Adrian Karatnycky, U.S. Atlantic Council expert

New York–based political analyst and Atlantic Council senior fellow Adrian Karatnycky, who closely follows developments in Eastern Europe, regularly visits Ukraine. The expert has spent many years studying democratic processes in post-Soviet countries and their relations with the United States. We speak with Mr. Karatnycky, in particular, about the impact of the corruption scandal on Western aid, the evolution of President Donald Trump’s views on the Russian war, the damage to Ukraine from the U.S. government shutdown, and the confrontation in Washington politics over the Epstein case.

CORRUPTION SCANDAL MAY AFFECT ECONOMIC, BUT NOT MILITARY SUPPORT FOR UKRAINE

– Mr. Karatnycky, in your view, can the corruption scandal in Ukraine affect Western assistance, particularly military aid?

– I believe that it can affect the level of support. I don't think it would lead to a cutoff of support, but the bigger problem is the flow of assistance to the Ukrainian economy beyond military assistance. I think there will be a separation made between military assistance and economic assistance, and that could be at higher risk. There may be more delays, a desire to see mechanisms of control.

I believe there is a lack of confidence now in the government because so many ministers and segments of the government have been shown to be penetrated by a high level of corruption and, to some extent, even by links to Russia and Russian intelligence. All of these are things that will be of concern to the West. But the President of Ukraine also has a way of preempting some of this by taking very resolute measures that show: a) that he is not getting in the way of these investigations and is using his instruments of influence to cooperate fully; b) that he is opening the government to a reshuffle and a completely different combination of forces, which I believe would require consultation with reformers, anti-corruption groups, civil society, the volunteer sector, and, I would say, the democratic patriotic opposition — not a coalition government, but a government led by technocrats and experts who were not associated with being asleep at the wheel when this crisis emerged over several years.

– You recently visited Ukraine, is that correct? What are your impressions and expectations?

– I left Ukraine as this crisis was erupting.

I would say that morale in Ukraine — I mean, I was only in Kyiv — is strong. People's ability to withstand hardship is strong. People organize their rhythm of life around large power outages and terrible attacks on both civilian and infrastructure targets.

I spoke with people who do polling, and the opinion of these pollsters — very reliable, thoughtful pollsters — was that Ukraine's population will be ready to fill the ranks, that there is not going to be a manpower crisis. If there were substantial movement on the front, many young people would volunteer to fight.

I did feel that the President has somewhat lost his way. I think reliance on a very narrow, small group of people has cost Volodymyr Zelensky his reputation. I hope this crisis will lead him to change his ways and take another look at building leadership that is effective, trusted, and ultimately loyal to Ukraine as much as it is to him personally.

– To what extent did the U.S. government shutdown hinder the process of delivering assistance to Ukraine?

– I don't think it hindered it substantially. Production is not hindered because contracts are written with arms manufacturers and suppliers, and I assume those contracts have tracks of payment and response.

I assume that if a European country is buying weapons on behalf of Ukraine from a U.S. arms manufacturer, they would be paying that manufacturer directly under a license received from the government. So the Europeans weren't shut down.

The flow of money, in those cases, would not be impacted. Delivery of supplies might be affected. But again, the military may not have had enough money for fuel to move things to Rzeszów, and from Rzeszów to Ukraine — that may have been affected, but that was only a matter of six or seven weeks. So I don't think this is a dramatic difference.

TRUMP HAS SHIFTED HIS ATTITUDE TOWARD PUTIN, BUT DOES NOT UNDERSTAND THE MOTIVES BEHIND HIS WAR

– In your view, how has Donald Trump’s position on the Russian war evolved, and why?

– I think his position has evolved because he expected some kind of understanding between him and Putin, and a real willingness on his part to rebuild relationships with Russia if Russia ends the war, and to give Russia significant incentives to end the war. He does not understand, and never understood, the real motive of Putin's war, which is the consolidation of totalitarian power over his own society, and the destruction of Ukrainian national identity, as well as Russian territorial expansion. I think he felt that this was a reaction to not the best relations between Putin and his Western counterparts.

But now he understands that Putin has no intention of ending the war, and Trump is looking for other, tougher mechanisms to press Putin into a resolution. His formula of having Europe pay resolves a problem with his electoral base, which doesn't want to spend a lot of money on priorities outside the U.S. This also helps build America's arms industry, brings more money into U.S. revenues, and provides more jobs in the military sector, with Europe buying these weapons.

This creates an incentive for his America First economic policy, where indirectly Ukraine is helped: Europe is paying, and America's technologies and military capabilities are given to Ukraine through European hands. We already see him selling anti-aircraft and anti-missile defense weaponry to European forces and saying that Europeans can decide whether use it for themselves or support Ukraine.

Trump also seems to be transferring day-to-day authority for intelligence sharing and targeting from the U.S. to NATO, where, of course, there is the American general Alexus Grynkewich (Supreme Allied Commander Europe), but the President sees this not as direct U.S. engagement, but as NATO’s direct engagement.

