As Ukraine and its international partners ramp up pressure on Russia to agree to an unconditional ceasefire and President Zelensky said he was waiting for Putin for talks in Istanbul on May 15, Ukrinform sat down with Eric Ciaramella, a senior fellow with the Russia and Eurasia program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace who had served for 12 years in the U.S. government as an intelligence analyst and policy official, to talk about the ongoing diplomatic battle, the influence of the actors involved, and the reasons why Moscow finally entertains the very idea of direct talks with Kyiv. We also spoke of the security architecture for Ukraine that could be most effective for the country in the interim period before Ukraine finally joins the EU and NATO.

IT’S GETTING HARD FOR PUTIN TO COMPLETELY REJECT THE IDEA OF CEASEFIRE

- Over the last few weeks, even days, we saw a whirlpool of events and developments around the Russo-Ukrainian war settlement efforts. Do you have a feeling that we're any closer to some kind of breakthrough in diplomacy, or is it just wishful thinking?

- I think we are closer than ever to some sort of rough ceasefire but I still think we're a long way away from a settlement. I think the attention that has been given by President Trump to stopping the war, which has really been his thing since he was on the campaign trail, is massive. It's clear that there's no coherent and unified strategy from Washington beyond that, and different advisors interpret what he means and how to achieve that goal, but he's been very consistent about that. And I think by making it such a priority he has in some ways shaped the Ukrainian position to be more in favor of some sort of ceasefire without conditions. But I think he also has been gradually chipping away at the Russian position. So what we saw over the past few days with this back and forth is that it's getting hard for Vladimir Putin to completely reject the idea of ceasefire.

Putin does want to preserve and build this relationship with Trump, and I think that is somehow factoring into his calculus to not say no and to potentially entertain the idea of direct talks between Russia and Ukraine, which, as you know, just a few months ago was not really in the cards from Moscow’s perspective.

I don't want to say that we're really on the precipice of a breakthrough but I do think that the attention and the energy coming from Washington is shaking things up in a way that we didn't see at all over the last three years.

TRUMP MIGHT EVENTUALLY BECOME FRUSTRATED WITH PUTIN

- President Trump earlier admitted that Vladimir Putin might be tapping him along. Also, what analysts have recently highlighted is that in the Russian media space, Moscow is pretty much mocking the U.S leader. Could this fact become one of the things that might lead Donald Trump to act more resolutely toward Russia?

- I would like to think that, but based on my analysis of Trump's past inclinations towards Russia I think he would sooner, as he says, “walk away” from the problem and just devote attention to other things, rather than taking a more resolute position. Although he has threatened additional sanctions and members of his party in Congress, like Lindsey Graham, put forward ideas of significant pressure against the Russian economy, I don't think Trump’s gut instinct will be to go in that direction. That’s because he still wants some sort of relationship with Russia. It's really been his top priority, even from his first term.

I would sooner expect that we could reach a situation where he's frustrated with Putin and that leads him to not apply much pressure on Ukraine as we saw over the past few months. He might ease some of the sticks that he's been using against Ukraine – and you’re already seeing that since the Vatican meeting, there’s been more common language between Kyiv and Washington. He might let some military assistance keep flowing at a lower level. But I don't foresee Trump doing massive military shipments to Ukraine, and I don't see him introducing major sanctions. I would love to be surprised if he did that, but I don't really think that's his gut instinct.

PRESSURE ON THE BATTLEFIELD IS BETTER THAN SANCTIONS IN THE SHORT TERM

- On the other side of the pond, we see that Europe is trying to ramp up its defense capabilities, building up the defense industry. Also, the latest visit of the four European leaders was really symbolic. Do you think the statement that came out toward Russia is tough enough? Do you think Russia will heed to their warnings of new sanctions?

