Ivan Stupak, former SBU officer

Russia is losing billions to the war yet continues to bankroll its aggression. At the same time, Ukraine is intensifying drone strikes deep inside enemy territory and preparing for a new phase — missile warfare. Ukrinform discussed the war economy, “Cheburnet,” intelligence operations, and the risks of major escalation in an interview with Ivan Stupak, a defense analyst and former SBU officer.

DRONE STRIKES ON MOSCOW: COERCION IN ACTION

Q: Ukraine is deliberately targeting the Kremlin’s most vulnerable point — its finances: Ust-Luga, Primorsk, Novorossiysk (the Sheskharis terminal), fertilizer plants, and more. How much have these Ukrainian “drone sanctions” actually undermined Russia’s economy?

A: We lack fully verified data, but overall, Western analysts estimate that over the past year Russia has lost around €10 billion in the oil sector alone due to strikes by Ukraine’s Defense Forces and the impact of sanctions. That is substantial — not the kind of money you can simply shrug off.

It is also important to mention Lukoil. Before the full-scale invasion, it was widely seen as a “gold mine,” a company generating seemingly endless profits. Yet in 2025, under combined pressure from Ukrainian strikes and U.S. measures, it reported losses of approximately $13 billion.

So yes, these strikes are being felt. They are painful and visible for the Russian budget. But they are not yet critical. It is more like a constant strain — disruptive, costly, irritating — without delivering a systemic blow to the economy.

The core limitation lies in the means of attack. The number of drones is increasing, which is positive. However, a typical drone carries only 50–70 kg of payload — far below the destructive capacity of a missile with a 500 kg warhead.

According to Fire Point co-owner Mr. Shtilerman, future Ukrainian missiles could carry warheads of up to one ton. At that scale, a direct hit on an oil refinery would leave little, if anything, to repair.

This is precisely why missiles are critical — they enable truly decisive strikes. Because Russia is able to recover. The average repair time for a refinery after a strike is just two to three weeks.

Q: To what extent can Russia develop effective countermeasures against Ukrainian drones and missiles?

 A: We must continue these strikes — even if the results are not yet decisive. And what would “decisive” look like? Queues at gas stations, fuel rationing — say, 20 liters per person. Russia has experienced this before, but unfortunately, it managed to stabilize the situation.

Still, if we have the capacity to pressure them, we should use it. Disruptions matter. Russian companies — Novatek, Lukoil, Gazprom, Rosneft — should be incurring losses. If you cannot deliver a knockout blow, then at least inflict sustained damage. That is precisely what we are doing.

Looking ahead, there is a breaking point. Continuous repairs eventually become too costly and too exhausting. A moment may come when it is cheaper to shut down a facility than to keep restoring it — often at the company’s own expense. I am far from convinced that the Russian government can indefinitely bankroll this cycle.

As for Russian air defense, it should not be underestimated. I am skeptical of claims that it is “full of holes.” However, even Russian sources acknowledge that Pantsir systems are sometimes deployed with limited ammunition — or none at all.

The reason is straightforward: Ukrainian drones are numerous and approach from multiple directions. As in our own case, the Russians cannot immediately distinguish between real strike drones and decoys. As a result, they are forced to engage everything — rapidly depleting their air defense resources.

There is also a clear operational logic behind strikes on Moscow. First, they serve as testing. The Moscow region has up to 70 air defense positions — an exceptionally dense network. If a drone can penetrate this zone, it demonstrates the ability to reach even more distant targets in less protected regions.

Second, it is a form of coercion. The goal is to prevent Russia from redeploying air defense assets away from Moscow — for example, to Rostov or other sectors. Instead, they are forced to maintain maximum concentration around the capital. That works in our favor.

Q: There are reports from Roscosmos and other corporations about relocating defense production from European Russia beyond the Urals and into Siberia How feasible is it today to evacuate entire industrial facilities and their workforce, as was done during World War II?

A: You are right to recall the World War II precedent, when Stalin ordered the evacuation of entire industries beyond the Urals and into Central Asia. In theory, something similar could be done today.

In practice, however, the issue is scale and complexity. How quickly can equipment be dismantled, transported, and brought back online in a new location? Because it is not just about machinery. You need fully prepared sites, infrastructure, and integration into production chains. And even if a site exists, it does not guarantee that the equipment will fit or function properly there.

