Atsuko Higashino, Professor at the University of Tsukuba

Over the four years since the launch of Russia’s full-scale invasion, Atsuko Higashino, a professor at the University of Tsukuba, has emerged as one of Ukraine’s most consistent and principled advocates in Japan’s public discourse. As pro-Kremlin narratives circulated—arguing that “more lives would be saved if Zelensky surrendered,” that “territory is secondary to human life,” or that “NATO’s eastward expansion is ultimately to blame”—she repeatedly stressed a simple but often overlooked point: the voices and choices of Ukrainians themselves must come first.

Japan’s sustained support for Ukraine is due in no small part to the efforts of experts like Higashino—scholars willing to engage in rigorous, good-faith public debate and to challenge disinformation with facts and moral clarity.

In an interview with Ukrinform, Professor Higashino, who also serves as Vice President of the Japanese Association for Ukrainian Studies, reflects on the evolution of Japanese media narratives about the war, the prospects for deeper security cooperation and potential military assistance from Tokyo, the tensions within Japan’s long-standing pacifist doctrine, and the broader lessons Japan can draw from Ukraine’s wartime experience.

I FEEL A SENSE OF GUILT ABOUT 2014 — THAT’S WHY I HAVE TO SPEAK OUT NOW

Q: Do you remember the first day Russia launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine?

A: My memories of that first day are fragmented. I remember feeling a deep sense of anguish and pain that the full-scale invasion we had feared for so long had finally begun. What stands out most vividly is that my phone would not stop ringing. During NHK’s daytime news broadcast, I heard my own voice on television as I gave a live phone interview, while the screen showed continuous footage of Ukraine under attack.

That same day, the Japan Forum on International Relations had scheduled an online discussion titled “Will War Break Out in Ukraine?” From early afternoon until evening, I was unable to answer calls. I felt helpless, because I could not fully describe what was unfolding in real time. Instead, I focused on explaining the broader historical and political background.

After the discussion, I went to the NHK studio to appear on the news. That marked the beginning of what I can only describe as my “television life from hell.” As soon as we finished recording, producers told me they wanted me back the next morning for a live program. I told them I first needed to prepare bento lunches for my children before heading out. I went home, took care of family duties, and then returned to the studio.

I did not even have time to process the shock of the full-scale invasion becoming a reality. The phone never stopped ringing. I remember crying as I traveled between television studios. That state lasted for several weeks. To be honest, I barely remember anything I did during that period apart from appearing on television.

For the first month, I could not sleep for more than two hours at a time. Whenever I managed to fall asleep, my body seemed to resist, as if it feared that something even more horrific might happen in Ukraine while I was resting. I had experienced that feeling only twice before in my life — when each of my two children was an infant. The third time was because of this war.

Q: Were you appearing on television every day?

A: Yes. On particularly intense days, I moved from one studio to another several times a day. Sometimes I would doze off in dressing rooms while waiting to go on air.

Q: What was the core message you were trying to convey at that time?

A: That “Ukraine is not to blame.” Even back then, there were loud claims that NATO’s eastward expansion had been a mistake, or that the United States and Europe had cornered Russia. But even if we hypothetically assume that Ukraine’s movement toward the EU and NATO irritated Russia, why would that justify an armed attack? These are completely disproportionate things. I kept saying that Ukraine had done nothing to deserve such a fate, and that it was unjust.

It is also worth recalling the aggression against Crimea in 2014. At the time, a common view in Japan was that “Crimea was originally Russian, so it simply returned to where it belonged.” I felt strong resistance to this thesis, but I did not voice counterarguments loudly enough. That has stayed with me as a feeling of guilt toward myself.

At the moment of gaining independence in 1991, Crimea was an integral part of Ukraine’s territory, and its seizure as a result of illegal occupation is unacceptable. But at that time, I did not communicate this position forcefully enough. And after 2022, as expected, I had to confront arguments such as “perhaps Ukraine gave reasons for the invasion.” Because I did not fully object back then, I felt that I had to do so now.

WE MUST ASK UKRAINE, NOT TRY TO GUESS TRUMP’S THOUGHTS

Q: Over the past four years, you have appeared in the media on a weekly basis. What did you talk about, in particular, last year?

