It is well known that defense intelligence is the "eyes and ears" of the armed froces. Without it, successful command and victory in modern wars are impossible. On the eve of the professional holiday celebrated in Ukraine on September 7, Ukrinform spoke with Vadym Skibitskyi, Deputy Chief of the Defense Intelligence Directorate, about how the intelligence community has changed during the war, what capabilities the enemy now has in the defense-industrial complex and on the battlefield, whether provocations should be expected from military exercises in Belarus, whether Russia is relocating its defense enterprises further from the Ukrainian border, and why European countries do not shoot down Shaheds (Iranian-made drones) over their territory.
WE ARE REINFORCING ALL AREAS OF INTELLIGENCE WORK
– In Ukraine, we celebrate the Day of Defense Intelligence on September 7. In this context, we would like to know about the transformations that have taken place in the intelligence community since the full-scale invasion began, and particularly over the past year, including new capabilities, artificial intelligence, and personnel potential.
– The transformation of the Defense Intelligence Directorate began very actively back in 2015. When the full-scale invasion began and Russia’s regular armed forces entered Ukraine’s territory from different directions, we intensified efforts to refine our structure and develop capabilities in all areas of intelligence work. We have expanded the aerospace reconnaissance, the human intelligence operations and we actively use cyberspace covering cyber operations, cybersecurity, and cyber defense.
In addition, in our analytical work we use not only domestic developments but have also adopted NATO standards and those of leading countries for close cooperation. Regarding the analytical component, since June 2022 we have been working with our partners on targeting, identifying centers of gravity, and in other areas – all based on unified standards. Moreover, our special units have received a significant boost and undergone substantial development. Essentially, what was once a small unit before the full-scale invasion has now expanded into many units, which are widely known: Artan, Shamanbat, Kraken, Timur, and others. Our society knows about the operations they have carried out, and they are recognized by their results. We are continuing to develop this segment. Today, it is impossible to resist the aggressor by conventional methods of intelligence gathering as it used to be before the war.
We have also strengthened (and I believe our community and the public feel this) all of our strategic communications units. In my view, the current presence of the Defense Intelligence Directorate in the media space is sufficient. Since 2014, our duty and our primary goal have been to convey to our society and to the Western community the full truth about the aggressive policy of the Russian Federation and its actions on our territory. Back in 2014, everyone started saying it was a "civil war," but in fact, it was the beginning of armed aggression against our state.
Another key area is patriotic education, which the Defense Intelligence Directorate has actively embraced. We have affiliated schools and a broad network of NGOs and volunteers working with us. We promote patriotism among the public, along with slogans and initiatives that boost the morale of our troops. That is why, anywhere on the front line, when a special unit from the Defense Intelligence Directorate appears, the morale and psychological state of the Defense Forces’ combat units immediately improve. They understand that these are truly professional, well-trained servicemen capable of carrying out any mission. Overall, a great deal of effort, resources, and time has been devoted to improving our work and increasing its effectiveness. I want to emphasize: we are reinforcing all areas of intelligence work.
– How much has the size of the Defense Intelligence Directorate grown?
– We cannot disclose the total number, but I can say it has increased many times. First and foremost, we expanded our special operations component. We created the Department of Active Operations, which conducts all operations both on the front line and in temporarily occupied territories of our state, as well as on enemy territory. This is a new element that appeared during the war.
– In one of his interviews, DIU Chief Kyrylo Budanov mentioned the growing number of women in the Directorate’s structure. How does this affect the quality of work, and is this trend of gender changes observed in other countries as well?
– From my experience, there is a large number of women analysts in special services and intelligence agencies in many countries. And this is a fact. Take other leading armies, for example – Israel. Women there serve compulsory military service. As for defense intelligence, we have indeed increased the number of women, but this trend in Ukraine is observed not only in the Defense Intelligence Directorate.
Let’s look more broadly. First, the number of women studying in higher military educational institutions has increased. These are women officers who then go into various structures of both the Armed Forces and the Defense Forces. Second, there is a patriotic mindset among women, equal to men, to serve, take responsibility, and participate in combat operations. As for the Defense Intelligence Directorate, women head divisions, and many hold positions as department chiefs. For example, in the analytical units, women make up a significant portion. Up to 25 percent of positions in our information units are held by women, who perform a variety of duties. Additionally, a large number of women serve in support units, including logistics, finance, communications, and medicine. We also have a robust diagnostic center, where the majority — up to 80 percent — are female military personnel and civilian women. This trend is not limited to the Defense Intelligence Directorate but extends across all our units in the Defense Forces.