I often explain it with a simple analogy: not every piece of furniture fits every apartment. The same applies to industrial equipment — it must be properly installed, integrated, and supported by the right infrastructure and processes.

So in theory, relocation is possible. In practice, it is a long and complex undertaking. I would estimate at least a year. And that window gives Ukraine time to further develop its strike capabilities — particularly by extending their range — so that even relocated production sites will not become a safe haven for Russia.

Q: We are all expecting large-scale missile strikes on Russia. Clearly, a single Ukrainian ballistic missile or a “Flamingo” cruise missile can inflict more damage than a dozen drones. How do you assess the current state of Ukraine’s missile program (including FP7/FP9)? When could we see salvos of 20–30 missiles?

A: Based on what I knew at the time, I expected the first mass launches as early as August 2025. Instead, what we saw was quite limited — two or three missiles at a time, nothing more.

You may recall that later President Zelensky stated that production would reach one missile per day in September, seven per day in October, and then continue to scale. However, by the end of November, he was forced to acknowledge publicly that our production facilities had been hit. As a result, the program slowed significantly, and rapid progress was no longer realistic — at least until 2026.

Now, in 2026, we are indeed seeing launches — not yet on a large scale, but they are taking place. These are primarily “Flamingo” cruise missiles.

I have spoken with individuals directly involved in the missile program within the Armed Forces of Ukraine. They confirm that Ukrainian ballistic missiles have already undergone testing. According to them, the results were solid: a stable launch, correct trajectory, and precise target engagement. From a technical standpoint, the system is functioning as intended.

But the key constraint is funding. A missile program is an extremely capital-intensive endeavor — it is not something that gets financed “just because.”

Take the “Flamingo” cruise missile: estimates place its cost between €700,000 and €1 million per unit. That is already substantial, and once you factor in logistics, maintenance, and deployment, the total cost rises further.

A ballistic missile, by comparison, is likely at least three times more expensive.

This is why the transition to large-scale launches is fundamentally a matter of funding. If, for example, the €90 billion package is unlocked and the Hungarian veto is overcome, then within three to four months we could realistically see large-scale strikes — salvos of 20–30 missiles.

RUSSIAN EW DEPLOYMENT NEAR NARVA SIGNALS BALTIC THREAT​

Q: Following successful Ukrainian drone strikes near Saint Petersburg, the Kremlin began issuing direct threats toward the Baltic states, claiming drones are flying through their airspace. Is this a crude attempt to mask failures in Russian air defense, or a deliberate effort to construct a casus belli within NATO space?

A: It is a valid question. The Russians clearly understand how Ukrainian drones reach Saint Petersburg and the Leningrad region. They track trajectories — but choose not to disclose them publicly.

Some routes do indeed pass over Belarus, along a narrow strip near the border. As for the Baltic states, if drones were systematically flying from their territory, this would be widely documented — including by Russian nationals living there. Isolated cases may occur, but certainly not at the scale Moscow is implying.

At the same time, there are tangible indicators that the Baltic direction is being considered. One example is the steady deployment of electronic warfare systems around Narva since 2023. By 2025, a third EW site had been established. In quantitative terms, recorded EW activity in that area increased roughly thirteenfold between 2023 and 2025.

This suggests that the Kremlin is keeping multiple scenarios on the table. One is full-scale escalation — involving drones and missiles. Another is a hybrid approach: for instance, several hundred armed personnel crossing the border, seizing local administrative control — similar to Donetsk or Luhansk in 2014 — and declaring a “people’s republic.”

The issue is not resources — Russia has them. The real question is whether they will take the risk, and which option they will choose. For now, they are hesitating.

Q: What could push Russia toward such a step? The situation in the Middle East, a possible weakening of the United States’ role, a potential withdrawal from NATO, or a partial pullout of American troops from Europe?

A: I agree: the key drivers are the Middle East and the situation around Trump. Unfortunately, both factors objectively work in Russia’s favor and could increase its confidence.

Look at what is happening in the oil market. The United States has effectively allowed Russia to continue exporting its oil — and, judging by recent developments, without clear time constraints. Whereas just weeks ago Russian oil was considered toxic and sold at a steep discount, we are now seeing strong demand and rising prices.

