Vasyl Syrotenko — AFU General, Chief of the Engineering Troops

Engineering Obstacles Are the Enemy’s Second-Deadliest Threat After Drones

The war in Ukraine illustrates the continuous evolution of modern conflict—from localized engagements to full-spectrum, nationwide defense. This shift has fundamentally reshaped the concept of engineering support. No longer confined to auxiliary roles, engineering troops have become a decisive instrument in shaping the battlespace and sustaining defensive resilience—true architects of the battlefield.

This was emphasized by Vasyl Syrotenko, Chief of the Engineering Troops of the Support Forces Command of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, in his address at Combat Engineer & Logistics 2026—a leading European forum for cooperation in engineering support and logistics, bringing together defense institutions, equipment manufacturers, and the armed forces of NATO member and partner states.

According to the general, engineering troops today operate at the strategic level, with responsibility extending across the entire national territory—from the line of contact to the operational depth. This discussion also examines the evolution of engineering forces in contemporary warfare, their expanding functions, and their growing role in ensuring the state’s defense.

FROM ECHELONED DEFENSE TO RESILIENT DEFENSE

Ukrinform: Over the past two years, engineering troops have fundamentally changed how defense is built. In practical terms, what has changed? What does this echeloned, resilient defense look like today?

Vasyl Syrotenko: The approach to engineering support has shifted across the board. And this isn’t a one-off adjustment—it’s a continuous cycle of adaptation to a rapidly changing battlespace. The character of combat has evolved so profoundly that little remains of the old concept of a “defensive line” beyond the term itself. What exists now is an entirely different structure, with new depth, density, and function.

We have moved beyond simply layering positions into an echeloned defense. The focus now is on building a resilient defense—one that enables maneuver, absorbs pressure, and, critically, creates optimal conditions for unmanned systems, which carry the main burden of engaging the enemy.

The core task is to deny the enemy freedom of movement—to prevent infiltration and advance. That is why current defensive construction is so intensive. At its center is a comprehensive system of engineering obstacles: wire entanglements, anti-tank pyramids (“dragon’s teeth”) integrated with barriers, and successive anti-tank ditches. Together, they form a complex, interlocking structure that constrains and channels enemy movement, effectively shaping the battlefield in our favor.

UI: What role do these engineering obstacles play? Why emphasize continuous non-explosive barriers combined with mining? How does this system work as a whole, and why is it so effective?

VS: Previously, obstacle systems were designed mainly to support fire engagement—to set conditions for destruction. Today, they have become a primary means of attrition in their own right. Built as continuous, multi-layered systems that cannot be breached quickly, they directly degrade the enemy’s combat capability. In other words, they create favorable conditions for other units to engage and destroy the enemy.

They disrupt tempo, force halts, and create disorientation. Units become entangled, lose cohesion, and are unable to maneuver—often taking losses directly within the obstacle belts. At the same time, these barriers amplify the effectiveness of other assets by fixing the enemy in place and exposing them to sustained targeting.

There is also a significant psychological dimension. Constant exposure to obstacles creates uncertainty, erodes initiative, and degrades morale. The enemy is compelled to alter plans, commit additional resources to reconnaissance and breaching, or seek less favorable routes—ceding the initiative.

In this integrated system, engineering obstacles are no longer just enabling tools. They are a decisive component of combat power—shaping enemy behavior, imposing unfavorable dynamics, and contributing directly to attrition on the battlefield.

UI: How has the work of engineering units changed with the emergence of unmanned systems? How does remote mining function today, and why has it become one of the key tools for deterring the enemy?

VS: Unmanned systems have fundamentally reshaped the battlespace. They combine accessibility, precision, and operational efficiency in a way no previous class of weapons has, and they now drive how many tasks are executed—from reconnaissance to strike.

Accordingly, engineering support has been reoriented to amplify the effectiveness of unmanned systems. Traditional distinctions—forward line, deep rear, safe zone—have largely eroded, as drones now project reach across the entire depth. In response, engineering units increasingly employ mobile, unmanned, and robotic platforms to execute support tasks. One key application is remote mining and the forward deployment of obstacle systems as close to the enemy as possible.

UI: What does remote mining look like in practice?

VS: Today, it is carried out by dedicated units using both UAVs and ground-based robotic systems. These platforms allow for the rapid denial of movement corridors while simultaneously inflicting losses.

The emphasis is on UAV-enabled remote mining. It delivers higher speed, precision, and scalability, while significantly reducing risk to personnel. Where sappers once had to operate in exposed, high-threat zones, these tasks are now conducted remotely—faster, safer, and with greater accuracy.

