Andrii Melnyk, Permanent Representative of Ukraine to the United Nations

Andrii Melnyk, a career diplomat, has been widely known since his tenure as Ukraine’s Ambassador to Germany. At that time, he gained prominence for his outspoken criticism of the hesitation shown by German political leaders in supporting Ukraine in its confrontation with Putin’s Russia. As a result of his unconventional diplomatic style, the German government fully reversed its previously cautious course within the first months of 2022, becoming one of Ukraine’s largest suppliers of military assistance—a position it maintains to this day.

Melnyk later served as Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs and subsequently as Ambassador to Brazil. In April of this year, he assumed the position of Permanent Representative of Ukraine to the United Nations.

Ukrinform spoke with the Permanent Representative about the outcomes of the December votes in the UN General Assembly on three Ukrainian resolutions, the challenges of diplomatic engagement on the international stage, prospects for the work of the UN Security Council, and expectations regarding continued international support for Ukraine within the United Nations system.

THE DIPLOMATIC FLOOR AT THE UN IS BECOMING INCREASINGLY SLIPPERY

— Mr. Ambassador, what is your assessment of the outcomes of the votes in the General Assembly, which in December adopted three Ukrainian resolutions—on the return of children abducted by Russia, the consequences of the Chornobyl disaster, and human rights violations in the currently occupied Ukrainian territories?

— All three of these resolutions, each in its own way, were genuinely very successful for Ukraine. This year’s session of the General Assembly—the 80th, a jubilee session—was marked by truly unprecedented intensity, as these critically important documents were adopted within the span of just fifteen days. Such a concentration of the votes, quite understandably, required special approaches and a great deal of creativity.

Even our friends—countries that supported us and co-sponsored these resolutions—were at times confused: what exactly is being voted on, how, when, and whether it was even necessary. It’s not a stretch to say that these were history-making two weeks in the annals of Ukrainian diplomacy. In my view, the solid results we managed to achieve were more than optimal given the conditions, which are becoming increasingly difficult for Ukraine. The situation is growing tougher not only on the battlefield, but also on the slippery diplomatic floor of the United Nations.

The main conclusion I drew from these votes is that we must honestly acknowledge: the situation for Ukraine at the UN is unlikely to become easier—quite the opposite. This means we must urgently find a new, bold approach to change this dynamic. This also concerns increasing the number of votes in our favor—arithmetic matters here. The numbers need to be shifted in the opposite direction.

This will require non-standard, perhaps even fairly tough decisions that are unusual for the UN environment. I very much hope that our proposals—on how to achieve this, and how to return to the levels of support Ukraine had in the emotional early months of Russia’s full-scale invasion in 2022, when we used to garner more than 140 votes “in favor”—will be supported in Kyiv.

The highest result we achieved in the fourth year of the war was just under one hundred votes. That is a serious challenge.

I believe it would be a mistake to sugarcoat the situation and claim that everything is fine. It is not the case. We must draw honest conclusions and begin acting using entirely different methods, including at the bilateral level, vis-à-vis those states that consider it acceptable to abstain in the UN or vote against Ukraine without facing any consequences.

This is also a challenge for our closest partners—above all the EU and our Western allies. Together, we need to look for ways to reverse this negative trend. We must encourage them to fundamentally rethink their overly lenient approach toward the Global South. The time has come to show teeth and act truly decisively.

COUNTRIES THAT DO NOT VOTE “IN FAVOR” WILL FACE CONCRETE CONSEQUENCES

— How do you plan to reverse this trend?

— Ukraine must act far more offensively, and I will explain why. This UN front is critically important, because changing the dynamics also matters given that Russia, unfortunately, is increasingly— and quite successfully—promoting its narrative of the “invincibility” of a “great” Russia, including here within the diplomatic environment.

What does this mean in practice? If Russia is perceived as impossible to restrain on the battlefield, if Moscow is seen as “winning anyway,” then more and more countries choose the easier option, resorting to a kind of “ostrich policy”—they abstain or do not vote at all. But we cannot afford to tolerate such a cynical approach.