Could this embolden the Kremlin? Absolutely. These revenues directly sustain its war effort.

As for Trump, he currently appears politically weakened, with his position increasingly unstable. Moscow sees this clearly. Add to that the rhetoric about a possible U.S. withdrawal from NATO. In the Kremlin, this is interpreted as a signal: the United States may choose not to intervene — and may not defend its European allies, including the Baltic states.

When these factors converge, the temptation arises to test the system’s resilience — to probe how far they can go and how the West will respond.

LARGE OIL REVENUES COULD ULTIMATELY BACKFIRE ON RUSSIA

Q: Recently, the Kremlin — through Peskov — unexpectedly shifted its rhetoric: instead of demanding four regions, it called on Ukraine to “withdraw from Donbas to stop the hot phase of the war.” What is really behind this change in tone?

A: The logic is quite simple. If you are confident in your ability to achieve objectives militarily, you do not ask your opponent to surrender in advance — you act.

That is why such statements suggest something else. My impression is that there is a systemic issue within Russia. Not necessarily critical, but already signaling that something is off — and that it would be preferable to address it sooner rather than later.

Recall 2025, when the so-called “28-point” proposals on Ukraine surfaced in The Wall Street Journal. There are strong reasons to believe these were drafted by the Russian side, not the Americans — and that distinction matters.

If Russia’s position had truly been strong, it could have continued the war in its current format, applying steady pressure without rushing into any form of “peace initiative.” Yet these proposals were put forward. And I am convinced that nothing of that scale would have appeared without Putin’s personal approval.

That was the first signal. Now we have a second — the recent statements regarding Donbas.

This brings us to an important point: large inflows of money do not automatically translate into stability. There is a well-known economic concept — the “Dutch disease.”

Q: What does that mean?

A: The term emerged in the Netherlands in the 1970s, after the discovery of a major gas field. At first glance, it seemed entirely beneficial: more exports, more revenue, more growth. But the outcome was more complex.

The surge in resource revenues led to an appreciation of the national currency. As a result, imports became cheaper, while domestic production grew less competitive. Over time, this undermined local industry.

That is the essence of “Dutch disease.”

Today, many economists — both Western and Russian, including figures close to the Kremlin — warn that Russia risks facing a similar dynamic. Even some Russian oligarchs have spoken about it openly.

This creates a paradox: high oil revenues may, in the longer term, weaken rather than strengthen the Russian economy.

It is therefore entirely plausible that part of the Kremlin’s current rhetoric is shaped by this concern. From their perspective, the optimal scenario may be to halt the conflict earlier — before underlying structural problems become more acute.

Q: We periodically hear proposals — including from American partners — along the lines of: “withdraw troops from Donetsk and Luhansk regions in exchange for ending the war, security guarantees, and investment.” Where is the main trap in such scenarios?

A: The fundamental issue is legal. Ukraine has no mechanism that would allow its leadership to simply “withdraw” from these territories. Neither the President nor the Verkhovna Rada possesses such authority. Any attempt to formalize such a decision would fall under criminal liability for high treason.

This is a matter of constitutional order, territorial integrity, and responsibility toward citizens — hundreds of thousands of people live in these areas, and abandoning them is not an option.

Equally important: there are no credible guarantees — neither from Russia nor from Western partners — that such concessions would actually stop further aggression.

At the same time, there is one scenario that, in my view, deserves serious consideration, although it is rarely discussed publicly: a peacekeeping mission. That could represent a workable compromise.

Q: And what could that look like?

A: One possible framework is a de-escalation model. Hypothetically, Ukraine could withdraw its forces from the administrative borders of Donetsk region to adjacent areas. However, the territory itself would remain fully under Ukrainian sovereignty: Ukrainian law, institutions, taxation, and law enforcement would continue to function as normal.

Between the Ukrainian and Russian sides, a UN-mandated peacekeeping force could be deployed. Yes, Russia would have to approve this in the UN Security Council. The mission’s role would be to guarantee security and monitor the line of separation.

