The President of Ukraine in March appointed Andriy Hnatov, then Major General, as Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine (AFU). General Hnatov has 30 years of experience of service with the armed forces, and used to have under his command a naval infantry brigade, the operational command "East" and the Joint Forces of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. He is currently Number Two in the command and control hierarchy, after the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine Oleksandr Syrskyi.
In this first interview with Ukrinform after appointment as chief of the Armed Forces General Staff, Andriy Hnatov was talking, among other things, about how the organizational restructuring process and the organization of corps within the Armed Forces are proceeding, the specifics of military training to adapt to a new enemy’s tactics on the battlefield, and where the enemy is expected to concentrate its efforts. Additionally, he answered questions about what to expect from the enemy’s autumn-winter campaign, about military salary hikes depending on the performance, and how contract servicemen aged 60+ can be useful.
- The agenda for the Supreme High Command General Headquarters meeting hosted by President Volodymyr Zelensky in late January included structural reorganization the Armed Forces of Ukraine and the formation of new corps. Where is the process now, and which of the milestones have been achieved?
- At this stage, the AFU have completed their transition to a corps-based command structure. All ten of the newly formed corps headquarters are already carrying out their assigned tasks within designated operational groups.
There are, of course, still "nuances regarding staffing, training, and ongoing changes within these structures". Well, we understand that such a large, complex mechanism as the Armed Forces of Ukraine is constantly being modified to adapt to rapidly changing technological landscapes and unpredictable future operational environments, and some organizational measures are constantly underway. I would add to this that the General Staff has arranged for and carried out a large amount of work to ensure simultaneous training of all ten newly organized corps headquarters. Needless to say, this has taken considerable effort, especially involving the best trained members of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. Alongside this, instructors from partner countries were helping in training personnel of the corps headquarters.
By the way, the enemy has failed to succeed with its plans for rapid offensive in the Donetsk Oblast, Kharkiv Oblast, Zaporizhzhia Oblast and other fronts, this thanks to the implementation of the corps-based command structure within the AFU.
The corps headquarters are now staffed to full strength, allowing them to perform combat (special) tasks as intended.
Other measures are being undertaken alongside the reform of the AFU organizational structure, including particularly the formation of new Assault Troops and Cyber Forces as separate branches of the military. This is part of a broader reorganization designed to increase efficiency and adapt to the challenges of modern warfare.
- Personnel shortage as before remains the most pressing issue. Thus, we cannot avoid the question about the personnel reshuffle that took place in the 17th and 20th Corps (the AFU Commander-in-Chief decided to remove Volodymyr Sylenko and Maksym Kitugin as commanders of the 17th and 20th Corps, respectively, - ed.). Are any other changes planned?
- Headquarters of the 3rd, 14th, 15th, 16th, 17th, 18th, 19th, 20th and 21st Army corps, as well as of the 8th Airborne Assault Corps have been formed within the AFU structure. These corps have already been transferred to under the command of operational headquarters of the AFU Land Forces and the AFU Airborne Assault Troops, respectively.
Regarding the personnel reshuffle that has taken place, this is a living process, and in the conditions of combat operations everything happens quite dynamically, because it is difficult to predict with 100% certainty whether a person will withstand the burden of combat leadership.
I would like to emphasize that the Armed Forces are actively implementing approaches aimed at expanding the autonomy of commanders at the tactical and operational levels. For this purpose, leadership courses of various levels are in place, and planning standards are being updated. A new generation of commanders - officers with immediate combat experience -- is gradually being integrated into the combat management hierarchy.
- Does that mean more personnel reshuffles will follow?
- Yes, indeed.
- General, how is the role of communication in the army changing, say, between the higher and lower levels of command? Are we moving to a more democratic style of communication?
- Good question. If we compare the times when I, for example, joined the military as a young officer, compare what the communication was like, what the relationships were like now and back then, I can tell you that this is a marathon distance apart. And I believe that communication between the military leadership and units they command is pretty open now, they talk quite boldly about their successes and failures.
I would also like to note that a lot has been done to ensure that there are no questions left unanswered that arise in society. Well, first of all, this is due to various negative situations that, understandably enough, arise time and again - be it enemy strikes that caused casualties, for example, or some crimes committed by servicemen. And I think it is good where people understand that the Armed Forces are not a flawless organization of some kind, but rather a large, complex structure that is constantly changing, constantly undergoing reform, while at the same time performing challenging combat tasks.
