Developments of recent months demonstrate a fundamental transformation of the European security order, as the United States is reassessing its role within NATO and increasingly expects Europe to ensure its own security, while the “security umbrella” that the USA has provided to Europe for decades may close at any moment. Washington’s outlook on European security is changing, the credibility of collective defence mechanisms has become a subject of debate, and Russia’s aggression against Ukraine is already posing a threat to European countries as well.

At the same time, amid the growing disconnect between the United States and Europe, a new window of opportunity is opening for Türkiye. Ankara remains one of the most capable between NATO partners in terms of military capabilities and deterrence, and its role in shaping a new European security architecture is therefore increasing. Yet this situation also entails risks, as the credibility of US security commitments remains a key element in deterring Russia.

We spoke with Sinan Ülgen, the director of the Istanbul-based think tank, Center for Economics and Foreign Policy Studies (EDAM), and a visiting scholar at Carnegie Europe in Brussels, about the stage at which the transformation of European security currently stands, the role Türkiye can play in it, the possible security guarantees for Ukraine involving Türkiye, and why deterrence remains the only effective approach to Russia.

THE EUROPEAN SECURITY ARCHITECTURE IS UNDERGOING A FUNDAMENTAL TRANSFORMATION

- Mr. Sinan, how do you generally assess the current geopolitical situation? Today, many experts are talking about a profound transformation of the world order, the redistribution of centers of power, and even the risk of a major global conflict, the Third World War. In your view, what exactly are we witnessing now, and at what stage of these changes is the world?

- Yes, indeed. We are at a fundamental transformation, at least in the European security order, which affects all of us. Because compared to the previous structure that had been established just after the Second World War, there was a strong US–Europe alliance that also underpinned NATO security. And since 1945, at least with the establishment of the UN and then NATO, that relationship has provided a security umbrella, by and large, for Europe. That security umbrella was then extended to other Eastern European countries after 1989. That relationship is now being deeply transformed.

The US outlook on European security has now fundamentally changed. This is having an impact in many ways on European states. There are discussions about the credibility of NATO Article 5 and NATO security. But it is also having an internal impact on many European states, which are realizing that what is generally called the peace dividend—which allowed them to reduce their defense expenditures after 1989 and increase their reliance on the United States—has now become a major challenge for them. So, there is now also a recognition that defense budgets must be increased and that strategic reliance on the United States must be decreased. But obviously, this will take time. This is not something that can happen overnight. And in the midst of this, we have the return of a conventional war in Europe with Russia’s aggression against Ukraine.

THE GROWING DISCONNECT BETWEEN THE USA AND EUROPE HAS OPENED A NEW WINDOW OF OPPORTUNITY FOR TÜRKIYE

- How do you think, which is Türkiye's role in this new geopolitical reality? Is Türkiye acting primarily as a regional stabilizer, a mediator, or an independent center of power positioned between the West and the East?

- Turkish foreign policy in general has already been involved before war in Ukraine with aspirations to enhance Türkiye's strategic autonomy. That has involved reaching out to non-Western powers like Russia and China, and diversifying Türkiye's relationships with other geographies, particularly in Africa.

So, that's already a well-entrenched trend that had even begun before Trump's election, before the crisis in European security that I had referred to. Now, in addition to that, after the Ukraine war and the disconnect between the United States and Europe, this has essentially presented a new window of opportunity for Türkiye, because Türkiye remains one of the most capable NATO partners in terms of military capabilities and deterrence. And now, that ability has become strategic leverage for Türkiye in its relations with other European countries.

Because if Europe is going to enhance its defense capabilities going forward, it will need a capable country like Türkiye to be part of that new defense architecture for Europe. So, that's on the positive side. But on the negative side, of course, if there is a new re-sanction of the United States from European security, that's also bad for Türkiye, because it is the U.S. credibility that is quite important to act as a deterrent against Russia. So, the United States that is too pro-Russia is not good for Türkiye.

- This new geopolitical reality is directly linked to what is happening in Ukraine and around Ukraine. I represent Ukraine, and for us the key issue remains the end of the war. Türkiye has repeatedly emphasized that peace must be lasting and just. In your opinion, what could a peace agreement look like that could truly be considered fair and capable of ensuring long-term security?

- Türkiye indeed has stated that, but ultimately it is for Ukraine to decide. Türkiye will not take the initiative for peace on behalf of Ukraine or behind the back of Ukraine. So, Türkiye would need to support any deal that is acceptable to Ukraine. So, that's basically how Turkish authorities frame this.

