As the brutal crackdown by Iranian authorities on protesters continues and the civilian death toll rises, Iran is witnessing one of the most serious popular uprisings in its modern history. International reactions are intensifying, as further developments will have major implications for the region and the global landscape. The situation is no longer confined within Iran’s borders, and multiple geopolitical interests are now directly tied to the outcome.

Ukrinform sat down with Mohsen Behzad Karimi, a Belgium-based Iranian researcher, socio-political activist, and journalist specialising in Iran-EU politics, transitional justice, and religious legal systems, to discuss the roots and nature of civic resistance in Iran, the actors involved, the role of foreign powers, Iran’s alignment with Russia and China, and the possible outcomes of the uprising.

TO UNDERSTAND THE ROOTS OF UPRISING, WE MUST GO BACK TO 1979

- Can you dwell a bit into the history of Iranian uprisings?

- To understand the roots of uprisings in Iran, we need to go back to 1979, the revolution itself. The fall of the Shah ended a state that had pursued rapid modernisation, institutional development, secular governance, women’s rights, education, and international integration. What followed was not a democratic transition, but the establishment of a clerical system that dismantled the state institutions inherited from the previous era and replaced them with ideological rule.

In the years immediately after the revolution, what followed was not a mass popular uprising against the new regime, but a phased and violent elimination of organised opposition. In the early 1980s, the Islamic Republic moved to crush groups such as the People’s Mojahedin Organisation of Iran (MEK) and various Marxist-Islamist and leftist organisations, despite the fact that these same groups had been part of the broad revolutionary coalition that helped bring about the fall of the Shah. Once clerical power was consolidated, they were redefined as enemies of the revolution.

The MEK, in particular, quickly shifted from political opposition to armed confrontation and later collaborated openly with Saddam Hussein during the Iran–Iraq War. This collaboration gave the regime both justification and opportunity to eliminate organised opposition. By 1981, widespread arrests, executions, and repression were already underway. However, this period still did not constitute a genuine mass popular rebellion by society at large; it was primarily an internal power struggle between the regime and former revolutionary factions.

The Iran–Iraq War (1980–1988) played a decisive role in shaping this period. The war absorbed society’s energy and priorities, militarised daily life, and allowed the regime to rule through a permanent state of emergency. At the same time, the authorities actively prevented the formation of any independent opposition by all available means. Political organisation outside state control was made impossible, while society was fully mobilised around survival, defence, and national security.

At the end of the war in 1988, the regime carried out mass executions of political prisoners, overwhelmingly targeting members and sympathisers of the MEK and leftist groups. These executions eliminated the remaining organised opposition inside the country and marked a decisive step in consolidating clerical rule through fear and violence.

Despite severe repression, censorship, and restrictions on public life, up to this point, there had still not been a nationwide, mass-scale popular rebellion against the regime by society as a whole. This was due both to the regime’s systematic prevention of any opposition from forming and to the fact that society had been heavily consumed by the war, prioritising survival and national defence over internal political confrontation.

A new phase began with what later became known as the chain murders of Iran. These assassinations and disappearances of intellectuals, writers, translators, and political activists began earlier than commonly assumed and continued over several years. They revealed a systematic policy by elements of the intelligence apparatus to silence independent voices and critics of the system.

Public exposure of these murders shattered any remaining belief in the possibility of reform from within the system and fundamentally changed how Iranian society perceived the regime’s nature and limits. This shift in perception laid the groundwork for open confrontation.

This process culminated in the 1999 student protests, the first large-scale street movement involving broad segments of society since the revolution. From that point onwards, the idea of regime change gradually entered public discourse, and uprisings became cyclical, broader, and increasingly confrontational.

THE PROTESTS ARE NOW BEING DRIVEN BY DEEP STRUCTURAL COLLAPSE

- Meanwhile, how did Iranian foreign policy develop at the time?

- Iran’s aggressive regional agenda was not initially shaped by China or Russia. In its early years, the Islamic Republic benefited from Western miscalculations and short-sighted policies. Over time, Iran expanded its involvement across Afghanistan, Iraq, Lebanon, the Palestinian territories, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Syria and beyond, while engaging in covert and overt operations abroad that increasingly drew international condemnation.

As Iran became more isolated, it shifted towards strategic alignment with Russia and China, while also maintaining cooperation with North Korea. This pivot marked Iran’s transformation into a fully revisionist power, opposing the Western-led international order and embedding itself in an authoritarian geopolitical axis.

- How do the ongoing Iranian protests differ from what the country saw before?