- I don't think sanctions are the right tool. They certainly are an important tool for raising the cost to Russia of waging the war, and I think we should keep them and strengthen them. But we shouldn't harbor illusions that sanctions are going to somehow change Putin's calculus because he has shown that he's willing to sustain significant losses in all sectors, including military personnel, equipment, and also economic turbulence, in order to achieve his aims towards Ukraine. But then, also, the Russian economy has been much more resilient than anyone really predicted in February 2022 when we first started levying these serious sanctions. So, in the medium term, sanctions are needed to constrain the Russian war machine, but I don’t see this as a near-term credible pressure tactic.

Credible pressure should be exerted on the battlefield. As long as the Russian army can keep making progress, even if it's very slow progress and coming at a huge cost, there's very little incentive on Putin's side to stop. The way you change that is not really through sanctions, but through international assistance on the battlefield, and so I would have liked to see a European statement that was not an ultimatum about sanctions, but was really focused on supplying Ukraine with the necessary weaponry to block Russia's offensive and hopefully turn back Russian gains.

SPEAKING OF AN INTERNATIONAL FORCE IN UKRAINE, IT’S IMPORTANT TO MANAGE EXPECTATIONS

- A lot of discussions these days revolve around a potential international deterrence force to be deployed in Ukraine. Obviously, different nations in Europe have different views on the format, capabilities, and the mandate of that force. What would be the most effective format for such mission? Do you think it's a credible option to consider now?

- I do think it's a credible thing to consider but the problem is the way it's been talked about is very imprecise. Sometimes you hear definitions like deterrence, reassurance, peacekeeping, ceasefire monitoring… In reality, I don't think any of those is an effective or credible mission for this type of coalition. For example, classical peacekeeping really requires forces of another country to stand between the two warring parties, and there's no way that Europeans were ever going to consider that or would ever consider it because it would require Russia necessarily to agree to it. If there’s peacekeeping, there has to be a peace to keep, and the only way to have peace is for both parties to agree to it, so that's ruled out from the get-go.

As for ceasefire monitoring, this can be done in different ways, including technologies, but ultimately, you need eyes on the ground, and it was going to be impossible for the Europeans to be in the lead on that, because again, it would require them being at the front line and requiring some amount of Russian acquiescence. Then, a deterrence framework could have been just an agreement between Ukraine and European partners deployed away from the front line with significant combat capabilities, if there’s a ceasefire, to deter Russia from launching another invasion. I don't think that was really credible either, because it would have required a number of European troops that is just not deployable at the moment, given commitments to NATO on its Eastern flank and so on. Then, there’s this reassurance idea, which is primarily less about signaling towards Russia and more about signaling towards Ukraine, in order to give a psychological boost to Ukrainians, a kind of a psychological umbrella. For example, imagine French soldiers deployed in Odesa or some other city… But to me, that's not a very precise military mission either.

I think what we're left with is actually still very important things but maybe more modest. I do think it's the direction that European countries have to go in. So it's the question of training and capacity building. Many European countries have been training Ukrainian military, and there's no reason why these training missions shouldn't be brought back to Ukrainian territory, which would be logistically a lot easier. The instructors could learn more about what Ukraine needs and what the battlefield realities are. They can share their know-how, but then also tailor the courses and the training regimens to be much more substantive and impactful for Ukraine.

As for long-term advising and capacity building, there have been well recognized challenges on the Ukrainian side with manpower recruitment or management variability across the Ukrainian forces. One idea could be to strategically embed representatives of the Coalition of the Willing at the brigade level and above to help manage the force and start integrating into these higher level structures, like the corps structure that president Zelensky has announced the transition to. I think that could provide a significant medium to long-term positive effect on morale and the effectiveness of the Ukrainian military.

None of this on the surface sounds as robust as a “deterrence mission”, but I think we have to be careful about overpromising what a force like that could do, and I think deterrence is not in the cards for such a small force. The main deterrent function will be the Ukrainian Army.

If the purpose of the force is realistic and clearly articulated, it’s going to be easier for European nations to agree on all aspects, and I think that's where European countries are headed. We just have to manage the expectations here. It's going to be just one leg in a stool, so to say.

