March Massacre of Russian Air Defenses

On March 4, the Commander of the Unmanned Systems Forces (USF/SBS) of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, Robert “Magyar” Browdi released striking figures: over the three winter months, Russian air defense assets were reduced by 54 units—39 surface-to-air missile systems and 15 radars—primarily due to the work of SBS drone operators.

The implication was clear. Losses of such scale, involving costly and technologically sophisticated systems, cannot be attributed to isolated successful strikes, chance, or favorable circumstances. Rather, they point to a deliberate, meticulous, and sustained campaign—one designed to reshape the architecture of the war in its most technologically intensive domain: the airspace.

While Ukraine’s winter successes were both encouraging and significant, they ultimately proved to be only a prelude. What unfolded in March exceeded even the most optimistic expectations. The pace and scale of strikes against Russian air defense formations no longer resembled an accelerating trend; instead, they took on the character of a systematic and large-scale dismantling of Russia’s air defense “umbrella.”

The results are striking. In March alone, SBS units neutralized 41 Russian air defense components. This is no longer a question of incremental losses—it reflects a degradation of system integrity within Russia’s air defense network and a growing inability to sustain its layered defensive architecture.

Further details and a chronological account of Ukraine’s Defense Forces’ successes in March are presented in Ukrinform’s latest overview, focusing on the most significant losses sustained by the Russian army over the past month.

RADAR BLACKOUT

The first signs of the spring rout emerged as early as the night of February 28 to March 1. During this strike, Ukrainian forces destroyed a self-propelled 3D air defense search radar 9S19 “Imbir” —part of an S-300V air defense system—along with a transporter/transloader vehicle from the same system. The strike took place on the Azov Sea coast, near the currently occupied city of Mariupol.

9S19 “Imbir” Radar (from S-300V System)

The destruction of “Imbir” radars has been reported on multiple occasions. However, it is important to emphasize that this is not merely a surveillance asset capable of detecting targets at ranges of up to 175 km—it is a critical component of the S-300V system.

The 9S19 “Imbir” (NATO designation: High Screen) is a Soviet/Russian self-propelled, three-coordinate sector-scan radar designed specifically to detect high-speed ballistic targets. Unlike conventional early-warning radars with full 360-degree coverage, it operates by scanning designated sectors with a high refresh rate—every 1–2 seconds for ballistic trajectories.

Production of the system is constrained by its reliance on high-precision components, resulting in limited manufacturing runs. It is a rare and technologically sophisticated asset, with an estimated unit cost of $10–20 million. Total production is believed to be limited to no more than a few hundred units. The loss of each radar therefore represents not only a tactical setback, but also a capability that cannot be rapidly regenerated.

On the same day, Ukrainian forces destroyed a 35N6 “Kasta” radar in the Zaporizhzhia region. While the “Imbir” is optimized for detecting and tracking ballistic and aeroballistic threats, the “Kasta” fulfills a different role—monitoring low-altitude aerial targets such as aircraft, cruise missiles, and UAVs.

Kasta 35N6 Radar

A defining feature of the “Kasta” radar is its ability to operate effectively in contested electromagnetic environments, maintaining target detection and identification even under heavy jamming.

It is particularly valued for its capability to detect low-flying targets that exploit terrain masking to evade standard radar coverage. As a result, it is considered one of the more challenging adversaries for drone operations.

The system can track up to 20 aerial targets simultaneously at extremely low altitudes—down to 100 meters—at ranges of up to 44 km, as well as an equivalent number of targets at altitudes up to 6,000 meters at distances reaching 115 km.

Based on the KamAZ-4310 chassis, the system comprises two vehicles: an operations unit equipped with workstations and electronic systems, and a transport platform carrying the antenna mast and primary power supply.

The cost of a single such complex is estimated at up to $60 million, depending on configuration and condition.

SUSTAINED DRONE PRESSURE

On March 4–5, Ukrainian forces continued a sustained campaign against Russian surface-to-air missile systems. During these strikes, two Tor-M2 systems were destroyed in the Donetsk region as a result of drone engagements.