It is naive to think that people who were civilians yesterday, engaged in various activities and put on a military uniform today will immediately turn into ideal, disciplined soldiers. This does not happen, of course not. This is a complex, complicated process.
- Do you believe it necessary to integrate new skills and abilities into the military personnel training curriculum, given the change in the enemy's tactics on the battlefield over the past year?
- While previously the training curriculum was never updated for decades, now it is updated constantly in line with changes in the weapons used. Accordingly, the training standards change in line with the changes in the weapons and tactics being employed.
On top of that, in training military personnel for combat missions, we place a premium on psychological resilience training. For this purpose, the duration of basic combined-arms training has been increased from 30 to 51 days.
Thus, the duration of training in shooting, tactical medicine, combat engineering, military topography and the basics of electronic warfare has been increased. In addition, after completing basic combined-arms training and arriving at a duty station, service members undergo a two-week adaptation course.
An equally important component of the training system is improving training levels of operational staff officers and raising the quality of headquarters-to-headquarters coordination as a whole.
Indeed, we dispatch them to undergo a training course at military educational institutions or got them trained by mobile training groups. Alongside this, it is worth emphasizing that we have introduced standardized operational procedures for planning combat missions, ones that are generally accepted in the Armed Forces of the NATO member countries, and integrated them into headquarters staff training curriculums. At the final stage of combat team training at the level of individual units and subunits, we conduct two-stage exercises where command and staff personnel practice managing units during various scenarios involving the adversary using electronic warfare measures or UAVs. Because nowadays it is essential that a serviceman knows how and is not afraid to fight against air threats of various types, that he can choose the most suitable position, equip it, camouflage himself, that he knows how to observe the battlefield in these conditions, that he knows what makes him and his position detectable by the enemy, and that he knows how to effectively use improvised or standard means of camouflage.
- Will the servicemen of the newly organized assault troops be trained differently?
- This is one of the most challenging missions for the infantry troops - to storm an enemy position or facility, the one which is skillfully equipped and well-defended. There are a lot of requirements set for these servicemen, ranging from the moral and psychological resilience (there must be provided special training for this) to practical skills in intra-unit coordination, the ability to act in small groups, the ability to act under the constant supervision of enemy drones.
Therefore, indeed, there are curriculums tailored specifically for assault units to train them for offensive, assault actions. They are constantly provided with the requisite, state-of-the-art equipment and armaments.
At the same time, I would hereby recall that the Armed Forces of Ukraine are fostering the culture of a responsible attitude towards human life, in particular through better training of servicemen, the sharing of best warfighting practices, the conduct of post-mission analysis (After Action Reviews), and the adoption and mastery of modern technological solutions such as unmanned systems among other things.
- Given the specifics of the service in the Airborne Assault Troops and Ground Assault Troops, is it worth introducing some kind of differentiated salaries or bonuses for these troops?
- It is worth it, indeed. I would not announce particular programs we are currently working on. The President of Ukraine has recently announced that work is currently underway to hike salaries and monetary bonuses to military personnel. These will be calculated using different methods depending on the complexity of a specific profession, on how much time it takes for a person to learn and master this profession. Understandably enough, military personnel performing less complex tasks will be entitled to lower salaries compared, for example, to an F-16 navigator or pilot, who needs to study a lot and has to maintain a very high level of personal health.
- Blackouts in Moscow (President Zelensky stated that if Russia threatens blackouts in Kyiv, it will face blackouts in Moscow in retaliation for bombardments of critical infrastructure in the Ukrainian capital, - ed.). So the question is: do we have what it takes, and are we really ready? Can we actually afford doing so?
- Well, look, every action by the enemy aimed to cause harm to our country will be retaliated symmetrically. The President said everything absolutely correctly, and we will find the opportunities, find the weapons, and carry out these operations; they will certainly understand that in this way they will not achieve an advantage through such actions.
Any action will definitely be met with a counteraction.
- So what do we actually have regarding long-range weapons now?
- We are okay with weapons of all sorts. Of course, there are problems with the quantities needed to gain an advantage. Quite clearly, the enemy currently has more combat aircraft, but that does not mean they can gain an advantage that would give them a chance to win the war. The same goes for other types of systems. They have more missiles, for example, but we use them differently.
- My next question is about government funding for defense procurements. A defense procurement decentralization process has already got started. How does it work? Will the amount of that funding grow, and will the assortment of products brigades can choose and buy independently be expanded?