Equally important is real-time control and feedback. Commanders can monitor mission planning and execution live, verify strikes against enemy personnel and equipment, and immediately integrate confirmed data into the Delta situational awareness system. This ensures both accuracy and transparency of the operational picture.

In practice, this creates a continuous loop: obstacle systems are deployed, effects are observed in real time, and decisions are adjusted instantly. Command posts can track how engineering barriers are being formed and immediately refine actions—turning engineering support into a dynamic, data-driven component of combat operations.

Construction of engineering obstacles / Photo credit: Support Forces of the Armed Forces of Ukraine

DISPERSION OVER MASS: WHY MODERN DEFENSE FAVORS COMPACT POSITIONS

UI: When it comes to fortifications, why have the Armed Forces of Ukraine shifted from large strongpoints to compact, squad-level positions? What does a modern squad position look like, and what is fundamentally new about it—particularly in terms of protection against FPV drones?

VS:  The evolution of our defensive construction did not begin in 2022, but back in 2015, with the creation of the stabilization line. At that time, we built large strongpoints—often, in effect, full fortified areas—designed to host substantial firepower, from artillery and mortars to air defense systems.

Today, however, the widespread use of unmanned systems, precision weapons, and high-impact guided munitions has made such concentrations ineffective and vulnerable. Large fortified areas with dense troop presence are now high-value targets.

Instead, it is sufficient—and far more survivable—to establish compact, squad-level positions. These positions provide fire coverage over sectors of non-explosive engineering obstacles while carrying out additional tasks. At the same time, the nature of enemy assaults has changed: large-scale frontal attacks are no longer the defining pattern.

We are adapting to the realities of the modern battlefield. These small positions must, above all, maintain a low signature and incorporate comprehensive counter-drone protection, as drones are now the primary means of inflicting casualties. They must also provide robust protection against artillery and air-delivered munitions, maintain observation over approaches, and ensure clearly defined fields of fire.

At its core, the objective is straightforward: preserve the lives of our soldiers in an environment dominated by precision strike systems.

UI: What engineering solutions make this possible? How do covered trenches and underground passages function, and how have they changed logistics and evacuation on the front line?

VS: The more the threat comes from above, the deeper we must go below ground. Depth now directly correlates with survivability. That is why overhead cover in trenches began to be widely implemented in 2024–2025 as protection against drones.

Today, anti-drone protection extends beyond positions themselves to include approaches, maneuver routes, and all movement corridors. Covered trenches are no longer optional—they are a baseline requirement. Protective structures and communication routes are also covered, reducing exposure to aerial reconnaissance and strike.

In practical terms, these covered trenches and underground passages enable safer movement of personnel, resupply, and casualty evacuation under persistent drone threat. They have fundamentally reshaped frontline logistics: movement is more concealed, less predictable, and significantly less vulnerable to continuous surveillance.

ANTI-DRONE CORRIDORS NOW SPAN THOUSANDS OF KILOMETERS, PROTECTING KEY LOGISTICS ROUTES

UI: FPV drones are one of the main threats today. How have engineering troops adapted? What are anti-drone corridors, and how effective are they?

VS: This is one of the fastest-evolving areas. Initially, anti-drone corridors were simple but effective measures designed to shield personnel moving toward positions from FPV strikes.

Over time, these measures have evolved into a comprehensive system. Today, without exaggeration, anti-drone corridors extend for thousands of kilometers, shielding key logistics routes, extending all the way to frontline positions.

They are no longer ad hoc solutions but fully engineered networks: covered road segments, protected entry and exit points, and reinforced high-risk nodes such as intersections that demand especially careful design. Comparable protective measures are also being implemented in populated areas—visible in Izium, Kharkiv, and across regions like Zaporizhzhia Oblast and Kherson Oblast, where key routes are shielded with netting and related structures. The most advanced anti-drone protection systems are currently concentrated in Donetsk Oblast.

The objective is straightforward: ensure the safe movement of logistics, evacuation, and other vehicles along approaches to frontline positions. These corridors reduce exposure, preserve operational tempo, and sustain forward units despite persistent drone threats.

This evolution in engineering support directly reflects changes in the battlespace—above all, in weapons and military technology. Early in the mass deployment of drones, effective engagement extended roughly 5 km from the line of contact. Today, strikes reach depths of 50–100 km.

The enemy has adapted as well, employing long-range UAVs—including loitering munitions—for remote mining, and in some cases using carrier platforms that deploy smaller strike drones against equipment. Ukrainian assets are being targeted at distances of 40–50 km or more from the front line, requiring a corresponding shift in defensive measures.