Tor-M2 Surface-to-Air Missile System

By March 6, the tempo of operations intensified further. Strikes across the Zaporizhzhia and Kherson regions resulted in the destruction of multiple air defense assets, including Buk-M3, Tor-M1, and S-300V systems, as well as Pantsir-S1 gun-missile system.

S-300V Surface-to-Air Missile System

The following phase saw continued degradation of enemy air defense capabilities.

On March 8, Ukrainian forces destroyed another Tor-M1 system along with an R-330Zh “Zhitel” electronic warfare complex.

The R-330Zh “Zhitel” is an automated electronic warfare and signals intelligence system capable of disrupting satellite communications and navigation over a wide area—making it a critical asset for countering UAVs and precision-guided munitions.

R-330Zh “Zhitel” Electronic Warfare System

With an estimated cost of around $10 million, the system relies on high-tech components, including scarce Western electronics. As of March 2026, more than 25 such systems have reportedly been destroyed, underscoring both their operational importance and vulnerability.

The following night, Ukrainian drone operators destroyed a 64N6 “Nadgrobye” radar along with a transporter-loader vehicle from the Buk-M2 system.

The 64N6 “Nadgrobye” is a three-coordinate long-range search radar integrated into S-300PMU and S-400 air defense systems. It is regarded as one of the most capable mobile radar platforms in service, designed to operate under conditions of mass aerial attack and intensive electronic countermeasures.

64N6 “Nadgrobye” Radar (S-300PMU / S-400)

The system is mounted on a heavy road train consisting of a MAZ-7410-9988 high-mobility tractor and a semi-trailer carrying an automatically deployable antenna array.

With an estimated cost ranging from $25 to $40 million, its destruction has operational-level consequences. The loss of such a radar effectively degrades the situational awareness of a full air defense unit within a given sector. In this case, Russian forces in Crimea were left with significantly reduced radar coverage.

CRIMEAN SETBACK

The loss of a long-range radar had an immediate operational impact. As early as March 9, Ukrainian special forces reported strikes against four additional enemy radar systems on the currently occupied peninsula.

Among the targets were the 5N84A “Oborona-14” radar, a “Nebo-U” radar, and two radar systems housed under radomes.

5N84A “Oborona-14” Long-Range Early Warning Radar

Within this group, the 5N84A “Oborona-14” stands out as a relatively rare and technically significant target. This Soviet/Russian long-range radar is designed to operate in contested electromagnetic environments and is particularly resistant to jamming.

Operating in the VHF (meter-wave) band, it is especially effective against low-observable (“stealth”) aircraft. A heavily redesigned modification of the earlier P-14 “Lena” radar, its primary function is the search and detection of stealth targets. The use of long-wavelength signals allows it to overcome radar-absorbent coatings optimized for centimeter-wave systems, effectively rendering stealth aircraft visible as conventional targets.

However, this capability comes at the cost of mobility. Unlike modern systems that can redeploy rapidly, the “Oborona-14” may require up to 24 hours to change position. Once its location is identified, it becomes highly vulnerable to precision strikes.

The estimated cost of the system, including modernization, ranges between $15 and $20 million.

Equally significant are reports of strikes against radars from the “Nebo-U” family. These systems are designed for the detection, tracking, and coordinate measurement of a broad spectrum of aerial targets—from aircraft to small guided munitions and low-observable platforms.

Operating in the meter-wave band, “Nebo-U” radars are capable of detecting targets at distances of up to 700 km and at altitudes of up to 65 km. This capability enables deep airspace surveillance, including early detection of Ukrainian aircraft during takeoff from their airfields.

Accordingly, the destruction—or even temporary degradation—of such systems has immediate operational consequences. It reduces the adversary’s ability to anticipate and respond to Ukrainian air operations within a given sector.

A $100 Million Target — the “Nebo-U” Radar

An important development followed ten days later. On March 19, Ukraine’s Defense Forces carried out a successful strike on the “Granit” center in Sevastopol—a critical facility within the Almaz-Antey defense concern responsible for repairing damaged radars and air defense systems.

Disabling this enterprise has significant operational implications. It disrupts the adversary’s ability to rapidly restore systems such as the “Nebo-U” after they are damaged, thereby prolonging the degradation of Russia’s air defense network.

