After three years of war in Ukraine, the European Union has taken systematic steps towards common defense. Russia’s war of aggression has brought security and defense issues back to the top European agenda. The leaders of the member states (not all) and the European Union as a whole, in the new geopolitical realities, where the world order is changing and the need arises for the alliance to affirm its political subjectivity and the role of an active global player, came to the conclusion that the problems accumulated in the post-Cold War period cannot be solved “in a working order”. It is necessary to update the policies, doctrines, and to search for money. It surprisingly became clear that peace and security is a very expensive luxury, but there is no other way but to pay.
At the same time, the belief was strengthened that the Ukrainian military, in the post-war period, would become not only the main guardian of Ukraine’s security, but also an essential element to the European security and defense architecture. And the US too has moved on from statements to actions by announcing the reduction of its military presence in Europe, which affects the plans of not only NATO, but also the EU.
NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte warned in a recent statement that the threat posed by Russia will not end with Ukraine and that Moscow is preparing with other adversaries for “long-term confrontation. “The danger posed by Russia will not end when this war does,” he said. “For the foreseeable future, Russia will remain a destabilizing force in Europe and the world.”
But, the NATO chief cautioned, Moscow is “not alone in its efforts to undermine the global rules.”
“It is working with China, North Korea, Iran and others,” he said. “They are increasing their defense industrial collaboration to unprecedented levels. They are preparing for long-term confrontation.”
In this context, he called on industry to “step up” so that the North Atlantic Alliance can “out-gun, out-produce and out-smart those that seek to harm or diminish us.”
He said quantity is key and that NATO countries need to produce hardware in volume. In terms of ammunition production, Rutte said the tide had already changed.
“Until recently, Russia was producing more ammunition than all NATO allies put together,” he said. “But not anymore.”
He said it is essential to build on this momentum with increased production of capacities “from high-end air defense to low-cost drone interceptors.”
To do this, he admitted, industry will have to take on some business risk but argued that “dangerous times call for bold action.”
Here Ukrinform conversed with Oleksiy Melnyk, Director of International Security Programs at the Razumkov Center, a prominent Ukrainian think tank based in Kyiv, to discuss plans and prospects for strengthening the EU’s defense capabilities.
- The European Union's White Paper, the Readiness 2030* was endorsed by the EU heads of state and government at a European Council meeting along with Defense Readiness Roadmap**. The full-fledged war in Ukraine has been grinding for nearly four years now. When to implement the program? Will there be enough time by 2030 to rebuild the European defense capacity so that it can withstand the Russian threat?
- First, I would like to comment on Rutte's statement that he expects the threat from Moscow to be permanent even after the war is over. This, I think, is one of the key problems with Europe's approach to addressing the Russian threat. If they do not plan for a scenario where there is no threat from Moscow, then this is a problem. Because the best solution to this problem would be for Moscow to cease to exist as the capital of the Russian empire. As long as there is an empire, it will always pose a threat of expansion, seeking to solve own domestic problems through an expansion into neighboring countries.
We, I suppose, should think about how to solve this problem radically, so that in the decades to come we will not worry that Moscow will once again build up its muscles and assault the Baltic states, or Poland, or Ukraine. This is an introductory remark of a conceptual nature. And now I come to the core of the EU documents that have emerged. One should not think that the authors of the initiative believe that 2030 is a horizon when we may not worry that Russia will attack earlier. In fact, this is not so. There are certain procedures for preparing such documents. First, there is a statement of the problem, where an analysis of the situation is made and key risks and expected threats are identified.
Second, the “White Paper” is a political document. And the other is the roadmap that was released in October. And this is the practical implementation of the political tasks set out in the White Paper. Well, ideally, in 2030, if everything is done as planned, if sufficient resources are allocated for this, the European Union will achieve the defense capabilities that will allow it to declare that the goals set have been achieved, and dear citizens, taxpayers will then feel safe, protected not only from military aggression, but also from other hybrid threats. That is, this is a process, and every year the EU member states will acquire certain capabilities.
