Recently, one year has passed since Ukraine’s Ambassador to Poland, Vasyl Bodnar, presented his credentials to the then President of the Republic of Poland, Andrzej Duda.
Ukrinform took advantage of this occasion to ask Ukraine’s top diplomat in Poland questions about the current status of Ukrainian–Polish relations, with focus on cooperation in the military and economic sectors, efforts to resolve historical issues in bilateral relations, and joint resistance to Russian influence. The Ambassador also spoke about the work of Ukrainian diplomats in Poland, the expansion of the consular network in that country, and how the Ukrainian government supports its citizens in Poland.
80% OF THE ‘PROBLEMS’ IN THE AGRICULTURAL SECTOR BETWEEN UKRAINE AND POLAND DO NOT ACTUALLY EXIST
Q: Mr. Ambassador, a year ago you presented your credentials to the President of Poland and officially began your tenure as the Ambassador of Ukraine to that country. What has this year been like for you?
A: It was a very dynamic and productive year. Considerable efforts were directed toward ensuring that the strategic partnership continued to take on concrete substance, that long-standing issues were addressed, and that our relations further advanced with due regard for Ukraine’s strategic interests related to its Euro-Atlantic integration. Of course, the most important topic in our dialogue has been ensuring Ukraine’s capability to defend itself and supporting our country in the war against the Russian aggressor. I believe that a great deal had been achieved over the past year.
Q: Poland was not a foreign country for you; you worked here at the embassy 15 years ago. In your view, how have Ukrainian–Polish relations changed over these one and a half decades?
A: I would suggest looking not at the last 15 years, but at all 34 years of independence, and at relations between our countries through the prism of how Ukraine is perceived in Poland and how Poland is perceived in Ukraine. In my view, we see a classic sine wave in mutual attitudes, linked to events as they unfolded. When Ukraine regained independence, the level of public support for our country in Poland was, quite naturally, high. Later, significant surges of positive sentiment and support for Ukraine in Poland were observed during the Orange Revolution, the Revolution of Dignity, and at the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine.
These upswings were accompanied by certain expectations regarding change in Ukraine. Over time, relations would then shift to a more stable and calm level.
In 2022, Polish society surpassed itself, demonstrating to the entire world what true solidarity looks like: open hearts and homes for Ukrainians fleeing Russian aggression, and sincere support for Ukraine fighting for freedom and survival. This became a genuine historical turning point in bilateral relations, showing what Polish society and the Polish state are capable of in times of major crisis and severe trials.
Over the past two decades, Poland has made a major leap forward. It has become one of the wealthiest countries in the world, is on the threshold of joining the G20, and demonstrates strong development dynamics. Ukrainians have also contributed to this progress—particularly due to the one million Ukrainian citizens who were forced to flee Russian aggression and found refuge in Poland. According to Deloitte, in 2024 Ukrainians who arrived in Poland after the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion contributed 2.7% of Poland’s GDP.
Today, we have a new quality of relations. We have matured and now perceive one another as equals, seriously and responsibly. We understand the weight of each state in the world and are aware of where we can be useful to one another, where cooperation is needed, and where we are competitors—and this, too, must be discussed openly.
This applies, for example, to cooperation in the agricultural sector, which is a sensitive issue both in Poland and in Ukraine. Last year, unlike in 2023–2024, there were no blockades of the shared border, as a systematic and continuous dialogue was established between the ministries of agriculture.
Either online or in-person meetings took place almost on a monthly basis, allowing the parties to present the real picture of trade in specific goods, compare statistics, and address issues that previously seemed impossible to resolve. I will say more: 80% of the so-called “problems” do not actually exist. They are invented or inflated through speculation, media hype, or attempts to pit Ukrainian and Polish producers against one another. At the same time, in the remaining 20% of cases, the problems are quite resolvable.
