In recent weeks, the core of our political life has been concentrated around yet another peace plan, with which we—and the world—nurture hopes of ending the full-scale war in Ukraine, barbarically launched by the Russian aggressor.

Here Ukrinform offers you an analytical perspective from an eyewitness to how an already signed peace plan—one of Trump’s peace initiatives—actually works and is being implemented in practice. At the invitation of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Israel, Ukrinform’s Director General, Serhii Cherevatyi, visited that country. Having recently returned from the working trip, he analyzed how the country is living today, what has changed since the peace summit, why Israel is losing part of the information warfare despite its military successes, how the war in Ukraine, the shared enemy—Russia and Iran— are viewed there, and what their expectations are from the “peace plan” for our own country, since the lessons from Israel’s experience are important for Ukraine.

Q: This event can be considered truly special: Israel’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs invited several editors from mainstream media outlets in Ukraine and Moldova to visit the country. I have the impression that one of the aims was to demonstrate, among other things, how a peace plan operates in practice. Is that correct?

A: I believe that was indeed one of the objectives. Another was to show more broadly how the State of Israel functions under conditions of what is essentially a permanent war—an experience that is highly comparable to ours. At the same time, they acknowledged that in certain respects Ukraine is resisting evil more effectively than Israel.

Moldova is currently of particular interest to Israel. With direct air travel unavailable for us, Moldova has become a key hub through which Ukrainians can travel onward to other parts of the world. The decision to open an Israeli embassy there—following the recent closure of the embassy in Ireland—is also explained by the relocation of Israeli airline flights from Ireland to Chișinău. In addition, Moldova demonstrates a friendly political stance toward Israel.

The visit’s agenda was extremely dense, encompassing events of direct relevance to us—ranging from the “Beit HaLochem” (Houses for Warriors), where tens of thousands of Israel’s wounded veterans and victims of terror undergo life-long rehabilitation, to meetings at the Knesset (parliament).

We visited the border with Gaza—the site of the October 7, 2023 massacre —visited the affected kibbutzim, and at the location of the music festival attacked by terrorists, where a memorial complex has now been established. We also traveled to the border with Lebanon, from where Hezbollah poses a constant threat, and saw the defensive system that has been built there. In addition, we visited a Druze village—an ethno-religious community that is highly loyal to the State of Israel and is known, among other things, for producing highly capable military servicemen.

Thus, the spectrum of the events was extremely broad. Within a very dense timeframe of just five days, a great deal had been done to ensure that we could see and feel how and by what the State of Israel is living today.

Q: Do people feel that something has changed, that peace has finally arrived? After all, the Trump-sponsored peace summit was held with considerable fanfare two months ago, on October 13. Did you see “peaceful life,” or does such a concept not really exist there?

A: First and foremost, no matter how much Israel is portrayed as a model of constant resilience and steadfastness, no individual and no society can endure a state of permanent war in all its dimensions. In both official and informal conversations, we clearly sensed a demand for peace—even in environments such as reservists, who serve for several months each year.

Q: Do you understand what it means to be an IT specialist, then spend two months in Gaza, acquire elements of PTSD or at least severe stress, and then return and be expected to immediately reintegrate into your business and function normally? Clearly, such a model does not work for anyone. Hence, there is a genuine desire for peace. Even this peace process—the peace summit and its outcomes—was received positively: people wanted a ceasefire and the return of the hostages. The hostage issue is extremely important for them.

A: All living hostages have now been returned. By the way, we were also arranged to meet a mother whose three-year-old child had been held hostage. For Israeli society, this was an extraordinarily painful topic. Although, numerically, there were “as few as” about 250 hostages, in a relatively small country everyone is connected in one way or another, which made it acutely sensitive. In the very center of Jerusalem, there is a spontaneous memorial—somewhat like our Maidan—covered with flags, stickers, posters, and drawings dedicated to the release of the hostages.

Q: When Trump spoke in the Knesset before leaving for the peace summit, he was greeted with standing ovations; applause lasted for three minutes. He said: “Now, not only for Israelis but also for Palestinians, as well as for many others, the long and painful nightmare has finally ended.” This is a highly symbolic moment for Israel and the entire Middle East, because across the region the forces of chaos, terror, and destruction that tormented it for decades have now been weakened, isolated, and defeated. Is this actually felt on the ground?

