Recent weeks have been marked by numerous initiatives aimed at discussing ways to achieve peace in Ukraine and finding a way out of the war launched by Russia. With each round of talks, it becomes increasingly clear that one of the key issues in ending the war is security guarantees. Without such guarantees, Putin’s Russia will regroup, rebuild its military, and advance again within a very short time.

Among the fairly wide range of tools and options that could be used to develop security guarantees is the deployment of military contingents from partner countries on Ukrainian territory. In particular, French President Macron was the first to put forward this idea and declared his readiness to deploy a French military contingent to Ukraine after a ceasefire.

So, peacekeepers or a foreign military contingent as a safeguard against renewed aggression. This is what Ukrinform discussed with Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary Volodymyr Handohiy.

- Mr. Ambassador, if I am not mistaken, half of your diplomatic career was devoted to the United Nations, including peacekeeping activities. You represented Ukraine not only at the UN but also at NATO, served as ambassador to Canada, Belgium, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom, and while working at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs you also dealt with peacekeeping operations. How could the global experience of peacekeeping be applied to our situation—especially now that intensive consultations are underway on a ceasefire and on guaranteeing Ukraine’s security?

- You have raised a very serious question. Indeed, if we look at the agenda of the negotiations today, then—at least according to President Zelensky—two major issues remain on which there is no consensus yet: security guarantees and territorial matters, and these depend on each other. If there is no consensus on territorial issues, then, of course, security guarantees remain up in the air, because guarantees are needed precisely to ensure Ukraine’s territorial integrity and sovereignty. Among the various approaches to this problem, an important component is the conduct of a peacekeeping operation or the deployment of a peacekeeping mission in order to secure Ukraine from further aggression and to preserve its territorial integrity.

Thus, under today’s conditions, discussions about the need to deploy a peacekeeping mission or to take some form of peacekeeping efforts are of a theoretical nature; in practical terms, it is hardly possible to speak about this today.

That said, such discussions are taking place, and from a diplomatic standpoint it is necessary to prepare for such a possibility. Macron has spoken about it, and, in fact, the so-called Coalition of the Willing effectively emerged as a follow-up to Macron’s suggestion regarding the possibility of deploying some kind of peacekeeping mission—more precisely, observer forces. If one uses the term “peacekeeping,” this automatically leads us to the United Nations, and there, in reality, it is unlikely that we can count on such a decision.

- President Zelensky has announced that a summit of the Coalition of the Willing will take place in the coming days. Obviously, this will be the result of meetings in London with the prime ministers of the United Kingdom and Germany, the president of France, as well as the NATO Secretary General and the heads of the European Council and the European Commission. In my view, this is a signal that a vision of security guarantees—as they are needed by Europe and Ukraine—has already been shaped, and that the summit will consider a concept and specific provisions. Therefore, there are grounds to hope that international forces will be part of these guarantees.

You noted that this is unlikely to be a peacekeeping force, so we return to the original question: what, then, can this be like? What is the specificity of these forces, which have already been referred to several times by different names—guarantee forces, deterrence forces, or something else?

- There are several models of peacekeeping operations, both in terms of their functionality and in terms of decision-making on their deployment. For example, in the classical sense we speak about operations conducted by the so-called “blue helmets” — peacekeeping operations mandated by the UN Security Council.

Historically, there have been many such operations, and the Security Council adopted the relevant decisions. However, it is clear that under current conditions we cannot expect a Security Council decision. There are other options for launching such peacekeeping operations. Incidentally, the first UN peacekeeping forces during the conflict between Israel and Egypt were deployed not by the Security Council, but by the UN General Assembly, on the basis of the well-known Uniting for Peace General Assembly Resolution 377, which was adopted for situations in which the Security Council is blocked due to the abuse of the veto power by one of its permanent members. But this requires a leader; at that time, such a leader was the highly respected UN Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld.