This is a compromise — but a costly one. For context, in Cyprus, maintaining roughly one thousand peacekeepers costs about $57 million annually, with a buffer line of around 180 km. In Ukraine, the frontline exceeds 1,200 km, meaning costs would be several times higher. And the duration remains an open question: one year, two, three — or longer.

Still, this is at least a scenario that can be discussed.

By contrast, proposals framed as “we withdraw — they advance” are a strategic dead end. Abandoning well-fortified positions in Donbas would not end the threat — it would simply shift it. The result would be new vulnerabilities for Kharkiv, Dnipropetrovsk, and beyond.

TWO NEW MOBILIZATION CHANNELS IN RUSSIA — VIA DETENTION CENTERS AND UNIVERSITIES

Q: As Ukraine’s Defense Minister, Mykhailo Fedorov, has stated, the target is 50,000 eliminated occupiers per month. In March, the “Army of Drones” accounted for more than 35,000. Given these losses, how much manpower can Russia realistically still mobilize and deploy in the near term?

A: By June, I think we could reach around 40,000 eliminated occupiers per month — possibly more, if drone production continues to scale.

In terms of effectiveness, both Ukrainian and Russian assessments broadly align: FPV drone efficiency is estimated at 80–90%. In practical terms, out of 100 Russian troops moving toward the front line, at best 20 make it — at worst, only 10. That is an exceptionally high attrition rate.

As for Russia’s mobilization capacity, there are clear constraints. They are continuously searching for new recruitment mechanisms, and this is increasingly evident.

At present, two primary channels are being actively utilized:

The first — through the law enforcement system. Whereas earlier recruitment focused on convicted prisoners, the system has now expanded to include suspects and defendants. Investigators from the FSB, the Ministry of Internal Affairs, and drug enforcement agencies visit pre-trial detention centers and offer deals: instead of 5–10 years in prison, a contract, deployment to the front, and a “clean” record upon completion of service. Investigators reportedly receive financial incentives — around €100 per recruit.

The second — students. The plan is to send up to 4% of the student population to the war by the end of the year — approximately 40,000 young people. This is facilitated by artificially worsening academic conditions, creating exam-related pressure, and simultaneously promoting so-called “student contracts.” In reality, no such special contracts exist — these are standard military contracts with no fixed end date. In effect, individuals either remain in service indefinitely or are killed.

Q: How credible are estimates that Russia could mobilize an additional 400,000 personnel this year?

A: It is not an extraordinary figure. It translates to roughly 30–35 thousand per month — essentially the benchmark they are already attempting to meet. The problem is that, in practice, they consistently fall short.

RUSSIA IS MOVING TOWARD A FULLY CONTROLLED INTERNET MODEL

Q: Russia is steadily advancing toward a “Cheburnet” — a de facto isolated internet. What are the implications of this shift?

A: Until early 2026, Russia maintained a partial equilibrium: certain Western platforms were blocked, but domestic services continued to operate. It was a semi-open system.

That changed abruptly after the assassination attempt on GRU General Alexeyev.

Previously, the military advocated for maintaining access to the internet — particularly Telegram — due to its role in communication, fundraising, and coordination. However, the security services, especially the FSB, had long pushed for tighter control, framing the internet as a security threat.

After the incident with General Alexeyev, the balance shifted decisively. The security services’ arguments prevailed: the internet, they claimed, facilitates recruitment, sabotage, and fraud.

As a result, Russia is moving toward a fully controlled internet model — the so-called “Cheburnet,” broadly comparable to systems in China or North Korea. Telecom operators are being compelled to deploy specialized hardware and software for surveillance, filtering, and blocking.

The objective is straightforward: full control over the information domain, insulation from external influence, and rapid identification of any internal dissent.

Q: As a former SBU officer, how would you assess the depth of Ukrainian intelligence penetration inside Russia today, compared to the early years of the war? Are successful strikes primarily the result of technology or human intelligence?

A: At their core, these operations are driven by people — by agents. Technology alone does not deliver results without assets on the ground.

Yes, partners — particularly the United States — provide highly advanced capabilities in signals intelligence and technical reconnaissance. But without an established human network, it is impossible to conduct operations such as targeted eliminations or precise target identification.

