After five weeks of war in Iran, hostilities continue on both sides. Donald Trump has repeatedly declared victory, yet the campaign’s objectives keep shifting, making it impossible to determine whether any of them have actually been achieved. The Strait of Hormuz remains blocked, while the United States continues to build up forces in the Persian Gulf in preparation for a possible ground operation.
This brings us to a key question: why are asymmetric actions so difficult to predict—and how can they be countered?
Ukrinform invited Lieutenant General Ihor Romanenko, former Deputy Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine (2006–2010), a military analyst and scholar, to address this and more questions. His perspective combines theory with battlefield practice—particularly valuable given his expertise in air defense.
Q: In the 20-minute speech from the White House on April 1, Donald Trump said his country will "finish the job" in Iran soon as "core strategic objectives are nearing completion, and had "decimated" Iran's navy drone and ballistic missile forces. He once again declared victory, stating that the war with Iran is nearing completion and could end within two to three weeks.
The U.S. president said:
“As we speak this evening, it has been just one month since the United States military began Operation Epic Fury targeting the world’s number one state sponsor of terror, Iran. In these past four weeks, our Armed Forces have delivered swift, decisive, overwhelming victories on the battlefield… Tonight, Iran’s navy is gone. Their air force is in ruins. Their leaders, most of them — the terrorist regime they led — are now dead. Their command and control of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Core is being decimated as we speak. Their ability to launch missiles and drones is dramatically curtailed and their weapons, factories, and rocket launchers are being blown to pieces — very few of them left.”
If everything has indeed been “destroyed,” as Trump claims, then why are another two to three weeks required? Such statements, at the very least, call for critical scrutiny.
A: Over the past year, we have grown accustomed to this style of messaging from the current administration. It is rich in slogans that often diverge from reality. This is particularly evident in matters of security—global security above all. And the war in Iran is unquestionably of global significance.
Its effects are already visible—not only in the security domain but also in the global economy. Much will have long-term consequences, especially if the war does not conclude within the timeframe announced by Trump. The contradictions are evident: on the one hand, nearly total destruction is proclaimed; on the other, strikes continue against U.S. bases in the Middle East and against facilities in allied countries.
Initially, “victory” was framed as regime change in Iran. If that objective remains relevant, its feasibility now appears highly questionable. The same applies to claims that Iran’s capabilities have been eliminated. While significant elements—particularly within strategic command and control—have been damaged, they have already been reconstituted with new personnel.
Iran, for its part, had prepared for such a scenario. Contingency frameworks were in place to replace leadership in the event of losses—perhaps not at the scale inflicted by U.S. and Israeli actions, but sufficient to maintain continuity.
As a result, the war continues. Iran retains control over the Strait of Hormuz and, judging by official statements, is neither making concessions nor accepting U.S. ultimatums.
Q: In his address to the nation, Trump made no mention of regime change in Iran. As it stands, the situation resembles the dilemma described in Joseph Heller’s Catch-22: whichever path he chooses, there are no good options. He has no easy exit. If he withdraws and ends the war, it will be seen as a humiliation; if he stays, the United States risks becoming mired in a protracted conflict—“stuck in a swamp,” as American experts put it.
So what went wrong? Why has an operation that was intended to be rapid, decisive, and effective turned into a drawn-out campaign? What explains this—and can it really be reduced to poor preparation?
A: This is precisely why Trump avoids addressing these questions directly and instead looks for alternative “victories” that lack an objective foundation. Both he and the broader U.S. leadership are now maneuvering politically.
The root cause lies in the absence of a plan grounded in a realistic assessment of Iran as a state and of its security apparatus. Without an objective evaluation of the adversary, it is impossible to design operations that align with battlefield realities. That is exactly what happened. There was no clearly defined strategic objective; moreover, the operation itself was built on a flawed understanding of Iran’s resilience and military potential.
Planning relied almost exclusively on the capabilities of the United States and Israel—and, as events have shown, that was insufficient. European and NATO allies were not meaningfully involved in the planning process, and it has now become evident that the available capacity is inadequate, particularly for a potential ground operation.
