Despite renewed U.S. sanctions pressure, Russia continues to generate billions from oil exports, adapting to shifting global market conditions. At the same time, Ukraine is intensifying strikes on key nodes of the Russian economy—from ports to oil terminals—effectively building its own model of economic pressure.
Can these dynamics meaningfully affect the course of the war? And which factors could prove decisive for Putin’s regime? Ukrinform spoke with political analyst Vadym Denysenko, head of the Business Capital think tank.
OUR STRIKES ON RUSSIAN PORTS HURT—BUT CONSISTENCY AND DURATION ARE DECISIVE
Q: The United States has reinstated sanctions on Russian oil. To what extent will the billions Russia earned during the period of eased restrictions influence the war? What can these funds sustain?
A: In practical terms, the impact on the war will be limited. Even before sanctions, roughly 90% of Russian oil exports went to China and India. That structure has not fundamentally changed—around the same share still flows to those markets today.
The key variable is pricing. Prior to the escalation around Iran, Russia was forced to sell oil at steep discounts and relatively low prices. The question now is whether that discount will persist. If it does, it is likely to be minimal. In fact, the chances of it remaining significant are low, as the global oil market is currently experiencing tighter supply rather than surplus.
Lavrov’s recent visit to China is telling in this regard. One of his goals was to secure stable demand for Russian oil. Beijing offered no clear commitments, but it is evident that China will seek to extract more favorable terms, including some level of discount. Still, at a strategic level, neither the tightening nor the easing of U.S. sanctions fundamentally alters the volume of Russian oil exports.
Q: At the same time, the U.S. Treasury Secretary has stated that Russia may have earned around $2 billion from oil sales during the sanctions relief period. Reuters, citing the IEA, reports that Russia earned $19 billion in March, compared to $9.75 billion in February. How do you interpret these figures?
A: The arithmetic is fairly straightforward. Every additional $10 increase in oil prices brings roughly $1.6 billion in extra revenue to the Russian budget. Compared to the period before the escalation around Iran, prices have risen by about $40. In theory, this could translate into roughly $6 billion in additional income for Russia.
However, this is an idealized model. In practice, the situation is more complex. Due to Ukrainian strikes on Baltic ports and Novorossiysk, Russia has likely been unable to fully capitalize on this potential. In other words, the additional revenues exist—but not at the maximum level that would have been possible without disruptions to infrastructure.
Q: You mentioned Ukraine’s systematic strikes on Russia’s economic nodes—ports, oil terminals, critical industrial facilities. Can we already speak of a measurable effect from these so-called “drone sanctions”? To what extent do they undermine Russia’s ability to sustainably finance the war?
A: The question is less about whether Russia can finance the war, and more about the scale of the losses it is incurring. Those losses are already tangible, even if they remain difficult to quantify precisely.
At certain points, there have been weeks when Russia lost approximately 15–20% of its export capacity. This translates into significant shortfalls in foreign currency earnings. Does this put war financing at risk? Probably not. But it does complicate budget inflows at specific moments.
The key variable is consistency. If Ukraine can sustain these strikes over time, the effect will be cumulative. Even now, they are highly painful—both for the stability of Russia’s oil market and for its broader macro-financial position. But the decisive factor remains the durability of this pressure: how frequently and for how long Ukraine can continue targeting critical infrastructure, particularly ports.
CURRENT UKRAINE–RUSSIA NEGOTIATION FORMAT HAS HAVE EFFECTIVELY REACHED A DEAD END
Q: How do you assess the current dynamics within the Ukraine–U.S.–Russia triangle? Are there any conditions for resuming negotiations any time soon? And how long will the informal principle of “not provoking Trump” remain a guiding factor?
A: Can negotiations resume? Certainly. But whether they will yield results is an entirely different matter. Frankly, beyond prisoner exchanges—which are genuinely important—no breakthroughs should be expected.
A sober assessment suggests that the current negotiation format has effectively reached a dead end. In my view, there are no clear signs that this will change in the near future.
Q: What or who could break this deadlock?
A: The core problem is that there is currently no actor capable of exerting real pressure on Putin—neither domestically nor externally. As long as that remains the case, he will continue along his current course.
Trump is often cited in this context. However, the reality is that he lacks sufficient leverage to force Putin to halt the war. That is why, within the existing framework, expectations of meaningful negotiation outcomes remain unrealistic.