AS LONG AS ARTICLE 5 IS OPERABLE, RUSSIA WILL KEEP TESTING NATO BY HYBRID MEANS

- Do you feel that Europe is actually preparing for a direct military contingency with a powerful adversary? Do you believe that not only leaders but the general public across Europe are now accepting the idea that such military threats exist?

- I think that there’s a lot of variation across general publics in Europe. In the Baltic States, Finland, or Poland, there’s a very coherent and cohesive strategic sense that they're facing an adversary with significant capabilities right across the border. Again, that's rooted in their history and culture. But in places like Germany and France, Russia is now seen as a threat to wider Europe, not as an immediate threat to their nation.

The steps that Germany is taking, for example, are much more focused on defense industrial production, and they will be contributing significantly to broader European rearmament, but I don't think that's translating into a real sense that the German population and army need to be prepared to fight a Russian invasion of Europe. I also personally think that this will be the case for as long as the United States remains committed to NATO and Article 5. For now, President Trump has been committed to it, although this could change. But as Article 5 is still operable, I don't think Russia is going to test any NATO country by conventional means. I mean, certainly hybrid aggression, assassinations, things like that – that's the new normal, and we have to be prepared for this kind of hybrid warfare continuing.

In general, Europeans are only halfway there in their realization of what they're going to have to do over the medium to long-term to ensure the defense of the continent.

CHINA HAS BEEN A HUGE BENEFICIARY OF THE WAR

- One of the ideas that the current U.S administration is pursuing is to not let Russia tie up with China too close. Meanwhile, over the past few days, China expressed its support for Russia as their leader attended the Moscow parade but after that, their foreign ministry spokesperson said China supports the idea of a 30-day ceasefire voiced by the EU and Ukraine, so it seems like a positive move. But it seems that for China, the best option is for this war to keep simmering because China doesn't need a strong Russia by its side but neither does it need a strong West. What do you think of China’s position?

- You're exactly right that China has been a huge beneficiary of the war. Because it has accelerated the dependencies of Russia on China while tying down the West and giving China important insights into effectiveness of Western weapons and things like that.

It doesn't necessarily mean that China has an interest in prolonging the war. I think the better way to formulate it is that so far, China has not seen a direct interest or benefit in actively trying to end the war and exerting any significant pressure on Russia to do so. It has tried to protect its own interests, such as by not openly supplying Russia with military equipment that would obviously create a sanctions risk for China. Of course, the Russians would love a situation where China just goes fully in on the Russian side, like North Korea has, basically, Iran has as well. But that's not been in China's interest. At the same time, they've had very little interest in kind applying real economic leverage on Russia, like stopping imports of Russian oil or stopping exports of critical technologies that are used in Russian military production.

Could the West create a better incentive structure for China to pull back a bit from Russia? Probably. But I think the idea of some in the Trump Administration to pursue a ceasefire and an opening to Russia as a way to split Russia from China is very unrealistic. I would be much more focused on changing Chinese behavior to limit support for the Russian war effort and try to get them into a more constructive position rather than to try and somehow get Russia to abandon China by enticing Russia into some new deal with the United States. The whole reverse Kissinger of pulling Russia from China is very, very unrealistic, but I do think that the Russia-China “friendship without limit” still does have some limits that can be exploited with a very smart policy, particularly towards China.

TURKEY IS A GOOD PLATFORM FOR MEDIATION

- Returning to the potential talks at the top level in Turkey, do you think this country is a valid site that could serve as a neutral platform for these negotiations?

- Well, first and foremost, Turkey is a NATO Ally. By providing critical weaponry to Ukraine, particularly early in the war, it has put itself on the Ukrainian side. At the same time, President Erdogan has clearly pursued a relationship with Putin, too, which dates back even before the full-scale invasion when Turkey bought Russian S-400 systems, and so on.

So it’s hard to say that Turkey is neutral in the same way that maybe the Gulf countries are but I do think Turkey is a good platform for mediation in the sense that the Turkish leadership has managed somehow, against the odds and unlike probably any other country in the world, to have relationships of trust with the Ukrainian and Russian leadership. Ultimately, it’s beneficial to Ukraine to be having these talks in Turkey because fundamentally, one of Turkey's core interests is the security of the Black Sea and the fact that Erdogan has been entertaining the idea of taking on a role in maritime monitoring. But Putin still does trust Erdogan so it’s an enticement for this unique role that they play.