Operations like “Spider Web” would not have been feasible without agents operating inside Russia. And these are not only Ukrainians — there are also Russian citizens who oppose the regime and are willing to cooperate. Ukraine works with them through a combination of motivation, financial incentives, and structured collaboration.

Q: Ukrainian intelligence vs. Russian intelligence — who has the upper hand?

A: The answer is quite clear — the score speaks for itself, to use a football analogy. Ukraine has conducted more than two dozen successful targeted operations on Russian territory, across multiple formats: explosions, shootings, and other actions.

Russia, by contrast, has essentially one comparable result — the killing of SBU Colonel Voronych. Even in that case, the perpetrators failed to escape and were eliminated during the arrest.

This illustrates the extent of Ukraine’s operational presence inside Russia. These actions strike directly at the integrity of the Russian system. Following the Alexeyev incident, there were internal repercussions — including personnel purges within the FSB’s counterintelligence units.

The paradox for Russia is obvious: a state it has long dismissed as “non-existent” is carrying out significantly more effective operations on Russian territory than Russia is on Ukrainian soil.

ESCALATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST POSSIBLE AFTER APRIL 15

Q: I can’t help but ask about Trump and Iran. What exactly happened? Did the U.S. President seriously consider a nuclear strike scenario?

A: The discussion centered on destroying Iran’s critical infrastructure — essentially an attempt to push the country back into a “stone age” condition. However, if we assess the outcome, Donald Trump did not achieve his stated objectives. The consequences also had negative spillover effects on the global economy.

In practical terms, Iran withstood the blow. Yes, it suffered significant damage and losses, but strategically it retained a crucial lever — control over the Strait of Hormuz. Now, it is attempting to monetize that advantage.

Before the conflict, roughly 130 vessels passed through the strait every day — about 47,000 annually. Even if we hypothetically assume a transit fee of $2 million per vessel, that would amount to around $100 billion per year. Even at half that level, the figure still reaches tens of billions. In other words, despite its losses, Iran is positioning itself to turn this into a long-term economic leverage.

Q: What are your forecasts for the Middle East?

A: Further escalation appears likely, with credible indicators already in place.

At the end of March, three U.S. amphibious assault ships carrying Marine units departed from California toward the Middle East. Two similar vessels are already in the region. Their arrival is expected around mid-April.

Simultaneously, additional forces are being deployed, including airborne units from the U.S. 82nd Airborne Division. By various estimates, around 60,000 American troops are now concentrated in the region. These forces could be used in active operations — for example, to seize strategic islands and exert pressure on Iran.

That is why, after approximately April 15, a deterioration of the situation cannot be ruled out. That said, this is high-level geopolitics, and predicting Trump’s decisions remains inherently uncertain.

Q: Deputy Head of the Presidential Office Pavlo Palisa stated that Russia is considering creating a buffer zone in Vinnytsia region this spring or summer. How realistic is this scenario?

A: The key point is: no panic. At present, there are no real threats from that direction.

Russia has a wide range of contingency plans — involving Dnipro, Kharkiv, Odesa, including even amphibious operations. But having plans does not mean having the capability to execute them.

The underlying logic is clear: to create additional pressure points for the Armed Forces of Ukraine. The frontline already stretches for roughly 1,200 km. Opening new sectors would force Ukraine to disperse its resources — personnel, equipment, and operational focus. The principle is simple: stretch the defense and strike where it is weakest.

In Transnistria, there are currently around 1,700 personnel holding Russian passports and guarding the ammunition depots in Kolbasna. This force is insufficient for any meaningful offensive operations.

Q: How do you assess the overall situation along the frontlines? Who currently holds the initiative, and how realistic are Russia’s stated objectives for the summer campaign?

A: At present, the enemy’s objectives do not appear realistic. At the same time, the battlefield increasingly resembles the later stages of World War I: entrenched positions, sustained intensity, but no large-scale breakthroughs.

That said, it is important to avoid premature optimism. We have seen this pattern before — moments when the enemy appeared exhausted, only to regroup, bring in reserves, and shift the situation.

Even so, over the past one and a half to two months, there has been a noticeable slowdown in the pace of Russian advances. They are encountering well-prepared Ukrainian defenses. In my view, one of the decisive factors behind this is what we might call a “wall of drones.”

Myroslav Liskovych led this conversation. Kyiv