At the same time, it is important to recognize that after the events in Iran, Trump needs foreign policy wins. Ukraine is one of the arenas where he may attempt to demonstrate “success.” This creates a complex dilemma for Kyiv: it cannot afford a rupture with Trump on the one hand, it must resist any attempt to force Ukraine into concessions on the other.
The temptation to respond sharply—especially against the backdrop of recent diplomatic gains—is real. But such reactions must be contained, as they risk becoming emotional decisions with negative strategic consequences.
To reiterate: the current negotiation format is effectively at a dead end. Without revising it—without broadening the circle of participants—meaningful progress is unlikely.
Q: What does expanding the format entail? Does it mean involving Europe and other actors?
A: First and foremost, Europe. In practice, it is already partially engaged: representatives of France, Germany, and the United Kingdom have participated in behind-the-scenes consultations, and the Ukrainian delegation maintains ongoing coordination with them.
Beyond Europe, other actors could potentially be brought into an expanded format—namely China, Saudi Arabia, and, in theory, Turkey. Expanding the pool of participants could help create the conditions necessary to move the process beyond its current impasse.
DON’T FOCUS ON TRUMP’S WORDS—WATCH HIS ACTIONS
Q: President Trump first speaks about the effective end of the “operation against Iran,” then about continued negotiations that “may take place in the coming days,” while also mentioning a possible blockade of the Strait of Hormuz. How should this be interpreted? More broadly, who is gaining strategically in this situation, and who is merely achieving tactical advantages?
A: The key point is not to overinterpret Trump’s rhetoric, but to assess his actions. At this stage, he has effectively extended the ceasefire while preparing for a new round of negotiations. The United States has neither exited talks with Iran nor shifted to large-scale military operations. There are no signs, for example, of serious action targeting Kharg Island.
This indicates that Trump still sees a negotiated outcome as achievable. The central question is whether he can apply sufficient pressure on Iran to secure meaningful concessions.
In terms of strategic gains and losses, Russia appears to be benefiting at this stage—primarily due to higher oil prices. By contrast, Middle Eastern states are incurring substantial losses as a result of the de facto disruption of the Strait of Hormuz.
The United States is also in a disadvantageous position—not so much economically as politically and reputationally. For China, the situation is likewise unfavorable: beyond energy flows and logistics through Hormuz, it affects significant Chinese investments in regional infrastructure. This instability directly undermines Beijing’s interests.
That is the current balance of outcomes.
Q: And what about Iran and Israel?
A: We are still in the midst of the process, so it is too early to draw definitive conclusions. That said, at this stage Israel shows no intention of ending the war. On the contrary, it is seeking to fully exploit the situation to degrade Iran’s infrastructure and its proxy networks.
For Iran, this is a survival scenario. The primary objective is to preserve the regime and maintain control over the country. If that goal is achieved, Iranian elites can already frame the outcome as a success.
Moreover, the very fact that Iran is able to influence the situation around the Strait of Hormuz—while the United States remains unwilling to commit to a ground operation—can be interpreted, at minimum, as an interim tactical success for Tehran.
BELGIUM HOLDS THE KEY TO RUSSIAN ASSETS—AND REJECTS CONFISCATION
Q: The future of roughly $300 billion in frozen Russian assets remains uncertain. Previously, the U.S. administration signaled to the EU the possibility of returning these funds to Russia as part of a potential peace agreement, while Moscow, through its allies in Europe, sought to block any move toward confiscation. Now the political landscape has shifted: the Orbán factor has effectively disappeared, and relations between Trump and Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni have become more complicated. Do you see a window of opportunity to revisit the confiscation issue? What is the main obstacle today?
A: In essence, nothing has changed fundamentally. Much attention is given to the Orbán factor or Meloni’s position, but the decisive player in this matter has always been—and remains—Belgium, where the bulk of frozen Russian assets is held.
Belgium’s stance is unequivocal: it firmly opposes confiscation.
Naturally, we would prefer a different outcome. But speaking realistically, I do not see any prerequisites for meaningful progress on confiscating Russian assets in the near term.