SOME RUSSIAN DEMANDS STRIKE EVEN U.S. SKEPTICS OF UKRAINE AS UNREASONABLE

- If Zelensky and Putin start talking, can we expect, in your opinion, some support from the U.S side in terms of not being forced to go for concessions to Russia beyond the red lines that Ukraine has articulated multiple times?

- I think President Trump really has repositioned the United States actually more as somehow a neutral party, which of course it isn't. I would expect that, if talks do proceed at a high level, it would be wise for Ukraine to ensure a European voice at the table. I think more reliable support for Ukrainian position will come from European leaders. And I think it's logical to have Europe at the table because Europe is a major player in the war in terms of providing significant support to Ukraine. This is ultimately about wider European security so you can't talk about that without having Europeans there.

There are a lot of different views in the Trump Administration what “reasonable” settlement would look like. And if you look at statements by people like General Kellogg versus statements by Vice President or Steve Witkoff, you get like really different views of what a reasonable Ukrainian position would look like from the American perspective. That’s why I have doubts about whether the United States in the format of these talks, if it were just Russia, Ukraine, and the U.S., would really come down on Ukraine's side.

But I do think that certain Russian demands strike the American administration, even skeptics of Ukraine, as unreasonable. Even Vance publicly hinted at some of Russia's proposals being off the wall. Things like, “demilitarization” or caps on the Ukrainian military make no sense to the United States because the U.S. wants Ukraine to be able to fight for itself and stop the Russians from moving further.

In fact, one of the messages from Ukraine and one of the achievements of Ukraine that has resonated the most with the American administration, including the skeptical wing of the Trump team is Ukraine's fighting spirit and self-reliance, the shift towards indigenous production and the sense that Ukraine is not only talking to talk but walking the walk. I think it provides an interesting counterpoint in Washington's mind to some European countries where it still seems like there's a lot of talking without real investment in their own defense. No one can accuse Ukraine of not taking care of its own defense given what it's done over the past three years.

MINERALS DEAL PROVIDES PERSPECTIVE FOR CONTINUED MILITARY SUPPORT UNDER TRUMP

- A good point of contact for Ukraine and the U.S. is the so-called minerals deal. Although there's no mention of security in the agreement, many still see it as a kind of deterrent against Russian aggression repeating in the future?

- Again, I would be careful to use the word “deterrent” because I don't think the purpose of the agreement was really to signal anything to the adversary. I think the purpose of the agreement was primarily to find a format and narrative that would change the understanding inside the United States, and particularly in the president’s political movement, among his allies, that the U.S-Ukraine relationship was only going in one direction, that the United States was giving hundreds of billions of dollars worth of aid and weapons to Ukraine and getting “nothing in return”.

So this offers a new way of looking at the relationship that shows some promise for the future. And I think this is an argument that supporters of Ukraine within the Republican Party and within the administration can use with the president to say, look, we're going to be getting something in exchange. The deal doesn't provide an immediate security framework. The presence of American workers in Ukraine would not stop Russia from attacking – in fact, there were plenty of Americans in Ukraine when Russia launched the full-scale invasion, including American companies that had invested in Ukraine, some of which Russia destroyed in the process. So that's not really a deterrent, but it provides a longer-term perspective for the U.S.-Ukraine cooperation that would enable the continuation of military support under Trump.

UKRAINE’S DE FACTO INTEGRATION INTO NATO MUST BE BUILT UP SO THAT ONE DAY, MEMBERSHIP COULD ACTUALLY HAPPEN

- It also appears that joining NATO in the short term is unattainable so what would be the best security mechanism, a set of security tools for Ukraine involving international partners?