There is another risk here: the vision of the 2025 threats projected into 2030 will not necessarily come true even by 50 percent. And the investments that are planned – are these going to be as relevant as they seem to be now, because even today, certain categories of weapons, if we are talking about main battle tanks, for example, are already losing their relevance. Will today's visions be as relevant in 2030? Will it not turn out that huge amounts of money will be spent on something that will no longer be useful on the battlefield?
- Yes, Moscow is a threat, and even after the war ends, as Rutte warned, it will remain so. Russia had a chance to cease to be a threat when, after the Cold War, it, like all other countries of the former communist bloc, was offered an equal and mutually beneficial partnership. And Russia had a special partnership with NATO, a special partnership with the European Union, but it did not work. Why? The answer is obvious: Russia, like some other countries, is not satisfied with the fact that there are states on the European continent that profess democracy, different principles of relations with their people and with other countries. So, the issue is not so much in where the threat will come from - Moscow, Tehran, or from another spot -- as in that we must be prepared. Not to rely on the United States, as it was all the time after World War II.
The Russian aggression against Ukraine revealed Europe’s complete inability and unpreparedness to defend itself. And this became obvious very soon, when it turned out that there were not enough stockpiles in the warehouses, and they were running out very quickly, when it became clear that modern warfare is completely different, and it became obvious that industry cannot fill the capability gaps quickly. And the most painful problem, for which European countries turned out unprepared, is that security and peace have to be paid for. And this price is very high.
So, the conceptual documents that the European Union has developed andlready begun to implement are aimed at making Europe self-sufficient. I don't know if this project will end up with a European defense alliance set up, but in any case, this course has been clearly defined. In your opinion, what are the prospects for this project to be a success?
- If we are talking about reform, then now it is at the planning stage, it is a project: there is the current quality that does not satisfy us, and there is a project for reform, transformation, we have a vision of what we want to achieve. But by the moment this vision becomes a reality, it already becomes outdated, because the realities, the requirements are changing. Therefore, there cannot be a straightforward answer to the question of whether Europe will ever reach such a level as to become a defense alliance, or whether it will remain what it is now, more of a political and economic alliance, but at the same time capable of defending itself. The key thing is what the Europeans themselves are saying: there should be cooperation between the EU and NATO, and this where the answer lies. That is, not competition, but synergy and maximum cooperation between these entities, not duplication, but interaction. This is probably the general path along which they should move.
- The Europeans approached the issue thoroughly: the White Paper, the readiness program, and the roadmap are based on completely understandable fundamental approaches, also taking into account the lessons of the war in Ukraine. After all, the main meaning of the White Paper is not only to identify capability gaps, but also to determine how to eliminate them. It has been determined that this requires strengthening defense capabilities and advancing production capacities. Even more importantly, one of key elements to this program is support for Ukraine through increased military assistance now and increased level of integration between the European and Ukrainian defense industries.
For us, it’s crucial that this system is already being built with the understanding that without Ukraine, Europe will be unable to achieve self-sufficiency. What role will Ukraine play in these measures by 2030?
- Indeed, in these documents, one of the most important priorities for strengthening European security is the support for Ukraine. That is, at some point, a qualitative transition took place: while at the initial stages, support for Ukraine was mostly provided as charity and based on moral incentives, then a transformation gradually took place. And now it is clearly stated in the documents that support for Ukraine is Europe’s security interest. Not only because Ukraine is now holding the front line of the war against the threat from the east, but also for the long term. Whereas this was only part of rhetoric previously, now everyone has received practical confirmation of the validity of these approaches. When drones flew to Poland, to other European countries, it surprisingly turned out that there were no capabilities, skills, experience or expertise, and then everyone turned towards Ukraine.
