Valentyn Badrak, Director of the Center for Army, Conversion and Disarmament Studies

The world breathed a sigh of relief—the “destruction of civilization” did not materialize. Just 90 minutes before yet another deadline, President Trump announced a two-week ceasefire, adding that negotiations would continue based on the ten points proposed by the Iranian side, with what appears to be a preliminary agreement in principle.

The statements sounded highly optimistic—a major step and a tangible outcome that immediately reverberated across both oil and stock markets. Yet this is clearly not the end of the story, nor even the beginning of the end of the war in the Middle East.

What conclusions can already be drawn, and what lies ahead? Ukrinform discussed this with Valentyn Badrak. (The conversation took place on April 9.)

Q: So, what is actually happening? Will this ceasefire evolve into a lasting peace? The New York Times, for instance, wrote the following the next day: “The ceasefire announced on April 7 by U.S. President Donald Trump, after warnings of the end of civilization, delivered a short-term tactical success but failed to address any of the root causes of the war. Iran has retained its regime, nuclear capabilities, and control over the Strait of Hormuz.” So what, in practical terms, have the parties achieved?

A: In my view, if we are to identify who has secured even a limited, palliative outcome, it is Israel. First, Israel succeeded in drawing Trump into a risky geopolitical venture. Second, it managed—through U.S. involvement—to degrade part of Iran’s military potential.

There were also secondary beneficiaries. Vladimir Putin gained some room for maneuver, along with certain economic and strategic advantages, including a degree of coordination with partners. More importantly, it has become clear that China played a pivotal role. As a global actor, Beijing has secured significant political dividends and is increasingly seen by experts as an alternative center of power—capable, at least in perception, of contributing to stability. In this sense, China appears to be the key force operating behind the scenes of the ceasefire.

As for Donald Trump, it appears he came close to a serious strategic miscalculation—if he has not already crossed that line. He was promised, and clearly expected, substantial political and economic dividends. Instead, he demonstrated the limits of U.S. leverage over Iran without resorting to a ground operation. Yet such an operation would almost certainly have turned into a trap.

There are reasons to believe that Benjamin Netanyahu sought to draw Washington further in—potentially through an initial, limited deployment of special forces as a stepping stone toward deeper involvement. Had that scenario materialized, the consequences could have been severe—not only for Trump personally and the Republican Party, but for broader U.S. strategic positioning.

The worst-case scenario would involve a cascading escalation. If the United States had become bogged down in a ground campaign against Iran, it could have created an opening for a coordinated move by the bloc informally aligned with China—namely Iran, Russia, and North Korea. In such conditions, a synchronized escalation might have unfolded: increased pressure by Vladimir Putin against European NATO members, alongside a major crisis around Taiwan. The cumulative effect could have been profoundly destabilizing.

Q: Be that as it may, a two-week ceasefire has now been announced. At the same time, Trump declared a “complete and total victory.” Iran, through its Supreme National Security Council, proclaimed a “historic victory.” Israel, notably, made no such claim: while supporting the ceasefire, it emphasized that it does not extend to Lebanon and continues military operations there.

Taken together, these signals suggest that this is far from a resolution. Iran has already accused the United States of violating the terms of the ceasefire, and there are strong grounds for skepticism that a two-week pause can be translated into a durable peace agreement.

A: In my view, the situation is extremely complex, even considering that Donald Trump himself now appears inclined to exit the war. He understands that prolongation will only worsen his position. In that sense, the ceasefire has effectively saved him—thanks largely to those around him—from what could have been a deeply humiliating outcome for a major power.

Paradoxically, both Trump and Iran seem interested in ending the conflict. Israel, however, does not share this urgency. The key question is how far Israel is prepared to go in sustaining or escalating tensions. It has consistently demonstrated an ability to increase pressure incrementally, step by step. This raises the real possibility that any fragile movement toward a prolonged peace could be undermined. As for even a temporary stabilization, it remains highly uncertain. There are no credible safeguards in place that would underpin a durable settlement. The situation, therefore, remains deeply unstable.

