On February 24, four years will have passed since the launch of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine — a war that has reshaped the country, altered Europe’s security architecture, and reverberated across the global order. Over this period, Ukraine has withstood the assault, preserved its statehood, consolidated an international coalition of support, and continues its fight to restore territorial integrity and secure a just and lasting peace.
In an interview, Deputy Head of the Office of the President Pavlo Palisa underscores that, despite sustained large-scale attacks and the enemy’s tactical adaptation, Russia has failed to achieve a decisive breakthrough capable of altering the war’s overall configuration. He identifies several pillars of Ukraine’s response: the resilience of its society and armed forces, the rapid technological modernization of the military, the expansion of the domestic defense-industrial base, and the deepening of strategic partnerships.
Ukrinform spoke with the Deputy Head of the Presidential Office about anticipated frontline challenges in 2026, necessary reforms within the Armed Forces, the tightening of sanctions against Russia, and Belarus’s evolving role in the Russo-Ukrainian war.
THE ENEMY HAS FAILED TO ACHIEVE A BREAKTHROUGH THAT WOULD CHANGE THE COURSE OF THE WAR
Q: Mr. Pavlo, let us begin by taking stock on the eve of February 24. For four years now, Ukraine has been resisting Russian aggression following the full-scale invasion. It was imperative for Ukraine to build Armed Forces capable — through advanced technological integration — of deterring and defeating the enemy. In your view, what five of the most effective decisions taken by the top military leadership over these four years stand out?
A: Frankly, I would caution against reducing this to “five decisions.” This confrontation is not defined by isolated decisions or a single date. It is a complex, often painful process of continuously adapting to challenges for which no one can ever be fully prepared in modern warfare.
We have endured — and we continue to fight. So rather than naming five decisions, I would speak about several fundamental responses to the challenges of war.
First, societal resilience. The enemy anticipated a rapid collapse. Instead, Ukrainians — both servicemembers and civilians — demonstrated the capacity to sustain a protracted struggle. Four years of full-fledged war constitutes an unprecedented strain for any country. Yet Ukrainian forces are not simply holding their defenses; they are adapting, learning, refining tactics, and maintaining initiative. This cannot be attributed to a single decision, but it represents a strategic response to aggression.
Second — technological transformation. Ukraine moved swiftly to integrate unmanned systems, digital command-and-control platforms, and elements of artificial intelligence into combat operations. Drones have evolved from a supplementary capability into an integrated system shaping battlefield dynamics. This shift has altered the operational balance and helped offset the enemy’s numerical superiority.
Third — the endurance and expansion of the domestic defense-industrial base. Despite sustained strikes on industrial facilities, energy infrastructure, and logistics networks, we not only preserved core capabilities but scaled them up. By the end of 2025, Ukraine was independently meeting roughly half of frontline requirements in key categories. This marks a structural transition: from being primarily a recipient of military assistance to becoming a producer of modern weaponry.
Fourth — the establishment of a durable international coalition of support. Considerable credit is due to the President of Ukraine and the diplomatic corps. In early 2022, there were no guarantees that support would be systematic or sustained. Today, assistance is institutionalized and structured — encompassing arms deliveries, financial backing, and coordinated sanctions policy.
It is the convergence of these elements — sustained international backing, expanded domestic production, technological modernization, and societal resilience — that constitutes Ukraine’s comprehensive response to full-scale aggression.
RUSSIA SEEKS TO ERODE TRUST AT HOME AND AMONG ALLIES
Q: What are the principal challenges facing Ukrainian forces in 2026? What threats and trends should we anticipate?
A: The enemy continues to rely on mass, sustained pressure, and rapid adaptation. We see how quickly the nature of warfare is evolving: strike drones, FPV systems, precision-guided glide bombs, and large-scale air assaults. Yet the critical point is this: despite the tempo and intensity, the enemy has not secured a decisive strategic outcome on the battlefield. There has been no breakthrough capable of altering the overall configuration of the war. That reality creates a dilemma for them.
Absent political progress or movement in negotiations, Russia will likely seek additional resources through renewed mobilization. In practical terms, the emphasis on quantity over quality may intensify. For us, this means the war will remain high-intensity.