As a result, anti-drone protection has effectively become a state-level priority—tasked at the highest command level—to ensure security at depths of up to 100 km from the frontline.

UI: Are anti-drone corridors essentially just nets stretched over roads?

VS: In practical terms, yes. But the key constraint is scalability and cost-efficiency: such protection must not consume disproportionate resources. That is why these systems rely on engineered netting capable of bearing mechanical loads while still allowing vehicle movement.

Work is ongoing to increase the height of these structures and refine their design standards. This is critical given the scale—millions of square meters must be deployed in a way that keeps designated routes operational while significantly improving safety of movement.

UI: But wouldn’t a drone detonate upon hitting the net?

VS: No net can fully withstand a drone detonation. The design logic is different: even if a drone explodes on contact, the structure creates a calculated stand-off distance that reduces fragmentation effects and disrupts the formation of a shaped-charge jet.

In practice, this means the strike is no longer delivered directly onto the vehicle. The cumulative jet is deflected or degraded, and the blast is partially dissipated—significantly increasing the survivability of both personnel and equipment.

UI: Remotely operated combat modules and even autonomous strongpoints—how much of this is already reality rather than a future prospect? Is artificial intelligence part of the plan?

VS: Engineering support today is a system-wide effort, executed not only by engineering troops but across the entire Defense Forces of Ukraine, including entities such as the State Special Transport Service and even regional administrations.

At the same time, technological adaptation is accelerating. Remote-controlled combat modules already in service are being upgraded with elements of artificial intelligence and are beginning to see practical application.

Large-scale trials are underway to develop fully autonomous positions. These are conceived not as isolated systems but as integrated complexes capable of delivering layered effects: from small-arms fire to automatic grenade launchers and air defense, combined with full-cycle capabilities—reconnaissance, detection, identification, and engagement of targets.

Such systems would also support follow-on tasks, including area clearance and enabling maneuver. In other words, they are designed not just to hold ground, but to actively shape it and facilitate further operations.

Autonomous strongpoints with AI are no longer theoretical—they are entering early-stage implementation. Given the pace of development, it is entirely realistic that near-term combat environments will feature increasingly automated engagements, where systems interact with—and counter—other systems.

THE ENEMY SUFFERS THE GREATEST LOSSES—AFTER UNMANNED SYSTEMS—ON ENGINEERING OBSTACLES

UI: To sum up, what role does engineering support play in overall defensive resilience today? And what is the primary mission for engineering troops in this war?

VS: Engineering support has moved beyond its traditional perception and purely tactical application. It is no longer carried out solely by servicemembers and engineering troops, but at the state level. A wide range of engineering tasks are performed far beyond the line of contact—deep in the rear, in troop concentration areas, and at training grounds. In other words, wherever personnel are concentrated, engineering units are actively carrying out their missions.

Route maintenance, for instance, is no longer limited to access roads leading to positions. The enemy actively targets bridges, key logistical arteries, dams, and reservoirs. Countering such actions—and ensuring continuity of movement—is an integral engineering mission. Much of this work remains classified: it involves sustaining logistics under threat, restoring critical infrastructure, and shaping conditions that complicate enemy planning and operations.

As a result, engineering support has gained both prominence and autonomy, moving from a supporting role to the forefront of national defense. It now integrates tactical and operational functions with strategic-level objectives.

Without diminishing other branches, it is clear that—after unmanned systems—engineering obstacles inflict some of the most significant enemy losses. They do not merely halt the adversary; they fix, disorganize, and destroy—entangling forces, denying maneuver, and causing casualties directly through engineered effects.

On average, up to a thousand enemy personnel are neutralized each month on engineering obstacle systems constructed by engineering units.

These systems are built as continuous lines of non-explosive barriers—wire entanglements and anti-tank ditches—that fix and contain the enemy, enabling their subsequent engagement by unmanned systems.

To reinforce this effect, UAV-enabled remote mining is employed both along the forward edge and deep into enemy positions, extending the reach and density of the obstacle network.

For example, in March 2026 alone, engineering obstacles installed by all engineering units of the Defense Forces of Ukraine accounted for 663 enemy personnel, 95 pieces of weapons and military equipment, and three additional targets.

Even when the enemy is not destroyed outright, these systems create conditions in which they become immobilized and exposed—allowing unmanned systems to complete the engagement. Accordingly, the provision and sustainment of engineering obstacles and munitions has become a priority at the level of national defense strategy and military-political leadership.

Pavlo Balkovskyi led this conversation. Kyiv

Photos: Yuliia Ovsiannikova, Danylo Antoniuk / Ukrinform