The Middle East War and Ukraine’s Prospects

Ukrinform explores forecasts about how the Iranian crisis could reshape the Russia–Ukraine war

March 7 marks exactly one week since the military operation by Israel and the United States against Iran began. Much has already been said and written about the rapidly evolving situation in the Middle East. Yet a number of important questions remain unanswered. In particular, how has this conflict already affected — and how might it continue to affect — the Russia–Ukraine war, not so much in military terms as in the political and diplomatic sphere?

The key issue is how the crisis could influence the negotiation process, the positions of the main stakeholders, and the interests of the principal global actors — including Ukraine, Russia, the United States, Europe, and China.

GEOPOLITICAL DOMINO: IMPACT ON UKRAINE, RUSSIA, AND THE OUTLINES OF PEACE TALKS

Assessing the impact of what some analysts describe as the second Iranian war on the situation around Ukraine, experts agree that the decisive factor will be the duration of the campaign. Political analyst Volodymyr Fesenko notes that “everything depends on how long the conflict in the Middle East lasts.” He emphasizes that “if the military operation by the United States and Israel against Iran ends relatively quickly, the potential negative consequences for Ukraine will be minimal.”

“For Ukraine, the main risk is that if the conflict drags on, it could lead to the depletion of U.S. and allied stocks of interceptor missiles for the Patriot air defense system, which are critically important for Ukraine.” At the same time, he adds, “the war between the United States, Israel, and Iran is unlikely to significantly affect Ukraine’s military potential in terms of other types of weapons and ammunition.”

Political expert Yurii Bohdanov highlights Kyiv’s diplomatic maneuvering. He points to an “intensification of Ukraine’s engagement in the Middle East.”

“Kyiv is working much more actively with the monarchies of the Persian Gulf — and this is the right approach,” he says. “Through military and technological cooperation, Ukraine can gradually expand into broader economic markets in the region — especially now, when Russia is weakened and its alliance with Iran creates additional risks for many Middle Eastern states.” According to Bohdanov, this situation “opens a window of opportunity for Ukraine to strengthen its position.”

Regarding Russia’s stance, military and political analyst Mykhailo Samus notes that “Putin is likely being presented with at least two basic scenarios.”

“The first assumes that the United States becomes bogged down in a long and exhausting war.” In that case, he says, “the conflict would drive oil prices upward and drain U.S. resources, including those currently directed toward supporting Ukraine.”

“Within this logic, the Kremlin may opt to stall negotiations: the longer uncertainty persists, the greater Russia’s chances of benefiting from higher oil revenues.”

However, Samus believes that “the United States will most likely try to localize the conflict as much as possible.” If that succeeds, he argues, the war will cease to have a major impact on global oil prices.

“If Tehran’s ability to influence maritime oil transportation is quickly neutralized and missile strikes across the region stop, the market could stabilize fairly quickly,” Samus explains. “If this scenario materializes, the consequences for Russia could be very unfavorable.”

According to Mykhailo Samus, “at some point Washington may finally conclude that endless attempts to reach agreements with Vladimir Putin yield no results.” In that case, he suggests, “a different conversation could theoretically begin — not about personal arrangements with Putin, but about engaging with those groups within the Russian elite that are ready to end the war and move toward normalizing relations with the West.”

Diplomat Volodymyr Ohryzko adds a note of irony when assessing the Kremlin leader’s psychological state. “For Putin, the current events are a serious signal,” Ohryzko says. “In today’s world, it is possible to reach almost anywhere.” And, he adds, “this is something Putin now has to live with constantly.”

As for the negotiation process surrounding Ukraine, experts do not expect fundamental shifts. Political analyst Volodymyr Fesenko believes that “the war in Iran will not lead to the suspension of negotiations on ending the war in Ukraine.” At most, there could be “a relocation of the talks to Europe while the conflict continues in the Middle East,” or “a temporary pause in the negotiation process.”

In his view, “the war in Iran will not significantly affect the substance of negotiations on Ukraine, although Russia may resort to demarches and attempts to pressure or blackmail its American partners.” Fesenko concludes that “the prospects and further development of peace negotiations will depend far more on the deadlock surrounding the territorial issue than on the Iranian war.”

Yurii Bohdanov shares a similar assessment, arguing that the impact on negotiations “will be minimal.” This is largely because “the current negotiation process between Ukraine and Russia remains mostly technical — or even imitative.”

STRATEGIC DIVIDENDS: WHO BENEFITS FROM THE IRANIAN CRISIS

When asked who stands to gain the most strategic advantages from the crisis, experts again point to one decisive factor: time.