These discussions range from how Ukraine should integrate into the European Union—whether this creates risks or opportunities for Poland—to identifying specific categories of goods that compete with Polish products and determining how resolving concrete issues can be turned into opportunities for Ukrainian-Polish cooperation. Unfortunately, certain restrictions on the export of Ukrainian produce to the Polish market still remain in place.
However, we are working together with Poland and the European Union to gradually address these issues in a way that benefits our producers while avoiding threats to the European market.
Today in Ukraine, Poland is perceived as a model of successful transformation. Ukraine aspires to EU membership, while Poland has already been part of the European Union for more than 20 years. Poland is a perfect example of how to properly use the opportunities provided by European integration in order to transform into a prosperous country.
In Poland, there is also a clear understanding of the security environment, particularly in light of Russia’s ongoing war against Ukraine. Poland pays serious attention to its security and to strengthening its defense capabilities and is arguably the most successful EU country in terms of defense spending and the enhancement of military capacity.
POLAND IS COMPILING ITS 47TH MILITARY AID PACKAGE FOR UKRAINE
Q: There is a vibrant debate underway, focused on various countries’ engagement in a potential peace process. Poland is also seeking to play a visible role, with Warsaw declaring being prepared to become part of a possible peacekeeping operation in Ukraine as a logistical hub. What kind of involvement does Ukraine expect from Poland?
A: The issue of Poland’s participation in the Coalition of the Willing and in peace negotiations is extremely topical in Poland. At the same time, the majority of Polish society opposes sending troops to Ukraine. This topic has become surrounded by various myths and has turned into an element of domestic political debate. We will not go into it now.
We will only note the following. First, Poland is critically important for us as a “lifeline,” since the implementation of any initiatives or operations without Poland involved is impossible. As a member of the Coalition of the Willing, Poland has been represented at various levels at 17 meetings. Recently, Polish President Karol Nawrocki took part in a conversation involving the President of Ukraine, European leaders, and U.S. President Donald Trump, while Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk participated in a meeting with European leaders. This is important, because Poland’s presence in such talks reflects a cross-party consensus.
Poland’s national interest lies in Ukraine standing firm, being strong and capable of containing Russian aggression. The second element is logistics: without Poland, it is almost impossible to implement operations related to logistics, unit support, or troop redeployments among others. Today, Poland plays a key role for Ukraine in ensuring the delivery of military assistance. For allies who decide to deploy military contingents to Ukraine after the end of hostilities, Poland will also play a key logistical role.
Q: How many military aid packages has Poland already delivered to Ukraine to date?
A: As of today, Poland has delivered 46 packages of military assistance to Ukraine, and the 47th package is currently being compiled. The previous assistance package was valued at approximately €250 million. The new package, which we expect within the next few months, will amount to €220–230 million. It will include ammunition, equipment, various military items required by specific branches of the Armed Forces, as well as replacement parts for military hardware. This particularly concerns Polish-made weapons that were previously supplied to Ukraine. This includes both earlier assistance and weaponry purchased by Ukraine.
Q: What is the current state of Ukrainian-Polish cooperation in the defense-industrial sector?
A: We are forging cooperation in the defense-industrial sector, with due account taken of the capabilities of both countries as well as the threats we face. This became particularly tangible in September 2025 following the visit to Ukraine by Poland’s Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of National Defense, Władysław Kosiniak-Kamysz. We have established working groups that focus on specific areas of cooperation. These include defense industrial base collaborations and coordination of priorities within the European SAFE initiative.
In particular, at the end of last year we drew up a shared list of needs and promising areas of cooperation in order to determine where we can work together and how to use available funds to the benefit of both countries—supporting Ukraine while simultaneously strengthening Poland’s defense capabilities. This concerns joint production, the development of innovative technologies, and the modernization of military equipment.