We are also seeing a parallel with Trump’s approach to Ukraine: security guarantees are framed as something to be provided only after hostilities cease. European countries have mirrored this logic in response to U.S. requests for military support in the Strait of Hormuz. At the same time, Trump has even raised the possibility of a U.S. withdrawal from NATO—despite the fact that existing legislation does not grant the president unilateral authority to do so.
Q: We will return to Europe shortly. After five weeks of fighting, military analysts and Middle East experts estimate that Iran retains roughly 50% of its launch systems, along with thousands of drones. This is more than sufficient to sustain instability in the region and to continue waging what Iranian authorities frame as a “holy war” against the United States. And this dynamic is likely to persist.
But returning to the operational theater: how should we assess the performance of air defense? The Persian Gulf states are wealthy, technologically advanced, and equipped with some of the most sophisticated and expensive air defense systems supplied by the United States. Yet these systems proved insufficient. Why? Did they fail to absorb Ukraine’s experience over more than four years of full-scale war?
A: The answer lies partly in the broader decision-making approach. Trump does not tend to engage deeply with complex issues. His mindset is rooted in a business-oriented framework—the assumption that even matters of national and international security can be managed in the same way as commercial negotiations.
However, returning to the substance of what is happening in the military domain, it must be emphasized that such approaches and “deal-based” thinking do not translate effectively into warfare. Moreover, Trump demonstrated a dismissive attitude toward Ukraine’s experience, even though U.S. military institutions, security agencies, and specialists have been actively studying it.
There were attempts to incorporate this experience—we shared a substantial amount of operational knowledge and expertise—and to translate it into training and doctrine. But such adaptation cannot happen quickly, particularly within large and complex military systems.
From my own experience, I can say that American servicemen now engaged in combat understand a fundamental truth: no level of training, however advanced, can substitute for the experience gained in actual combat operations.
Powerful air defense systems were deployed at U.S. bases across the Middle East, yet they lacked adequate protection against drones. This is what we refer to as short-range or low-tier air defense. Drones operate at low altitudes—typically between 10 meters and 3 kilometers—where high-end systems are less effective without layered protection. These advanced systems were poorly concealed and lacked maneuverability, which made them vulnerable. As a result, four were destroyed. Iranian forces specifically targeted radar stations, and once those were disabled, the surface-to-air missile systems became inoperable.
Moreover, Iranian strikes have extended beyond air defense assets to include both aviation and command-and-control components. Aerial refueling aircraft have been destroyed, along with an E-3A airborne early warning and control (AWACS) platform. Attacks have also targeted systems critical to coordinating command, air defense, and missile defense operations. These losses are not widely publicized, but they reflect the actual operational picture.
Q: Despite the stance of Trump and the United States, countries subjected to Iranian air and drone attacks quickly grasped the nature of the threat, assessed the risks, and turned to Ukraine for assistance. Ukraine responded immediately, offering both advisory and direct support—and did so efficiently.
President Zelenskyy deployed more than 200 Ukrainian experts to the region and personally conducted a diplomatic tour of Middle Eastern countries to discuss both immediate assistance and long-term cooperation. The objective is not limited to solving immediate tactical problems—such as protecting specific bases—but extends to establishing a durable framework for future security cooperation.
President Zelenskyy stated:
“Ukraine participates in all formats of cooperation with partners to enhance security and strengthen our collective capacity. We continue working with countries under attack from the Iranian regime. New agreements have been reached, and Ukraine will expand its presence in emerging security frameworks. This will undoubtedly strengthen both our export potential and our defense capabilities.”
This is an ambitious objective with clear practical implications, particularly for civilian protection, as Iranian strikes continue to damage airports, hotels, and critical infrastructure.
At the same time, there is a second dimension to this mutually beneficial cooperation. The greater the deployment of Ukrainian short-range air defense systems abroad, the more interceptor missiles can be conserved for Patriot and other long-range systems currently defending Ukrainian airspace. What, then, are the prospects for this cooperation?