Yurii Bohdanov notes that “everyone — except Russia — is interested in bringing this conflict to an end as quickly as possible.” “High oil prices, and especially the prospect of shortages, undermine the economic and political interests of almost all major players in the global economy — including Europe, the United States, and China.”

Russia, however, remains the only clear beneficiary of a prolonged conflict.

Volodymyr Fesenko confirms this assessment, warning that “another major risk factor is a potential surge in oil prices — to $100 per barrel or even higher.”

At the same time, Fesenko believes that Vladimir Putin is unlikely to risk a direct confrontation with Donald Trump. “Any open support for Iran under the current circumstances would be viewed by Trump as a hostile act toward the United States and toward him personally,” he explains. “At the same time, it would also be disadvantageous for Russia to damage relations with its Arab partners — Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates.”

For the United States, the objectives are highly pragmatic. Bohdanov argues that “Donald Trump will do everything he can to ensure that clarity emerges as quickly as possible and that the economic consequences remain minimal.” In the United States, he notes, “the popularity of those in power is closely tied to gasoline prices — the higher they are, the lower the approval ratings.”

Volodymyr Fesenko predicts: “If the United States wins this war quickly and decisively — destroying the Islamic regime in Iran and eliminating the possibility of Iran acquiring nuclear-capable status — this would significantly strengthen the geopolitical position of the United States, as well as Donald Trump’s international and domestic political standing.”

“If the war drags on, however, the situation could develop in the opposite direction for Trump — his party could lose control of both chambers of the United States Congress.”

Mykhailo Samus outlines Washington’s military concept, which, he says, “does not envisage changing the political system in Iran or forcibly imposing democracy.” Instead, “the logic is different: establishing constructive communication with part of the current Iranian regime and identifying those among its representatives who could ensure a gradual transition toward more predictable relations between Iran, the United States, and the international community.”

According to Samus, the strategic objectives of the United States are threefold. “First, to make Iran a more predictable player, particularly on the global oil market. Second, to eliminate or significantly limit its nuclear program. And finally, to gradually move the country out of isolation toward the status of a state with which business, economic relations, and political dialogue are possible.”

“In essence, the strategy is to prevent the conflict from escalating into a large-scale global war and to keep it within the bounds of a controlled regional crisis.”

Special attention should also be paid to the position of China. Samus notes that for Beijing the potential loss of Iran “could be a very serious blow.”

“For a long time, Beijing tried to maintain the role of an observer — figuratively speaking, sitting on the riverbank and watching its proxies create instability in different regions of the world: Iran in the Middle East, Russia in Europe, and North Korea in the Asia-Pacific region.” According to him, this approach allowed China to strengthen its own geopolitical position.

However, he warns that “elements of that informal ‘axis’ on which China relied to expand its global influence may now begin to fall away one by one.” Samus explains: “If a government emerges in Tehran that does not cooperate with China in bypassing sanctions, destabilizing regions, or supporting Russia in its war against Ukraine and Europe, it would be a very painful blow for China.”

Yurii Bohdanov adds that “the Chinese economy critically depends on stable energy flows, so Beijing is also interested in ensuring that the conflict does not lead to serious disruptions or prolonged instability in energy markets.”

According to Samus, the ideal scenario for China “would be for the United States to become bogged down in the conflict and expend significant resources — but without sharp spikes in oil prices that could hurt the Chinese economy itself.”

At the same time, Volodymyr Fesenko concludes that “a prolonged Iranian war would create serious problems for the Chinese economy.”

Finally, Volodymyr Ohryzko sums up the geopolitical equation: “If Donald Trump succeeds in bringing a U.S.-friendly regime to power in Iran, he will gain a powerful trump card and, in effect, will be able to influence the global oil market.”

“In that case, neither Trump nor the United States will have much interest in Russia.” According to Ohryzko, this would make the situation for Russia critically dangerous. “If the world no longer needs Russian oil — on which its barely functioning economy still relies — the question becomes: what awaits Russia next?”

The expert’s answer is stark: “Only catastrophe.”

AWAKENING OF EUROPE: MERZ’S “ULTIMATUM” AND NEW SECURITY REALITIES

A political earthquake was triggered by the statement of German Chancellor Friedrich Merz which, according to some analysts, effectively sounded like an ultimatum to Donald Trump: Europe, he suggested, will not accept any agreement on Ukraine concluded without its participation. Expert assessments of this move, however, remain divided.