A: My appearances in 2025 were fundamentally different from those in the previous three years. After the Trump administration came to power, the media showed heightened interest in how exactly he intended to end this war.

I believed that placing great hopes on the Trump administration was not the best idea, and I voiced doubts about whether that administration truly understood the nature of this war. I emphasized that the focus should be elsewhere.

The key question is not what Trump thinks or what kind of solution he wants to impose, but what Ukraine wants, having resisted aggression for four years. Does it want to continue fighting with the support of its partners, or is it seeking assistance to bring the war to an end? I was deeply troubled by the way people began competing to guess Trump’s thoughts without first listening to Ukraine’s own message.

I tried to constantly remind audiences that Ukraine’s future must be discussed with Ukraine itself. “Nothing about Ukraine without Ukraine” should be the guiding principle. Yet while in 2022 and 2023 everyone was trying to figure out what was in Putin’s head, in 2025 they simply replaced him with Trump. I have always considered that kind of discussion misguided, because Ukraine ceased to be treated as a subject in its own right, and I tried to steer the conversation back to Ukraine’s interests.

Q: In your view, have Japanese attitudes toward and interest in Ukraine changed over these four years?

A: There have been both positive and negative shifts. On the positive side, people who previously knew virtually nothing about Ukraine learned about its geographic location and history after the full-scale invasion. Many discovered — or rediscovered — the country for themselves. They learned about the Ukrainian origins of borshch and about traditional clothing such as the embroidered vyshyvanka.

At the same time, unfortunately, even after four years it has not been possible to fully dispel certain myths and prejudices — for example, the claim that “people in Donbas want to be with Russia,” or that “Russian-speaking Ukrainians are actually Russians.” There is also still rhetoric in Japan in which criticism of the United States or Europe is unfairly redirected toward Ukraine. As the war drags on, a misleading narrative has gained traction: that “if Ukraine capitulates, the war will end.”

Q: Is the view that Ukraine would be better off surrendering widespread in Japan?

A: For example, if you look at Pew Research Center polling, a majority of Japanese respondents view Russia as a threat. So there is certainly sympathy for Ukraine. At the same time, however, it is a fact that Japan has strong inward-looking anti-war sentiments and a deeply ingrained, somewhat self-focused pacifism — a feeling of “I don’t want to hear about a war somewhere far away anymore,” a desire to shut the issue out.

Q: Is there war fatigue among the Japanese public?

A: There are people who feel uncomfortable seeing those of us who speak about the war, including me. Some assume that we are somehow profiting from these discussions and simply do not want to watch or listen.

If we speak about Japanese public opinion more broadly, most people still believe that supporting Ukraine is the right thing to do. But the reaction directed personally at me can be different. When I say that “Ukrainians themselves must decide,” this is sometimes distorted and interpreted negatively — as if I were calling to “fight to the last Ukrainian” or opposing a ceasefire.

I understand the emotional impulse not to want to see or hear about war. But this is not a war in which “both sides are equally to blame.” Would the world truly become a better place if the country that was attacked simply surrendered? That is the question I continue to raise.

I LOOK AT MY CHILDREN’S FACES EVERY DAY AND THINK ABOUT UKRAINE’S ABDUCTED CHILDREN

Q: It will soon be four years since the start of the full-scale invasion, and twelve years since the occupation of Crimea and the first act of aggression. Over time, public attention inevitably fades. In fact, during the recent elections to Japan’s House of Representatives, support for Ukraine or sanctions against Russia were not subjects of debate. What do you make of this situation?

A: Every Japanese government has spoken about Japan’s role and contribution in the world. For that reason, the question of how to stop Russia’s prolonged aggression and how to support Ukraine’s defense capability should be of paramount interest to Tokyo.

Under Prime Minister Fumio Kishida, new frameworks for assistance were launched. Kishida himself visited Kyiv, invited President Volodymyr Zelenskyy to the G7 summit in Hiroshima, and was among the first to provide aid to help Ukraine get through the winter, including generators.

However, under the governments of Shigeru Ishiba and Sanae Takaichi, while previously adopted decisions have been implemented, there have been no new major commitments or visits to Kyiv. Prime Minister Takaichi participates in meetings of the “Coalition of the Willing,” so it would be wrong to say she has no interest at all. But in Japan, foreign policy and security rarely become central issues in election campaigns, and these dimensions continue to be largely overlooked.

