Foreign troops in Ukraine: what the ‘Coalition of the Willing’ Paris summit clarified

European Partners Move on Toward Practical Steps, but without a U.S. Backstop

FORCE DEPLOYMENT REMAINS AN OPEN QUESTION

The Paris summit of the so-called “Coalition of the Willing” signaled a readiness among Ukraine’s partners to move beyond declaratory political statements and toward practical decisions on security guarantees and the deterrence of potential renewed aggression by the Russian Federation.

The Paris Declaration adopted at the end of the meeting, together with a separate trilateral declaration by Ukraine, France and the United Kingdom on intentions to deploy multinational forces, underscored that the discussion is no longer confined to rhetoric. Instead, it reflects concrete—albeit still limited—steps by Europe toward action. The documents formally outline, among other elements, the prospective contours of an international contingent in Ukraine following a possible ceasefire.

At this stage, however, what has been agreed so far remains a framework vision of future security guarantees. Final decisions will still require approval by national parliaments, and any potential foreign contingent—if deployed at all—would be limited in scope, including its size, areas of deployment and rules of engagement. Most of the arrangements remain provisional, dependent both on the parameters of a future ceasefire and on domestic political dynamics within partner countries.

The decisive prerequisite remains the position of the United States: European members of the “Coalition of the Willing” are prepared to deploy in Ukraine only if there is a U.S. backstop—clear political and military guarantees of support from Washington.

THE BROADEST REPRESENTATION, FORMALIZED COMMITMENTS TO UKRAINE, AND U.S. INVOLVEMENT

The Paris summit became the most representative gathering in the history of the Coalition of the Willing, bringing together delegations from 35 countries, including 27 heads of state and government.

A particularly significant element was the direct participation of representatives of the U.S. president’s team—Special Envoys Steven Witkoff and Jared Kushner—alongside NATO’s Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) and the Commander of U.S. European Command, General Alexus Grynkewich. Their presence sent a clear signal that transatlantic unity on Ukraine remains intact, despite Russia’s efforts to undermine it through information influence operations and high-profile claims about alleged “drone attacks” on Vladimir Putin’s residence.

The Paris Declaration adopted at the end of the summit recorded the Coalition’s readiness to assume politically and legally binding security guarantees for Ukraine, to be activated once a ceasefire is established. These guarantees are intended to complement existing bilateral security agreements, in line with the national legal and constitutional procedures of participating states.

The document envisages U.S.-led participation in ceasefire monitoring and verification mechanisms, long-term military support for Ukraine’s armed forces, preparations for the deployment of a multinational force, and coordinated responses in the event of renewed Russian aggression—ranging from military and intelligence measures to diplomatic and sanctions-based actions. To ensure operational coordination across these tracks, a trilateral U.S.–Ukraine–Coalition coordination group is to be established in Paris.

A separate outcome was a trilateral declaration by Ukraine, France and the United Kingdom, which formalizes intentions to deploy multinational forces following a ceasefire. London and Paris are now viewed as the principal potential contributors to such a contingent.

“This is a vital part of our firm commitment to support Ukraine over the long term. It paves the way for a legal framework under which British, French and partner forces could operate on Ukrainian territory—protecting Ukraine’s airspace and maritime domain and helping to rebuild Ukraine’s armed forces for the future,” British Prime Minister Keir Starmer said at a press conference following the summit.

At the same time, the configuration, size and mandate of any potential foreign contingent remain undefined.

According to the Paris Declaration, multinational forces for Ukraine would contribute through “measures to ensure security in the air, at sea and on land, as well as the reconstitution of Ukraine’s Armed Forces,” to be undertaken “at Ukraine’s request after a reliable cessation of hostilities is achieved.” These elements would be “European-led, with participation by non-European members of the Coalition and with proposed support from the United States.”

For now, only one point is clear: any potential deployment of foreign forces in Ukraine is envisaged solely after a ceasefire agreement is reached. It would not take the form of a traditional UN peacekeeping mission, nor would it involve the stationing of troops directly along the line of contact.

According to French President Emmanuel Macron’s vision, any potential multinational contingent would be deployed at strategically important locations deep inside Ukrainian territory and would perform deterrence, support, training, and reconstruction functions for Ukraine’s Armed Forces.

UK Prime Minister Keir Starmer, for his part, said Paris and London intend to establish a network of military hubs in Ukraine, as well as construct protected facilities for storing weapons and military equipment, to help sustain the country’s defense needs over the long term.

At this stage, however, it remains unclear—at least publicly—what the size of any such multinational force might be or what specific contributions individual participants would make. Even the two countries that have explicitly declared their readiness to take part, France and the United Kingdom, have avoided providing concrete details. President Macron has referred only to “several thousand” troops, while Prime Minister Starmer has stressed that any final decisions would rest with parliament.

According to the British newspaper The Times, citing military sources, France and the United Kingdom together could deploy around 15,000 personnel to Ukraine—approximately 7,500 from each country. This would be significantly fewer than figures previously discussed within the so-called Coalition of the Willing, where some officials had spoken of 30,000 to 60,000 troops. Even the 15,000 figure may prove overly optimistic: the same Times sources note that deploying 7,500 troops could be a major challenge for the United Kingdom, given that it has only about 71,000 trained service members in its regular army.