Our front with Russia stretches from Pokrovsk and Kupiansk across the entire Atlantic Ocean, and here it also runs straight through the hall of the UN General Assembly. Everyone watches very closely who votes in whose favor. Therefore, we cannot simply take note of someone’s arguments and shrug it off, even if these are close partners or countries with relatively neutral bilateral relations.

My message to other delegations is straightforward: if you do not vote “in favor” of Ukraine, we consider this a vote “against” us—even if you abstain or do not participate in the vote at all.

I say this explicitly to my fellow ambassadors at the UN: I take it personally. I perceive such pseudo-neutral positions very personally, and I will do everything in my power to ensure that countries which allow themselves to abstain or vote against our resolutions understand that this will carry very concrete negative consequences. These may lie in the political or reputational dimensions, and ideally will also entail economic consequences—for example, through limitations on development assistance.

The fact is that EU countries transfer billions of euros every year to states in the Global South. Germany alone allocates more than €30 billion annually. For me, this is a matter of principle: to ensure that all these countries feel, in their own wallets, the real cost of effectively playing along with Russia at the United Nations.

— Does this also apply to the position of Arab states, which often abstain when voting on our resolutions?

— Yes, and this is a separate and highly sensitive issue. I am not an expert on the Arab world, but here at the UN one is forced to understand in greater depth the nuances and internal contradictions within this group. For us, the collective abstention on the General Assembly resolution on the return of Ukrainian children abducted by Russia came as a genuine cold shower.

It is one thing when countries such as Qatar have well-founded reasons to abstain, given that they have acted as mediators and have directly helped us return our children. It is quite another when a unified position is formed across the Arab States. That represents a serious challenge.

The point is that these countries wield significant influence within the UN system, and that influence is growing rapidly. Other actors are increasingly orienting themselves toward their positions.

We have already begun working to ensure that all States understand one simple point: Ukraine will not accept a stance that seeks to sit on two chairs at once—playing “both sides”—while simultaneously telling us how much they “support” and “stand with” Ukraine.

By way of comparison, the influence of our main allies—European countries and the broader Western world—has not increased here in any meaningful way. This is a real problem not only for Ukraine but also for the EU, even if many Europeans have not yet fully internalized it.

— Would it be fair to say that the countries voting against our resolutions constitute the so-called “axis of evil,” made up of dictatorial or semi-legitimate regimes?

— This is unquestionably true for some of them. This is a genuine “axis of evil,” and we know very well which States are involved—from Russia and Belarus through Iran to North Korea.

— And what about China?

— China has abstained on some of our resolutions. Therefore, with regard to the PRC, I would not go that far.

At the same time, it is no secret that a number of African countries have effectively fallen into the Kremlin’s sphere of influence—geopolitical, military, and economic—from which it is not easy for them to extricate themselves. This primarily concerns the dependence of political elites. For now, I would not label all these States as part of an “axis of evil,” but it is undeniably a real challenge for Ukraine.

If we look at the level of support these African states receive from our closest allies—above all EU countries that provide substantial financial, stabilization, humanitarian, and especially development assistance—we see that this support has not significantly diminished.

I analyzed this in detail during my tenure in Brazil. There is no proportional relationship between how countries of the Global South vote against the resolutions we promote—often in concert with the EU—and the amount of funding the EU continues provide to them. For many of these States, such assistance is a critical necessity.

— You are referring primarily to African countries such as Burkina Faso, Burundi, and Eritrea. But these are, in effect, Russian proxies. Moscow also invests resources in them.

— Yes, of course, Russia also invests, but primarily political capital. But for us, the key issue lies elsewhere. What Russia or other geopolitical actors do is one side of the coin. Ukraine is first and foremost concerned with what we ourselves can influence.

Unfortunately, we cannot stop Russia from distributing bribes, buying off political elites, or facilitating military coups—phenomena we have witnessed repeatedly in recent years.