- As I alluded earlier, I don't think it will be one kind of mechanism or guarantee. I think it will be a set of arrangements, like stool legs. Key areas would include long-term financing from international partners for the Ukrainian military and direct investments in Ukrainian defense industry, the so-called Danish model, expanding that and making it long term. This will allow Ukraine to plan better some kind of joint ventures for production, particularly of technologies that require some licensing from Europe. Ukraine can already produce a lot of drones and ammunition on its own. But when you get into the higher-level equipment, there needs to be a little bit closer cooperation with Western companies. There has to be long-term investing in Ukrainian capacity. And I do think that a European presence on the ground, engaged in training, capacity building, and advising would be another leg in that stool. Also, depending on what happens with the ceasefire talks, if some sanctions are lifted, there can be snapback provisions. There has to be a clear mechanism of punishment for major violations of a ceasefire.

I think part of the factors that enabled Putin's initial full-scale invasion was that he really didn't think the international community would react in the way that it did – with such strong sanctions measures and arms supplies to Ukraine.

Also, you have bilateral security agreements signed over the past year between Ukraine and a number of countries. They need to be made to some extent legally binding with really clear provisions about what would happen in a break-glass moment of a ceasefire being majorly violated.

The last part is also credible preparation for such contingencies. If there is a ceasefire, the worst thing to do for Ukraine’s partners would be to bury their heads in the sand and assume that ceasefire will last forever and they can shift their focus elsewhere. So they need to not only help Ukrainian Army reconstitute and continue to develop its technical and tactical proficiency, but they have to also build stockpiles and plans to send aid to Ukraine and be able to do so on a very large scale if there is a repeated invasion.

Russia has to see that those preparations are happening. I would envision a number of strategic stockpiles in NATO countries and on Ukrainian territory, too, of Western weapons that can be filled over time as production increases, including with long-range strike assets. It should be clearly signaled to Russia that these stockpiles are growing and, as time goes on, the cost of invading again is growing more and more, and they have to know that those weapons are going to go straight into Ukraine if they attack again. So, I think that's how you build some security in an interim ceasefire phase.

When it comes to these bigger questions of Ukraine's institutional membership in NATO and the EU, those are complicated processes for a number of reasons. I think it's pretty clear Trump has ruled out NATO for the time being. EU membership is a ways off because of the amount of reforms Ukraine will have to undertake. But eventually, the geopolitical circumstances will change. If you look at Finland and Sweden, they were ready, they had the closest possible cooperation with NATO. So, at the moment when they needed to enter, they were totally interoperable and welcomed by the Alliance. I think this time in between won't be wasted. And when we go back to that other stool leg, the European mission, a big part of that is to improve interoperability between Ukrainian and NATO forces, build Ukraine’s de facto integration into NATO so that one day membership could actually happen.

THE US HAS NOT ABANDONED FOCUS ON RUSSIA’S ACCOUNTABILITY

- We spoke about the impunity that Putin felt when initially invaded Ukraine. Now we’re seeing that the issue of setting up a special tribunal for the Russian crimes of aggression is moving into a practical phase, with wide support from the EU. Do you think that the U.S. would be ready to support the ongoing work toward holding Russia accountable?

- This isn't as much my area of expertise, but I do think this administration has departed in a lot of ways from the traditional U.S focus on accountability. So, I see it as pretty unlikely that this administration is going to support the work of the Tribunal and any kind of investigations of war crimes with the same energy that the previous administration did.

I could imagine some lower level sharing of information to help cases, for example, if there's some piece of intelligence that comes through to the United States that would really help a case, and that could be shared with European countries that are involved in this. But I think frankly, Ukraine is going to get a lot more support from U.S civil society, law firms that are helping Ukraine, universities that have research centers helping document war crimes, all kinds of non-profits, and so on. They're still working. It's not like the U.S. has completely abandoned any focus on accountability. It's just that it's not one of this administration's priorities.

THERE’S NO WAY TO ENGINEER A CEASEFIRE WHERE RUSSIA WOULD NOT REARM

- How would you assess a suggestion that for Russia, for Putin and his commanders, ending a war would be like abruptly stopping a nuclear reactor, which would imminently lead to a catastrophic failure? We see that their economy has been put on war footing, their soldiers get allowances the size they could never dream of in peaceful life… Also, it’s unclear how would the Russians react to their leadership failing to deliver a promised overwhelming victory.