He has developed a philosophy and approach that still opens the door, in his view, to heavy pressure on Putin, continued support for Ukraine, but an open door where the U.S. is not directly involved — which allows him, possibly, some kind of settlement in the future.

Numerous failures of negotiations and being misled by signals from special envoy Steve Witkoff have shifted things to a more professional handling of diplomacy, with the State Department and Secretary Marco Rubio involved, which has helped the situation.

A DISCUSSION IS NEEDED ON THE RETURN OF MEN WHO LEFT UKRAINE DURING THE WAR

– As you mentioned Marco Rubio, what do his comments mean when he says America has nearly exhausted its sanctions potential against Russia?

– I think there are not many more sanctions that could be taken.

Effective enforcement of existing sanctions could be improved, but what else can be done? Limits on travel? There is still seizure of Russian assets being debated, and essentially there are sanctions against people purchasing Russian energy. Europe is tightening sanctions. So he meant that there is not much more to be done — no magic bullet.

The “magic bullet” is showing long-term financial support for the Ukrainian war effort, and long-term support for Ukraine’s economy during the war.

A discussion needs to begin about the return of Ukrainian men who left during and immediately before the war. Chancellor Friedrich Merz scolded President Zelensky about young people leaving who should remain for military service.

Such populism is harmful to Ukraine's security and future, and it causes resentment.

In Poland, there are many able-bodied males who came since after the war began, living well, and Poles don’t understand why they aren’t back. They understand why women, children, and elderly had to leave, but not men. A discussion is needed on who should return now.

– How do you think — does Trump truly believe in his own power, in the idea that he helped end eight wars, even though he seems to barely remember which wars those were?

– Trump is exaggerating that he ended these wars. But he is not exaggerating that in each of these conflicts, countries look to the U.S. as an arbiter or moral guarantor.

He brought Central Asian countries to speak about deeper economic cooperation and Armenia and Azerbaijan. This shows these countries’ concern about Russia and desire for U.S. presence.

These processes in the former Soviet Union represent erosion of Russian power and acknowledgment that many countries see the U.S. as a stabilizing influence.

Trump didn’t negotiate many of these directly, but countries felt the U.S. is essential, and he enjoys being a global arbiter. This is far from the isolationism many expected. He wants to show American power and influence, making the U.S. more engaged in foreign policy.

LOCAL ELECTIONS IN THE U.S. SHOW RADICALIZATION OF BOTH PARTIES

– What is happening in the relationship between Trump and the MAGA movement? How telling is Trump’s refusal to support and endorse Marjorie Taylor Greene known for her anti-Ukrainian statements?

– Several issues are emerging in MAGA. One is a small radical, isolationist, nativist, sometimes racist and antisemitic wing. Trump and MAGA are debating whether these extreme voices should be pushed out. This includes political commentators Tucker Carlson, Nick Fuentes, and to some extent former Trump senior counselor Steve Bannon, who make more rational actors uncomfortable.

Marjorie Taylor Greene was considered very radical but seems to be moving toward a more normal, less conspiratorial style. The President sees this as disloyalty.

I don’t think this is a deeper MAGA problem, but it could be a future issue. If Trump’s ratings weaken, especially with upcoming elections in purple states, some members of Congress may take more middle-of-the-road positions to appeal broadly. With Trump’s high negative ratings among independents, some distancing may occur, though not complete, and Congress may play a more active role rather than rubber-stamping the President.

– What do recent local elections in the U.S. indicate, including the victory of left-wing populist Zohran Mamdani in New York’s mayoral race?

– They indicate radicalization among Republicans and Democrats, which is dangerous. The first party moving to the center will likely win the next presidential election. Americans want normal, calm government, with some principled positions, but centered politically.

Mamdani is partly a reaction to Trump, and partly to immigration in NYC, which doubled the Muslim population to about 750,000 over 10 years. Enthusiastic supporters were highly motivated voters, along with far-left voters. Low turnout in primaries amplified this effect. With Democratic endorsement in a city voting 80% Democratic, it was very hard to unseat him, especially with a flawed independent candidate, former Governor Andrew Cuomo, weakened by alleged sexism scandals — exaggerated, in my view — but politically costly.

Not all elections followed this extreme path; Virginia and New Jersey elected centrist candidates.

– How do you expect the Epstein scandal to unfold? Could it undermine Republicans?

– I don’t think so. Epstein’s case is about Trump, who will no longer be on the ballot. It might affect his rating slightly and add information blackening Democratic politicians, strengthening anti-elite cynicism.

Trump is not running, and JD Vance or Rubio won’t be affected.

It's clear he had an association with Epstein, and that association was long-standing. They were good friends, and they partied together, and Trump could not have not known how Jeffrey Epstein lived and what he was up to. And many politicians knew this, and many people in the establishment knew this, but nobody did anything about it until very late in his rather wild and corrupted life.

Volodymyr Ilchenko, New York

Photos from Ukrinform's archive