Germany, which has one of the largest armed forces in Europe, could theoretically make a substantial contribution to the size of a potential multinational force. For now, however, the deployment of Bundeswehr units to Ukraine is not planned. Federal Chancellor Friedrich Merz has said that Berlin will continue to provide political, financial and military support to Ukraine, but that sending German troops to Ukrainian territory is not under consideration. At the same time, German officials have signalled that a deployment of forces to NATO countries bordering Ukraine—such as Poland or Romania—could be possible, subject to the appropriate government and parliamentary mandates.

A similar position has been articulated by Poland, Ukraine’s neighbor and another country with one of Europe’s largest armies. Warsaw has stated that it will not send its troops into Ukraine, instead focusing on providing logistical, organizational and infrastructure support to countries that may participate in a future mission.

Italy has also ruled out the participation of its armed forces in a multinational contingent. Following the Paris summit, Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni said explicitly that the deployment of Italian troops to Ukraine as part of security guarantees was not being considered.

At the same time, several other countries—including Canada, Spain, Belgium, Sweden and Turkey—have expressed readiness to contribute to security guarantees for Ukraine once peace is achieved, though these contributions do not currently include the deployment of troops.

The United States, for its part, is not considering sending its own combat units, but has said it is prepared to lead a ceasefire monitoring and verification mechanism using drones, sensor networks, and satellite-based capabilities. At the same time, the specific parameters, scope, and operational design of this system have yet to be clearly defined.

US BACKSTOP IS THE KEY CONDITION — BUT QUESTIONS REMAIN

Nearly all members of the so-called Coalition of the Willing acknowledge that, without clear and credible commitments from the United States, any foreign military mission in Ukraine is highly unlikely. President Volodymyr Zelensky has repeatedly stressed that an American backstop is essential as the foundation of any viable system of security guarantees for Ukraine.

Austrian military analyst Markus Reisner echoed this assessment in comments to Ukrinform, underscoring that US involvement is the decisive factor shaping European states’ willingness to deploy forces to Ukraine.

“The key issue remains the extent to which the United States would be bindingly engaged with multinational forces in Ukraine, in both peace and any future wartime scenario,” said Reisner, a colonel in the Austrian Armed Forces. “The absence of a clear answer to this question places all the commitments and promises made in Paris into a relative context.”

According to Reisner, European leaders in Paris discussed concrete security guarantees for Ukraine in the event of a ceasefire. “However, the core message of the adopted declaration is that the United States would need to commit to supporting European forces deployed in Ukraine in the event of a renewed Russian attack,” he said.

“Without such assurances or binding commitments from the United States, Europe is not ready to move forward. This means the issue ultimately returns to Washington,” Reisner argued.

At the same time, the level of US willingness to make binding commitments remains unclear. Under President Donald Trump, any such commitment represents what the expert describes as a “difficult-to-predict risk.”

Reisner highlights a critical scenario for which there is still no clear answer: what happens if European forces deployed in Ukraine come under attack by Russia and the United States does not intervene?

“The question arises: what would happen if European forces in Ukraine were attacked and the United States did not actively step in?” he said. “Without US involvement, Europeans would struggle to defend themselves given their limited military capabilities. Does Europe possess thousands of ballistic and cruise missiles, or tens of thousands of strike drones, as a conventional deterrent against Russia?”

RUSSIAN THREATS AND MISSION’S CHALLENGES

Russia, in turn, has stated in no uncertain terms that it would treat any presence of Western troops in Ukraine as a legitimate military target. Immediately following the Paris summit, Russia’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs declared that foreign units and the infrastructure associated with them would become “lawful combat targets” for Russia’s armed forces.

The risk of direct missile and drone strikes against potential deployment sites—even deep inside Ukrainian territory—remains the primary deterrent for members of the Coalition of the Willing. Any such attack would automatically raise the prospect of a direct military response and the possible involvement of European states in a war with Russia.

Experts caution that an attack, for example, on French or British units deployed in Ukraine under bilateral arrangements would not automatically trigger Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty. Since such forces would be operating outside NATO territory and not under a NATO mandate, any incident would be treated as bilateral in nature. This is precisely why U.S. guarantees—most notably extended deterrence, including the nuclear dimension—are central to the entire concept.

“It is still difficult to imagine European armed forces being deployed in Ukraine without U.S. support, with its unique military capabilities, and without a guarantee of American military intervention in the event of a large-scale Russian attack—especially as long as Russia continues to regard Western soldiers in Ukraine as military targets,” said Austrian Colonel Markus Reisner. “In the absence of a relevant UN mandate, such a mission would be based on bilateral commitments between Ukraine and individual European states. It would also fall outside the scope of NATO’s Article 5, since the troops would be stationed in Ukraine, that is, outside NATO territory. This means the Alliance’s collective defense mechanism would not apply in the event of a Russian attack on European forces.”