- Since 1999, Iran has experienced repeated waves of protest. In earlier uprisings, the regime managed to survive through repression, limited concessions, and the manipulation of political narratives. Each cycle, however, returned stronger, as unresolved grievances accumulated.

This time, the uprising is driven by deep structural collapse: economic mismanagement, corruption, embezzlement of public funds, a generational rupture, and total loss of legitimacy. A young, globally connected generation no longer accepts religious rule. On top of this, the regime has exhausted any remaining regional legitimacy through its support for Russia’s war in Ukraine and its involvement with Hezbollah, Hamas, and the Houthis in Yemen.

Even if sanctions were lifted tomorrow, the system itself would remain beyond repair. The entire economic and monetary structure requires dismantling and rebuilding from the ground up, as it is structurally collapsed and not salvageable.

- How did US and Israeli actions influence public sentiment toward the regime?

- The decisive change is the collapse of fear. In the past, the killing of hundreds was often enough to restore control. Today, despite hundreds killed and thousands detained in a short period, protests continue. The regime’s reliance on foreign militia elements and proxy forces has only deepened public anger and the national will to end this regime.

RUSSIA MAY BE EVACUATING TECHNOLOGY FROM IRAN FEARING REGIME TOPPLE

- How is Russia helping the Iranian regime now?

- Russia and China have supported the Iranian regime primarily through technology, surveillance capabilities, and security cooperation. In recent weeks, several Russian cargo planes have reportedly travelled between Iran and Russia. While some assessments suggest the relocation of assets, there is also a strong possibility that these flights transported large quantities of missiles, drones, and military components to Russia, as Moscow intensifies its war effort in Ukraine, and Russia fears that in the case of regime change or a longer period of unrest, the supply will be interrupted.

Iran has already supplied Russia with drones, missiles, and other military equipment worth billions. It has also recruited individuals to fight alongside Russian forces, using the same proxy-based model it previously employed in Lebanon and Syria.

- Donald Trump urged protesters to seize government buildings. How was this received?

- These statements were received very positively by many Iranians, particularly because Trump publicly named a detained individual facing imminent execution and warned of consequences if the sentence were carried out. This focus on a concrete case resonated far more than abstract rhetoric and reinforced the perception that the regime is no longer untouchable.

CROWN PRINCE REZA PAHLAVI IS SEEN AS UNIFYING NATIONAL FIGURE

- How is Crown Prince Reza Pahlavi perceived inside Iran?

- Crown Prince Reza Pahlavi is widely seen as a unifying national figure rather than a partisan leader. He does not present himself as a ruler, but as a guarantor of transition. For many Iranians, he represents continuity with a period of statehood, national dignity, secular governance, and international respect that was destroyed in 1979.

Iranian society today can broadly be divided into three groups: a shrinking minority loyal to the Islamic Republic, a large majority that supports Crown Prince Reza Pahlavi as a transitional figure, and a small, ageing group with Marxist or Islamist-republican affiliations. Organisations such as the MEK retain media visibility but have virtually no social legitimacy inside Iran due to their violent history, cult-like structure, and collaboration with Saddam Hussein.

- Why is the EU cautious about contacts with Crown Prince Reza Pahlavi?

- Contacts exist mainly at the level of individual Members of the European Parliament. The European Commission has so far remained cautious and reactive. However, realities on the ground are forcing a gradual reassessment, as it becomes increasingly clear that Pahlavi represents a broad national consensus rather than a factional agenda.

THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC, AS WE HAVE KNOWN IT, IS ALREADY FINISHED

- How would foreign intervention be perceived by protesters?

- Iran is not a sectarian society like Iraq or Afghanistan. Despite ethnic diversity, there is a strong sense of national cohesion. External support aimed at dismantling the regime’s security apparatus, rather than harming civilians, would likely be welcomed by a large segment of the population.

- What is China’s stance?

- China prioritises economic interests and strategic positioning. It avoids confrontation while benefiting from Iran’s isolation. Its approach is transactional and opportunistic, focused on long-term influence rather than ideological alignment.

- How do you see developments unfolding?

- There are only two scenarios.

The first is increased pressure leading to temporary negotiations and short-term economic relief, accompanied by major socio-political changes that, in reality, mean the regime is no longer the same. Even this scenario would not last long and would usher in a period of rapid transformation in Iran’s political sphere.

The second and more likely scenario is that the uprising continues, repression escalates, and external support eventually contributes to the collapse of the regime, followed by the return of the Crown Prince Reza Pahlavi and a democratic period of transition.

There is no third scenario. The Islamic Republic, as we have known it, is already finished.

Ievgen Matiushenko, Brussels

Photos provided by Mohsen Behzad Karimi