And that is why NATO exercises are already taking place in one of the Baltic countries, and a Ukrainian unit participates with a Ukrainian combat management system. That is, Ukrainians are already being invited, experience is being shared, it is already absolutely obvious to everyone that this is a two-way movement. That is why there is a joint center in Poland, where systematic work is underway to study the Ukrainian experience, pilot projects are being developed. And if we talk about manufacturing capabilities, then new production lines are already being deployed in Ukraine, industrial collaborations (which, given the security situation, are now risky to locate in Ukraine) are being set up. That is, cooperation with Ukraine, Ukrainian experience, Ukrainian technological innovations are something that is now no less valuable than European money, which, I think, they could best invest in their own security by supporting Ukraine not only in repelling aggression, but also in advancing these industrial capabilities.
- A clear signal about completely new approaches to the Armed Forces of Ukraine and Ukraine’s role came when the Europeans, in early 2025, began talking of the need of restarting negotiations with the Russians, and Moscow brought the so-called 2022 Istanbul agreements back on the agenda. Then the Europeans immediately and very clearly stated: no, no reductions in the Ukrainian Armed Forces as a precondition for any negotiations. On the contrary, Ukraine’s Armed Forces need to be strengthened, and we will stand with them. Now, after the recent EU enlargement, and the EU concluded that Ukraine can complete membership negotiations in 2028, the year 2030 is no longer such a distant prospect. And in 2030, when Europe plans to acquire new defense capabilities, Ukraine can already be there, already become part of the Union.
- In the context of the prospects for Ukraine's membership in the European Union or NATO, there are two important nuances, regarding particularly how Ukraine is fulfilling its obligations. After all, now, during the regular round of reviewing Ukraine's preparedness for EU accession, there were quite critical remarks, not regarding defense and security, but justice and the anti-corruption effort. And I am inclined to support the position of those who do not advocate simplifying the admission procedure or easing the requirements for Ukraine. Because this is the case where the process is no less important than the outcome. After all, there is evidence that without external pressure, both from within Ukraine - from civil society, and from outside, from our partners, these reforms often stall, unfortunately. Therefore, clearly spelled out requirements and the obligations that Ukraine has assumed are extremely important.
That is, someone, of course, can demand certain political decisions to soften these conditions and requirements, leave something for a later time, but it is still better for Ukraine to try and fulfill, to the maximum possible extent, the obligations that it has taken on. The same goes for NATO. Out of the five sections of the national program, only one or two relate, directly or indirectly, to security, the rest of the requirements for Ukraine being of political or economic nature. In other words, the country must meet the standards of democracy, the values that are shared by both NATO and the European Union. This is also important.
But if we talk about NATO membership, this is the key point of external security guarantees, but the main obstacle here is our partners’ fear of getting “a ticket to war”, as they call it. But should there be political will and readiness to take certain acceptable risks, the decision to invite Ukraine into NATO, I suppose, could be made faster than when all these points are tick marked as those that Ukraine has fulfilled.
- The European Union sees, understands and takes this into account. Therefore, all the defense build-up effort and the prospects for Ukraine’s defense industrial capabilities enhancement, even at the current stage, include not only Ukraine. There are collaborations between the European Union and Norway, Great Britain and Ukraine. And in this regard, I would like to return to the documents again. In particular, the roadmap states, " Ukraine remains Europe’s first line of defense and is an integral part of Europe’s defense and security architecture, and the EU will continue the support and intensified cooperation with Ukraine”. And further, the roadmap states that “Member States and the EU will contribute to a framework of long-term security guarantees to Ukraine that rests on: enduring legal arrangements; predictable multi-year finance and military supplies; defense industrial integration into the European Defense Technological and Industrial Base (EDTIB); clear consultative mechanisms; and a link to Ukraine’s EU accession and postwar reconstruction”.
Another important aspect is the integration between European and Ukrainian defense industries. Finally, a linkage between this defense build-up process and Ukraine's EU accession process and post-war reconstruction has been explicitly stated. That is, there is a comprehensive vision, there is an understanding of how Ukraine will be gradually integrated into the European community. And this is happening even now: the Danish model -- an innovative procurement approach where foreign governments (starting with Denmark) directly finance Ukrainian defense companies to produce weapons and equipment for the Armed Forces of Ukraine -- is growing in extent, and industrial collaborations have already become integral to the EU roadmap implementation process. It is also essential that the EU defense capabilities enhancement will be carried out through coalitions of capabilities. This is the same mechanism that has already been trialed within the Ramstein format, and this is what has been created for Ukraine. The EU will now do this for itself with the involvement of Ukraine and the United Kingdom.