There is also another mechanism — the so-called “coalition of the willing,” that is, those who want to act. Today we often translate this as a coalition of the determined (or the willing), but in fact it is a coalition of willing states — those that wish to make a contribution. In our case, there are all the grounds to activate this mechanism precisely through a coalition of the willing, as was the case, for example, in Iraq, where the ground operation was launched not on the basis of a UN decision — which Russia blocked — but on the basis of an agreement reached among a number of states. It was a multinational operation on Iraqi territory, and the decision to conduct it was taken precisely through the so-called coalition of the willing. Thus, this represents a third option, a third model for deploying a peacekeeping force.

I believe that this option is currently the most acceptable, especially given that the legal basis for such a decision has always been Article 51 of the UN Charter — namely, the right of a state that has been subjected to aggression to individual and collective self-defense until such time as the Security Council is able to take the appropriate decisions. Thus, Article 51 is the foundation on which a future operation in Ukraine should be built.

What is needed is political will — and then no obstacles in the form of veto power will stand in the way, provided there is genuine willingness on the part of the relevant states.

— So, we have Article 51 of the Charter and political will. Does that mean there are no political reasons not to deploy such a mission?

— Theoretically, yes. However, there are also financial and logistical challenges, and here the position of the United States of America is crucial. Everyone expects that the U.S. would take part in such peacekeeping efforts in one way or another—either directly or through some kind of support—but this needs to be clearly stated by Washington. Unfortunately, we do not yet have such a clear articulation of their position, although there have been various statements made. In particular, Trump has voiced general support for the efforts of European states and a willingness to help in some way.

But after the publication of the U.S. National Security Strategy, where we see a return to the Monroe Doctrine in Trump’s interpretation, this suggests that the United States is effectively stepping back from any direct influence on or participation in this type of operation or in the actions of European states.

— The Monroe Doctrine was adopted under very different historical circumstances and pursued a completely different purpose, but it was essentially centered on the same slogan: “America First.” We shall see how this develops, because in fact the tendency toward U.S. self-isolation is already showing signs, particularly in its attitude toward international organizations, including the United Nations.

Thus, the question of financing the mission arises. In addition, we need to talk about the mandate—what tasks the mission will carry out. We must also consider the conditions of its deployment, in particular its size, given the length of the line of contact. The number of forces that could control or at least monitor such a front line can probably be calculated theoretically—but where would they come from? Force generation, the formulation of a mandate, and financing—how is all this generally done within the UN?

— If we take the United Nations as a model, first of all the Security Council adopts a political decision to launch a peacekeeping operation. Then comes the next stage, which begins already during the preparatory phase but is formally triggered once the decision is adopted—this includes developing the mandate, determining troop numbers, and addressing logistical issues. In particular, this involves the so-called Rules of Engagement—the rules governing the use of force: what exactly will the peacekeepers do? Will they, for example, have the right to fire weapons? Will they be allowed to open fire only in self-defense? Or will other restrictions be imposed by individual states or by the Security Council? All these issues have to be worked through in detail.

Therefore, the model used by the UN is unlikely to work in this case. However, if we are talking about a Coalition of the Willing that has united around a single goal—to provide guarantees to a state on the basis of Article 51—they can themselves determine the mechanisms, the size of the forces, and everything else they need. And for this, there is no need to adhere strictly to the classical UN peacekeeping formula. That is the advantage, so to speak. One can consult with the UN and look at how things work there in detail, but in practice the deployment of peacekeeping operations without the UN is already the prerogative of the participating states themselves. They have the right to set their own objectives, determine troop numbers, and not take into account the views of international organizations.

— You mentioned the Rules of Engagement, or rules governing the use of force. This is a very important element, especially for the host country of any operation: what exactly does Ukraine need to do for all this to happen? After all, only now is the European Union taking practical steps to introduce a kind of military visa-free regime, while we do not yet have this. Ukraine is not yet covered by these arrangements. Even for foreign military instructors to enter Ukraine, a decision of the Verkhovna Rada is required. We have not defined who would command such forces, how they would operate, or to whom they would be subordinated if such forces were deployed in Ukraine. Who would give the orders?

