This month has seen important and interesting events, some of them dramatic, others very difficult. Encouraging signals from Washington and the dialogue between Zelensky and Trump, first by phone, followed by a face-to-face meeting on October 17; Putin’s surprise call to the White House and statements about a meeting in Budapest; the rapid response by European leaders and a new peace plan for Ukraine; the cancellation of Trump’s meeting with Putin and, finally, the long-awaited Russia sanctions from Trump – and this all within a few weeks, literally.

Ukrinform discussed the international situation and the prospects for a ceasefire with Yehor Chernev, who serves as the Deputy Chairman of the Parliamentary Committee on National Security, Defense, and Intelligence, and the Head of the Permanent Delegation of Ukraine to the NATO Parliamentary Assembly.

- The dynamics of recent events were determined by the intensive communication between Presidents Zelensky and Trump, as well as Trump's rapid evolution from the intention to meet with Putin in Budapest to tough sanctions against Russia. There were many other events and contacts that are of particular importance and indicative of a direct connection between political will and finances. To what extent have these events in Ukraine-US-NATO-EU relations, the partners’ actions in other formats brought us closer to the cessation of hostilities and the development of a vision of a new security architecture involving Ukraine?

- I think that here it is necessary to understand, in the first place, the position of the United States, whose president is trying to find a solution to a very complex problem. On the one hand, to end the war, to help Ukraine, and to prevent the Russian Federation from collapsing on the other. They don‘t want this to happen for fear of the Russian Federation being pushed further towards China, and at the same time want to retain the possibility of dragging Russia away from China through future economic ties, common interests, for example, in the Arctic, the purchase of its natural resources, etc. These three mutually exclusive factors complicate the settlement of the war.

We are now seeing a certain response from Trump, his gradual actions and escalation against the Russian Federation. He is acting incrementally, unwilling to impose everything at once in order to retain the possibility of ties with Putin and Russia not being severed completely. Today, I believe, the issue remaining on the table is providing us with long-range weapons, not necessarily "Tomahawks", because there is a whole arsenal of various missiles that can be used for attacks deep into the territory of the Russian Federation. There are sanctions and confiscation of Russian assets, where the United States can play a key role, because it knows how to work with European partners, in particular with Belgium, and what to offer, how to approach this issue and resolve it.

Therefore, we see some progress, a gradual increase in pressure on the Russian Federation, but I think it is not worth expecting Trump to go all-in. The pressure will grow, and each time Trump will watch whether Putin is ready to sit down at the negotiating table. Not ready? Then let's impose sanctions, more painful ones. Not ready yet? Let's try to provide Ukraine with long-range weapons. As we can see, it works, because the Tomahawks have already worked, at least at the political level, forcing Putin to call Trump and agree on a postponement. After this call, from what I understand, negotiations began about what the meeting in Budapest will be about. And when Rubio heard the same nonsense from Lavrov, the meeting was put on hold because they understood: there is nothing to talk about in Budapest, it is not worth wasting President Trump's time on this. That is why we saw sanctions against Rosneft and Lukoil, and I don‘t think these steps from Washinton will be the last ones taken.  

- This logic is understandable, judging by Trump's remark to Putin that he should be concerned not about the Burevestnik, but about a ceasefire, and Trump is going to adhere to this logic. An essential step has been taken. These interludes with Putin also have had an additional effect and influenced Europe. The Europeans were obviously somewhat confused: here are talks with Putin again, another summit, and for some reason, this time in Budapest, which Europe does not like at all. Therefore, the very next day after Zelensky's meeting at the White House, British Prime Minister Starmer suggested working on a new peace plan similar to what Trump managed to do to settle the war between Israel and Hamas. President Zelensky also said just the other day that a ceasefire plan drawn up jointly by Ukraine and the Europeans would be ready in 7-10 days. In your opinion, does this approach have any prospects?

- It is essential that Britain, which is perhaps the United States closest ally in Europe, is doing this, and, Trump heeds to his European partners, in principle. But the problem is that over the past 30 years, due to the focus on the economy, the military disarmament, defense budget cuts, and the strengthening of ties between European countries and the Russian Federation, Europe has lost part of its political subjectivity it used to enjoy before 1991. And now Starmer, Macron, Merz are trying to return this subjectivity to Europe in order to sit down at the negotiating table with alongside Trump, Zelensky and Putin.