So, the details of a deal that's acceptable to Ukraine can be discussed. Türkiye can play a facilitating role in trying to bridge the differences between Russia and Ukraine to accelerate the quest for a just and lasting settlement. It will not go beyond that and try to pressure Ukraine or pressure Russia.

- Today, together with the United States and its European partners, Ukraine is seeking effective security guarantees, taking into account the negative experience of the Budapest Memorandum. Models similar to Article 5 of the Washington Treaty are being discussed, with clearly defined actions in the event of renewed Russian aggression. Under what conditions can such guarantees be truly effective and actually work?

The guarantees similar to NATO Article 5 are discussed. The difference is that those guarantees for Ukraine will not be extended by NATO. They will be extended by the United States, to the best of our understanding. So, this is not going to be decided by NATO membership, but it's something that during the negotiations the US must commit itself. And there, whether they are credible or not, basically, you need to have an evaluation whether that commitment by the United States government will be credible or not.

Now, under Trump, it's difficult really to guarantee that commitment will be credible, given how he changed his position on Russia. But ultimately, the same risk exists, as I said also for NATO Article 5, because if the US commitment to the security of Europe loses its credibility, then NATO Article 5 guarantees also lose their credibility. But in relation to Ukraine, the security guarantees, there may be other countries involved, but ultimately it's going to be done by the United States. It is not going to be a NATO security guarantee.

TÜRKIYE IS WILLING TO TAKE THE LEADERSHIP OF THE NAVAL DIMENSION OF THE SECURITY GUARANTEES

- Do you think that some international military forces, peacekeeping or some monitoring missions on the territory of Ukraine, including Türkiye participating in it, may be effective for stabilizing the situation in Ukraine?

- Yes, I think it will be, of course. The question is whether this initiative will take concrete form before the political settlement or after a political settlement. That's the first question.

In terms of the Turkish position, Türkiye is willing to take the leadership of the naval dimension of those security guarantees, and that's understandable given its position, given the fact that it is implementing the Montreux Convention. And it's also willing to contribute to the air dimension with its air policing capabilities. There is not much of a discussion of putting Turkish soldiers on the ground in Ukraine, because there, I think the negotiations are a bit unclear as to who would be willing, under what conditions, whether it's going to happen before a settlement or after a settlement.

But nonetheless, overall, Türkiye is willing to contribute to that package of security guarantees, primarily through the naval and air dimensions at this point.

THE VIOLATIONS OF TURKISH AIRSPACE BY RUSSIAN DRONES ARE NOT ACCIDENTAL

- Talking about these naval and air dimensions: in recent weeks there have been reports of incidents involving Russian drones over Turkish territory. Are these accidental incidents, elements of political pressure, or part of potential hybrid actions? What would be the optimal response for Türkiye? How does Türkiye assess these developments?

- I don't think these are accidental, because they started to happen suddenly, and not just one, but at least right now there are three or four confirmed sightings of these drones violating Turkish airspace. So, if it had been one, we could have talked about being accidental, but the timing and the frequency tell us that this is not accidental. In terms of what Türkiye can do, it is definitely to warn Russia that this type of behaviour is not acceptable. Türkiye should also, in parallel, devise novel ways to potentially counter this sort of hybrid threat.

Because right now, the traditional response of having a fighter jet use multi-million dollar ammunition to down a $5,000 or $10,000 drone does not make sense. So, there needs to be some degree also of creativity in terms of how Türkiye devises its anti-drone defences. We're not there yet.

THE BEST SOLUTION FOR TÜRKIYE WOULD BE TO SEND THE S-400 BACK TO RUSSIA AND GET THE MONEY, BUT THIS IS HARDLY REALISTIC

- This situation shows an interesting point. Türkiye has S-400 Russian air defence system. If they were active, this air defence system should work against Russian drones. As far as I know, it's not active, and Türkiye, as Bloomberg recently reported, are trying to find a solution to come back to the F-35 project, and maybe to sell S-400 to another country, even if it was an idea through a European country, to Ukraine, or to give them back to Russia. In your opinion, which scenario would be the most optimal, from political, security, financial perspectives for Türkiye. Is there some compromising solution possible that this S-400 will not work against Ukraine?

- From a Turkish perspective the best solution is to send them back and get money from Russia. But I don’t think it is a very realistic. I don’t think that Russia will be ready to solve Türkiye's S-400 problem. Even though that is on the table, again according to Bloomberg reporting, there needs to be another solution.