- The defense procurement system has always been decentralized, actually. It's just that the volumes have changed, the amounts of funds provided to the brigades have changed, and this all in order to ease, in the first place, the provision of those funds that they need in large amounts.
Simply put, brigades, for example, could be allowed to purchase tanks for themselves, but they obviously don’t really need them, even if they had the money to buy them. Instead, they are allowed to independently choose and purchase FPV drones, reconnaissance drones – this option has been made available to them.
- But there are complaints about troubles with writing off damaged inventory. What’s your vision of how this can be handled?
- Quite clearly, a specific procedure is in place, and we are working to ensure that it is not overly bureaucratized. But that being said, it would be wrong to make it so that anything can be written off without adequate consideration. And if we compare this with how the write-off process used to take place previously, when it took years and tons of paper to write off damaged assets before their value is confirmed by the Minister of Defense personally... today, this has really been reduced to a practical minimum.
The latest updates have been made just recently. In particular, military unit commanders have been empowered to approve a single write-off act for property lost, damaged, or destroyed in combat. This simplified process applies to property with a value limit of UAH 1.7 million, regardless of the type of the assets being written off. The simplified procedure where brigade commanders can approve write-off acts for property lost will significantly reduce bureaucratic burdens, relieve commanders’ workloads, and streamline accounting processes.
In addition, there has been introduced a procedure to write-off with a single act expendable UAVs (FPV drones), related components and ammunition. Additionally, a procedure has been introduced allowing unmanned systems to be dismantled or completed with additional equipment based with a single document.
- Your duties in this position include work with international partners. What progress has the General Staff achieved in cooperation with international partners and from which countries? Which countries are most active in cooperating with the Ukrainian military?
- The Russian war against Ukraine has demonstrated that no country in the world can sustain waging war at the current level of intensity on its own.
Today, the United States remains the Number One partner in terms of the amount of military assistance provided. It is also worthwhile highlighting the role the United States is playing in multiple efforts, namely, the routine maintenance and repair of the equipment provided, personnel training, the provision of intelligence and satellite images, military-grade GPS, assistance in the improvement and expansion of military communications.
Today, a new format of cooperation with the United States is being built, featuring an increased role for EU countries as sources of international military aid. In particular, weapons manufactured in the United States are being supplied with financial support from European countries. Alongside that, the US Government is weighing supplying weapons and military equipment through contributions to the US-Ukraine Reconstruction Investment Fund, which was set up as a joint initiative launched by the governments of Ukraine and the United States to mobilize private investment for Ukraine's economic recovery and development. The Fund's establishment is part of a comprehensive agreement on minerals and rare earth metals between the United States and Ukraine, which was signed on April 30, 2025.
One point up to that, the European Union countries and the United Kingdom have boosted their efforts for providing international military support to Ukraine’s Defense Forces. These efforts include co-procurement of weapons, in addition to collaborative production of unmanned platforms, means of destruction and armored vehicles. Among other things, the “Czech initiative” and the “Danish model” remain relevant ways of providing for the Armed Forces of Ukraine’s priority needs.
For your information: The Czech initiative is a multi-national effort, launched in February 2024, to procure and deliver large-caliber artillery shells for Ukraine's armed forces. Since its launch, the initiative has successfully coordinated the delivery of millions of shells, helping to significantly reduce Russia's artillery advantage on the battlefield. The Czech Republic, led by President Petr Pavel, uses its diplomatic and industrial expertise to secure funding from partner countries and purchase shells from suppliers around the world. The initiative has secured funding from numerous countries, including Canada, Denmark, Germany, the Netherlands, Norway, and Sweden, with some partners increasing their financial commitments in 2025.
The "Danish model" is a financing mechanism established by Denmark to provide direct and effective support to Ukraine's defense industry. First implemented in 2024, the model involves foreign governments directly funding Ukrainian defense companies to produce weapons and equipment for the Armed Forces of Ukraine. Denmark and other participating nations—including Norway, Sweden, Iceland, and Canada—provide financial contributions to procure weapons and equipment directly from Ukrainian manufacturers. The primary goal is to expand Ukraine's domestic production capacity, rather than relying solely on foreign donations of existing stock. This ensures faster delivery times and more competitive prices. The initial phase of the Danish model financed the production of Bohdana self-propelled howitzers and long-range drones, which have been deployed on the front lines. For 2025, the model's scope has expanded to include high-tech long-range UAVs, modern missile systems, and anti-tank systems. The total support for 2025 is expected to reach €1.3 billion.