One particularly interesting area could be the use of Ukrainian naval systems to defend Poland’s coastline. We have these systems in sufficient quantities and are capable of supplying them. This could significantly enhance Poland’s defense capabilities in the Baltic Sea. In addition, important issues extend beyond drones to include missiles, reconnaissance, and air defense. Ukraine’s experience in countering daily large-scale drone and missile attacks demonstrates how critical missile and air defenses are for the protection of civilian infrastructure. Here, Ukraine can offer its solutions, while Poland also has its own innovations.
Cooperation in the field of air defense is especially promising, as Poland has a well-developed air defense network. The Polish Piorun MANPADS are well known and are now used in Ukraine with high effectiveness. However, these are short-range air defense systems, whereas we are also discussing medium- and long-range air defense systems needed to neutralize Shahed drones. We also need to exchange operational information and create joint control and monitoring systems. In my view, Ukraine’s air defense network should be integrated into NATO’s air defense architecture. This would strengthen the Alliance’s air defense capacity and help Ukraine integrate militarily with NATO’s relevant defense components.
THE INTERCEPTION OF RUSSIAN TARGETS OVER UKRAINIAN TERRITORY BY NATO AIR DEFENSE SYSTEMS REMAINS ON THE AGENDA
Q: Is the issue of NATO air defense systems intercepting targets over western Ukraine still relevant at this time?
A: Yes, this issue remains on the agenda. No political decision on this matter has yet been taken within NATO. Quite naturally, various solutions have been suggested by both the Ukrainian and Polish sides. This issue was particularly acute in September last year, when Russian drones repeatedly violated Polish airspace.
We continue to argue that the most effective approach would be to intercept Russian drones in Ukrainian airspace. I believe this issue will gain additional momentum once agreements on a ceasefire are implemented and the initiatives from the Coalition of the Willing are realized—initiatives that would also include allied protection of Ukrainian skies.
Q: When can we expect the joint implementation with Poland of projects under the European SAFE initiative?
A: We have agreed on a list of prospective projects and submitted it to the European Commission for approval. In the near future, we will discuss this matter with our Polish colleagues. According to preliminary information, by March it should be clear which projects have received funding, and then we will see in which direction to forward further work. It is worth recalling that the SAFE initiative is a credit facility aimed at defense production on the territory of EU countries, with the possible involvement of third countries—in this case, Ukraine. Implementing projects under this initiative will help both us and Poland create modern weapons systems. This includes, for example, the production of ammunition, air defense systems, and the development of innovative technologies.
Q: When will the transfer of Polish MiG-29s to Ukraine take place, as discussed, among other occasions, during President of Ukraine Volodymyr Zelensky’s December visit to Poland?
A: As of today, four aircraft are ready for transfer. They have been inspected by a Ukrainian inspection team, and decisions are now being made regarding the timing, location, and procedure for the transfer. This will hopefully take place in the first quarter of this year. I believe these MiGs will require some upgrade, but that is already a matter for the military.
As a result, each side will receive what it needs, since the Ukrainian side intends to provide Poland with equipment to bolster the country’s drone capabilities. This mechanism has been proposed so that the strengthening of defense capabilities for both sides assumes a constructive character.
Q: How many of these aircraft will be transferred in total, and will this take place in 2026?
A: Around ten. The timing of their transfer will depend on the capacity to receive them, the aircraft’s readiness for immediate use, and our readiness to provide something in return. Of course, it should be taken into account that these are aircraft that have completed their service in Poland, but can still be used in combat conditions in Ukraine.
Q: Last year, Ukraine’s Foreign Minister Andrii Sybiha told Ukrinform that Ukraine had requested a €120 million loan from Poland to purchase Polish-made weapons. Has this loan already been granted?
A: We are at the final stage of coordinating all the details related to signing the agreement on this loan. The finance ministries of both countries are aligning the terms; we have involved representatives of the Ministry of Defense and other institutions to help with the substantive aspects of the proper use of the loan to strengthen Ukraine’s defense capability and cooperation in the defense industry. I do hope we will sign this agreement in the first half of the year.