Q: A closer look at the negotiating positions of the United States and Iran underscores just how difficult—and protracted—the path to peace is likely to be. The Trump administration presented Tehran with 15 points, while Iran responded with a more concise framework of 10. However, the gap between these positions is significant, in some areas fundamentally irreconcilable.

The core issues are well known and central not only to Washington and Tehran but also to Israel: the nuclear program, missile capabilities, and control over the Strait of Hormuz. In fact, the Strait has emerged as one of the primary strategic prizes of the conflict.

Bridging these differences will be extremely difficult. Even technical questions—such as transit fees for passage through the Strait—are interpreted in fundamentally different ways. Iran maintains that its understanding with the United States allows it, together with Oman, to levy such fees. Washington, by contrast, firmly rejects any attempt by Iran to impose charges on maritime transit.

At the same time, following his meeting with the NATO Secretary General in Washington, Trump continues to signal that he expects NATO allies to play an active role in ensuring freedom of navigation through the Strait. This raises a broader question: what is the actual direction of the process?

A: It seems increasingly likely that the decisive leverage may lie with Europe and its partners, where several dynamics are converging. On the one hand, China is seeking to restore technological and economic cooperation with Europe after what has effectively been a period of trade confrontation since early 2024, including the withdrawal of numerous European companies from the Chinese market.

On the other hand, Europe itself is reassessing its strategic posture and appears more willing to negotiate assertively. This is reflected in the evolving rhetoric of European leaders toward Trump in his role within NATO—often critical of what they perceive as dismissive or undermining behavior toward allies.

Under these conditions, the Alliance appears weak in a global sense. Suffice it to note that European NATO members lack their own ballistic missile capabilities—an obviously uncomfortable reality for Europe. Against this backdrop, a renewed rapprochement between the United States and European NATO allies becomes entirely plausible, particularly as a means of exerting coordinated pressure on Iran to advance negotiations.

At the same time, Iran appears to have skillfully exploited the fact that the United States and Israel were, in effect, left without meaningful European backing. Some countries, including Spain, even refused to allow the use of their bases. Moreover, over the past three years, European NATO members have increasingly purchased Israeli systems or developed domestic alternatives rather than relying on American platforms. These trends are telling: Europe has begun a tangible push for greater strategic autonomy.

Meanwhile, Donald Trump has often treated European partners with a degree of condescension—and continues to do so. In that sense, the “cold shower” in Iran may serve as a corrective, forcing a more grounded reassessment in Washington.

Q: Be that as it may, there appears to be no viable military solution to reopening the Strait of Hormuz. The waterway remains only partially operational, and Iran shows little urgency in removing the constraints. This issue is likely to become one of the central bargaining points in negotiations. Even now, despite the temporary ceasefire, it is clear that Iran has preserved key strategic assets. The status and location of its uranium stockpiles remain uncertain; its missile program has been degraded but not eliminated; and its capacity to threaten the Strait endures. Should sanctions be lifted and assets unfrozen, Iran could restore much of its damaged capability relatively quickly.

What comes next? Trump speaks of a forthcoming “golden age” for Iran and the Persian Gulf states. Tehran, however, appears to hold a far more cautious—if not skeptical—view. How should this be assessed?

A: I agree that there is no military solution to this problem. The Western world, particularly Europe, largely understands this. The critical task now is for Trump’s inner circle to reinforce that reality. The resolution will almost certainly lie in the political and diplomatic domain. In this context, European backing becomes essential. From Trump’s perspective, a broader coalition should be drawn into the process. If European NATO members, alongside partners such as Japan, South Korea, and Australia, are actively engaged, the prospects for progress may improve.

I believe Iran genuinely perceives itself as the winning side. For Iran—much like for Ukraine—endurance itself constitutes a form of victory. Demonstrating that the United States, which claims global hegemony, cannot act with impunity—let alone “destroy civilization”—is, from Tehran’s perspective, a significant political achievement.