Needless to say, this is our strong negotiating position, we would like to see Europe there, but Europe is now dependent on the United States for security issues. Having strong trump cards such as sanctions against the Russian Federation, as well as frozen Russian assets, Europe can, theoretically, take its place at the negotiating table. But, unfortunately, today neither the United States nor the Russian Federation perceive Europe as an entity with which they are ready to negotiate.

- Yes, Europe is regaining its political subjectivity from day one of the full-scale invasion. The steps that Europe took in February and March 2022 generally go beyond the boldest pre-war ideas about what Europe could do. It turned out to be a lot: political support, military, financial, opening borders for Ukrainian refugees, humanitarian aid, etc. The future of Europe lies in restoring its political subjectivity, because otherwise Europe will not be able to be competitive in the global dimension.

We must understand that the United States will always be needed, because there is a global balance of power, a nuclear equation, where the United States alone can balance Russia for now. At the same time, Europe is now much bolder and more responsible in its actions, although when it came to security guarantees for Ukraine, as we see, the Coalition of the Willing seeks to gain the support of the United States.

There are still issues of frozen assets, there is still room for improvement with sanctions. Trump has imposed sanctions, quite tough ones, and this may be just the beginning, since the Congress is currently considering bills that provide for bolder and more painful sanctions against the Russian Federation. The European Council approved the 19th package of sanctions, and, as the leaders of the EU countries assured, work on the next package has begun immediately. However, the war has been ongoing for over 1,400 days, and we are talking about the next and future sanctions. Isn't it too late? To what extent does such a incremental approach meet the interests of both Europe and Ukraine in order to finally stop the hostilities?

- Sanctions always work in both directions: against those on whom they are imposed, and those who impose them, because this is a violation of the trade balance between countries. I would very much like all possible sanctions to be imposed on the Russian Federation immediately. There were similar examples in history even after World War II, such as complete embargoes on the purchase of oil or some natural resources. But I also understand that Europe is to some extent dependent on the Russian Federation, and it is gradually, precisely by imposing sanctions, refusing to buy energy resources and other mineral or natural resources from the Russian Federation. And if there is a blow delivered to the economy of the European Union, it will make the European Union weaker, and as a result, Ukraine will receive less assistance. That is why sanctions have to be balanced out.

I also really do not like the fact that during almost four years of the war, our European partners have helped us less than they have purchased energy resources from the Russian Federation, but such are the realities. In order to help us, economies need to work, money needs to be earned, including on the resources purchased from of the Russian Federation. However, it was decided that the EU countries should stop buying energy resources from the Russian Federation by 2026, which I consider a geopolitical failure of the Russian Federation and of Putin personally, who has managed to lose everything that was built before him.

- These are not only strategic miscalculations, but also consequences that are only now becoming apparent, because a new arms race has got underway, and it will last for decades. Just look at the new programs of the European Union...

- Europe, if you look at the history of human civilization, has always been the most belligerent, most wars have been waged in Europe, and Putin simply does not understand who he has stirred up. And if (and everything is going to the point where Europe will fully rearm itself) a conflict occurs, then I do not think that the Russian Federation will be able to oppose Europe allied with the United States.

- Returning to support for Ukraine, it is worth mentioning that, along with other events in recent weeks, a regular meeting of the Ramstein Group took place. There, Ukraine’s Defense Minister Denys Shmyhal said that Ukraine requires USD120 billion for defense over the next year, half of which we will finance by ourselves, but we need another 60, also for the purchase of weapons, in particular from the United States. How to handle this shortage? European resources, as President Zelensky said the other day, are distributed for 2–3 years, Europe has stated this, it can and will support us. And what’s next?

- We have to rely on ourselves and, of course, on our European partners. Today we are talking about the fact that we have been left without financial and military support from the United States. Indeed, the United States still helps us in many other ways, particularly by providing intelligence. So, we have to rely on our European partners.