- I do agree that this was clearly a war of choice by Putin in the beginning, and it has become more existential because of the way he has restructured Russian society, economy, and the elites around this organizing principle of supporting the war. So, if it disappeared tomorrow, it could create serious vulnerabilities in the system.

That being said, I don't think there's any realistic scenario where you get a comprehensive peace settlement that removes the reasons for confrontation between Russia and the West, or Russia and Ukraine. So, even if there's a ceasefire, I think Russia would probably then pivot to instrumentalize the war economy towards rearmament. There would be a new national impetus, which is to prepare for some future war with NATO, which is a threat that we need to take seriously.

I don't think there's any scenario where Russia can or would go back to a pre-war social contract. So, we're looking at a Russia that over the medium term, at least with Putin in power, is going to be more militarized, certainly aggrieved in its own way. With Russia’s economy being at least on partial war footing, locked in this kind of structural confrontation with Europe, maybe the United States depending on the direction of its policy, we just have to prepare.

There's no way to engineer a ceasefire where Russia doesn't rearm. So, the key is to structure it so that Ukraine is able to rearm at a pace and on a scale that does not create a fundamental imbalance such that Russia thinks in the future that it could invade again, with impunity. That's the point. In February 2022, when Putin made that decision, he felt that the balance of power was so much in Russia's favor that he could take Kyiv in three days. Obviously, he misread Ukrainians and what local sentiment would be, he fundamentally misread the capabilities of the Ukrainian Army and the willingness of international partners to support Ukraine.

So, during a ceasefire period – and I think this is what Trump is trying to do – you have to convince the Russians that they can use that period to rearm. But then, at the same time, you focus on ensuring that Ukraine does so, too, at the necessary level, such that even a Russian rearmament doesn't allow them to be at such an advantageous level that they could attack again.

It's fundamentally about the psychology of one person and that person's cost-benefit analysis. There's no real scientific equation for how you get there, but you have to find a way to signal that Ukrainian capabilities are somehow keeping pace with Russia's, and there is some strategic balance between the two. Ukraine is never going to reach the level of capabilities of Russia, but Russia has to know that Ukraine is just too big of a bite.

PUTIN IS BEING PAINTED INTO A DIPLOMATIC CORNER

- Why do you think Putin is now claiming he's ready for talks. Not so long ago, direct talks with Ukraine were off the table for Russia. So what made him change his mind?

- I really believe it was the pressure from Washington that changed. It was Trump coming in and making this a focal point. Although the beginning of the diplomatic process included a lot of sticks towards Ukraine and carrots towards Russia, I think Trump has said “ceasefire” over and over again, and it has become harder for Putin to completely ignore that. So I think it's a combination of that attention from Washington and the fact that the Europeans have stepped in and basically backed the Ukrainian positions. Meanwhile, Ukraine has certainly shifted to a much more flexible approach to saying ‘yes’ to things that Washington is requesting. It’s a yes, but with a little caveat. We're ready to talk, we want peace, we're ready to have an unconditional ceasefire – so on and so forth.

I think that's been a very smart pivot by the Ukrainian government to show we're not the reasons why Trump isn't getting his peace, and I think those factors play in favor of Putin being painted a little bit into a corner where he has to do a little bit more each time to show that he's the constructive party, and so he has been forced to climb down from some positions, like being unwilling to have direct Russian-Ukrainian talks, from the position that Zelensky is illegitimate.

Maybe he hasn't come out and said Zelensky is legitimate, but just a month ago, that was every other talking point. And now it kind of disappeared. Is there anything out there today to change the Kremlin's calculus? I don't think we're quite there yet, but dilemmas are mounting for Putin where he's being forced into positions to be seen as more constructive. And I think those can be exploited by Ukrainian and European sides to get some better terms for the negotiating table.

Ievgen Matiushenko, Kyiv

Photo by Pavlo Bahmut