A: First, let me tell you about attitudes toward Trump in Israel: there is a strong sense of sympathy for him across many social groups.

One can see, for example, traditional Jewish kippahs with Trump’s portrait being sold on the streets, as well as T-shirts; there is a large banner displayed outside the U.S. Embassy in Jerusalem. There are also allusions to Trump’s slogans—most notably, in Jerusalem I saw a poster reading “Make Gaza Jewish Again.” He is a fairly popular figure there.

As for the defeat of terrorist forces, given the history of this land and the region, I would be cautious. Unfortunately, what we are observing now is more of a temporary lull. That said, when discussing tangible achievements, Israeli politicians and journalists we met pointed out that the leadership of Hezbollah in Lebanon has, in effect, been almost entirely eliminated.

During the twelve-day war with Iran, significant damage was inflicted on Iran’s nuclear program, with key facilities hit. Hamas in Gaza has also suffered notable military losses, though not a complete defeat. There were also interesting assessments suggesting that the Iranian regime is currently at its most fragile. On the other hand, Iran lacks a strong, organized opposition.

Q: Be that as it may, peace came only after two years. Israel was fighting terrorists—non-state armed groups. At the same time, Hamas in Gaza managed to build an extensive system of large tunnels and to mount fairly strong resistance. When the war began, up to two and a half thousand rockets were launched at Israel simultaneously. Where do they get them from? And how do they sustain the number of supporters who are not just willing to fight with weapons, but are prepared to die—willing not only to dig tunnels, but to sacrifice their lives without hesitation?

A: If we start with the question of who is willing to fight, it is important to understand the context. Gaza has a population of up to two million people and has lived for many years under a totalitarian regime. Political propaganda, reinforced by religious indoctrination, dominates daily life. A large percentage of the population is young and unemployed, because there are simply no jobs. All problems are blamed on the Zionist enemy, while the proposed alternative is struggle and armed resistance.

Israeli experts we spoke with are convinced that the attack from Gaza was conceived as the opening stage of a broader campaign aimed at destroying Israel. According to this scenario, Hezbollah and Iran were supposed to follow with massive ballistic missile strikes, while the Houthis from Yemen would also join in with drones and ballistic missiles. The combined effect was meant to generate chaos: pressure from the south via Gaza, from the north via Hezbollah, the seizure of military bases and hostages, and, ultimately, the collapse—at least political and possibly partial military—leading to Israel’s defeat. From this perspective, they argue that despite the initial shock and failures during the Gaza phase, Israel later recovered the initiative and inflicted serious damage on all these adversaries. They also believe that Iran is now closely watching Syria, where a regime change has taken place; consequently, Israel, as it often does in conditions of uncertainty, has established a certain line on Syrian territory, effectively creating a security buffer zone.

Q: In Israel, they are compelled to reckon with Syria and its interim president, Ahmed al-Sharaa. Trump received him in the Oval Office, and the overall attitude has shifted dramatically—he is no longer viewed as an enemy. In reality, however, once Israel grasped the full implications of the October 7 attack, it used every available means not only to deal with Hamas, but also to strike painfully at all its other enemies. It must be said that the Americans and other allies were instrumental in this effort. Trump’s strike on Iran was a major development, as was the fact that attacks in the Red Sea against commercial shipping affected everyone. In other words, a great deal has been done. Yet Israel’s uniquely hostile environment has not disappeared and has not fundamentally changed. In the relatively short history of the State of Israel since 1948, this was already its fifth war. From your perspective, how far has Hamas been destroyed and bled dry?

A: We had an interesting conversation with one of Israel’s lead journalists. He is convinced that the attack was organized primarily to derail negotiations that had been under way for many years between Israel and the leading power of the Arab world, Saudi Arabia—talks aimed at finding a compromise that could have served as a prologue to a long-term peace in the region.