– What is your vision of the development of defense intelligence in Ukraine in the near future, and do changes in geopolitics affect these processes?
– This is a serious question. It implies not only development but also the application of all available new approaches and technologies emerging worldwide. What does this mean? New approaches involve a completely different understanding of many factors today – first, ideological components; second, financial components. For example, previously, agents were given cash or funds were transferred to accounts. Now, completely different methods are used – cryptocurrencies, new communication tools, and lines of communication that did not exist before. Look at what can now be done using Telegram channels and other social networks, which have truly revolutionized both the management of agent networks and agent recruitment, as well as other intelligence activities. And this can be applied in any corner of the world.
– Can we say that Telegram is now used most actively, for example, for recruitment?
– You see, nowadays, there are so many social networks and different channels used for communication. Let’s take simpler ones – Signal, WhatsApp, and others.
So, this is a major step forward in communication, but it also introduces new approaches to using these communication tools directly for our intelligence activities. Moreover, if we talk about information, and you correctly mentioned artificial intelligence, these are new forms and modern methods of processing information. Enormous volumes of data have appeared, which a human can no longer fully process. For this, specialized software, dedicated databases, and artificial intelligence are necessary. I believe AI is essentially specialized software products that allow for rapid preliminary processing of information and preparing it for further analysis.
Furthermore, in terms of geopolitics, a new development is the broad cooperation among intelligence and special services, along with close partnerships. Today, no country can face emerging challenges and threats alone. Effective collaboration, information sharing, and joint special operations are essential to neutralize threats. In fact, no nation in the world could manage without this. For example, consider current operations in the conflict between Israel and Iran — Israel also received assistance from partners in the form of intelligence sharing and other support. This is why close interaction and cooperation with partners and allies are critically important today, allowing us to address any problem collectively.
– Can you comment on the level of cooperation between Ukraine’s intelligence services and their foreign partners? Some reports have hinted that the U.S. might stop providing intelligence support.
– Many different statements are made, but practical work continues, and it benefits both sides. We are interested in the information we receive while they are interested in the information that can be obtained from us. We have built constructive relationships and hope that cooperation will continue in the same direction.
RUSSIA HAS USED 50 TO 75 PERCENT OF ITS OLD ARMS AND EQUIPMENT STOCKPILES
– Let’s analyze Russia’s current capabilities in the defense-industrial complex and on the battlefield. What percentage of its equipment and weapons reserves, stored since Soviet times, has Russia used? And what are its current production capacities for major types of weapons?
– Indeed, before the war and even after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Russian Federation accumulated a significant amount of weapons and military equipment in its arsenals and depots. And if we talk about the total amount, even the Russians themselves could not count exactly how much there was. I remember that in the early 2000s, there was information that the Russians “lost” about 1,000 tanks somewhere beyond the Urals, which were unaccounted for and located at a training center, and no one knew about them. This shows the enormous amount of weapons stored in their depots. After 2014, they began to systematize everything, creating the corresponding Mobilization Deployment Centers, particularly near our borders in the Southern Military District and the former Western Military District, where they concentrated equipment to support mobilization deployments.
Since the start of the full-scale invasion, most of the weapons delivered to units – tanks, artillery systems, APCs, IFVs – were taken from storage, either modernized or refurbished, and sent to the troops for combat.
Regarding the amount still in storage today, it is difficult to say, as there are different figures. It has been reported that the Russian Federation has already used 50 to 75 percent of its various weapons reserves from the old stockpiles. At the same time, I want to note that despite these used reserves, Russia’s defense-industrial complex has retained the ability to produce new types of weapons. This is largely because most Soviet-era defense enterprises were not closed; they reduced capacity, but Russia has remained one of the main exporters of weapons abroad.
We have a clear understanding of the figures Russia has planned for the production of new types of weapons. For example, regarding modern aircraft – Su-57, Su-35, Su-34, and Su-30 – they have planned 57 units this year. Almost 250 T-90M tanks, which are new rather than upgraded. Additionally, about 1,100 new BTR-3 and BTR-82A armored personnel carriers, and 365 artillery systems – all new, not upgraded. At the same time, modernization and refurbishment of weapons and military equipment amounts to thousands of units currently used by Russia.