— This is indeed a very important issue. If we return to the UN experience, the problem has always been obtaining the consent of the state on whose territory a peacekeeping contingent is deployed. This is especially difficult where there is no legitimate government or other subject capable of giving such consent. In our situation, it is much simpler. Ukraine is a capable, functioning state that can take a decision to consent to the deployment of such an operation. And this must become the key element of deploying international forces. Everything else is secondary. And indeed, this requires the consent of the Verkhovna Rada. I see no problems with this, because we are interested in it; it is part of our position—the security guarantees we are talking about will, among other things, include the presence on Ukrainian territory of a certain force from countries that agree to this. Yes, there are many aspects involved there, but everything is within the realm of possibility. The main thing is political will and desire.

Of course, here we are not taking into account or discussing the position of the Russian Federation. And this also needs to be addressed and explained: in this case, the operation would be deployed on the territory of Ukraine, and it is Ukraine’s sovereign right to decide who, when, and how may be present on its territory—provided that other states are willing to take part in this.

— I believe this is a fundamental principle that must be taken into account when discussing any plans: it is Ukraine’s sovereign right to invite, accept, and deploy foreign troops on its territory.

— Exactly so, and I want to emphasize once again that Article 51 of the UN Charter is the core principle, the foundation on which all of this rests. The right to individual and collective self-defense is carved in stone in all international legal documents.

— Is there any interconnection or interaction between different types of operations and the various organizations that could be involved in or carry out such operations—NATO, the EU, the OSCE, regional groupings?

— First of all, decisions in NATO are taken by consensus. That is why there were attempts to get NATO engaged as an organization through the Ukraine Defense Contact Group, which brings together the defense ministers of 50 countries. However, within that format they act individually, representing their respective states. Therefore, it is hardly realistic to expect a decision on NATO’s participation as an organization in the arrangement of such a mission.

The OSCE, as is well known, has its own functions and plays its own role when it comes to election observation, humanitarian demining—these are OSCE responsibilities. In recent years, the EU has stepped up its involvement in military-related activities; it already has its own command structures, but it does not have a common armed force. Therefore, it would hardly be appropriate for the Coalition of the Willing to operate under the flag of the European Union.

Another matter would be for the EU to find its place within this system, for example at the stage of Ukraine’s reconstruction and in addressing certain financial issues—this would be a significant contribution overall, including to the security guarantees we are discussing. Other organizations can also play a role; it will all depend on the key question of how and in what format the peace-support operation itself is launched.

— We have our own experience of engaging international organizations—the OSCE monitoring mission in Ukraine was deployed after the annexation of Crimea and the outbreak of active hostilities in eastern Ukraine. It was a special monitoring mission, not a military or peacekeeping one, but we saw what it was capable of, how it operated, and what its shortcomings were. It seems to me that the main drawback was the participation of observers from the Russian Federation. And even now, by the way, three employees of that mission—Ukrainian citizens—remain imprisoned in Russia in violation of all international norms and rules.

— Personally, I am very skeptical about the OSCE as an organization, because it still has not acquired the status of a full-fledged international organization; it does not have a charter. Therefore, relying on it in our situation is hardly advisable, although it does have election observation functions and ad hoc humanitarian missions. But the Russian Federation is a member of the OSCE, and no OSCE decision can be adopted without Russia’s consent, because the principle of consensus applies.

 I believe we must keep chipping away at this rock from the standpoint of the Coalition of the Willing—the determination of a number of key European states to do this and to move forward, to work out their own modalities, to formulate a mandate with Ukraine’s participation, if they so wish, and to assist Ukraine on the basis of Article 51.

— So we need to start working already now, without waiting for formal decisions?