One solution would be to send that material to a Turkish base that is in one of the countries where Türkiye has military outposts.

This can be Libya or Qatar. But there the United States must demonstrate flexibility, because right now the condition on the part of the United States for lifting the CAATSA sanctions, which had been triggered by the S-400 transaction, is for Türkiye to cease possession of that material. So sending back the S-400 to Russia would have fulfilled that condition. But sending that material to another Turkish base abroad, it does not fully fulfill that condition, but the USA might demonstrate some flexibility and accept that outcome. So this is where we are right now.

And the third option for Türkiye is to destroy this materials. But that's very difficult for a government. We need a face-saving formula.

- From air, let's come back to naval. Ankara has previously expressed concern regarding Ukraine's actions against Russian ships of the so-called shadow fleet in the Black Sea, including within the exclusive economic zone of Türkiye. In your opinion, how can a balance be found between Ukraine's right to self-defense and the need to preserve stability and freedom of navigation in the Black Sea?

- I don’t think that Türkiye's position will change. I think if there are another incidents that happened within Türkiye's exclusive economic zone, Ankara’s reaction will be the same.

They don't want the consequences of the war to impact the navigation security within Türkiye's exclusive economic zone.

So, obviously, one option would be for Ukraine to consider giving this response in areas that are beyond Türkiye's exclusive economic zone. That would be one option which would not raise Ankara's criticism. But if it continues to happen within Türkiye's exclusive economic zone, Türkiye will continue to protest.

BLACK SEA SECURITY CANNOT BE DISCUSSED SEPARATELY FROM EUROPEAN SECURITY

- Does the Black Sea region require a new security architecture, in particular after the end of the Russian war against Ukraine? And which role could Türkiye play in this architecture, especially if taking into consideration that the Turkish fleet is now the strongest in the Black Sea after these actions of Ukrainian drones against Russian ships?

- They will certainly need to be a new Black Sea security understanding. But it is impossible to untie this from the discussion on European security and from the discussion on the security guarantees for Ukraine. All of this must take place in a comprehensive manner. These are not independent discussions. If indeed, as the international community, we end up with a credible package for the future of security guarantees to Ukraine, it will be a Black Sea dimension in that. In any case.

- In your opinion, what should Ukraine and Türkiye focus on at this stage in order to further build a strong and strategic relationship?

- I think there needs to be a discussion, and I'm sure there is already that discussion, about the details of that naval dimension of the security guarantees to Ukraine.

I think Ukrainian authorities must understand the Turkish expectations: what it is willing to do, under what conditions, with what sort of capability, the possible terms of engagement.

So, there is a lot of detail in that. Ukraine and Türkiye must discuss all of that in order to end up with a security guarantee package that is satisfactory for both sides, but also to manage expectations in terms of, you know, what Türkiye would be willing to do and what not.

- I would like to come back to the European Union, because I can't avoid your experience working on Custom Union agreement. Türkiye has initiated the renewal of this agreement. Beсides, the purpose to join the European Union is valid. Do you believe that this path will finish with membership?

- I think for the foreseeable future they will be neutral on Türkiye’s accession. The Türkiye-EU relationship however is broader than that. There is going to be an economic track with the possible deepening of the customs union, there is energy, foreign policy, security and defense cooperation. All of these will be advanced separately from the accession track.

Accession has right now stalled. Аnd it's unrealistic to think under current circumstances, unless there is quite significant political change in Türkiye to start with, that the accession dynamic will be rejuvenated.

THE ONLY WAY TO DEAL WITH RUSSIA IS TO ACT FROM THE STANDPOINT OF DETERRENCE

- More broadly, looking ahead, when do you think it will be possible to bring this war to an end and stop the aggression? When do you believe the world will become more stable than it is today?

- Yes, I think there are a couple of conditions for that to happen. First, assuming that this disconnect between the United States and Europe is permanent, European countries must over time build up their security and defense capabilities in a way that is both more independent from the United States, but also powerful enough to deter Russia. That is the critical threshold if we are going to end up with a stable European security order. Because what Russia has demonstrated with its aggressive war against Ukraine is that the only way to deal with Russia is from the standpoint of deterrence. And so this is what European countries must enhance. That's the only way to ensure security and stability in Europe in the years to come, in my view.

- Undoubtedly, Russia understands only the language of force. However, by building up military power, we once again return to an arms race, as was the case during the Cold War. So, is history entering the same cycle once again?

- Yes, but it's unavoidable when you have Russia that acts this way on the continent. I don't think there's any other solution.

Olga Budnyk, Ankara