Q: What Ukraine-related issues now attract the greatest interest among the Japanese public?

A: For better or worse, much depends on the “Trump effect.” If Trump says something or makes a dramatic move, the volume of news coverage immediately spikes and public interest rises. At the same time, even significant developments concerning Ukraine receive little attention if they are not connected to the United States — and especially to Trump.

For example, when Ukraine and European partners prepared a ceasefire plan last May, it attracted almost no coverage, whereas the meeting between the U.S. and Russian leaders in August was reported extensively. At present, much of Japan’s interest depends not on Ukraine itself, but on “what Trump said.”

Q: At the same time, you consistently raise in the media the issue of Russia’s abduction of Ukrainian children, so that it is not forgotten. Is that right?

A: When reports first emerged about the abduction of children, I could not sleep for several days. I myself have two kids. I love them dearly. For parents, their children are a treasure — something they would protect even at the cost of their own lives. If my children were taken from me and I did not know where they were, I am not sure I would be able to remain sane. The fact that many parents and families in Ukraine continue to suffer this way — as a direct consequence of Russian aggression — is unbearable for me.

Every day, when I look at my children’s faces, I think: “What if they were taken away by the army of another country?” Perhaps this maternal instinct is one of the driving forces behind my public advocacy on this issue. I pray every day that as many children as possible will be returned to their parents as soon as possible.

THERE IS NO CLEAR UNDERSTANDING IN JAPANESE SOCIETY OF WHAT KIND OF WEAPONS ARE NEEDED TO DEFEND PEACE

Q: Japan sets itself up as a “peace state,” yet it provides Ukraine with certain forms of military assistance, such as vehicles for the Defense Forces. Have Japanese views on “war and peace,” or on supplying military aid, changed as a result of this war?

A: Changes, if any, are very limited. I think that in Japan, a strong perception persists that military assistance is inherently wrong, that it is, by definition, about killing people.

I have repeatedly emphasized the importance of providing Ukraine with air defense systems. This is assistance meant to protect hospitals, schools, and shopping centers from missile strikes. Yet I do not believe the very concept of “air defense” is well understood in Japan. There is still no clear societal understanding of what kind of weapons are necessary to defend peace. The prevailing mood persists that if something can in any way be used to kill, we should not provide it.

Q: Then why does Japan support Ukraine at all?

A: A major factor was former Prime Minister Fumio Kishida’s argument that “today’s Ukraine could be tomorrow’s East Asia,” along with the recognition that security between Europe and Asia is interconnected. That framing was persuasive to some extent. Japanese pacifism also contains an element of sympathy for the weaker side. The idea of supporting Ukraine and imposing sanctions on the aggressor, Russia, was accepted to a certain degree.

The problem is that it has been difficult to build a broad consensus for sustaining that support. After the earthquake on the Noto Peninsula, voices emerged arguing that funds should be spent domestically instead. That is a natural reaction. But supporting Ukraine does not mean we cannot also support our own citizens. What has been lacking is a meaningful discussion about how to do both effectively — how to address domestic needs while also alleviating the suffering of Ukrainians.

As a result, it feels as though there was an initial wave of emotional solidarity, but not enough strategic logic was developed to sustain it. In my view, the logic is straightforward: as long as Russia continues its invasion, the situation for Ukrainians deteriorates, the number of casualties rises, more children cannot attend school, more people lose limbs. If that is the reality, then the level of assistance should increase accordingly. Yet without sustained public debate, it has been difficult to connect the scale of aid to the actual situation on the ground.

THE DESIRE FOR GRATITUDE SHOULD NOT BE THE MOTIVE FOR HELP

Q: That said, however, Japan ranks seventh among donor countries in terms of total assistance. That is a substantial contribution.

A: Seventh place in total volume is indeed something to be proud of. However, if you look at assistance as a share of GDP, Japan lags behind countries such as Estonia, Poland, Lithuania, or Finland. Smaller countries bordering Russia are allocating a far greater proportion of their resources.