- Let's talk about Russian drones flying into Europe. Is it safe to say that without us, without our experience and expertise, the Europeans will face troubles shooting them down? Of the 92 drones that were on the way to Poland, as few as 19 actually flew over the border, according to President Zelensky.
- Judging by the trajectory of these aircraft, there were a lot of them flying, but we have no knowledge of the destination they were to reach, so we shoot them all down. Of the 92 Russian drones launched towards Poland during an incursion on September 10, nearly two dozen flew over Poland’s airspace, violated international law, violated its airspace. This was a deliberate attack by the enemy, because they bear full legal responsibility for how their weapons are used.
There can be no talk of a mistake or some other innocent reason... No. This cannot be looked at that way. This is an act of aggression. Things must always be called by their rightful names.
- You say that we are trying to shoot down all drones. And what happened to the Hungarian reconnaissance drone that entered Ukrainian airspace over Transcarpathia? Why didn't we shoot it down?
- This object violated our airspace twice. We didn't expect it, but shooting down a drone is not as easy a task as it seems.
Firstly, these violations of our airspace didn’t last long, and we obviously don't have enough means or readiness to shoot down intruders over those areas, because these are not the directions from which Russia usually attacks.
- But, basically, should it fly for a longer time, we were supposed to shoot it down…
- Yes, we were supposed to shoot it down or halt the intrusion. First, we needed to communicate and figure out what was happening, given that Hungary is not a country that is at war or in some kind of conflict with us. This object could have lost control over there and deviated from its intended path, for example.
This was an incident. It was recorded, documented, and an investigation will follow.
- What about the drones being detected flying over Denmark and Germany among other countries? Do you think this is more of a psychological pressure from Russia? Does this indicate their intention to prepare for a more serious confrontation with NATO countries?
- Or maybe they are just playing on our nerves. No, nothing happens with no reason. And threats to territorial integrity and national security must be considered and assessed very seriously. And such issues cannot be neglected. I don’t believe it a coincidence.
The Russian Federation employs a broad variety of methods and techniques, including hybrid ones, in pursuance of its strategic objectives. The Russians are keen to get the situation exacerbated both on the Ukrainian battlefield and in Europe as a whole. The enemy is trying to put pressure on our partners in order to demonstrate the futility of further supporting Ukraine.
The joint strategic exercises “Zapad-2025”, for example, were primarily designed as a show of force for NATO member states. The violations of airspace over European countries by Russia-launched UAVs and by fighter jets that followed were a predictable game of raising the stakes to test NATO’s reaction, both as a military-political bloc as a whole and from individual major Allies that determine most of the Alliance’s policy. The military aspect of these provocations lies in testing NATO’s air defenses on its eastern flank.
Any provocations can be expected from the Russian Federation, and one must be prepared to offer a joint decisive response to the aggressor’s actions.
President Volodymyr Zelensky said that Ukraine is ready and willing to facilitate readiness for joint air defense and share its battle-tested expertise in drone defense. Ukraine offers assistance in the form of technology, crew training, and provision of intelligence.
The work to this end has already got underway. Ukrainian military experts are now sharing their battle-tested tactics with European partners to help build a continent-wide "Drone Wall”. Thus, Ukrainian military personnel were sent to Denmark to train with Danish forces in joint exercises called "Wings of Defense". The goal is to build a framework for future cooperation and lay the foundation for a Europe-wide "Drone Wall". This is a crucial step towards improving interoperability with the armed forces of NATO members, and, also, a clear evidence of our transparency and willingness to come to the aid of those who supported us and continue to support us in the fight against the Russian aggressor. As we can see, Ukraine is not only a recipient of assistance, but we have something to give in return to our European partners. And this is important to know and understand.
- What are you expecting from Russia’s autumn-winter offensive campaign? Will the offensive intensify, will it not intensify, what are the possible future scenarios?
- As of today, the situation in the war zone remains challenging. The adversary continues intensive offensive operations against our forces along the main axes, having achieved a 5-6-fold superiority in manpower and equipment. The adversary is conducting offensive operations along the full length of the frontline in thirteen main operational sectors of the front, increasing the intensity of assaults to an average of 160-190 per day.