Hamas has suffered a serious military blow. However, it is important to recognize that while effectively absorbing defeat after defeat on the battlefield, Hamas managed to outplay Israel in the information domain. They systematically showcased the suffering of children and humanitarian crises—often, as our Israeli colleagues noted, exaggerated severalfold, and in some cases staged outright. Significant financial resources were invested in these efforts. As a result, in broad terms, Israel lost the information battle. I believe this factor also contributed to Israel’s decision to agree to peace talks and, to some extent, compelled it to enter them.

There are clear parallels here with Ukraine. Compared to Russia, we possess far more limited information influence capabilities. In response, both Ukrainians and Israelis rely on all available tools to communicate their position—sometimes resorting to unconventional methods.

From the Israeli perspective, they also see a degree of similarity between our situations in this respect.

Q: The peace plan for the Middle East—Trump’s plan—consisted of 20 points and combined elements of force with compromises. You mentioned one of the compromises on Israel’s side. Did people in Israel tell you about any other compromises? How do they see the overall picture? Has a balance already been achieved, or not yet? What comes next?

A: As I understand it, quick solutions are extremely difficult to find, given the sheer number of actors involved, including within Israel itself. We should keep in mind that on a territory roughly the size of Ukraine’s Cherkasy Oblast, there exist two additional enclaves: the Gaza Strip, with about two million people, and the West Bank of the Jordan River with the Palestinian Authority, where around 3.6 million people live, if I’m not mistaken. That is nearly half of Israel’s population in demographic terms.

Within these territories, there are different forces: Hamas in Gaza, which is more radical and explicitly terrorist in nature, and the Palestine Liberation Organization on the West Bank. Even these actors do not share a unified position among themselves.

Add to this the external factors that influence them. And, of course, Israel itself is far from monolithic internally. It is an electoral democracy with its own political currents, internal debates, struggles against corruption, and other complexities. For example, up to 15 percent of the population consists of ultra-Orthodox groups who categorically refuse to serve in the military.

All of this creates a highly complex mosaic that makes reaching consensus extremely difficult. And even, as we can see, a player as powerful as the United States cannot guarantee that all elements of such a plan will ultimately be implemented.

Q: Indeed, it is very difficult to predict outcomes, but at least for me it was interesting to see what might come of the approach Trump embedded in this peace plan. In particular, for the peace summit in Egypt he convened more than 20 leaders from Arab countries and Europe. One of the objectives was to secure support for mobilizing resources to rebuild Palestine, especially the Gaza Strip. On the surface, this is a noble idea, which even includes rather fantastical plans to relocate two million people from Gaza elsewhere and to build a kind of “paradise” in its place. But it seems to run into the very issue you already mentioned: some 4.5 million Palestinians living in two enclaves have, for generations, lacked normal living conditions, jobs, and prospects for the future, surviving instead on international aid. Such plans, in my view, only reinforce these sentiments, because they do not create opportunities for Palestinians to build their own future. Instead, they are again offered the idea that someone else will come and do something for them. Is this visible on the ground, or is my impression mistaken?

A: It seems to me that Trump, as a major businessman, embedded a rational core into this plan—much as he is trying to do in our negotiations with the Russian Federation. It is the rational core of a pragmatic individual raised in a democratic society, who sees development opportunities primarily through a business-oriented model: the construction of technology parks, better housing complexes, conditions for launching factories, plants, IT sectors, and so on. At the same time, he does not always grasp that such approaches do not necessarily work in different social, cultural, and political environments.

Q: Of course, it must be acknowledged that fanaticism is a driving force behind terror and brutality. At the same time, the process had ultimately resulted in a peace settlement and a peace summit. Israel made certain compromises and incurred significant reputational costs. Protests against Israel and demonstrations in support of Palestine spread both in the United States and across Europe; a number of countries—primarily in Europe—recognized the State of Palestine. These developments are also consequences of the war and of the humanitarian catastrophe in the Gaza Strip. These are the realities Israel encountered while already in the conflict, and their effects continue to this day. How is Israel coping with this? What role do the media play here—both inside Israel and internationally? How do they explain their position to the world?