— It is their decision, so let them make that decision and shape their conceptual position: such-and-such composition, such-and-such size, such-and-such functions—and be ready. Again, this is being held back by the reluctance of the United States to provide support; this factor alone is delaying a final European decision to launch such a mission. Because without the United States, as they see it, the issue would be very difficult to resolve due to a lack of internal capabilities to sustain such a mission. They are afraid to assume this responsibility without the large U.S. umbrella they are accustomed to. Only now are they beginning to realize that this umbrella could close one day —and then the rain will pour down on them.

— You mentioned Russia’s position regarding the deployment of a military mission on the territory of Ukraine. Unfortunately, it seems that Washington, due to various circumstances and also in light of the new security concept, is nevertheless listening to what Moscow has to say. And Moscow, as a “peacekeeper” and given its attitude toward peacekeeping, is a very specific actor. I cannot recall a single case in which the participation of Russia or the USSR in peacekeeping operations was positive.

— Well, no, it never was at all. Because there is an unwritten rule at the UN that permanent members of the Security Council cannot take part in peacekeeping operations, with the exception of so-called individual observers.

— But Moscow did everything to circumvent these unwritten rules. And it persistently and repeatedly exploited the OSCE for this purpose, as was the case, for example, in Transnistria, Nagorno-Karabakh, and Georgia.

— These are impostors. They had no UN mandate whatsoever; they were self-proclaimed “peacekeepers” both in Georgia and in Transnistria. And they have nothing to do with genuine peacekeeping activities. This brings us back to the issue of mandates. The actions of Russia (and earlier the USSR) have nothing in common with international norms and rules at all—suffice it to recall, for example, the so-called “peacekeeping mission” of the USSR in Czechoslovakia in 1968 or in Afghanistan.

— Returning to the main topic: let us hope that the summit of the Coalition of the Willing, announced by Zelensky, will adopt concrete decisions and that the issue of a military mission in Ukraine will finally move forward. Although, as is known, work is already underway behind the scenes: there have been reports that chiefs and representatives of the general staffs of the Coalition countries are developing concrete plans for the deployment of contingents and their logistical support.

— Yes, even figures have been mentioned—40,000 troops was cited as a possible size of this mission. So all of this is still hanging in the air, and in fact the public, the expert community, and Ukrainians in general are all waiting for an official concept and the public announcement of these decisions.

— Let us hope for positive decisions. But for these decisions to be implemented in practice and for this element of security guarantees to be realized, the first prerequisite is still a ceasefire. Without it, nothing will happen. And so we return to the main question that arose even before Trump entered the Oval Office and has continued to be discussed ever since.

— Returning to the national security strategy that has just been published by the United States, I would like to draw attention to the fact that one of its very first points is the fastest possible ceasefire in Ukraine. It does not speak of some kind of peace, a broad, comprehensive peace agreement. It clearly states, as a strategic goal, the fastest possible ceasefire. We need to seize on this wording and gradually return to the idea of a ceasefire with which Trump traveled to Anchorage.

- It seems to me that we have already done this more than once, but after every visit by Trump’s representatives to Moscow or after a phone call between Trump and Putin, everything changes again.

- Absolutely so. But today this is written into the strategy; previously, we did not have such a document in hand as an argument. So, in my view, this is a very telling fact: in an official document we see that first it is necessary to cease fire, and only then address the other problems.

— And then to build peace. In conclusion, I would like to cite the following fact. The SIPRI Yearbook published by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute records that in 2024 there were armed conflicts in 49 countries around the world. Two of them were of very high intensity: Russia’s war against Ukraine, and in the Middle East between Israel and Hamas. Now we can state that the number of such conflicts has decreased by one. We very much want to believe that the next SIPRI Yearbook will record that the war in Ukraine has been stopped. So we will await news from the summit of the Coalition of the Willing and hope that security guarantees for Ukraine will be reliable and inviolable — guarantees that will allow not only us, but all of Europe to stop worrying that Russia could once again return to aggressive actions.

— All we can do is hope and work to make this happen.

Ihor Dolgov led this conversation

Photo: Volodymyr Tarasov / Ukrinform

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