However, both Ukraine and the Russian Federation today focus significant attention on producing weapons that are effective on the battlefield. We are talking about unmanned systems, FPV drones, and various missile systems. Russia is trying to increase its stock of these weapons as well. The aggressor state has planned to produce nearly 2,500 so-called precision-guided missiles of various classes in 2025, including cruise and ballistic missiles of the Iskander complex, hypersonic Kinzhal missiles, and others. Russia intends to further increase production. Additionally, we have observed a significant rise in the production of unmanned aerial vehicles, primarily models such as Geran, Harpia, and FPV drones.
RUSSIA WILL NOT ABANDON HEAVY EQUIPMENT IN FAVOR OF DRONES AND MISSILES
– Is it correct to say that the Russians will reduce funding for heavy equipment and weapons, directing more resources toward drones and missiles?
– That is absolutely incorrect. The defense intelligence has data on the Russian Armed Forces’ 10-year armament program, from 2026 to 2037. The Russians have clearly outlined the key requirements for the defense-industrial complex regarding heavy weapons, warships, aviation, and missile systems. We know they will continue to develop strategic and long-range aviation through modernization and the creation of new aircraft.
By the way, Russia’s Ministry of Defense has identified three main battle tanks. This will no longer be a wide range, as before. The main battle tanks will be the T-90, Armata, and T-80. Additionally, the newest artillery systems include the Koalitsiya, Msta of various types, Malva, Hyacinth, and Magnolia. They are attempting to implement lessons learned from using these weapons on our battlefield into production. Furthermore, there will be a wide range of missile systems, from strategic to tactical levels. Moscow plans new long-range missiles and modern hypersonic anti-ship missiles. They foresee three directions for improving missile systems: first, increased range; second, improved accuracy; and third, increased warhead size.
The reason is that striking Ukrainian territory requires one combat radius, but preparing for 2030, for potential conflict with NATO countries, requires weapons with a longer operational range. This is what they are building into their armament programs.
Regarding new approaches – FPV drones, artificial intelligence – the enemy aims to bring the share of unmanned and remote-controlled systems on the battlefield to 40 percent in the future. We are tracking (not only military personnel but also civilians and society as a whole feel it) the increase in drones used in attacks by the Russian Federation on our territory.
These directions are considered primary. Additionally, I emphasize: there will be no abandonment of artillery systems or heavy armored vehicles – this is inherent to the classical approach to warfare.
THE ENEMY WILL DELIVER COMBINED STRIKES ON UKRAINE
Putin has announced new large-scale attacks on Ukraine’s energy infrastructure. Will the enemy be using the same missiles we have seen before, or could there be something new?
– We are witnessing the Russian Federation modernizing and upgrading its missile systems and drones, based on the aftermath of their attacks on our country, particularly targeting civilian infrastructure and key enterprises.
First, the strikes will be combined, involving various types of UAVs, including so-called decoys, and cruise missiles of different launch types: naval Kalibrs, air-launched Kh-101, Kh-32, and ground-launched Iskanders. The enemy can use both ballistic and cruise missiles. What we observe is, first, a change in strike tactics; second, the use of modernized weapons.
Let’s analyze the changes in the use of Shaheds. They used to fly directly toward their targets, but now they can circle around Kyiv for several hours and change altitude. Next is weapon modernization. For example, the Kh-101 cruise missile now has new elements: electronic warfare countermeasures, a dual warhead, meaning a larger explosive payload. There is also an upgraded navigation and guidance system to overcome our electronic warfare systems. This is an ongoing evolution, continuous improvement of all means of combat and strike.
That is why it is wrong to assume the enemy will stop at any given level. For example, the Kometa system was originally 8- to 12-channel; now it is 16-channel, and in the future, 32-channel, enabling it to overcome electronic warfare systems.
This process for the enemy will be continuous – improvement, increasing the effectiveness of strikes through accuracy, and so on. Our task is to counter this effectively.
– Do international partners ask Ukraine to share information about captured Russian weapons?
– Yes, they do. When we talk about partnership and mutually beneficial cooperation, this is exactly what it involves. Why? Because they also have powerful laboratories for technical expertise of all systems used by Russia, providing us with recommendations to improve countermeasures. Our partners are also preparing for potential armed conflict. This work continues and will continue because the evolutionary approach means new developments appear every three to four months. What existed in 2022 is already far too simple compared to today.
THE THREAT FROM BELARUS REMAINS LOW
– Everyone is closely following news about the Russian-Belarusian Zapad-2025 exercises. Both in the West and in Ukraine, officials say there are currently no threats. But could there be provocations from this direction, and if so, what might they be?