THE 2025 BILATERAL TRADE WILL AMOUNT TO USD 16–17 BILLION
Q: What is the current state of economic cooperation between Ukraine and Poland?
A: Over the first three quarters of last year, trade turnover between Ukraine and Poland increased by 7.7% quarter-on-quarter to reach USD 13 billion. In particular, imports from Poland to Ukraine amounted to USD 9.3 billion, while exports from Ukraine to Poland totaled USD 3.7 billion. Polish imports particularly include defense articles. The total volume of bilateral trade for last year may reach USD 16–17 billion. We purchase a large amount of goods from Poland that help Ukraine function under wartime conditions. In particular, this includes fuel, gas, and electricity, which are now supplied from Poland to Ukraine in significant amounts.
It is also worth noting that Ukrainian exports are largely comprised of raw materials and resources, while Polish exports are high value added. Therefore, we still need to do serious work to ensure that products manufactured in Ukraine with sufficient added value enter the Polish and EU markets, rather than, for example, merely mined ore or harvested grain.
Extremely important issues also include the development of border infrastructure, the functioning of the border itself, and resolving the problems faced by transport operators.
At the same time, in economic terms it is worth highlighting another very important aspect—human capital. Today, more than 2 million Ukrainian citizens are in Poland. Of the one million Ukrainians who moved to Poland after the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion, 72% are employed. There are also 80,000 enterprises and companies in Poland founded by Ukrainian citizens. Ukrainians in Poland contribute to the dynamic development of the Polish economy, and they are also an added value for Ukraine. In fact, a fairly significant additional opportunity is emerging for the development of joint partnerships, bilateral trade, and new opportunities for Ukraine’s postwar reconstruction.
Q: In Poland, voices are periodically heard calling for restrictions on the export of certain Ukrainian products to the local market, arguing that such imports destabilize it. How should the Ukrainian side act in this situation so as not to generate additional problems in bilateral relations?
A: Protecting one’s own market is a natural reaction of any society. Every manufacturer wants to have dominant conditions for their products in their domestic market. At the same time, when it comes to agricultural imports from Ukraine, we see many myths, stereotypes, and various false narratives being amplified in the media that in fact have no factual basis. It is precisely dialogue and cooperation—between agricultural producers and between the ministries responsible for these sectors—that make it possible to resolve many of these issues.
Therefore, the best option is dialogue and cooperation. Last November, Ukraine’s Deputy Prime Minister and Trade Representative, Taras Kachka, visited Warsaw. He held meetings with relevant representatives of the Polish government, including the Minister of Finance and Economy, Andrzej Domański. All these issues were raised, and the parties remain in constant dialogue. In the coming weeks, Minister Domański will visit Ukraine to hold a meeting of the co-chairs of the Intergovernmental Commission on Economic Cooperation. This visit is important in terms of organizing the International Ukraine Recovery Conference (URC 2026), which will take place in Poland this year.
Q: Where and when will the International Ukraine Recovery Conference be held?
A: A proposal from the Polish side is currently being considered; most likely, it will take place in June or July. The time and venue of the International Ukraine Recovery Conference will be officially announced soon.
UKRAINE AND POLAND ARE WORKING ON NEW PERMITS FOR SEARCH AND EXHUMATION OPERATIONS
Q: The Ukrainian-Polish border is a constant problem, primarily due to long queues, and there are also frequent complaints about the treatment of travelers. Can these problems be resolved?
A: The Ukrainian–Polish border is probably the busiest border between the EU and a country outside the Community. Approximately 20 million border crossings by Ukrainian citizens and nationals of other countries are recorded here every year. For our citizens, this border is a life road; for our country, it is a gateway for defense supplies from partners, the delivery of energy resources, and other essentials. This explains the heavy workload borne by border guard and customs officers working at this border.