A: They are trying to do so. I believe that, among other things, our visit was intended precisely for this purpose, and it was organized in a fairly professional manner. Israel has many talented, highly professional journalists—based both domestically and abroad, including the United States. However, this time they themselves acknowledge that they lost the information battle in Europe and, partially, in the United States, because their opponents had been financing the relevant media, academic, and expert environments for years. Incidentally, this is also what hostile Russia does—systematically shaping certain journalistic and expert communities in Europe.

And that is why we have seen the Free Palestine movements—primarily in Europe and also in the United States. On the campuses of world renowned universities, people sometimes support these movements even without fully understanding the subject matter, acting instead on a subjective, emotional level. It is well known why many people respond coolly to our tragedy and, in some cases, show greater sympathy toward Russia: because they hold negative attitudes toward the United States. It seems to me that similar mechanisms are being exploited there as well, and this makes the situation particularly difficult for Israel.

I believe they will be forced to substantially revise their information policy, because at present their opponents are outperforming them in the information domain. Israeli interlocutors themselves noted that they cannot match their adversaries in terms of financial resources.

Q: Consequently, terrorist organizations are employing the tactics and mechanisms of hybrid warfare, which Russia supplies in significant measure, thereby generating models that others seek to emulate.

A: Incidentally, this is somewhat paradoxical. On the one hand, Ukraine and Israel are not particularly close or powerful allies. On the other hand, Iran is currently Israel’s principal adversary. We have seen Russian-made weapons being supplied to terrorist groups via Iran. Shahed drones and missiles are being launched at Israel as well. Russia is Iran’s key ally. Moreover, within days after the attack—and notably on his birthday—Putin met with representatives of Hamas and stated that it was unjust that they lacked statehood.

I believe that Russia has served, perhaps even consciously, as a role model for Israel’s enemies in demonstrating how hybrid methods can be used to influence Western public opinion and democratic societies. Social media, non-governmental communities, and academic circles have become fertile ground for cultivating actors who—knowingly or unknowingly—advance one’s interests. Importantly, this is a two-way process.

Q: Here let’s turn to the United States. You mentioned that the role of the U.S., Israel’s strategic partner, is visible everywhere. This has indeed been the case from the very beginning. Moreover, a peace agreement between the United States and Israel has been in force since 1979, and Israel receives nearly four billion dollars in annual U.S. financial assistance, which is guaranteed at least through 2028. In Ukraine, we have discussed the concern that the outbreak of war in the Middle East would divert resources—including American resources—away from support for Ukraine. In practice, this is exactly what happened: following the attack, the United States sharply increased its assistance to Israel. In addition, Israel is the United States’ primary non-NATO partner, which is another highly significant factor.

One point in all this stands out in particular: the United States and Israel not only have mutual security commitments, but also work closely together in defense industry cooperation and military technologies. Did you observe this during your visit?

A: It was impossible not to notice. Israeli soldiers who are currently serving in the army often go on leave carrying their rifles—typically American-made M4s or other U.S. weapons. During our travels, we saw extensive use of American equipment: ranging from vehicles transporting specialized ammunition to air-defense missile systems. U.S. support also played a role in repelling aerial attacks, although, as Israelis emphasize, the majority of airborne targets were intercepted by their own forces.

Q: So, Israel’s strength lies not only in reliable strategic partners and a strong military. What else underpins it? Ideology, territorial defense, reservists—or each of the above?

A: Israel, above all else, has built a robust security and defense system—crucially, one that is not only professional but also perceived as fair. Service is universal.

It is well known, for example, that Benjamin Netanyahu lost a brother who served in special forces. Among Israeli society, one of the first points of connection between people who have just met is where they served, which often reveals shared experiences and common ground. This creates a strong sense of solidarity, mutual support, and social cohesion. It enables society as a whole to self-organize rapidly when necessary—either because you are serving yourself, or because you are doing everything possible to support those who are.

Israel is not a large country: almost everyone either currently has someone serving in the military, has served themselves, or lives next door to someone who has. This shared burden of defense is a central pillar of national resilience.