– Currently, the level of threat associated with the potential use of any formation from Belarusian territory remains low. We clearly understand the objectives, plans, and tasks being practiced as part of all the exercises currently taking place in Belarus. This includes the CSTO exercises and the active phase of Zapad-2025.
One of the main purposes of the exercises is not only the defense of the allied state of Belarus and the Russian Federation, but also the testing of all necessary elements of newly formed headquarters in the Moscow and Leningrad military districts. Overall, the exercises aim to verify the functioning of their headquarters, planning processes, and other elements typical of any strategic exercise in this direction. The Russian Federation does not have substantial reserves or free military units to demonstrate the kind of might we saw in previous exercises. All of their forces are now engaged in combat operations on our territory.
MANY FOREIGN CITIZENS AGREE TO WORK AT RUSSIAN DEFENSE ENTERPRISES
– In a recent interview, you said that Russia is actively recruiting citizens of other countries to work at its military enterprises. Are you seeing an increase in the number of such workers, given that there is data not only about hired labor from post-Soviet countries, but also from African countries, North Korea, and others?
– This practice is real and actively employed. For instance, North Korea is now planning to send thousands of specialists to Russia to gain experience — not only in the defense-industrial complex but also to assist in construction and other industrial sectors.
For example, when we talk about 6,000 North Korean specialists working in Kursk region, that is a significant number. We know for certain that over a thousand workers have already arrived. They are involved in road repairs, engineering fortifications for defensive lines in Kursk region. Next is work in the Russian defense-industrial complex, including enterprises producing ammunition and weapons such as tanks, APCs, IFVs – in other words, armored vehicles. Additionally, unmanned aerial vehicles are part of this production. Similar production is now being established and improved in North Korea itself. On one hand, this is gaining experience; on the other hand, it is helping the Russian Federation.
We have data on the recruitment of foreign citizens to work at Russian enterprises, specifically in the Yelabuga zone. There, Russia is expanding its production. While they once started with around a thousand employees, they now plan to have 40,000 workers in the Yelabuga zone, which manufactures drones. We are recording many foreign nationals agreeing to sign contracts and travel to Russia for work. However, many of them later end up signing contracts with the Ministry of Defense and go to fight.
MOST RUSSIAN DEFENSE-INDUSTRIAL ENTERPRISES ARE LOCATED OVER 750 KM FROM THE UKRAINIAN BORDER
– Are you observing the relocation of Russian defense enterprises further from the border with Ukraine so that our missiles cannot strike them?
– Most of the powerful Russian defense-industrial enterprises are located 750 km or more from our border. Only 25 percent are within 250–500 km.
We do not see a large-scale relocation of enterprises; rather, we observe the creation of new ones 1,500–2,000 km from our border. There are many of them, and our deep strikes are needed to halt or disrupt their production processes.
New approaches are required here. It is necessary to identify the most critical enterprises and the most critical elements within them in order to destroy them effectively. This is because there is extensive industrial cooperation – a single type of weapon can involve more than 100 enterprises. This is similar to the Soviet model. The second problem is that the enemy understands this vulnerability and is strengthening air defense and electronic warfare capabilities. Overall, they are now trying to create a strong system to counter our drones and missiles. This is a comprehensive program, which includes creating units and new countermeasure systems. According to our data, in September, they are going to test seven unmanned systems designed to counter our strikes. These include anti-drone systems of quadcopter and aircraft types to protect their facilities and defense-industrial enterprises.
For this reason, we need not only our UAVs but also missile systems. We clearly see this from the strikes Russia carries out against our infrastructure. The greatest damage comes from missile weapons, due to larger warheads and greater precision. Here, assistance from our partners and the development of our own programs, particularly missile programs, is critically important.
NORTH KOREAN SOLDIERS WILL REMAIN IN RUSSIA
– The issue of North Korean soldiers participating in the war in Ukraine has faded a bit from the headlines. What do we know about the possibility of their involvement in Russia’s autumn-winter offensive?
– First, North Korean troops are present and will remain, but on Russian territory. Why has this topic quieted down? There are no active combat operations in Kursk region, where they are all concentrated. Their mission is to strengthen the border — fortifying defensive positions and supporting the defense of Russia as a strategic ally. While they aren’t in the headlines, this doesn’t mean they aren’t there. Second, looking at recent events in North Korea, their leader personally welcomed and awarded troops, including honoring those who died, emphasized the great role they played, and so on. But we are aware that if people attended those ceremonies, they were likely replaced by others on the battlefield. Our assessment, supported by the documents we have, is that North Korean servicemen and units will continue to be deployed in Russia, with clearly defined tasks in Kursk region. This deployment will most likely be rotational.