NO RESET ON THE HORIZON FOR UKRAINE-HUNGARY RELATIONS—JUST LESS FRICTION
Q: Péter Magyar has declared a pro-European course and willingness to cooperate with Brussels. This could open the way to unlocking €90 billion in financial assistance for Ukraine and new sanctions against Russia. At the same time, he does not support Ukraine’s rapid accession to the EU and has promised to hold a referendum on the issue. How do you interpret this duality? What are the prospects for resetting relations between Ukraine and Hungary?
A: First, it is important to understand the context: Magyar has secured a constitutional majority, which inevitably creates a sense of post-victory euphoria. In such circumstances, politicians rarely move toward rapid or far-reaching compromises.
For that reason, I do not expect any radical reset in Ukraine–Hungary relations in the near term. There will be some improvement—that is clear. In particular, Ukraine will most likely receive the financial decisions previously blocked by Orbán, including the €90 billion package.
However, any talk of a fundamental shift in Budapest’s policy would be an exaggeration. A significant portion of Hungarian society, shaped by years of Orbán’s rule, holds a rather critical—at times negative—view of Ukraine. Magyar cannot ignore these sentiments. He simply lacks the political space to pivot the country 180 degrees and declare a wholesale change in course.
Therefore, the most we can realistically expect is a reduction in tensions. If current relations can be described as openly negative, they may move to neutral-negative, and in the best-case scenario—to neutral. In the near term, however, relations will remain complex, albeit more constructive.
Q: Magyar inherits a system that Viktor Orbán spent 16 years building. How realistic is it to dismantle this “state within a state” quickly, given that Orbán placed loyalists throughout the system? Will the constitutional majority help the Tisza party in this regard? And secondly, how might Putin’s strategy evolve after the defeat of his ally?
A: Orbán’s loss marks the third consecutive major setback for Russia in European elections, following Romania and Moldova. This is undoubtedly positive for Ukraine. However, it does not mean that Russia has disappeared from Europe’s political landscape—it will continue to seek avenues of influence.
I am convinced that the Kremlin will attempt to establish points of contact with the new Hungarian leadership, particularly with the Tisza party. And it will likely succeed. One of the key instruments is the Druzhba oil pipeline—effectively the same kind of leverage that gas once represented for Ukraine. For segments of the Hungarian elite, it is also a consistent revenue stream, which makes it an especially sensitive tool.
But the issue goes beyond energy. Russia has long relied on political, business, and human intelligence networks to project influence. These mechanisms have not disappeared—if anything, they are likely to intensify.
As for domestic change, a rapid dismantling of Orbán’s system is unlikely. There are no signs of large-scale lustration. Instead, targeted personnel changes are to be expected —replacing several dozen, or perhaps a few hundred, key figures with people aligned with the Tisza party.
However, a full overhaul of the middle and upper tiers of the bureaucracy—or any kind of tectonic institutional shift—is unrealistic. Most likely, Magyar will build on the existing state framework, partially “clean” it, introduce selective legislative adjustments, but stop short of fundamentally restructuring the system—at least in the initial phase.
Q: And what will happen to Orbán? Are criminal cases possible? And what about Szijjártó?
A: As for Szijjártó, there is a high probability that he will either leave the country or come under investigation. The scenarios here are relatively straightforward.
Orbán’s case is far more complex. It remains unclear whether any informal arrangements were reached between Orbán and Magyar regarding a form of “political immunity.” The potential role of the United States in this process is also uncertain.
At this stage, Magyar has shown no intention of launching large-scale prosecutions. Most likely, any legal or lustration measures will be limited to a relatively narrow group within Orbán’s inner circle.
Q: Will Slovak Prime Minister Robert Fico and his government remain a problematic factor for Ukraine within the EU? Could he, after Orbán’s defeat, attempt to assume the role of the leading skeptic of support for Kyiv?
A: It is clear that Fico will remain skeptical toward Ukraine. The question is how far he can go.
Without Orbán, he no longer has the political weight or backing that previously enabled the formation of a kind of “anti-Ukrainian center” in Europe. On his own, he is unlikely to lead such a bloc.
As a result, while his rhetoric will remain critical, his actions are likely to become more restrained. The overall level of confrontation from Bratislava will probably decrease.
IF GERMANY AND FRANCE OPPOSE FAST-TRACK EU ACCESSION FOR UKRAINE, THE EU FOLLOWS
Q: There is increasing discussion about a shift in Ukraine’s role on the global geopolitical stage. While we should be cautious with such conclusions, if this shift is indeed occurring, how fundamental is it?