That is why everyone is involved and everyone contributes; the entire system is designed around this principle. For example, we visited a hospital in Haifa that serves a population of roughly 2.5 million people. During periods of heightened threat, they established an underground hospital. In peacetime, the space functions simply as an underground parking facility. However, it is fully equipped with oxygen lines and all essential healthcare infrastructure, including dialysis capability. When necessary, within a very short time frame, everything shifts underground: staff and patients move down, systems are activated, partitions are sealed, showers and toilets come online, and operating theaters begin functioning.

Q: Over these nearly four years, we too have learned a great deal about resilience. For us, as for Israel, it has become a matter of survival. This brings me to a question about Ukrainians. Are they visible in Israel? What is the role of Ukrainians as part of Israeli society?

A: First of all, within Israeli society as a whole, some 68–70 percent support Ukraine, which is encouraging. This is despite Russia’s long-standing presence there—through television channels, cultural events, opinion leaders, and a large post-Soviet immigrant community that remains to a significant extent pro-Soviet in outlook.

The Ukrainian community itself, although very diverse and largely Russian-speaking—since many came from large cities in eastern Ukraine—has, to our satisfaction, shown full and consistent support for Ukraine.

At the hospital we met Oleksandr, a native of Lviv. He emigrated from the Soviet Union in the early years of Ukraine’s independence and was educated in Russian. He initially addressed us in Russian, but toward the end he delivered a brief, deeply motivating statement—in Ukrainian. He said how much he misses his friends, how strongly he wants to return to Ukraine, and that he will do so at the first possible opportunity.

We also spoke with the ambassador. A Ukrainian center has recently opened there, sustained not only by government support but also, to a significant extent, by private donors. The Ukrainian community is actively involved: photo exhibitions, seminars, and public discussions are held at the center. The First Lady attended its ribbon-cutting ceremony. To put it shortly, Ukrainians are visible—Ukrainian flags can be seen in many of the places we visited.

When we introduced ourselves as being from Ukraine at various meetings, many people responded with “Slava Ukraini!” (‘Glory to Ukraine!”), which was especially heartening. We also met Ze’ev Elkin, a native of Kharkiv and a prominent leader within the Likud party, who has served as a minister in multiple governments. He is currently responsible for matters comparable to what we in Ukraine refer to as internally displaced persons—refugees in the Israeli context. He received us, and we had a substantive and extended discussion.

Q: I can see you have many impressions, and if I didn’t stop you, you could go on at length about this unique country—how it lives, fights, wins, and continues to compete. But I would like to conclude our conversation with a question that is particularly important for us today. You noted that a majority of Israel’s population supports Ukraine. What do they say about peace and about a peace plan? How do they envision an end to Russia’s war of aggression and the achievement of peace in Ukraine?

A: For the most part, what we encountered was simple human empathy. Many people there have relatives or friends in Ukraine. When we mentioned that there had been yet another shelling attack, the reaction was not political analysis but genuine compassion and sincere sorrow. They wished for our war to end as soon as possible.

I would say that many openly cursed Putin and his entire clique. They, too, do not yet see a quick or easy solution to our war, but they empathize deeply. And one important thing I noticed is that, while parts of the political establishment are cautious about making very explicit, demonstrative gestures of support for Ukraine, at the expert level and within society more broadly there is already a growing understanding that we are, to a significant degree, allies—because we are confronting the same axis of evil.

This understanding seems to be emerging gradually, despite the long-standing historical fears shaped by the fact that the Soviet Union once supported regimes hostile to Israel. Increasingly, there is a recognition that the source of evil is ultimately the same for them and for us.

Q: At the peace summit we have mentioned several times today, Chancellor Merz publicly urged Trump to do everything possible for achieving peace in Ukraine. He said explicitly that, in order to bring peace to the Middle East, you, Mr. President, applied pressure. Here, too, we are waiting for the moment when Donald Trump finally reaches for the whip rather than the carrot and shows it to Putin.

A: I think that when that happens, we will take a banner reading “Thank you, Trump,” go to the U.S. embassy, and stretch it out together with our colleagues—just as is being done now in Jerusalem.

Q: God grant that it be so.

Ihor Dolgov led this conversation

Watch the conversation in full on Ukrinform YouTube channel