We are talking, firstly, about their own production, secondly, about the purchase of weapons from the United States, and thirdly, about our domestic production, which they can finance. To find the money for this, we need to either take it from our budgets or do something with the frozen assets of the Russian Federation. And the reparations loan, I think, is an absolutely correct idea that it is the Russian Federation, not the Europeans who should pay for this war with own funds. But the Europeans are faced with the fact that they cannot find a direct legal settlement of this issue. In Belgium, for example, most of the approximately €290 billion ($315 billion) in frozen Russian central bank assets is held in the financial clearinghouse Euroclear. While Belgium has agreed to use the proceeds from these assets to aid Ukraine, it has delayed a decision on a larger EU plan to secure a loan for Kyiv with the assets as collateral, for fear that Belgium could be held legally liable by Russia and targeted with financial countermeasures if the plan failed. Brussels is insisting on "full mutualization of the risk," meaning other EU countries must also accept legal and financial risk. And the European Union, in turn, wants the risk to be shared with the United States, so that it would be a collective responsibility and a collective decision.

So far as budgets of certain countries are concerned, this is what I am dealing with, conducting negotiations with the parliaments of our partners, because they are the ones who vote for the budgets. And, of course, we are requesting for an increase in spending on Ukraine compared to the current year, arguing that at the beginning of this year we still had aid packages from the United States that had been voted for during the Biden presidency. And some countries are coming to our aid, but they are, firstly, limited in resources, and secondly, limited by social policy.

And it is not even a question of political will. They may have the will, but they look around and rely on public sentiments. After all, these funds need to be taken from somewhere, particularly from social payments. And if you take from social payments, you immediately turn the people against you. And it is very difficult for them to explain to their people that they need to tighten their belts somewhere and produce more weapons, because Russian missiles can equally reach Poland and Portugal. And here the main problem is how to redistribute funds within the country.

We emphasize that we need to adopt a single rule for all partners, for example, 0.25% of GDP, which they spend on helping Ukraine. Some Baltic countries have adopted this as a rule, and this is being discussed in the Netherlands. We are suggesting that Germany too adopt this as a rule, and we are gradually pushing this forward. But not every country is ready. And here we are coming to the conclusion that finding the 60 billion that is missing is quite difficult, even if part of this money would go to the United States. And the United States is interested in earning this money through selling us weapons. This is a kind of an economic, commercial approach. And they are ready to push Europe to implement the PURL program, which was endorsed by NATO.

- They want to give the frozen Russian assets to Ukraine if Russia refuses to pay reparations. Everyone understands that Russia must pay for the damages it caused to Ukraine. The hesitation lies precisely in this: what if Russia refuses to pay?

- Yes, the losers pay reparations. If we reach the Kremlin, then there will be no question. And where there is no winner or loser, it is extremely difficult to force the Russian Federation into paying reparations. Perhaps, through the mechanisms of the International Court of Justice or a special tribunal that we want to launch, we will be able to find a solution.

- We have to find the solution. Because the other option is to look for the money inside the country, in the budgets of the European Union member states and beyond. This is an issue that is very painful for the governments and political leaders of the countries in question. And explaining to the population that security requires investments, that peace is expensive, that Europe has completely distanced itself from this since the end of the Cold War and has only been concerned about reducing its militaries -- that is much more difficult to do.

It is not only about helping Ukraine, but also about a vision that has already become shared: the European security architecture will incorporate the Armed Forces of Ukraine and will rely largely on their own capabilities. Ukraine’s Armed Forces must be supported not only now, not only until the ceasefire, but also afterwards. After all, we must beef up our own capabilities to ensure Ukraine is self-sufficient and capable of performing the functions it is already performing: defending NATO’s eastern flank, deterring Russia, destroying Russia’s military and industrial infrastructures to limit its ability to wage war. So, this potential solution is projected into the future. Unfortunately, not all politicians think in terms of the future. For them, the future is measured by elections alone. How to handle this?

- Political cycles are, relatively speaking, the driving force of political parties, because they understand that they come for 4–5 years. But this does not mean that opponents in election campaigns cannot have a common strategic vision. Today, I think, Europe has sobered up and woken up after the war in Ukraine and certain hybrid threats coming from the Russian Federation, and more recently, following incursions by aircraft and drones into European and NATO airspace.

- That’s true, but in many aspects, this is a matter of the future, because a million drones, including produced domestically in Ukraine and in partner countries are only prospects. And 150 JAS Gripen aircraft from Sweden are all right, but they will not arrive today either. And strengthening capabilities through the expansion of the Danish model will also increase our capabilities, but not in the amounts that we need today.