Despite all this, Western leverage over even these Moscow-aligned satellite states still exists, and even more so over countries that have not yet slid fully toward the “axis of evil.”

However, our joint efforts with the European Union must primarily focus on those States that do not vote in favor of our resolutions at all, or that consistently abstain simply because it is convenient for them.

If we fail to convince the Europeans right now—and believe me, this must be done at the very highest political level—nothing will change. This requires a political decision at minimum by the EU Council, the European Commission, and the European External Action Service. It will not be easy, because such an approach demands a genuine shift in paradigms. The EU has long relied almost exclusively on so-called “soft power,” but that is no longer sufficient. As EU High Representative Kaja Kallas aptly noted recently, the European Union should not be afraid to become the “bad guy.”

We need to put all the cards on the table and say honestly: look at what is not working.

If those countries of the Global South that continue to receive EU assistance while persistently abstaining in the UN General Assembly not suddenly come to some moral awakening on their own, then something works wrong here. There will be no moment of revelation descending from the sky, like that of the Apostle Paul. This will not work unless pressure is applied—figuratively speaking, unless they are stepped on “by the tail.”

The sequence should be clear: first a warning, then a temporary suspension of financial assistance, and if they continue to ignore our shared security interests with the EU—then, as the saying goes, goodbye.

THE SECURITY COUNCIL MUST FINALLY PUT A RESOLUTION ON AN UNCONDITIONAL CEASEFIRE TO A VOTE

— The number of Security Council meetings on Ukraine seems to have decreased recently. What explains this?

— No, that is a misleading impression. In reality, the number of meetings has not decreased. The only month without a meeting was October, during Russia’s presidency of the Security Council. In all other months—September, November, and December—there was at least one meeting.

In October, we made a conscious decision not to initiate a meeting. Formally, in order to convene a Security Council meeting, one must address the presiding State—in this case, Russia. Even such a procedural request from Kyiv could be exploited by propagandists in a way that would cause more harm than benefit. That is why we confined ourselves to a joint press appearance alongside our Western allies.

On that same day, Russia organized its so-called signature event—the flagship meeting of its monthly presidency—dedicated to the protection of multilateralism, under the familiar banner of being “in favor of everything good and against everything bad.” We prepared a very clear statement that demonstrated, in concrete terms, that in practice Russia acts against everything it claims to support rhetorically.

Overall, the instrument at our disposal—initiating Security Council meetings either directly or through our partners—continues to justify itself, even given the impossibility of adopting Security Council resolutions regarding Russian aggression due to the abuse of the veto power. These public debates in themselves help sustain international attention to the war.

They also require a substantial amount of preparatory work.  Not only do Ukraine and its allies speak, but briefers from the UN Secretariat take the floor as well. They present objective, up-to-date information on developments over the previous month—above all, on Russian missile strikes and aerial bombardments of cities and civilian infrastructure—based on verified data from the UN Human Rights Monitoring Mission in Ukraine. All of this is formally documented, including for the historical record, as evidence of Moscow’s war crimes.

In this way, we manage to keep the issue of Russian aggression firmly on the agenda of the UN Security Council. However, in my view, this is not sufficient. Only a single resolution—“The Path to Peace,” proposed by the United States—has been adopted this year, in February, in relation to Russia’s war against Ukraine.

— And even that resolution is merely recommendatory in nature…

— It was a Security Council resolution adopted with the synchronized support of the United States, Russia, and China. As you may recall, Ukraine was, to put it mildly, far from enthusiastic about this step at the time. Our European partners did not veto this resolution, although they could have done so.

On the other hand—and I say this explicitly to all those who voted in favor—the issue of implementation now lies primarily with them. It is their political responsibility, since they were the ones who effectively “gave birth” to this resolution. The time is long overdue for a separate Security Council meeting to examine why this document has remained a dead letter.

At the same time, irrespective of the negotiation process initiated by the United States, this resolution still matters, in my view. It could—and should—serve as the basis for a new document calling for a ceasefire without any preconditions, not undermining negotiations but rather complementing and reinforcing them.

