves. We do have to include Ukraine in our own interests.

EUROPE MUST NOT BE AFRAID OF UKRAINE’S FUTURE ACCESSION

- Do you think it is possible to put the defense area integration first? How can it be done?

- Well, a project of the Schengen area started also outside the Treaty of the EU, and when it was appropriate to integrate it, it was done. And that will at the latest be when Ukraine as a whole enters the European Union. And frankly speaking, while I see a bit problematic to oblige us on a date of accession of Ukraine, it is better to have the obligations ready that are necessary, first with defence, and then see where we can practically apply already the provisions of the Treaty in other areas, be it in the trade area, in the trade of goods or of services.

In the end, enlargement is still unanimous. We must take away the fear of those who are afraid, including in agriculture business. Agriculture is a very good example where we need not be afraid. We had, with the 2004 enlargement, the same discussions with Poland and Hungary and others.

But in Poland, we had millions of uncompetitive, very small-scale farmers, so the challenge was how to include uncompetitive ones and to keep them alive. Now with Ukraine, we have the challenge of having overcompetitive, big units mostly, so that they would probably not even need subsidies because they are so competitive, but they would pose then the threat if they were allowed to enter the market from the first day.

But, as food is needed globally and increasingly, I think we can ask Ukraine to sell their goods globally in order not to put it all on our market. And then step by step you see how to integrate that.

There’s also a valuable discussion about foreigners buying Ukrainian land. There was always a fear that foreigners buy land. But they cannot take it away home, it will stay where it is. The second thing, you can always limit the sale not being obliged to sell everything to everybody, and certainly not to outside the EU. You will not be obliged to sell it to Chinese or to Russians.

But inside the EU there shouldn't be discrimination in principle. The more European foreigners buy Ukrainian land, the better and the more insistent their expectation that it is safe. I was told that in the 50s when the Americans in West Germany bought a lot of things, but that rooted them in West Germany and their resolve to defend what they had bought. When there are tens of thousands of owners of Ukrainian land from the European Union, they will say, that is my land, and I want it to be protected so that the Russians don't come and take it away.

All in all, even in such critical areas like agriculture, we can find common ground and also a way that doesn't overcharge our existing promise. Otherwise, it might get difficult.

ANY COMMUNICATION WITH PUTIN SHOULD COME FROM BRUSSELS, NOT ON BILATERAL LEVEL

- Speaking of the peace negotiations that are supposed to lead us closer to peace, do you think that Europe should get a concrete negotiator to speak with Russia at this moment? Do you see any sense in member states reaching out bilaterally?

- If we want to send a concise message to Putin, it should come from here, from Brussels. Whether it’s Mrs. von der Leyen, or Mr. Costa or Mrs. Kalas, I don't care.

What is important is that Putin knows that they speak for all of us, apart from Fico and Orban, who in these circumstances are definitely irrelevant. These two people will not prevent us from formulating our demands. But then any national leader, when von der Leyen, Costa or Kallas are speaking on behalf of all of us, they can all add to that and say the same.

That is the point. My fear is a bit when any individual leader tries to go there and then Putin is fit to listen to the details, where the sound of the one is a little bit other than the other one, and then he will make the best for his interpretation. So the best thing is definitely here from Brussels, to have somebody who gets this mandate additionally to existing competences.

PUTIN THINKS HE IS IN A POLITICAL CHAMPIONS LEAGUE

- Putin has definitely underestimated Ukraine when he invaded, because he was given wrong intel about how he will be met. Do you think Putin is now also underestimating the EU with all these hybrid attacks and all these threats being voiced by Putin’s people like Medvedev?

- I think he underestimates us, because he thinks that he has a place in another league, with Trump and Xi Jinping. That is the political Champions League, where he makes deals and where he now is even profiting from this American president, who is like no president before, and being able to manipulate him in the way he does.

And that is really a pity, but as it is, because there is a situation that obliges us even more to do what needs to be done, and that is to stand together and to develop our defence, but also to include Ukraine in all the efforts. That is the situation as I see it.

- What is your message to the Ukrainians on the 4th anniversary of the full-scale invasion?

- Ukrainians, you are not alone. We are with you with all our possibilities, and the political will to make you stronger, and to have you with us at the end of this dreadful war. You are defending us, and that obliges us to defend you. We are mutually connected. We have the same future. We have a common future and I wish that this war ends on conditions that you can accept.

Ievgen Matiushenko, Brussels

Photos provided by the author and Reiner Wenning