The overall sum matters. But arguing that, because of a few tenths of a percent, “there is no money left for Noto” is not a serious discussion. What concerns me is that, without a proper analysis in terms of GDP share, an emotional impression spreads that Japan is spending “too much” on Ukraine. For a country that calls itself a peace state, that is a troubling trend.

Q: Many Ukrainians want to express their gratitude to the Japanese people. Does that gratitude reach Japan?

A: I believe Japan is not helping in order to receive gratitude. If the world becomes one in which the aggressor prevails, Japan itself will not be able to survive. That is why we impose sanctions on the aggressor and support the country that came under attack — so that it does not fall.

I personally do not engage in debates in Japan about whether Ukrainians are sufficiently grateful. But internationally, the situation is quite different. On the global stage, Japan’s assistance is highly visible and widely recognized. Perhaps within Japan there is simply not enough attention paid to that international assessment. It is good if gratitude is expressed and heard. But the desire to receive gratitude should never be the motive for providing help.

FOR JAPAN, IT IS EXTREMELY IMPORTANT TO LEARN FROM UKRAINE’S EXPERIENCE

Q: Is there a possibility that, after the most recent parliamentary elections, Japan’s approach to military assistance for Ukraine will change?

A: Frankly, I do not believe Japanese military assistance will expand in a linear fashion. There are political parties in Japan that take a cautious or passive stance toward military aid, and when domestic consensus-building and coalition stability become the priority, expanding such assistance becomes more difficult. That is a classic feature of Japanese politics.

As part of the current coalition arrangement between the Liberal Democratic Party and the Japan Innovation Party, there has been a proposal to abolish the so-called “five categories” — the government-imposed restrictions on the export of defense equipment. I consider this a positive idea. However, public resistance is very strong. Some fear that abolishing these categories would lead to uncontrolled arms exports and turn Japan into a militaristic state. One rarely hears constructive public discussion about how reforming the system could enable Japan to make a more effective international contribution.

As an expert, I cannot categorically state that abolishing the five categories would carry no risks. Those risks must be discussed soberly. At the same time, it is easy to imagine situations where useful assistance Japan could provide becomes impossible simply because it does not fit neatly into one of these formal categories. Decisions should be made case by case, rather than mechanically tied to rigid classifications. Restrictions are necessary, but if we become prisoners of formalism, we risk losing the ability to contribute internationally through Japan’s advanced technologies.

As for Ukraine, even within the existing five categories, meaningful support is possible — for example, in mine clearance. I have consistently emphasized demining. Yet the amount of demining equipment delivered to Ukraine remains catastrophically insufficient. Even without abolishing the restrictions, we should be making fuller use of the existing framework.

At the same time, during Ukraine’s reconstruction phase or amid changes on the battlefield, new technological needs may arise that fall outside the current categories. We must avoid a situation in which the regulatory system itself becomes an obstacle to providing necessary assistance.

Q: Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi regularly attends summits of the “Coalition of the Willing,” and discussions are ongoing about future security guarantees for Ukraine. How can Japan be involved in that process?

A: Japan is not a member of NATO, and when NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte stated that Japan is also part of the security guarantees framework, it caused confusion and some negative reactions domestically. In my view, genuine security guarantees mean preventing a renewed Russian attack and ensuring the capacity to defend Ukraine if such an attack reoccurs. Since Japan would not provide a direct military response, this would not constitute security guarantees in the strict sense.

However, Japan can contribute in the economic dimension. For example, it could participate in a mechanism for the immediate imposition of sanctions or the automatic activation of emergency assistance if Russia launches another invasion. Japan should be part of such arrangements.

Ukraine’s accession to NATO would be the most reliable security guarantee. I regret that current discourse is built around the assumption that Russia will attack again. I would prefer the Coalition countries to focus more on how to prevent a renewed assault in the first place.

Q: Ukraine has gained extensive experience in war against Russia. What aspects of that experience could be useful for Japan?

A: There are several dimensions to this, but ultimately it all comes down to deterrence. The key lesson from Ukraine is that deterrence is not achieved solely by possessing sufficient military force. Russia miscalculated not only Ukraine’s capacity to resist and the determination of its people, but also the durability of international support.