At the same time, we consistently raise the issue of cases involving negative treatment of Ukrainian citizens with the relevant services on the Polish side and draw attention to specific incidents. I am in direct contact with the head of the Polish Border Guard Service and with the appropriate deputy minister at the Ministry of Finance, which oversees the operation of customs services. Fortunately, we are seeing a good response from both central and local authorities. Our consuls in Rzeszów and Lublin are also in direct contact with commanders at border crossing points, and we are trying to resolve every issue that arises.
We are cooperating with our Polish partners primarily on the reconstruction and modernization of border crossing points. At present, the authorities of the Subcarpathian Voivodeship have decided to modernize the railway border crossing point in Przemyśl, create additional capacity at the pedestrian crossing in Medyka, and at the end of 2024 a new road border crossing point, Nyzhankovychi–Malhowice, was opened. Modernization of the Medyka–Shehyni crossing point will begin soon to improve its capacity.
Indeed, the agreement on joint border and customs control is also important. It is currently in operation at four road border crossing points, but we want it to be implemented at all crossings. We are trying to resolve this issue in consultations with Poland and the European Commission.
Q: Difficult history remains one of the most sensitive issues in Ukrainian–Polish relations. At the end of last year, the Ukrainian and Polish sides agreed on an action plan for 2026. Can this year bring positive changes? Where and when will search and exhumation works be carried out in Ukraine and Poland in the near future?
A: Historical issues are important, and the conduct of search and exhumation work should not cast a shadow over other dimensions of bilateral cooperation, particularly defense, logistics, and transport. That is why, since 2024, a dedicated working group has been operating, established in line with the agreements reached between the foreign ministers, Andrii Sybiha and Radosław Sikorski. As of today, the issue of conducting searches and exhumations has moved into the implementation phase.
In 2025, exhumations were carried out at two sites on the territory of Ukraine, and the remains were reburied. Search work also took place at one site in Poland. I consider this a certain turning point, because for a long time there had been no cooperation in this area at all.
We are working on new permits and on resolving problems that, for various reasons, had remained unresolved for a long time.
For some time, we were unable to find common ground on where to begin this process and how to present it to Ukrainian and Polish societies. The success of 2025 shows that much can be achieved with political will, responsibility, and readiness for constructive cooperation.
Q: Would you tell us where search and exhumation work is being carried out this year and where it is planned?
A: As of today, the Ukrainian side has issued three additional permits for search and exhumation work on the territory of Ukraine. The first is the village of Uhly in Rivne Oblast. A mixed Ukrainian–Polish group visited the site in December and discussed a plan to begin search work. The second permit applies to work in the villages of Ostrivky and Volia Ostrovetska in Volyn Oblast, which constitute a single location. The third site is Puzhnyky-2, that is, a second burial site in the village of Puzhnyky in Ternopil Oblast. We are also preparing a package of documents related to work in the village of Huta Peniatska in Lviv Oblast, and more locations will be considered.
From the Polish side of the border, we are expecting permits to conduct search and exhumation work in Sahryn and the nearby village of Laskiv, which also form a single location. The second site is Przemyśl, and the third is the village of Yurechkova, where the second phase of search work will take place. The Ukrainian side has already received permission to conduct work in Yurechkova, while the Polish side is finalizing decisions regarding Przemyśl and Sahryn.
Most importantly, the search work carried out last year in Yurechkova demonstrated the Polish side’s willingness to work with Ukrainian expedition teams. Maximum assistance was provided, security ensured, proper working conditions created, and no obstacles were imposed. This demonstrates the openness of both sides to resolving issues of historical memory that have traditionally been extremely sensitive and have been used politically on both sides of the border.
The next element of our cooperation—also discussed during President Volodymyr Zelensky’s visit to Warsaw in December—is contact between the Institutes of National Remembrance. We previously lacked such contacts and were unable to establish systematic cooperation. We now hope that this cooperation will be launched and will advance so that concrete issues can be resolved at the level of both institutions.