So, we are left to rely on Ramstein and aid packages from partners. President Zelensky's visits to Oslo and Stockholm on the way to Brussels are an example of how countries, in particular the Nordic countries, demonstrate responsibility for the future and take concrete steps.

Everything we have talked about leads us to the conclusion that another step has been taken in recent weeks towards the use of force to achieve peace. This is both President Trump’s move and the EU’s decision on a fresh sanctions package and the endorsement of the Defense 2030 Roadmap. This is what the Coalition of the Willing has actually done, focusing on five specific areas by the end of the year. The most important among them, in my opinion, concerns long-range attack capabilitis. The Tomahawks remain a project for now, but there are other capabilities. But will this be enough to put the squeeze on Putin and the Russian military-industrial complex in addition to sanctions?

- I think that it’s only a set of measures that can stop Putin. As long as he has the ability to continue this war -- financially, militarily, economically -- it will grind on. We do not see any signals of readiness to end the war from Russia, so coercion remains the only solution.

The current Russian economy is not in the best shape, to put it mildly, and they are exploring the shape it will be in six months later. Working days, working weeks are being reduced even now, workers’ salaries are backlogged, because all the money is going to the military-industrial complex. Even in the military-industrial complex, they have experienced difficulties paying salaries in recent months. This is happening precisely because sanctions are working. Not only the sanctions from our European partners, but also ours, Ukrainian sanctions, with which we are knocking out Russian refineries and reducing their income from fuel exports.

It seems to me that we have found the Koshchei needle, their sore spot, because by knocking out refineries, we, firstly, create fuel shortages within the country, secondly, they do not earn on exports, and, thirdly, it makes logistics, not only military, but also civilian more expensive. And the increase in the cost of logistics inevitably leads to a general rise in the cost of goods and services, which stirs up dissatisfaction among people. Another factor is that where there is no refining, there are only two things to do with crude oil: either preserve it (which is very expensive), and then de-preserve it (even more expensive), or throw crude oil onto the international market at reduced prices. That is why Russia is currently selling its crude oil at a big discount, and in addition, there are certain restrictions due to sanctions on the sale of this oil, the so-called price caps.

We have to continue long-range strikes at critical targets. And that is why the situation is now starting to force Putin to go into negotiations of some kind with Trump.

- We will live and see. In any case, US Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth made a statement at the 31st meeting of the Ukraine Defense Contact Group (Ramstein format) on October 15, 2025, where he warned Russia of severe consequences if the war in Ukraine continues, “If this war does not end, if there is no path to peace in the short term, then the United States, along with our allies, will take the steps necessary to impose costs on Russia for its continued aggression." He also added that, if this step is necessary, the U.S. War Department is prepared to "do our part in ways that only the United States can do." 

Moreover, Trump, while on an Asian tour, said several times that during his conversation with Chinese leader Xi Jinping he would also talk about influencing Russia to reduce the country’s ability to sell its natural resources for export. Should we expect that Trump and Xi will be able to reach some kind of common vision about the aggressor and the war in Ukraine?

- I think we can expect certain shifts and agreements. We can look at India who has reduced its purchases of Russian oil precisely because of the position of the United States. Although at first they spoke about their sovereign right to decide how to behave and with whom, and about what to buy from whom. Therefore, one of the topics for the negotiations may be a request for certain actions by China towards the Russian Federation. By the way, some Chinese banks have closed the accounts of Russian companies, fearing secondary sanctions from the United States. For them, the United States is a more important strategic partner than the Russian Federation. Therefore, there is definitely room for maneuver there. Will this summit yield any results in this regard? We will wait and see.

- So, today the balance of "diplomacy or force" has clearly tilted towards the side of force. This force has begun to be projected in the form of very concrete actions by the United States and the European Union. The issue of frozen Russian assets remains in reserve for now, and their potential use to finance the reconstruction of Ukraine is going to deal another very painful blow to Putin. And the main thing that still remains in reserve is certainly long-range weapons, which we all hope for. They are extremely necessary to supplement the effect of pressure, which must be strengthened in order to force the aggressor, if not to capitalize, then to cease fire.

- We must use this tool to its full potential. And we, while not expecting long-range weapons from our partners, are carrying out strikes on targets in the deep rear areas of the Russian Federation.

Ihor Dolgov led this conversation

Photo: Volodymyr Tarasov, Ukrinform

This conversation can be watched in full here