Political analyst Vadym Denysenko sees it as a fundamental shift in paradigm. According to him, “against the backdrop of attempts by Washington and Moscow to monopolize the negotiation process on ending the war, European leaders are beginning to demonstrate unexpected political agency.”

“Increased pressure from the United States has forced the European Union to move from passivity toward formulating its own ultimatums,” Denysenko argues.

He believes that “Merz’s statement about the inevitability of EU participation in negotiations is only the first signal in what may become a series of changes to the negotiation format.” In his interpretation, the German chancellor’s remark that “Europe will not accept an agreement on Ukraine concluded without its participation” effectively means that even a bilateral Russia–U.S. deal would be impossible without European involvement.

Denysenko’s argument rests on economic leverage. “Despite Europe’s weaknesses, the controlling stake in sanctions belongs to the EU,” he says. “And without lifting those sanctions, a peace agreement is impossible in principle.”

Moreover, he adds, “the decision of the Supreme Court of the United States regarding Trump’s tariffs has, at least partially, untied Europe’s hands.”

According to Denysenko, Europeans will now insist that Washington consult with them more closely. As a result, “the Americans will have to consider changes, at least in the advisory formats of the negotiations.”

He also recalls a notable remark by Wolfgang Ischinger, who suggested that “it would be beneficial for Europe if the war lasted two years.” The reasoning, Denysenko explains, is pragmatic: “Europeans believe they need time to rearm and establish more stable security guarantees — and they are prepared to support Ukraine financially during that period.”

Thus, he concludes, “the EU appears to be proceeding from the assumption that 2026 will not be the year the war ends.”

However, Volodymyr Fesenko strongly disagrees with such an interpretation. “I do not share the view that Friedrich Merz’s statement sounded like an ultimatum to Donald Trump. Those who claim this are presenting wishful thinking as reality.” In Fesenko’s view, “neither Germany nor Europe is currently in a position to issue ultimatums to Trump.” Moreover, he notes, “ultimatums are not a European style. Trump, on the other hand, can issue ultimatums — and does so from time to time.”

The political scientist interprets the chancellor’s remarks differently. “Merz’s statement is an expression of a principled position regarding Europe’s participation in negotiations on a peace agreement for Ukraine,” he says. “Such determination should have been demonstrated to the Americans long ago. Yet I have not heard any reaction from Trump or his administration.”

Fesenko also points to the internal fragmentation within the Old World. “Europe still needs to determine who exactly will represent it — and in what capacity — in negotiations on ending the war between Russia and Ukraine,” he argues. “We already see Emmanuel Macron and Merz separately claiming the role of the main negotiator on Ukraine on behalf of Europe. And there is also the European Commission.”

“Therefore,” he concludes, “Europeans must first reach agreement among themselves and only then firmly insist on their participation in the negotiations.”

Regarding the conflict in the Middle East, Fesenko notes that “it is already clear that the impact of these events on Europe’s role is contradictory.” According to him, “there is no consensus within Europe regarding this conflict,” and “European interests here do not entirely coincide with those of the United States.”

For the Old World, he stresses, “support for Ukraine is strategically more important than participation in the U.S. and Israeli operation against Iran.” Europe’s primary interest is that the conflict “end as quickly as possible and not trigger a global energy, economic, or security crisis.”

Yurii Bohdanov offers a similar perspective. “When it comes to Europe’s role, it is important to understand that its position will largely depend on how Iran and its regime demonstrate hostility toward European countries,” he explains. “So far, we see a rather restrained line. In fact, Europe is quietly adhering to a logic similar to China’s: the priority is to end the conflict as quickly as possible through political and diplomatic means and to prevent its escalation.”

Bohdanov emphasizes that “Europe currently has no objective need to intervene in the war between the United States and Iran.” For Europeans, he says, the priority lies elsewhere: ensuring their own security — and in this context, Ukraine plays a central role.

“Ukraine’s security has effectively become a fundamental element of the entire European security architecture,” he notes. This understanding is increasingly evident in Germany, France, the United Kingdom, and the countries of Central and Northern Europe. In these capitals, there is a growing recognition that “the key strategic issue for Europe is Russia’s war against Ukraine, because the long-term stability of the continent depends on its outcome.”

Therefore, Bohdanov concludes, “despite all its dangers, the Iranian conflict for Europe remains primarily an external factor — one that should be contained and resolved as quickly as possible so that it does not divert resources and political attention from the central issue of European security: Ukraine.”

Myroslav Liskovych. Kyiv

Headline photo via U.S. Air Force