Another major challenge is preserving personnel. Exhaustion is not theoretical. Four years of all-out war impose extraordinary strain on servicemembers. Issues of rotation, recovery, and training are not administrative matters — they directly determine combat effectiveness.
Separately, I would highlight the PSYOP dimension. Russia continues to target our internal cohesion and the unity of our partners. It understands that the front is not limited to the line of contact; it also runs through public trust within the country and among allies. For that reason, the PSYOP domain remains an integral and active theater of war.
RUSSIA IS PREPARED TO PAY A HEAVY PRICE FOR ITS IMPERIAL AMBITIONS
Q: Russia has undoubtedly paid a significant price for every kilometer of Ukrainian territory it captured over these four years. Can you share specific figures?
A: Russia has paid an extraordinarily high price — and continues to do so every day. But it is essential to consider not only the extent of the losses, but their strategic implications.
Russia’s cumulative personnel losses have reached approximately 1.26 million — the highest since the Second World War. In 2025 alone, the cost of seizing one kilometer of territory averaged 120 personnel. These are not merely statistics. Russia has forfeited its reputation as the “second army of the world.” It has depleted much of its professional military cadre and grown increasingly dependent on imported components and support from other authoritarian regimes. That, too, constitutes a strategic cost.
Our objective is to methodically degrade Russia’s military potential to the point where continuing the war becomes strategically irrational.
From an economic standpoint, Russia still posts certain macroeconomic indicators, but they are sustained by large-scale budget militarization. The economy has effectively shifted into a wartime mobilization model — characterized by surging defense expenditures, contraction in civilian investment, and deepening technological isolation. Such a model may be viable in the short term, but it does not generate durable, long-term sustainability.
That said, we must remain clear-eyed: despite these losses, Russia has not halted its aggression. It continues to adapt and adjust tactics. It is prepared to absorb significant costs in pursuit of its imperial ambitions.
Nevertheless, if there is even the slightest opportunity to end the war through diplomacy, it must be pursued.
VICTORY REQUIRES BOLD AND DECISIVE CHANGE
Q: After your first meeting with the new Minister of Defense, Mykhailo Fedorov, you noted that key priorities had been aligned and the groundwork laid for new decisions. How have these concepts been received at lower levels of command?
A: We cannot afford stagnation in the face of the challenges we are confronting. If we intend to prevail, bold and sometimes uncomfortable reforms are indispensable. The readiness to implement necessary — even unpopular — reforms is not a matter of choice; it is a requirement of wartime reality. This expectation is not imposed from above alone — it is voiced by soldiers on the front line.
I would prefer not to pre-empt forthcoming announcements, but I am confident that we will soon see greater detail regarding the Minister’s initiatives and how they will be implemented.
AN ARMY “RATING” SYSTEM MUST BE A PROFESSIONAL TOOL — NOT A MEDIA EXERCISE
Q: How do you assess the proposal to establish a ranking system for commanders’ effectiveness?
A: There is a strong and capable pool of professional personnel. Over four years of full-fledged war, a generation of officers has emerged with invaluable operational experience. Our responsibility is not to lose them, but to ensure their expertise is applied effectively and systematically.
The concept of measuring effectiveness is sound. However, any “rating” mechanism must function as a professional management tool, not a media-driven exercise. It requires clearly defined, objective criteria that enable advancement based on competencies and performance — not subjective preferences or personal loyalty.Початок форми
INTRODUCING CLEAR CONTRACT MODELS WITH DEFINED TERMS OF SERVICE
Q: The Minister has stated that he is prepared to take politically difficult decisions. In your assessment, which of those should be addressed first?
A: To speak candidly, the most contentious decisions in wartime invariably concern mobilization and the question of fairness.
Society demands clarity and transparency. Accordingly, a key priority must be the modernization of the service model — specifically, the introduction of clear contractual frameworks with defined terms of service. This is an inherently sensitive issue, as it affects different social groups in different ways. Yet it is precisely predictability and equal conditions that underpin public confidence and a sense of justice.
The war has become protracted. We must move beyond emergency, improvised measures toward a structured and sustainable force-generation system. That shift requires deliberate institutional reform.
I welcome the Minister’s willingness to assume responsibility for such steps. Without anticipating formal announcements, I believe we will soon see more detailed proposals outlining how these changes will be implemented.