DECOYS REPLACE RADARS AS LOSSES MOUNT

During the second ten-day period of March, Ukrainian forces continued to systematically dismantle additional elements of the enemy’s air defense system.

On March 10, in Donetsk, the R-330Zh “Volna-3” electronic warfare station was destroyed. The system had been used to counter Ukrainian UAVs by jamming control frequencies, causing drones to lose target lock or communication with their operators.

Buk-M1 Surface-to-Air Missile System

That same night, in the Zaporizhzhia region, another Buk-M1 air defense system was eliminated.

On March 12, Ukrainian forces destroyed two additional air defense components: an S-300V launcher near the settlement of Borovenky in the Luhansk region, and a Tor system near Berdianske in the currently occupied part of the Zaporizhzhia region.

The “Merlin-VR”, Russian reconnaissance unmanned aerial vehicle designed for long-range reconnaissance and artillery fire adjustment at altitudes of up to 5 km.

On March 13, the Commander of the Unmanned Systems Forces reported a series of successful engagements dubbed “Friday the 13th.” Ukrainian drone operators destroyed four rare “Merlin” reconnaissance UAVs near Huliaipole, a Buk-M1 system near Kurakhove, and a 55Zh6 “Nebo” radar in Crimea.

On March 16, two more Tor systems were struck. A Tor-M2 was eliminated in the Luhansk region near Korobchyne, while another system was destroyed near Balashivka in the Zaporizhzhia sector.

On the same day, reports indicated that the adversary, facing increasing degradation of its air defense capabilities, had begun deploying decoy assets. A mock-up radar installation was identified in the Donetsk region near Shyroka Balka—an indication of attempts to compensate for losses and complicate Ukrainian targeting.

“SHALTAI-VALDAI” AND COMPANY

Meanwhile, on March 18, reports emerged of the destruction of Russia’s latest “Valdai” radar system in Crimea.

The RLK-MTs “Valdai” (117Zh6) is a specialized radar complex developed specifically to counter small unmanned aerial vehicles, including loitering munitions and reconnaissance drones such as the Mavic.

RLK-MTs “Valdai” (117Zh6) Small-Target Radar Complex

It was designed at the Lianozovo Electromechanical Plant (part of NPO “Almaz”) in response to the growing challenge posed by low-observable UAVs, which conventional air defense radars often struggle to detect.

A key feature of the system is its dual capability: it not only detects small targets but can also actively suppress them.

The “Valdai” is particularly effective against very small UAVs, with a radar cross-section as low as 0.01 m², at distances of up to 5–6 km. It is equipped with a high-resolution thermal imaging system for visual target confirmation, as well as an integrated electronic warfare module capable of disrupting communication links and blocking GPS navigation. Additionally, it can geolocate drone operators by analyzing control signal emissions.

The destruction of such a system represents a meaningful reduction in the adversary’s counter-UAV capabilities.

However, this was not the final blow. By the end of March, Ukrainian forces had destroyed several additional high-value radar assets, including a radar from the S-400 “Triumf” system, another “Nebo-U,” and an “Imbir” radar from the S-300V system.

Strela-10M Surface-to-Air Missile System

Beyond these, losses included a Buk-M3 system, a Buk-M2 transporter-loader vehicle, five Tor systems of various modifications, and legacy Soviet-era frontline air defense systems such as the Osa and Strela platforms.

Importantly, Ukrainian operations in March were not limited to air defense targets. A number of other high-value assets were also successfully engaged.

A BROADER TARGET SET

Project 266ME (“Aquamarine”) Minesweeper Valentin Pikul

On March 2, Ukrainian drone strikes damaged at least five Russian naval vessels in the port of Novorossiysk. Among them were Project 1124M “Albatros” small-class anti-submarine ships Yeysk and Kasimov, as well as the Project 266ME (“Aquamarine”) minesweeper Valentin Pikul.

Small-class Anti-Submarine Ship Yeysk

Notably, both anti-submarine ships were originally built in Kyiv at the “Leninska Kuznia” shipyard. Their primary role is to provide anti-submarine protection for larger vessels such as frigates and amphibious ships. Their damage or loss therefore increases the vulnerability of remaining Black Sea Fleet assets.