In theory, these gaps could be addressed through separate international legal agreements. However, such arrangements would require ratification by national parliaments, further complicating and slowing the process.

“In the past, either a UN mandate or U.S. participation in a coalition of the willing guaranteed military intervention—specifically by the United States. If neither of these factors is present, Europeans would be forced to act on their own and assume all associated risks,” the expert said. “At present, there is no clear agreement on a future deployment of European troops in Ukraine, and serious doubts remain as to whether Western states would truly commit to fighting Russia in Ukraine if hostilities were to resume.”

At the same time, Reisner described the trilateral declaration by Ukraine, France and the United Kingdom—along with expressions of interest from other European countries in joining—as “a visible step forward and evidence of Europe’s growing readiness to act.”

The Austrian military expert also highlighted another critical dimension of the debate over the robust security guarantees Europe and Ukraine expect from the United States for: the issue of mutual trust and the predictability of U.S. commitments.

“Under Trump, the United States has demonstrated what it is willing and capable of doing militarily, not least in Venezuela. Trump reinforced this with subsequent statements regarding Cuba and Greenland. U.S. military capabilities have been demonstrated convincingly leave little room for doubt, and the objective of imposing respect on any current or future adversaries has clearly been achieved,” Reisner noted. “At the same time, however, the reputation of the United States among its European allies has suffered. This raises the question of which treaties or commitments can be relied upon in the future. Has international law become entirely irrelevant, replaced by the law of the stronger? Any promises of protection and support can only be effective if there is mutual trust—much like a marriage vow, in good times and in bad.”

In Reisner’s assessment, Europe remains the weaker partner for is still unable to exercise full-spectrum military power without U.S. military support.

“When Trump says that Denmark has pledged to send another dog sled team to Greenland, it illustrates Europe’s limited—if not effectively paralyzed—capacity to project military power. This applies both to Ukraine and to Greenland,” the expert added. “If the declaration envisages a functioning ceasefire monitoring and verification mechanism, that implies the deployment of appropriate military capabilities across all key domains of operational command. This includes, in particular, real-time situational awareness along the entire Ukrainian frontline and in depth, as well as the ability to respond rapidly with appropriate land, maritime and air forces to any attacks.”

THE UKRAINIAN ARMY AT THE CORE OF THE SECURITY GUARANTEE ARCHITECTURE

The Paris summit of the Coalition of the Willing thus marked an important step toward formalizing commitments on security guarantees for Ukraine, including the potential deployment of multinational forces. At the same time, all participants without exception acknowledge that any foreign military presence would be possible only after a ceasefire is achieved—a scenario that, for the time being, remains hypothetical.

Even if a ceasefire were secured, approved by national parliaments, and backed by a sufficiently robust U.S. backstop, the future presence of foreign troops—given constraints on troop numbers, deployment areas, and rules of engagement—risks remaining largely political and symbolic. Whether a limited British-French contingent in western Ukraine, supplemented by a small German presence in Poland or Romania, could become a genuine deterrent to a revisionist Russia remains an open question.

The risks of a purely symbolic mission were also highlighted by retired U.S. Army General Ben Hodges, former commander of U.S. forces in Europe. In his assessment, an effective multinational presence would have to comprise thousands of well-trained troops with clear authority and capabilities to respond immediately to anticipated Russian provocations.

“The Coalition of the Willing must have real power and rules of engagement that allow for an immediate response to any violations. Commanders cannot be calling Paris or London every time to ask how to react to a Russian drone,” Hodges said in comments to The Guardian.

A similar view is shared by Gustav Gressel, a lecturer at Austria’s National Defense Academy and a former senior fellow at the Berlin office of the European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR). In comments to Ukrinform, Gressel said that credible deterrence of Russia would be possible only under a different model of sustained allied presence—one akin to NATO’s Enhanced Forward Presence (EFP).

Launched at NATO’s 2016 Warsaw Summit following Russia’s annexation of Crimea and the outbreak of hostilities in eastern Ukraine, the EFP model integrates allied units into the national defense structures of NATO’s eastern flank states. Its purpose is to deter potential Russian aggression against Alliance members while visibly demonstrating NATO solidarity.

“This could be a structure similar to the EFP,” Gressel said. “European forces would be integrated into Ukrainian structures—just as the German brigade in Lithuania is integrated into the Lithuanian army and defense planning system. In that case, Ukraine would be a de facto NATO member, even if not yet one de jure.”

Despite ongoing debates over the format and mandate of any potential foreign presence, one point remains clear: the cornerstone of Ukraine’s security guarantees will continue to be its own Armed Forces as the central pillar of deterrence. , strengthened by long-term partner assistance, but without illusions that anyone else will fight on Ukraine’s behalf.

This emphasis is also reflected in the Paris Declaration, which identifies support for the Ukrainian Armed Forces as the central element of deterrence. The document stresses that “the Armed Forces of Ukraine will remain the first line of defense and deterrence,” while the Coalition commits to providing them with critical, long-term military assistance and weapons”.

Vasyl Korotkyi, Berlin

Photos courtesy of the Presidential Office