Q: In light of the challenges Ukraine has faced over the past year regarding the supply of weapons and military equipment from the United States, would it be prudent to progressively expand procurement from European partners?
A: Diversification is a pillar of strategic resilience. We are indeed observing a gradual European shift toward greater investment in domestic defense-industrial capacity. Capabilities that Ukraine cannot yet produce at scale are best secured from our closest partners. The broader Europe’s production base and the more joint defense projects we undertake, the less vulnerable we become to political volatility.
At the same time, the United States remains an indispensable partner, particularly in terms of the range and volume of specific weapons systems — most notably in the field of air defense.
MANY PARTNER COUNTRIES ARE WARY OF DIRECT ENTRY INTO WAR WITH RUSSIA
Q: In your assessment, why have our partners still refrained from securing the skies, even over western Ukraine? Beyond political signaling, would Russia realistically risk striking a NATO member state?
A: It is a difficult question, and one that should, in fairness, be addressed to our partners. But frankly, for many of them the underlying concern is the risk of direct involvement in the war. My view is simple: The most reliable way to mitigate the risk of a broader war in Europe is to ensure that Russia’s defeat is unequivocal and beyond doubt.
Q: When might it be possible to expand the “kill zone” to prevent the enemy from infiltrating with small assault groups?
A: The term must be clearly understood. A “kill zone” is not a discrete area on the map; it is an integrated operational architecture — combining reconnaissance, target detection, accelerated decision-making, precision engagement, and battle damage assessment.
This architecture is progressively expanding, driven largely by the enhanced capabilities of unmanned aerial systems. Is the expansion proceeding at a sufficient pace? If the enemy continues to adapt — shifting to small assault groups, dispersion, and infiltration tactics — then the answer is clearly no. There remains substantial scope for improvement.
In my view, securing dominance in low-altitude airspace requires more systematic countermeasures targeting enemy drone operators and their control networks. Relevant capabilities are being developed, but operational specifics and timelines are not disclosed publicly.
INFORMATION OPERATIONS ON ENEMY TERRITORY HAVE IMPACT — BUT NOT IMMEDIATE RESULTS
Q: How do you assess the effectiveness of information (including disinformation) operations conducted on enemy territory?
A: There is an impact, but it is inherently long-term. Information operations work cumulatively: they erode trust in governing institutions, influence mobilization patterns, and shape society’s readiness to absorb the costs of war. At the same time, the Russian Federation maintains a highly centralized system of censorship and repression, which constrains the likelihood of rapid or visibly disruptive outcomes. Success in this domain depends on consistency, credibility, and precise targeting of the adversary’s structural vulnerabilities.
THE ENEMY IS SEEKING ALTERNATIVES TO A BLOCKED STARLINK NETWORK
Q: How has restricting Starlink access for Russian forces affected the battlefield situation?
A: I would advise caution in drawing sweeping conclusions — even within Russia, reliable statistics are limited. Any disruption of communications degrades drone command-and-control capabilities and reduces the effectiveness of unit coordination. That is an objective operational reality. Credit is due to Mykhailo Fedorov for initiating the measure and to Elon Musk for responding.
However, the adversary is actively seeking workarounds and continues to adapt. It would be unrealistic to expect a single step to generate a decisive or transformative outcome. This measure is part of a broader contest for dominance in the communications and command-and-control domain.
In modern warfare, communications constitute a battlespace in their own right. The side that maintains more stable, secure, and resilient command structures holds the operational advantage.
RUSSIA HAS LAUNCHED THE FORMATION OF FOUR NEW DIVISIONS — BUT LACKS THE PERSONNEL TO FULLY STAFF THEM
Q: Is Russia establishing new military districts? If so, where and in what numbers?
A: In 2024, Russia reorganized its military command structure by reconstituting the Leningrad and Moscow military districts. Officially, this has been presented as strengthening the strategic axis vis-à-vis NATO. In practical terms, however, it appears to serve largely as political and psychological signaling rather than a substantive enhancement of combat power.
Establishing a military district administratively is one matter; manning it with trained personnel, equipping it adequately, and building a functioning logistical backbone is quite another. Furthermore, newly formed formations require significant time before they achieve real operational readiness.
It is also important to recall that in 2025 Russia announced plans to create 15 new divisions. In reality, only four have begun forming — and even those exist primarily on paper, with limited operational capacity. Heavy casualties at the front have made it difficult to staff these units up to strength.