- It is extremely crucial what is now declared at the level of official documents: Ukraine belongs to Europe not only geographically. Europe believes that Ukraine belongs to it. And this solidarity is no less important than the formalization of such relations. This is first of all. Second come Ukraine's place in the EU’s future security architecture and the issue of security guarantees for our country. One of the most realistic scenarios today is the transformation of Ukraine into a “steel porcupine” – indigestible to any invaders – that is, the creation of such defense capabilities in Ukraine that would preclude Russian aggression in the near term. And the main question here is who should pay for this? Because as a matter of fact, Ukraine currently spends its entire budget collected from taxes to sustain its war effort. Pensions, wages, salaries, social benefits - all this is paid for by our partners.
Rough calculations show that Ukraine needs almost 120 billion euros per year. Provided a ceasefire is achieved, Ukraine will need an additional approximately 50 billion. Ukraine will not be able to finance its army and defense capabilities necessary to sustain this “steel porcupine” capacity solely with its own resources. And Europe, who sees its own security as inseparable from Ukrainian security, is willing and ready to undertake these commitments. Whether it will take a monetary form, or the form of the Danish model or support within the Ramstein format is a technical question. It matters most that there is political will, that Europeans continue to understand that supporting Ukraine is a contribution to and investment in their own security, and not charity.
- Funding is crucial, indeed. President Zelensky explicitly told the partners that they should provide for future funds for the Armed Forces of Ukraine. Defense Minister Shmyhal said at the latest Ramstein format meeting that Ukraine has to search for and find 60 billion for the next year, and there are two ways to achieve this: either set aside 0.25 percent of the partners' budgets to support Ukraine's defense needs, or use Russian sovereign assets immobilized in Western jurisdictions. We need to look for solutions together, and one such could be through the defense export sales. By the way, EU’s pilot projects in the defense sector also encourage this: a wall of drones, a guard on the eastern flank - this takes the use of Ukrainian technologies and capabilities. So, what are the prospects for Ukraine to re-open its domestic defense industry to international markets to secure funding for its war effort?
- I feel that a certain consensus has already been reached, at least at the expert level; there is an understanding that a country at war not only can buy armaments but also sell them. After all, more than half defense industries in Ukraine are owned privately. And whereas state-owned enterprises can plan production, investments, and recruitment of personnel with a fairly high degree of confidence, knowing that this will be financed from government funding, some prospects should as well be created for private manufacturers. But the government cannot offer this opportunity. So, ideally, it should simply set the rules of the game. If exports are reopened at some point, then the government says: we can guarantee we will purchase such and such amount of products from you, and everything that is in excess will be allowed to be exported and sold at market prices. And the demand for Ukrainian products on international markets is extremely high. And then there will be an opportunity to invest the revenues in our own industries. Therefore, in my opinion, there should be no debate about the matter: this is possible and feasible.
- Here I see a direct connection to the issue of mobility. We are talking about the so-called military Schengen. How ready are we for this? We are talking much and constantly working with the Coalition of the Willing on the possibility of partner’s deploying their military forces on our territory, we are talking about collaborative projects in the defense industrial sector. All this rests on issues of logistics, mobility, and also legislative support, because mobility is also a matter of legislation. We cannot just deploy foreign contingents in the territory of Ukraine, since there is a procedure, legislation, and the Verkhovna Rada. The same goes for defense technologies: we have a robust export control system, but it is not adapted to times of war. What do we need to do on that matter?
- I suppose that, in Ukraine, this issue has been largely resolved today. It was acute at the beginning of the invasion, both for us and for our partners. In particular, it turned out that to get into a passenger car and cross the border without even noticing it where there are actually no borders is one thing. And another thing is not a passenger car but a military convoy, because then national procedures come into play, you need to get a permission. Second, when this convoy approaches a tunnel that was built 20-30 years ago for ordinary civilian vehicles, and they did not think of a tank being unable to pass through it. And then there is a bridge that a trailer carrying a tank can bring to collapse. That is, Europe is now starting to address these infrastructure issues. But the most important thing, it seems to me, the one that has not yet happened in Europe, is the transformation of mentality.