Subsequent reports indicated that additional vessels may also have been affected, including Kalibr cruise missile carriers—the frigates Admiral Makarov and Admiral Essen.

Railway Ferry Slavyanin

On March 14, Ukrainian strikes continued to degrade Black Sea Fleet logistics. Railway ferries Slavyanin and Avangard—key components of the Kerch ferry crossing—were hit. These vessels play a critical role in sustaining Russian military logistics, transporting fuel, weapons, equipment, and ammunition between mainland Russia and occupied territories.

Project 02510 “BK-16” Transport-Assault Boats

Also in Crimea, fighters of Ukraine’s Main Intelligence Directorate (HUR) destroyed two Project 02510 “BK-16” landing boats along with their crews. These high-speed assault craft are typically used for rapid troop deployment, special operations, and coastal patrol missions.

On the same day, Ukrainian special forces struck launchers of the Iskander tactical-operational missile system as they were preparing to conduct strikes against Ukrainian cities.

Iskander missile launcher vehicle

One launcher was destroyed directly at its firing position in a forest belt near the village of Vyshneve. Impact analysis confirmed a secondary detonation of its missile load. Simultaneously, a storage site for Iskander launchers in the settlement of Kurortne was also hit.

Ten days later, on the night of March 24, Ukrainian intelligence identified a column of Bastion-M coastal missile system launchers moving toward firing positions in Crimea.

Precision strikes resulted in the destruction of one launcher and two high-value 3M22 “Zircon” missiles, while another Bastion system sustained damage. Seven Russian personnel were reported killed or wounded.

Bastion-series coastal missile systems are relatively scarce but represent a significant threat. They are used to deploy P-800 “Oniks” and, in newer configurations, hypersonic “Zircon” missiles—both of which have been employed in strikes against Ukrainian territory, including civilian targets.

Launcher of the Bastion-M Coastal Missile System (K-300P / Bastion-M TEL)

The cost of Bastion systems varies depending on configuration. A full Bastion-P battery (four launchers with command and support vehicles) is estimated at approximately $60 million, while a single launcher is valued at around $4 million.

Missile costs further underscore their strategic value:

P-800 “Oniks”: approximately $1.25–1.3 million per unit

3M22 “Zircon”: approximately $5.2–5.6 million per unit

Due to production complexity, the total number of Bastion launchers in Russian service is limited—estimated at around 56–60 units. The Bastion-M configuration, capable of deploying Zircon missiles, is even more scarce, with analysts describing these systems as effectively bespoke assets. The loss of even a single launcher is therefore operationally significant.

Most Bastion systems are concentrated in Crimea (15th Coastal Missile Brigade), near Anapa in Krasnodar Krai (11th Brigade), and on the Kuril Islands.

Production rates also remain constrained. Earlier assessments suggested output of up to 10 “Oniks” missiles per month, while “Zircon” production reportedly increased in 2025, though exact figures remain undisclosed.

In the final days of March, Ukrainian forces continued targeting high-value assets in Crimea. Near Sovkhozne, three 300 mm multiple launch rocket systems—either Smerch or Tornado-S—were destroyed, along with a self-propelled transport-loader vehicle.

Tornado-S Multiple Launch Rocket System (MLRS)

It is important to distinguish between these systems. The Smerch represents an older-generation MLRS, firing unguided rockets at ranges of approximately 70–90 km. In contrast, the Tornado-S is a modernized platform equipped with automated fire control and satellite navigation, enabling precision-guided strikes at ranges of up to 120 km.

The destruction of such systems reduces the adversary’s capacity for long-range area bombardment and precision strike operations.

Ka-52 Reconnaissance-Attack Helicopter

The most notable high-value target destroyed in March was a Ka-52 reconnaissance-attack helicopter, eliminated together with its crew on March 20 in the Donetsk region.

This episode illustrates a defining feature of contemporary warfare: the asymmetric impact of low-cost technologies. A platform valued at over $15 million was neutralized by a relatively inexpensive fiber-optic FPV drone, highlighting the growing effectiveness of unmanned systems in countering advanced, high-cost military assets.

Ivan Stupak, Kyiv

Representative photos from publicly accessible sources