Unfortunately, our European partners at the Security Council, for reasons that are difficult to understand, are still hesitant. In my remarks, I compared this peculiar position to Samuel Beckett’s famous play Waiting for Godot—a figure who, as we know, never actually arrives. Even if Russia—entirely predictably—were to block a draft resolution on an immediate and unconditional ceasefire, it would still be worth tabling it for consideration by the Security Council. In that case, everyone would once again see clearly who is truly interested in prolonging the war.

If Ukraine were currently a non-permanent member of the Security Council, we ourselves would have far greater leverage over the agenda.

It is only through working here in New York that I have fully come to appreciate that the Security Council is, in effect, the top tier of international diplomacy. Whereas the General Assembly resembles a parliament—a highly democratic, relatively soft instrument—then the UN Security Council is almost the Olympics of international politics. Every member State, even the smallest one, immediately begins to see itself as a shaper of others’ destinies, a kind of semi-god.

In reality, however, the vote of every country seated at the Security Council table ultimately affects, to a certain extent, Ukraine’s fate as well.

— The Secretary-General can also initiate consideration of a resolution in the Security Council. He often speaks about the need for a ceasefire and respect for Ukraine’s territorial integrity. He would have little to lose by initiating such a resolution, especially given that 2026 will be the final year of his mandate.

— You are absolutely right. Under the UN Charter, the Secretary-General is empowered to bring to the attention of the Security Council any situation which, in his opinion, may threaten the maintenance of international peace and security.

At the same time, he does not have the authority to independently submit draft resolutions. That is the exclusive privilege of Security Council Member States. Nevertheless, any such initiative by the Secretary-General carries enormous political weight and can serve as a catalyst for the relevant process.

In December, Slovenia, which held the presidency that month, convened its signature event—a flagship meeting—devoted to leadership for peace in the context of selecting the future Secretary-General…

COURAGE MUST BE THE DEFINING TRAIT OF THE NEXT UN SECRETARY-GENERAL

— Slovenia’s term on the Security Council ends this year, doesn’t it?

— Yes, that’s so. And, incidentally, just a few days ago the Slovenian delegation hosted a farewell reception to mark the conclusion of its Security Council membership. It’s only natural that I attended, thanked my colleague for the excellent cooperation, for Slovenia’s support for Ukraine, and for the important steps it took during its two-year mandate.

That said, however, at that very event the Permanent Representative of Russia, Mr. Nebenzya, along with his First Deputy, Mr. Polyanskiy, appeared and were socializing in an almost friendly manner—laughing, enjoying themselves, feeling completely at home. I was genuinely shocked and left almost immediately.

I mention this episode deliberately. Our European partners at the UN constantly lament: oh dear, Russia is returning to “normality,” gradually emerging from international isolation, reclaiming its place among the diplomatic community. What should be done?

But if we are being completely honest, within the walls of the UN this process is already, to a large extent, a fait accompli.

One thing is when interaction with Russian representatives is strictly limited to professional necessities. There is the Security Council, and within its framework a certain degree of communication is unavoidable—there are written and unwritten rules of the game, even among adversaries. This is established diplomatic practice, and there is no escaping it.

But it is an entirely different matter to formally invite Russian diplomats to one’s own official protocol events. In my view, that is something one could very well refrain from doing.

Some other European States at the UN, unfortunately, act in the same way, and then later complain about Russia breaking out of isolation.

Now, I would like to return to the main Security Council meeting convened by Slovenia in December. Ukraine also participated. In my statement, I emphasized that courage must be the defining quality of the next Secretary-General, to be elected in 2026.

To be fair, the current Secretary-General did demonstrate resolve at the beginning of Russia’s full-scale invasion: he flew to Moscow, then traveled to Kyiv, and put forward the Black Sea Initiative, which enabled Ukraine to partially restore trade through its blockaded seaports. Unfortunately, since then there have been no new initiatives.