The third dimension is cooperation between historians from both countries. In November last year, the first consultations were held to prepare a large forum of historians, which is scheduled for 2026 in Poland. We are working on topics and on engaging historians to show our societies that, even despite differences in views, we can find opportunities for dialogue and cooperation. We want this forum to become a platform for discussions on historical issues, so that politicians do not manipulate these topics to create a negative atmosphere in the societies of both countries. To date, we have done everything in our power to ease tensions around this issue and move it into a constructive framework.
Q: When will this forum of historians take place, and in what format will it work?
A: We are preparing the historians’ forum to take place in the middle of this year. This period will be used to prepare the substantive agenda and to select historians who specialize in Ukrainian–Polish relations and who will be able, at least in part, to provide answers to the questions that are of concern to our societies.
We are trying to establish a new mechanism of communication between historical institutions in Ukraine and Poland. Previous discussions between the two sides on historical issues, which lasted from the 1990s until 2018, had mixed success and outcomes and were accompanied by strong emotions.
It is important that the future format of cooperation among historians become a professional platform that takes into account the political and societal sentiments on both sides of the border, while at the same time engaging in rigorous research of specific cases based on archival documents, scholarly studies, and facts, rather than on political or media speculation. Diplomats and politicians will help organize this process.
A GUIDE FOR UKRAINIANS ON HOW TO ACT IN CASES OF HATE WILL BE CREATED IN POLAND
Q: Last year saw a sharp surge in anti-Ukrainian sentiment, as well as threats and physical violence against Ukrainians in Poland. The Polish Ministry of Justice has announced the creation of specialized units within prosecutors’ offices to investigate crimes motivated by national hatred. Will this improve the situation? How will the Ukrainian side cooperate with the Polish side on that matter?
A: Let us be frank: the main reason for the change in public sentiment in Poland is the ongoing war. It has forced many Ukrainians to leave their homes and move to foreign countries. There are many Ukrainians in Poland—over two million—and this creates internal pressure on Polish society. However, this phenomenon is connected not only with Ukrainians, but also with shifts in political moods in Poland and in Europe as a whole. These moods are noticeably shifting toward the right. Anti-immigrant rhetoric is beginning to dominate globally, and this also affects the situation of foreigners in Poland, including Ukrainians.
Of course, much depends on the prevailing political discourse—that is, on statements made by politicians. In social media and in the political discourse, critical remarks are voiced regarding medical and social benefits for Ukrainians, as well as issues related to the education of Ukrainian children. This is often accompanied by the mythologization of certain topics and the creation of negative stereotypes, which significantly influence public attitudes. Unfortunately, some political forces also exploit this in an attempt to expand their electoral base.
Indeed, we are actively working on this issue, first and foremost with the justice authorities. The decision of the Polish government to establish specialized units within prosecutors’ offices is an adequate response to the challenges we are currently facing related to hate speech and aggression toward Ukrainian citizens. We, for our part, we are working compiling a kind of guide for Ukrainian citizens on how to behave in crisis situations, in cases of hate or manifestations of aggression, as many people do not know how to protect themselves within the Polish legal framework. Ukrainian diplomats are preparing this guide together with lawyers and experts. We hope it will be available in the coming weeks. We are also working with local police authorities, who respond immediately to acts of aggression against Ukrainians. We are closely monitoring every socially resonant incident, and an appropriate response follows whenever necessary.
WORK IS UNDERWAY IN POZNAŃ TO OPEN A UKRAINIAN CONSULATE
Q: Russian propaganda machine is working very intensively on an anti-Ukrainian track in Poland and, unfortunately, has even achieved certain successes. How can this be countered jointly with the Polish side?