Put simply, Ukraine was attacked because it — and the international community — were underestimated. The lesson for Japan is to ensure that we are not underestimated. Of course, it is impossible to fully control the thinking of a country that intends to attack, and that structural challenge will always persist.

Another crucial factor is the will to resist demonstrated by Ukrainians, which fundamentally shifted global perceptions. At the outset, many believed that if Ukraine were attacked, it would quickly collapse. But Ukrainians’ determination to defend their country themselves — and the fact that President Volodymyr Zelensky did not flee Kyiv at the outset of the war — generated and sustained international support. The continuation of both resistance and external backing was not preordained. Without that visible national resolve, it would not have materialized. I am not certain that Japanese society would respond in the same way under comparable circumstances, and that is something we must seriously reflect on.

Beyond that, Ukraine could become one of Japan’s most important defense partners. The ability of Ukrainians to develop indigenous weapons systems, effectively integrate externally supplied equipment, and preserve state functionality under four years of extreme pressure constitutes extraordinary practical experience. Recently, Ukrainians themselves have been saying: “We have the most real-world experience — learn from us.”

For Japan, studying Ukraine’s experience is therefore of strategic importance. This awareness represents a profound shift compared to the pre-2022 period. Ukraine and Japan have become important partners, and the real challenge for Japan now is how to internalize and apply the lessons Ukraine has learned at such a high cost.

I WANT UKRAINE TO EMERGE FROM THIS HORRIBLE SITUATION AS SOON AS POSSIBLE

Q: Have you visited Ukraine since the start of the full-scale invasion?

A: No, I have not.

Q: What would you like to do first when you visit next time?

A: That’s a difficult question…

Q: But you do want to visit Ukraine, don’t you?

A: I do. Every year I look for an opportunity, but as a professor at a public university I am required to follow the Japanese Foreign Ministry’s security recommendations, so I have not been able to go yet. Still, I know people who travel there, and I would very much like to as well.

When I do go, I actually want to try ramen and sushi in Ukraine. I’ve heard they are very popular there. I have never eaten a ramen egg that is pink — in Japan, ramen eggs are not pink. When my Ukrainian friend comes to Japan, she wants to eat Japanese sushi. I, on the contrary, want to try Ukrainian sushi.

Beyond that, since I have only ever been to Kyiv, I would like to see other cities with my own eyes — including the Donbas region — to understand how people have lived over these past four or five years and to speak directly with local residents.

Q: Do you have a favorite Ukrainian dish, if any?

A: I once lived in the United Kingdom for quite a long time, and that is where I first tried Chicken Kyiv (known in Japan as “Kyiv-style cutlet”). There was a period when I ordered it every time I saw it on a menu. For some reason, it is very popular there. The aromatic butter melting from inside is simply incredible.

I also love mushroom soup — it is delicious anywhere. I like borshch, and green borshch as well, but if I have to choose, I would pick mushroom soup. And in Ukraine, tea tastes wonderful everywhere.

Q: Today, as is often the case when you appear in the media, you are wearing a Ukrainian vyshyvanka. What meaning do you attach to that choice?

A: It is important to send a visual message of support for Ukraine at first glance. In fact, some of my relatives believed that a scholar should appear neutral — that the role of an academic is to analyze with a neutral demeanor.

But from the very first day of the invasion, I have either worn a vyshyvanka or at least a Ukrainian pin, or something in blue and yellow. I am a specialist in international politics, yet I want to convey that I do not take a neutral “both sides are to blame” position. I stand with those who have been wronged. I believe I must not only analyze, but also express a value-based judgment. Ukraine deserves support, and Russia must withdraw its troops. The vyshyvanka is a symbol of that stance of mine.

If people perceive me as pro-Ukrainian, I welcome that. For me, it is an honor.

Q: What is Ukraine to you now?

A: It is something of utmost importance after my family — something I wish happiness for every single day. I want Ukraine to emerge from this terrible situation as early as possible. I used to think that a specialist in international politics should not be emotionally attached to any particular country. Now I think differently. Until the day Ukraine frees itself from aggression, overcomes the long and difficult process of recovery, and can finally leave this war behind, I will stand with Ukraine and support it. It is what I pray for, and it never leaves my thoughts.

Takashi Hirano, Tsukuba

Photos via Author