A: Ukraine’s role is undoubtedly growing. The very fact of what Volodymyr Zelensky has achieved in the Middle East and beyond is already a significant positive. However, conducting successful visits is one thing; translating them into concrete outcomes is another.
The key question is whether these diplomatic efforts will be backed by tangible decisions, binding agreements, and long-term results. Much will depend on that.
For now, this can be seen as a positive start. But the most difficult phase begins next—consistent, day-to-day work. What Mykola Khvylovy once described as “heroic everyday life.”
Q: How realistic is the prospect of a deeper reconfiguration of the European Union and NATO involving Ukraine? What form could this take? Is it achievable in the foreseeable future, as some suggest?
A: Frankly, this issue is not even on the agenda at present. While it is a subject of discussion—and occasionally raised by European partners—there is no real process underway to “restructure” either NATO or the European Union.
Similarly, talk of Ukraine’s rapid accession to the EU is not grounded in current realities. There are no such prospects in the near term. As for NATO, the situation is even more clear-cut: Ukraine’s membership is not advancing at all at this stage.
We have already received clear signals from key EU states. If Germany and France do not support accelerated accession, this effectively defines the position of the European Union as a whole. Accordingly, expectations of a swift EU membership for Ukraine in the near future are unrealistic.
RUSSIA COULD THEORETICALLY TARGET THE BALTICS—BUT FOR NOW IT’S DETERRENCE, NOT WAR PREP
Q: The State Duma is creating a legal framework for deploying troops abroad “to protect Russian citizens.” Does this signal preparation for new aggressive scenarios, including against NATO countries?
A: If we speak about potential targets, then, theoretically, the Baltic states are the only plausible option. But “could” and “is ready” are fundamentally different.
At present, I see no evidence that Russia is preparing for actual military action against the Baltic states. There are two conflicting logics at play. On the one hand, Russia seeks to restore economic ties with Europe and secure sanctions relief. On the other, a direct confrontation with Europe would automatically eliminate that possibility.
The second factor is China. Beijing has no interest in escalation involving the Baltic region. Baltic ports play an important role in logistics, including energy supply chains, and instability there would run counter to Chinese interests.
Third, even a hypothetical incursion into Narva or Tallinn would not resolve Russia’s core strategic objective—undermining the European Union. Without Ukraine’s defeat, such actions would not deliver the outcome the Kremlin seeks.
So, is Putin theoretically considering such scenarios? Yes. But at this stage, their practical rationale appears weak. For now, this is better understood as a tool of intimidation rather than preparation for a real war.
Q: Russia is tightening control over the internet, restricting digital services, and pressuring messaging platforms—moving toward a “sovereign internet” model. What does this indicate, and where could it lead?
A: There is no single driver here—it is a convergence of factors. These include preparation for potential mobilization, fear of foreign influence, concern over unrest amid declining living standards, and efforts to rein in so-called “ultra-patriots”—the Z-community, which is highly active online and at times problematic for the authorities.
In terms of consequences, we are already seeing some fluctuations. There are indications that pressure on Telegram may be temporarily eased. But this should not be mistaken for a strategic shift.
On the contrary, Russia is steadily moving toward maximum restrictions on access to independent communication channels. Over the coming year, it will likely attempt to block or severely limit access to Telegram and other platforms.
The key uncertainty is how effectively the authorities can counter VPNs and other circumvention tools. There is no clear answer yet. But the trajectory itself—even with temporary pauses—is clear.
Q: In the fifth year of the full-scale war, what factors could become decisive for destabilizing or even bringing down Putin’s regime? Are there scenarios beyond the notion of a “black swan,” or will unpredictability remain central?
A: By definition, a “black swan” cannot be predicted. But if we focus on more tangible and realistic factors, the economy remains the decisive one.
A sharp deterioration in the economic situation—both in key sectors and in the living standards of the broader population—remains the primary potential trigger for destabilization.
Ukraine, for its part, can directly influence this dynamic—above all by targeting Russia’s oil export infrastructure. The energy sector is the backbone of the Russian economy, and sustained pressure on it translates into direct pressure on the regime’s stability.
Myroslav Liskovych led this conversation. Kyiv