In recent weeks, people have been talking about the fact that phase “zero” has come – the stage where Russia is preparing for war with NATO. That is, the very fact that this possibility has been realized is very important, the transformation that this is a possibility has happened. And there are a lot of small, at first glance, issues that need to be addressed in order to finally achieve this mobility, so that to allow contingents to be moved from place to place within certain deadlines, troops deployed, and to dig a basic trench on the land owned by a farmer without violating private property rights. This is much more difficult to do than endorsing a concept.
- Indeed, everything takes time. As this conversation comes to a close, let's talk a little about cooperation with NATO. News emerged the other day that the US is starting to redeploy its troops from Europe, including 800 servicemen being withdrawn from Romania without replacement. Simultaneously, NATO, commenting on the need to get ready for a possible assault and a direct clash with Russia, is preparing relevant decisions. The concept of a "containment line on NATO's eastern flank" contains over 4,000 pages, compared to as few as about 20 pages contained in the European Union's "White Paper". What is it -- the depth of approaches or excessive detail?
- I think that we are talking about different levels of documents, because the roadmap, for example, is supposed to then be implemented in detailed plans, which will be calculated, perhaps, to the amount of fuel or shells that will need to be deployed somewhere. However, NATO and the European Union, whose headquarters in Brussels are located not that far from each other, by the way, are two highly bureaucratic organizations that are trying to achieve something without closely communicating with each other. We are talking about European security, but we must remember that there is no such thing as NATO army or European army. There are national armies, national industries, national politicians and heads of government who sit at the NATO table today, and at the EU table tomorrow. We can hardly advise this bureaucratic machine about how it can work more effectively and efficiently. But the key to this is precisely in establishing cooperation, in avoiding duplication.
And there is one essential factor where there is talk about NATO, and that is the United States of America. Because, apart from nuclear deterrence, nuclear doctrine, the US is, in fact, the military potential that NATO relies on and that NATO can boast of when talking about a worthy rebuff. We should probably be grateful to Trump that he, with his unconventional and tough methods, has given a push to the Europeans so that they finally come to do what they should have done if not 10 years ago, then at least 4 years ago.
Therefore, the United States, true to form, will now try every bad solution before finding the right one, suggesting a tendency to exhaust all alternatives before settling on the correct course of action. Now they are gradually approaching the right solution, and the attempts aimed at pushing away European partners, distancing itself from them, and dwindling its military presence there, will certainly spiral back at some point. And the Americans must be aware that the problem they are trying to solve in the Indo-Pacific region will not be solved without allies, and that there can be no US security without European security.
- In conclusion, it is worth noting that European security will be, and it already partially is, and that national armies are indeed at the heart of it. And Ukraine’s national army, our Armed Forces are at the core of European security.
- Indeed, Europeans should consider Ukraine as part of Europe. And if Ukraine counts on support from Europe at the time when Ukraine is under threat, Europe can equally count on support from Ukraine if it finds itself in a challenge.
- Actually, that's how it is now. While NATO and Europe are making plans, the Ukrainian Armed Forces are fighting, defending both Ukraine and Europe. Therefore, Europe has to continue to help us, and this will hopefully be the case.
Ihor Dolgov led this conversation
The conversation can be watched in full on Ukrinform YouTube channel here
Photo: Hennady Minchenko
Ukrinform photos are available for sale here
* "Readiness 2030" (formerly known as the "ReArm Europe" Plan) is a strategic defense initiative launched by the European Union in March 2025 to significantly enhance the EU's military capabilities and self-reliance by 2030.
** Defence Readiness Roadmap 2030: A detailed plan outlining milestones and progress tracking, featuring four flagship projects: the European Drone Defence Initiative, the Eastern Flank Watch, the European Air Shield, and the European Space Shield.