THE KREMLIN HAS ENLISTED NEARLY 280,000 CONTRACT SOLDIERS SINCE THE BEGINNING OF THE YEAR
– You mentioned that the Russians have no problems with mobilization, as there are operational reserves and ongoing recruitment of Russians eager to earn from the war. Has the monthly recruitment in Russia changed, or does the figure remain 30,000–35,000 per month?
– Unfortunately, they have the capacity, supported financially and through propaganda. Russia recruits at least 35,000 servicemen every month. According to our data, as of September 1, 2025, the Kremlin has enlisted about 280,000 contract soldiers.
I should remind you that Russia makes large payments to contract soldiers. Currently, it is 2 million rubles for signing the first contract. So, there are all indications that by the end of the year, they will fully meet their recruitment plan.
BEIJING IS CLOSELY MONITORING THE WAR
What are your impressions of the SCO summit, particularly the military parade, and how is Ukraine assessing China’s military capabilities in this context?
– We are working on this, but let me put it this way: what China demonstrated once again underscores that it possesses a full nuclear triad — air, land, and sea. They also have new developments in missile technology, and China has significant mobilization potential. That is the key point. In addition, they are carefully studying everything related to new weaponry — both from the Russian Federation and from Western models now being used on the battlefield. Beijing is following the war in Ukraine very closely.
– The issues of prisoner exchanges and the return of Ukrainian children are among the most sensitive. How has the dynamic in this area changed over the course of the war?
– This is everyday work. The process gained some momentum thanks to Istanbul and all the meetings held there. Why? Because new approaches were applied – the principle of “everyone for everyone,” with clearly defined categories for processing. For example, severely wounded and sick prisoners, people who have been in captivity for a long time, and young people – this added momentum. However, the work is routine and has been ongoing since 2022. This is a unique experience that has not existed in the world before. Never during a war were prisoner exchanges carried out; they only happened after its end. The positive aspect is that our citizens, our servicemen, are returning home.
MODERN MILITARY CONFLICTS LAST LESS THAN A MONTH, RUSSIAN-UKRAINIAN WAR IS AN EXCEPTION
– What possible scenarios for military conflicts around the world would you highlight in the near future, or is it too difficult to predict right now?
– When we analyze all the conflicts that took place this year, the first question that arises is: is any country really prepared to fight a long, exhausting war? Ukraine and Russia have been at war for three and a half years. Now let’s look at what has happened over the past year: India–China, India–Pakistan, Armenia–Azerbaijan, Iran–Israel. Each of these lasted less than a month. No one wants a prolonged, grinding war — except the Russian Federation. That is why, when we talk about modern conflicts, the experience shows they last less than a month. After that, countries either reach agreements or postpone the unresolved issue for the future. But a large-scale, drawn-out conflict — a full-scale war — simply doesn’t exist anywhere else.
THE EU IS AWARE OF THE RISKS POSED BY RUSSIA, BUT CAN IT RESPOND IN TIME?
– If we talk about the hybrid war that Russia is now waging against EU countries, what would you focus on first — cyberspace, information campaigns, or influence on electoral processes? Do EU leaders acknowledge that this war is already underway?
– If you analyze all the doctrinal documents of EU and NATO countries over the past three years, what do you see? The enemy is the Russian Federation. Are the methods of hybrid warfare described there? Yes, they are. What is identified as the greatest threat? Propaganda, disinformation, cyber operations, and so on — everything is covered. They are aware of this, and it is explicitly stated in their documents. Accordingly, their entire security and defense system is being developed based on these assessments. The question, however, is how capable they are of countering those threats. That depends on political will, which currently is limited. Look at what is happening in Europe — they are dealing with their own issues: migration, demographics, economic challenges, and so on. In my view, again, they are aware of the threat; the question is whether they can neutralize it in time.
So, it is not something new for Europe. They felt it back in 2022, and at that time they had a unique opportunity – they completely banned all the Sputnik outlets, Telegram, Russian channels, and expelled all intelligence officers operating under diplomatic cover. But time passed — and it all came back. Unfortunately.
– Why aren’t Russian Shahed drones shot down over EU territory?
– Back in October 2022, we weren’t shooting down Shaheds either. Later, S-300 air defense systems were used to intercept them, and now a broad range of countermeasures is being deployed. They don’t have much experience yet, but they will.
Irina Kozhukhar
Photo credit: Hennadii Minchenko