At present, the United Nations is largely observing developments from the sidelines, even though the Organization’s history contains numerous examples in which a Secretary-General played a decisive role in bringing armed conflicts to an end.

Ideally, the United Nations was created not merely to issue verbal condemnations of aggression once it has already occurred, but to identify and pursue real pathways to stop it. This is not only about isolated historical cases—so to speak, not just the war on the Korean Peninsula or other precedents of the past. This was, and remains, the foundational logic behind the creation of the UN.

A return by the United Nations to this approach—back to the roots, to its original mission, which American partners now consistently pursue—would definitely be a major advantage for Ukraine.

The key question is: why was this Organization created in the first place? Precisely to maintain international peace and security. To ensure that at the moment a war erupts, when aggression occurs, the international community has instruments not only for strong statements, but also for the actual cessation of a military invasion.

Unfortunately, the UN system has over recent decades expanded to such an extent that today its budget vividly reflects a fundamental shift in priorities. The largest share of funding is allocated to development assistance. By current figures, this amounts to approximately 32–33 percent of the total budget. In practical terms, this means financing equipment assistance, education, healthcare, and institutional capacity-building projects —areas with which many governments, particularly in vulnerable states, struggle to cope on their own. As a result, the UN often ends up duplicating the functions of sovereign states. And, as we can see, nearly one third of the entire budget is now spent on this.

Next, almost another 30 percent goes to humanitarian assistance: responses to natural disasters, catastrophes, and emergency situations. This is, of course, critically important and absolutely necessary.

However, if one looks at the UN’s core function—maintaining international peace and security, that is, the very purpose for which the Organization was created—it accounts for only about 17 percent of the budget. In effect, roughly one sixth. These funds are what finance peacekeeping operations, most of which are currently deployed in African countries. Their mandates continue to be renewed—and it is positive that this is the case.

Yet there is currently little sense among Member States of a systemic understanding that peace and security must once again become the UN’s primary function. Intellectual resources, political energy, and financial and managerial capacity should be directed first and foremost toward preventing wars—and, where they have already begun, toward stopping them at an early stage.

If this does not happen, all other areas of activity—development, humanitarian programs, equipment assistance—ultimately lose their meaning, because without peace, all of this remains to be just an illusion.

I AVAIL EVERY OPPORTUNITY TO SECURE WALTZ’S SUPPORT

— Do you maintain contact with the U.S. Permanent Representative to the UN, Mike Waltz? What are your impressions?

— Yes, of course. I am in constant and very close contact with him. I have formed a positive impression of Ambassador Waltz both as a person and as a professional. He brings a unique background—not only as a former U.S. National Security Advisor, but also as a long-serving Member of Congress—and this clearly shows. He is genuinely engaged on Ukraine-related issues and demonstrates a solid depth of understanding.

Ambassador Waltz is extremely well informed about everything taking place along our negotiation track. I avail every opportunity to explain Ukraine’s stance and to secure his personal support. It seems to me that he listens carefully and takes my views seriously.

It is also encouraging that Mike Waltz already has a first tangible success to his credit. I am referring to the peace plan for the Gaza Strip, which was achieved through the diplomacy of President Donald Trump. In a very short period of time—literally a matter of weeks—Waltz managed to push a U.S. resolution through the Security Council, one that neither Russia nor China dared to vote against. Both abstained, which in itself is a meaningful result.

Therefore, for us—given that at a certain stage the entire peace track aimed at halting Russian aggression may likewise move to the UN platform—Ambassador Waltz is, without doubt, a key actor.

It is also worth noting that the U.S. Mission has undergone an almost complete change of team. In addition to Mike Waltz himself, there are two deputy representatives with ambassadorial rank who also carry significant weight: Dan Negrea, the U.S. Representative to the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), and Jeff Bartos, the U.S. Representative for UN Reform. Together, they form a strong trio with whom I work on a daily basis.

FOR BAERBOCK, IT WAS A REVELATION THAT THE UKRAINIAN COMMUNITY HAS A STRONG HUB IN THE HEART OF NEW YORK

— Do you maintain contact with the President of the General Assembly, Annalena Baerbock?