The rhetoric surrounding this escalation was, in many ways, a serious political miscalculation. Equally questionable was the decision to initiate such a confrontation while Russia’s war against Ukraine remains unresolved. It was, in essence, a high-risk gamble—and one can only hope that the current ceasefire holds. Yet the reality is that everything remains precariously balanced. The situation is highly complex and carries global risks.

Q: That is certainly true. Still, regardless of the outcome, some lessons can already be drawn from Donald Trump’s Iran campaign. One of the most evident is the limited reliability of air defense systems in the Persian Gulf—including American ones. They failed to provide full protection against Iranian strike capabilities, which, while not cutting-edge, are significantly more cost-effective.

What should be done in response?

A: It is precisely in this context that Ukraine becomes highly relevant. This war, although it has somewhat expanded the operational space for Vladimir Putin, is also generating tangible advantages for Ukraine. First and foremost, Ukraine has acted with political consistency and strategic discipline. Despite the often dismissive attitude of Trump, Ukraine has demonstrated that it is a reliable partner—offering interceptor systems, deploying experts for training, and even expressing readiness to contribute to securing the Strait.

Importantly, Ukraine is not merely making declarations—it is delivering in practice.

However, a critical question remains: will the Ukrainian authorities fully capitalize on this moment? There is a real opportunity to integrate Ukrainian defense companies into the global arms market. If this window is missed, the losses could be substantial. According to experts, up to a hundred Ukrainian companies have already relocated and are actively trading in weapons, critical goods, and technologies—yet the State is not capturing corresponding benefits. Volodymyr Zelensky acknowledged in an interview that around ten such enterprises exist, but in reality, the number is significantly higher.

Some Ukrainian companies have already entered international markets on entirely legitimate terms. A notable example is General Chereshnya, which was invited to a U.S. competition, effectively won it, and received highly favorable conditions to establish a joint venture and operate within the American defense ecosystem. Thus, while Donald Trump may publicly downplay Ukrainian contributions, in practice an American analogue of the Shahed drone has been developed with Ukrainian involvement.

There are numerous other cases, particularly in the field of low-cost interceptor systems engineered by Ukrainian firms. A telling example: in the early days of the conflict, the United States deployed approximately 10,000 interceptors from the “Merops” family to the Gulf theater. Yet these systems proved inferior in both quality and effectiveness compared to Ukrainian counterparts—despite costing $10,000–15,000 per unit. Ukrainian interceptors, by contrast, reach speeds of 320–340 km/h while costing just $2,000–3,000.

This highlights a broader structural issue. In wars of attrition, the Western model—reliant on expensive, high-tech systems—risks becoming economically unsustainable unless it is complemented by scalable, low-cost solutions. This is precisely where Ukraine has a strategic opportunity. Ukrainian air defense has already demonstrated that shortages of systems such as the Patriot missile system can be partially offset through cheaper, mass-produced alternatives.

In other words, technological superiority alone is insufficient; it must be paired with industrial scalability. And this is an area where Ukraine is uniquely positioned to lead.

Ukraine has every right to claim this role, as it is Ukrainian air defense that has proven its effectiveness and demonstrated that shortages of systems like Patriot can be compensated for. The high costs of advanced Western weaponry cannot be offset by technology alone—what is needed is scalable, low-cost mass production. This is precisely where a real opportunity emerges for Ukraine.

Q: This is already evident in practice. Iran carried out strikes against U.S. bases in Gulf states—even issuing advance warnings—yet the level of protection proved inadequate. This naturally raises the question: why was the experience of four years of war in Ukraine not systematically integrated? Where were the Americans during those four years, when it was clear what Ukrainian companies were capable of—and that asymmetric solutions can be more effective than expensive, high-tech U.S. weaponry?

The Gulf states, however, appear to have drawn the necessary conclusions. The regional tour by Volodymyr Zelensky—including visits to Gulf countries, as well as Turkey and Syria—demonstrates both strong interest and a growing recognition that precisely such Ukrainian technologies are now in demand.

Even if the current ceasefire evolves into a more stable arrangement, the tasks of monitoring maritime routes, securing the Strait, containing Iran, and neutralizing its strike capabilities will require exactly these kinds of cost-effective, adaptive systems—areas where Ukraine already holds a competitive edge.