East remains the hottest battlefield in Ukraine. Russian forces rely on a significant numerical advantage in manpower and equipment and, with the support of aviation, artillery, and the heavy use of strike UAVs are conducting high-intensity offensive operations aimed to take full control over the settlements of Chasiv Yar and Toretsk, create conditions for encircling Kostyantynivka from the east, south, and west, and envelope the Pokrovsk-Myrnohrad urban area.
It should be noted that the Russian military is increasingly using small groups for infiltration deep into Ukrainian rear positions. The groups attempt to find gaps in the frontline, infiltrate, and then accumulate forces in Ukrainian rear areas. These small pockets are then reinforced and used as a base for further offensive actions.
In turn, the Defense Forces, under favorable conditions, are conducting assault operations to recapture territory or strategic points that they previously controlled but were taken by an enemy, as well as to track down and destroy the enemy’s small groups who have infiltrated behind Ukrainian defense lines.
Basically, Russian forces keep on the offensive despite suffering heavy losses in personnel, weapons and military equipment.
The nature of the enemy's tactics in other sectors of the front, in particular Zaporizhzhia, will be determined by expected future outcome of their efforts on the Pokrovsk front, in the Donetsk region, the most intense and active combat zone in the war as of October 2025.
The weather will indeed play a role, since precipitation will make the terrain significantly more difficult to pass, and will thus reduce the troops’ ability to maneuver.
At the same time, it is highly likely that the Russian military will continue offensive operations in pursuance of the objectives set by Russia’s political and military policy and decision makers. The objective they declared, I will remind you, was as follows: the “liberation” of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions in their entirety. That is, from our point of view, it will be an attempt to reach the administrative borders of the Donetsk Oblast and Luhansk Oblast and establish full control over this territory. Looking at what is happening now, what force groupings are being formed, how they are manned, what tasks they perform, we can make a prediction that they will continue to focus their efforts on these areas, including especially Pokrovsk and Dobropillya sectors.
For your information: The "Dobropillya operation" refers to a Ukrainian counteroffensive launched in August 2025 to neutralize a dangerous Russian salient that had pushed deep into the Donetsk region. The operation successfully encircled some Russian units, recaptured significant territory, and inflicted heavy casualties on the invading forces. As of October 1, 2025, Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief General Oleksandr Syrskyi reported that Ukrainian forces had liberated 177.8 square kilometers of territory and cleared another 198.9 square kilometers of Russian sabotage and recon groups, and Russian forces had suffered over 3,320 casualties, including 1,864 irrecoverable losses. Russian forces lost 971 units of weapons and military equipment during the operation, according to Syrskyi. The Dobropillya operation is considered a significant Ukrainian success, as it blunted Russia's advance and prevented a larger strategic breakthrough in the Donbas. The operation highlighted Ukraine's ability to adapt and counter new Russian tactics, such as the use of small-group infiltration, with well-coordinated and bold actions.
- President Volodymyr Zelenskyy said that the Russians are misleading Western leaders by manipulating frontline monitoring software, in particular the DELTA software. How this can be handled?
For your information: The DELTA software is a situational awareness and battlefield management system developed by the Ukrainian military to give its forces a technological edge. It is a crucial tool for network-centric warfare, enabling real-time battlefield awareness, operational planning, and secure information sharing among units. The system is accessible on a wide range of devices, including laptops, tablets, and smartphones, making it highly portable and flexible. The software is equipped with an AI platform that enables the automatic, real-time detection of enemy equipment and other assets. It includes modules like Target Hub and Mission Control, which allow for planning UAV missions, coordinating strikes, and managing large-scale drone warfare.
- Yes, there is DELTA, there is DeepState, there are other information resources, there is the Internet, and information has become much more accessible than a few years ago. This is reality. For example, we see and the software is monitoring the enemy movements, but it cannot distinguish whether it was a sabotage and recon group that moved in, or these were military men who infiltrated and were immediately neutralized - it simply monitors and reports where they moved to, occasionally creating a false impression that an area is captured. But this is not so.
Prigozhin, once in Bakhmut, entered the site of the destroyed former city council, put up some kind of flag there and said: "If the administrative center of the city is captured, consider that the city is ours."
But remember that half of Bakhmut was controlled by the Armed Forces of Ukraine at that time, and this situation continued for almost half a year.
They acted exactly in the same way in Krynky, for example, on the eastern bank of the Dnieper, where they would run to a destroyed house every day, put up their flag, and die near this flag, simply because the enemy brigade commander promised that whoever would put up the flag would be awarded with five days of leave. But this leave turned out to be for ever. That's it, installing the flag didn't mean anything.