A:: This is indeed a complex issue for Ukraine. There is a risk that the United States—despite European funding commitments—could suspend deliveries of missile defense systems, particularly Patriot systems armed against ballistic threats. Currently, the U.S. provides roughly 75% of these missiles to Ukraine. Importantly, these are not standard interceptors, but PAC-3 variants specifically designed to counter ballistic threats, including Russian missiles.
At the same time, Ukraine now possesses some of the most advanced unmanned systems in Europe—and possibly globally. This capability has been forged through hard-earned battlefield experience, including the significant sacrifices Ukraine has made. That experience not only enhances our ability to counter aggression but also positions Ukraine as a highly attractive partner for both Middle Eastern and European countries.
European states have increasingly recognized that Ukraine represents the most capable, combat-experienced military force in Europe. As a result, they are turning to Ukraine for solutions in weapons development, training, and joint production. Crucially, the diplomatic and security initiatives led by President Zelensky—particularly his engagement with Middle Eastern partners—are now shaping a long-term strategic horizon extending ten years or more.
His recent visit should therefore be understood as a strategic-level development. It is not only about addressing immediate needs—such as securing anti-ballistic missiles or financing new procurements—but also about opening pathways for sustained defense-industrial growth and, ultimately, deeper integration into the European Union.
Q: Discussions about launching Ukrainian arms exports during wartime have been ongoing for some time, particularly among private defense manufacturers. The reason is straightforward: Ukraine’s defense-industrial base is currently underutilized, operating at roughly 40% of its potential capacity. With sufficient investment, output could be significantly increased. Arms exports, therefore, offer a mechanism to solicit direct investment into the sector.
In this context, the war in Iran and the broader instability in the Middle East have accelerated Ukraine’s entry into the global arms market. Even prior to the Iranian campaign, President Zelensky had announced that Ukraine would re-enter the arms market in 2026.
The key question now is: what exactly is Ukraine bringing to that market—and where is the demand strongest?
A: In this context, funding is critical—resources we currently lack for further development. What is required is sustained investment in Ukraine’s domestic defense-industrial base, combined with deeper cooperation with companies from allied countries. Our partners possess capital and industrial capacity, but they do not—and will not—have certain capabilities that Ukraine has developed, particularly in the field of weaponry.
As for training, we have already addressed that. But when it comes to weapons systems—especially drones—the pace of change is extraordinary. Developments occur monthly, sometimes even weekly. In some cases, lessons learned in the first half of the day are already implemented by evening. While the head of Rheinmetall once referred to Ukrainians building systems “in garages,” in reality, modifications are often made immediately on the front line, in field workshops.
In other words, Ukrainian design engineers operate in a continuous feedback loop—adapting technologies and tactics in real time. By contrast, foreign defense companies have traditionally required up to two years to integrate similar changes. Now, observing Ukraine’s model, they are compressing these cycles from years to months in response to the demands of modern warfare.
Q: The broader conclusion is clear: the conflict in the Middle East, the war in Iran, and Russia’s war against Ukraine all represent a new type of warfare—21st-century warfare—defined by high technological intensity, rapid adaptation, and asymmetric methods. The significance of asymmetry is underscored by the fact that the United States did not anticipate Iran’s ability to effectively block the Strait of Hormuz.
This brings us to an important conceptual shift. We are already familiar with the notion of total defense, which Ukraine applied in the first year of the war. Now, however, we must also consider the concept of total war—where conflict extends beyond the battlefield into the economic domain, as evidenced by the global impact on energy markets.
A: I agree with this assessment. Victory in modern war will belong to the side that adapts more rapidly, responds in line with objective battlefield realities, and avoids decisions driven by political illusions.
There are objective laws of warfare. Regardless of leadership, these laws must be understood and respected. This requires a clear-eyed assessment of the adversary, an honest evaluation of one’s own forces, and the ability to act in accordance with these realities—at speed.
Only under such conditions can victory be achieved.
I have well-founded confidence that Ukraine can be that victor.
Ihor Dolhov led this conversation
Photo via Ukrinform’s archive