Q: The President has warned of the risk of Belarus being drawn into the war. From a strategic standpoint, what is more important for Russia: using Belarusian territory as a platform for strikes, or involving the Belarusian armed forces to open a new front?
A: For Putin, it is strategically more convenient to use Belarusian territory as an operational platform — for pressure, missile deployments, and force projection. We are already observing the active use of transit corridors for Shahed drones, including the exploitation of telecommunications infrastructure to support drone navigation and control.
Direct involvement of the Belarusian armed forces would carry significant political risks for Lukashenko and provide questionable additional combat effectiveness. However, as a mechanism of pressure and strategic intimidation, the threat itself remains a tool actively employed.
Q: You maintain regular dialogue with ambassadors of partner states. To what extent does the issue of Belarus — and the potential deployment of the “Oreshnik” system — feature in these discussions? Do partners perceive it primarily as a regional threat to Ukraine, or as a broader European security concern?
A: The issue is consistently raised during consultations and briefings. Embassy representatives seek detailed assessments regarding the prospective deployment of the “Oreshnik” system on Belarusian territory. Our partners clearly recognize that the placement of a nuclear-capable delivery system in Belarus would not be aimed solely at Ukraine; it would represent a direct security concern for them — particularly for our Western European allies.
Q: In your February 10 statement, you mentioned detailed discussions with partners about the presence of foreign components in Russian missiles and possible sanctions responses. What practical steps can Ukraine and its partners take to further constrain Russia’s weapons production?
A: This is an extremely important issue. Russia’s war machine remains heavily dependent on imported components — microelectronics, optics, precision machine tools. Therefore, the most effective approach is not broad, generalized sanctions alone, but targeted disruption of supply chains, the imposition of secondary sanctions, and tighter synchronization of export controls among partners.
This is painstaking and technically demanding work, but it yields tangible results. Certain supply chains are severed, forcing Russia to seek alternative procurement routes, often substituting lower-quality components. In some cases, specific parts cannot be replaced at all. The more difficult it becomes for Russia to manufacture precision-guided weapons, the fewer opportunities it has to conduct large-scale, high-intensity strikes.
VICTORY IS A CONDITION IN WHICH RUSSIA CAN NO LONGER KILL OUR PEOPLE OR DICTATE OUR FUTURE
Q: Do you remember February 24, 2022? What were your emotions and impressions on that day?
A: Yes, I remember it very clearly. At the time, I was in the United States, attending the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College. It was a professional program focused on operational planning and contemporary approaches to warfare.
I did not sleep that night. Messages, calls, constant news updates. The decision to return was immediate. There was no hesitation. I am a soldier of the Ukrainian army. My place was in Ukraine.
However, returning was not straightforward. The American side, understandably, could not release me instantly — these were formal programs governed by procedures. I was told that an official request from the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine was required. I remember thinking: where would such a request come from in the first days of a full-scale invasion? Who even had the capacity to draft formal letters at that moment?
So I began making calls — through acquaintances, through professional contacts. Eventually, I obtained the number of the Commander of the Ground Forces. I explained the situation and stated clearly that I needed to return. After that, the process began to move more quickly.
It was a moment of absolute clarity. Not fear, not panic — but a sense of duty. When you understand that waiting is not an option. I had no clear vision of what the future would look like, but I knew with certainty that I had to be in Ukraine.
Q: Any war, regardless of its duration, brings death, destruction, loss, and exhaustion — especially one of the scale that millions of Ukrainian citizens are experiencing today. For you personally, and for your family given your military traditions, what would victory over the aggressor mean?
A: Victory is not an emotional image or a single day on the calendar. It is a sustained condition in which Russia no longer has the capacity to kill our people or dictate our future. It entails reliable security guarantees, a strong and modern army, accountability for crimes committed, and the return of our citizens — prisoners of war and deported children alike.
For a military family — and, ultimately, for any family in Ukraine — victory means something profoundly simple: that children grow up without air-raid sirens as a routine backdrop to their lives. It means that the price Ukraine has paid is converted into a lasting and secure peace, not merely an interlude before another war.
Svitlana Tkachuk led this conversation
Photos via Pavlo Palisa’s Facebook page