Hopefully, this opportunity will not be missed. What is required is a streamlined and institutionalized framework enabling private defense industries to access foreign markets. Crucially, the focus must shift from short-term demand to long-term positioning: multi-year agreements, durable integration into global supply chains, and the export not only of counter-drone systems but also of technological expertise and operational know-how. Ukraine has a clear window of opportunity—what is needed now is proactive positioning and sustained diplomatic engagement.

As Volodymyr Zelensky emphasized: “A ceasefire is the right decision that leads to ending the war. It saves lives, prevents the destruction of cities and villages, and allows power plants and other infrastructure to function normally. Therefore, it creates the time and conditions necessary for diplomacy to deliver results.” At the same time, diplomacy must be backed by capability—by credible national forces and means. Ukraine possesses such capabilities, but not yet in sufficient scale to ensure deterrence without continued support from partners and allies.

Regarding NATO and procurement mechanisms such as PURL, developments so far have not disrupted the flow of American weapons to Ukraine via the Alliance. The more pressing question is forward-looking: will the evolving situation in the Persian Gulf begin to affect the prioritization and fulfillment of Ukraine’s defense needs?

A: It seems essential that those close to Donald Trump draw his attention to Ukraine’s consistent and constructive role throughout the war. The situation is approaching a turning point at which Trump must—if not fully realign policy—at least recalibrate his rhetoric and take tangible steps.

Consider a concrete example. Around May 2025, the United States began producing approximately 42 compact cruise missiles per month—known as URAM. With a range of about 450 kilometers and a 250 kg warhead, these systems could effectively fill Ukraine’s “middle strike” capability gap. They were not intended as aid, but for purchase. Funding—approximately $850 million, largely from European sources—had already been secured for more than 3,000 units. However, the initiative was blocked, and Ukraine has yet to receive this critical capability.

For Ukraine, it is vital that any shift in Trump’s position leads to the unblocking of such options.

 Likewise, obtaining a production license for systems such as ATACMS would be strategically significant. Ukraine has demonstrated effective use of HIMARS since 2022 and has achieved a high level of operational proficiency. Extending this to localized production—potentially in partnership with Poland—would be a logical next step. It is difficult to imagine Warsaw rejecting such a proposal.

These are precisely the kinds of measures that function as practical “litmus tests”—and, in effect, as elements of security guarantees. Strengthening Ukraine’s defense-industrial base is not merely supportive; it is foundational to long-term stability.

Europe, in this regard, should lead by example. There are already positive signals, such as the decision by the United Kingdom to develop the Nightfall ballistic missile for Ukraine. However, with a projected timeline of roughly two years, this solution arrives too late to address immediate operational needs.

At the same time, a degree of European self-interest remains evident. When Volodymyr Zelensky visited Paris, Ukraine was promised several batteries of the latest SAMP/T NG systems—capable of intercepting ballistic threats and having completed testing in December 2025. Yet the initial battery ended up in Italy. This raises a legitimate question: why? If Europe seeks to demonstrate strategic leadership, it must move beyond such reflexes and lead by example—by transferring advanced capabilities to Ukraine. This, in turn, could shape the behavior of the United States.

Q: In reality, this must be a two-way process. As noted, Ukraine has already offered its capabilities to Gulf partners. Volodymyr Zelensky personally engaged in this effort, signaling readiness to share both technologies and operational experience. At the same time, Ukraine requires access to Western technologies and, critically, to licensing frameworks.

Technologically, Ukraine is capable of producing a wide range of systems. However, it lacks the legal rights and certain proprietary know-how. This is not only a matter of trust—it is also a question of regulatory frameworks and intellectual property protection. Progress in this domain is essential, both for expanding exports and for enabling licensed production. Assuming current agreements on arms supplies are fulfilled, this could become a pivotal area of advancement.

This ceasefire has also created a moment in which Zelensky has reminded Russia that there remains an alternative path—diplomacy and negotiations. You noted above that China and Russia have derived certain advantages from the Gulf conflict. The question now is whether there are any realistic grounds to expect movement toward negotiations with Russia.