A: Russia is attempting to shape, fuel, and intensify anti-Ukrainian and anti-immigrant sentiments in Poland through propaganda, manipulation, and efforts to recruit Ukrainian citizens for acts of sabotage and subversion. Unfortunately, some Ukrainian citizens allow themselves to be used and become serious tools in the hands of Russian special services, and this is a major problem. I urge Ukrainian citizens not to sell themselves to hostile Russia for “thirty pieces of silver,” which have never brought happiness or benefit to anyone. They will not earn anything from this, but will ruin their lives.
Simultaneously, we, acting together with the Polish side—at the level of government institutions and non-governmental organizations—are working in various areas to neutralize these asymmetric threats. In particular, we hold major conferences on countering disinformation, strive to insert truthful information into the Polish public discourse, and have established close cooperation between the Offices of the Prosecutors General of both countries. Recently, our countries signed an intergovernmental agreement on cooperation in countering organized crime. This is one of the dimensions that will help strengthen our cooperation and provide an adequate response to Russian threats.
Q: Ukraine’s vice-consulate in Rzeszów has recently begun operating. When will the consulate in Poznań open, and will the status of the consulate in Gdańsk change?
A: In December, Foreign Minister Andrii Sybiha cut ribbon of Ukraine’s sixth consular institution—the vice-consulate in Rzeszów. It has already begun operating and receiving citizens. This is quite a significant relief for those who live in the Subcarpathian Voivodeship or travel transit through Ukraine, for example to Kraków, Katowice, or other cities, and who can use the services of the vice-consulate.
The opening of Ukraine’s seventh consular institution—in Poznań—is next on the agenda. We expect the head of this newly established consulate to arrive later this month, after which preparations for its opening will begin. We are currently working with local authorities on premises, operating conditions, and related matters. The necessary approvals from the Polish side have already been obtained, and their implementation is now underway.
At the same time, a decision was taken last November to transform the consulate in Gdańsk into a Consulate General, and the re-registration of this institution is ongoing. I believe a decision on this matter will be announced soon.
10,000 NEWBORN UKRAINIAN CITIZENS REGISTERED IN POLAND IN 2025
Q: How many Ukrainians, by your estimates, are currently living in Poland? How many newborn Ukrainian citizens were registered last year by Ukraine’s consular offices in Poland?
A: According to various estimates up and down, between 2 and 2.5 million Ukrainian citizens are currently in Poland. A significant percentage resides in Poland permanently, some arrive for seasonal work, and many people also travel through Poland in transit. At present, we have a fairly positive trend in the number of newborns. In particular, over the year, Ukraine’s consular institutions in Poland registered about 10,000 newborn Ukrainian citizens. Consular offices strive to provide maximum assistance to young parents registering their newborn Ukrainian citizens. Our children are the future of Ukraine.
Q: Given the large number of Ukrainians in Poland, the issue of education for Ukrainian children arises. How is this issue being addressed?
A: First and foremost, we sustain Ukrainian schools in Poland. In Warsaw alone, there are five such schools, in addition to two interschool education centers—so-called Saturday and Sunday schools. Officially, more than 200,000 Ukrainian children are currently studying in Polish schools.
This year, an initiative was launched to introduce a program for teaching Ukrainian as a second foreign language in Polish primary schools and secondary schools (lyceums). Relevant curricula were compiled by Associate Professor Dr. Pavlo Levchuk from the Institute of Slavic Studies of the Polish Academy of Sciences. We secured funding, engaged sponsors, and now this program can be implemented in Polish schools. Both Ukrainian citizens and Polish parents have the opportunity to approach school administrations and advocate for Ukrainian to be taught as a second foreign language.
We are also working with various Ukrainian institutions to obtain books and textbooks for distribution to Ukrainian schools in Poland. In addition, we are expanding the network of Ukrainian book shelves under the patronage of First Lady of Ukraine Olena Zelenska in Polish libraries and public institutions. We also strive to support educational institutions attended by Polish citizens of Ukrainian origin.
Yurii Banakhevych, Warsaw
Photos via Author and the Embassy of Ukraine in Poland