- What about the situation in the southern sector - the Zaporizhzhia Oblast, Zaporizhzhia NPP - how dangerous is it there?
- Zaporizhzhia NPP belongs to nuclear power infrastructure. It is a dangerous facility protected by international law. And Russia as a country that violates the law, that does not have respect for any laws or believes that it can do so, has captured this dangerous facility.
All responsibility for what is happening to the facility lies entirely and completely with them.
And all of the civilized world has to make efforts to solve this problem, because if something bad happens there at this facility, it will obviously not be purely Ukrainian concern.
- What about the situation with fuel supplies to Russian civilian consumers in general and the Russian military in particular?
- I can note that in general, they have temporarily lost about 20% of their oil refining capacity. And how soon they will be able to restore this capacity, if at all, is an open question. This is a real problem. We see from different sources that the shortage is particularly acute in Russia’s southern regions. Civilian consumers will indeed be the first to suffer, followed by business consumers, and the armed forces of the aggressor country will be the last to experience fuel shortages.
How soon this will happen and whether it has already happened is difficult to say, but we are receiving certain information, intelligence, indicating that commanders are giving instructions to save gasoline, imposing limitations.
- And where are the North Korean troops now?
- A certain quantity of soldiers is deployed there in the Kursk Oblast, training activities are being conducted on them. They define themselves as combat engineering units that have come in to help clear the territory from mines.
We do not observe them being present on the front line, we do not observe them being immediately involved in hostilities yet. But troops from North Korea are deployed there. On top of that, North Korean workers are involved in defense production, in particular, the Geran drones, which are manufactured in Yelabuga, Tatarstan.
According to unconfirmed reports, about 20,000 North Korean workers are involved, which is actually equivalent to participation in the conflict.
- A legislation on contract military service for volunteers aged 60 and older has come into force in Ukraine. "Contract 60+" is an addition to the already existing project "Contract 18-24". Who are you waiting for among these volunteers?
- Indeed, volunteers aged 60+ will not be superfluous in the military. At this age, a person still retains the ability to perform tasks. The main thing is that s/he is really willing and healthy enough, and there is always a job available for such people in the military.
The Armed Forces want professionals, for example, in maintenance and repair, drivers of various categories, drivers licensed to transport fuels and lubricants, hazardous freights, ammunition. These all are the categories that are beyond the competence of 18-year-old guys.
Also in demand are doctors, middle and junior medical staff, who are needed in military hospitals, where relevant positions remain vacant. Why can't a person in his 60s come and sign a contract for a year or two and do such job? Of course, s/he can. This job doesn’t require any ultra high skills or knowledge.
Obviously enough, a 60 plus years old is unlikely to get a position in an assault brigade. It will probably be difficult for him there. That said, however, I saw in my experience many officers, sergeants, and soldiers who you would never tell that they are 60 years old. One such comes and says, "Mr. Commander, let me... I will turn 60 in two months, let me sign a contract for another year." You look at him, thinking: he is 60, really? He looks better than I do.
- Ahead of the Day of Defenders of Ukraine, what would you like to wish our soldiers, in particular those who are currently fighting on the front line and serving alongside you?
- This is a professional holiday that was introduced when the all-out war was already in full swing. It highlights the significance of the military profession, and I would like to wish not only the defenders, but also the people who are close to them - their families, relatives, loved ones, friends - that everyone will definitely stay alive and healthy.
This is probably the most important thing you can wish for. I would like to wish those who did not manage to fully preserve their health, those who were wounded, a recovery and return to service. Wish our boys and girls who remain in captivity a return home, and wish a speedy Victory to us all.
It would be perfect if we all could celebrate the next Defender's Day in a peaceful Ukraine, under a peaceful Ukrainian sky. This would probably be the best wish. For me, it's just a dream. I wish it to everyone.
- How do you see our Victory?
- I would want a justice. And justice will only be there where the aggressor country is defeated and where it is held accountable. Where particular persons will unavoidably be held accountable for war crimes, for crimes against humanity.
First of all, it is about Russia’s top political leaders and military brass who unleashed this war, which is now grinding on with no end in sight, despite all the efforts being made by the international community.
I do hope that punishment will eventually happen.
And victory will be achieved when Ukraine’s territorial integrity and control over all its sovereign territory are fully restored. There is no other way.
Iryna Kozhukhar led this conversation