A: If we speak frankly about the prospects for peace—whether a ceasefire or even a frozen conflict—I do not currently see the necessary preconditions. The war sustains Vladimir Putin. It reinforces his hold on power and, in a broader sense, underpins his political—and arguably physical—survival.

Moreover, Russia does not face, and is unlikely in the near term to face, a meaningful manpower constraint. Its societal structure continues to reflect deeply entrenched authoritarian patterns. Anyone seeking confirmation need only observe a single day of programming on Russia’s primary state television channels. The content itself illustrates how this environment is cultivated and maintained. What we are witnessing is a deliberately sustained degradation of public discourse. Those capable of independent thought either remain silent or leave the country.

That being said, there is one potentially positive factor—primarily economic in nature. The acceleration of Russia’s decline can be driven by expanded strike capabilities, particularly missile systems. However, Ukraine cannot rely on American solutions in this domain. It is also telling that when France approached United Kingdom and Germany with a proposal to develop a 2,000-kilometer-range missile, Ukraine was not included—despite the fact that its own ballistic capabilities are already nearing serial production, while comparable systems in those countries remain under development.

At the same time, Ukraine’s Defense Forces have demonstrated a high degree of operational adaptation. They are now capable of achieving effects comparable to missile strikes through the use of drones. Operations targeting key infrastructure—such as ports in Ust-Luga and Primorsk—illustrate this clearly, as do efforts aimed at isolating Crimea. These are tangible and strategically meaningful achievements.

Nevertheless, without a robust and scalable missile capability, it is difficult to expect outcomes that would align with Ukraine’s definition of victory.

Q: Since we have shifted the discussion to Russia, it is evident that the adversary must be studied in depth. There have been reports about your upcoming joint publication with Volodymyr Horbulin. Is this research also focused on Russia?

A: Indeed, the book has already been released—advance copies are available, and it should reach bookstores within the next one to two weeks. This is our third joint work with Volodymyr Pavlovych. The first focused on the initial 200 days of the full-scale war. The second adopted a more philosophical lens, examining why and how such a war became possible—an analysis not only of combat operations but of the broader systemic conditions that enabled the conflict, and how to prevent similar scenarios in the future.

This third book, in many respects, continues the line of thinking developed by Volodymyr Horbulin in his 2020 work “How to Defeat Russia in the War of the Future.” The level of foresight demonstrated in that publication is remarkable—many of its projections have proven accurate, particularly regarding the central role of unmanned systems, missile technologies, and related capabilities.

In the new book, we synthesize four years of full-scale war, focusing on how Ukraine has applied emerging technologies and how these have reshaped the battlefield. The transformation has been profound. For instance, tanks have largely disappeared from active frontline roles—they are no longer central to assault operations or maneuver warfare. Instead, they have been pushed back by heavy strike drones such as “Vampire” and “Nemesis” to distances of 20–25 kilometers from the line of contact on both sides.

For personnel, the so-called “kill zone” is narrower—on certain sections of the front, up to around five kilometers—but remains extremely lethal. These shifts are profound: drones have displaced armored vehicles, diminished the role of artillery in some contexts, and even challenged the use of helicopters. As for Russia’s naval forces, they are now largely confined to their bases in Novorossiysk.

Q: We look forward to the new book. The key is that this knowledge—how to defeat Russia—translates into practice, so that when the time comes, we can speak not only about theory, but about results.

A: We firmly believe that defense and the strengthening of Ukraine’s defense potential must be placed at the very center of national priorities. If that happens, significant progress is not only possible but highly likely. The war has revealed the extraordinary resilience and capacity of Ukraine and its people. Despite heavy losses and the reality of currently occupied territories, this potential remains vast.

It is this understanding that should sustain and motivate future efforts—both toward achieving strategic success and ultimately restoring Ukraine’s territorial integrity.

Ihor Dolhov led this conversation

Photo: Kyrylo Chubotin / Ukrinform

Watch the conversation in full on Ukrinform’s YouTube channel