— Absolutely. We are in very close contact. I know Ms. Baerbock very well not only from her time as Germany’s foreign minister, but also from much earlier—when she was a rank-and-file member of the Bundestag, and later elected as president of the Green Party.

Over the past few months, we have met on several occasions. I invited the President of the UN General Assembly to lunch at the Ukrainian restaurant Veselka in Manhattan. For her, it was a genuine discovery to get to know that the Ukrainian community has such a strong and well-established presence right in the heart of New York — the so-called Ukrainian Village. Beyond the restaurant, it includes our church, the Ukrainian National Home, a museum, a credit union, the Shevchenko Scientific Society, and, a little further away, the Ukrainian Institute.

In short, Ms. Baerbock was able to feel the strength of this vibrant Ukrainian hub. I believe it left a strong impression on her.

— Is she building her future career in Germany, or rather here at the UN?

— I may be mistaken, but at this stage Ms. Baerbock appears to see her future more within the UN system. She is, of course, unlikely to become Secretary-General, as António Guterres represents the Western European regional group. However, I would not be surprised if, at some point, she were to seek the position of Deputy Secretary-General — a nomination endorsed by the General Assembly, unlike other deputy roles — or to head one of the organizations within the UN system.

Ms. Baerbock, I believe, is still searching for her next role once her term as President of the General Assembly comes to an end (the PGA is elected for a one-year term). At the same time, I would not rule out her return to active German politics.

Incidentally, her current role as President of the General Assembly is not merely ceremonial or purely representative. In addition to setting the agenda and chairing plenary meetings, she has the authority to convene high-level events, appoint special representatives and co-facilitators of intergovernmental processes, and establish advisory and expert bodies.

Accordingly, we are now closely examining how Ukraine can use to best effect these broad prerogatives with Ms. Baerbock’s support.

— What is planned at UN Headquarters for next February, marking the 4th anniversary of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine?

— A final decision has not yet been taken. What is certain is that we plan to convene an emergency special session of the General Assembly on 24 February, the somber fourth anniversary of Russia’s aggression. On a parallel track, we intend to initiate debates in the Security Council—either on the eve of that date or the following day. A possible new resolution, which is still under consideration, is the third element.

THE NEXT COMPOSITION OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL IS A SERIOUS CHALLENGE FOR UKRAINE

— What should Ukraine expect from the upcoming changes in the Security Council’s composition at the beginning of next year? As is known, Algeria, Sierra Leone, the Republic of Korea, Guyana, and Slovenia are rotating off the Council, to be replaced by Liberia, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Bahrain, Colombia, and Latvia.

— For us, this will be a serious challenge. With the exception of Latvia, our experience of practical cooperation with the other incoming members is rather limited and, frankly, difficult. And I am not referring to African countries such as Liberia or the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) only, but also to other future Security Council members like Colombia or Bahrain. Unfortunately, the DRC is the only one of these countries where Ukraine has a fully-fledged embassy, which was ribbon-cut last year. In the other three countries, our diplomatic representation is non-resident.

Based on the experience we already have in engaging with the incoming members of the Security Council, we can expect that things will certainly not become easier for Ukraine. I can already feel this now, as we are in constant contact with all of their delegations here in New York.

That is precisely why we must urgently begin preparing concrete engagement plans — which is exactly what we are doing — with a clear focus on the future members of the Security Council. And this is not only about significantly intensifying bilateral interaction or increasing high-level political contacts. That alone will not be sufficient.

We must more actively involve our key allies, first and foremost those who have special relationships with these countries, in order to help form a broad coalition in support of the UN Charter.

Because if one listens carefully to statements made in the Security Council or the General Assembly, the majority of countries articulate the right words and declare their commitment to international law. Yet in practice, we often see a very different picture — one of widespread passivity when it comes to genuinely defending these principles.

Volodymyr Ilchenko, New York

Photos courtesy of Andrii Melnyk