Escalation in the Middle East: What It Means for Ukraine

The collapse of an “axis of evil” ally is shattering Russia’s illusions of power

The world entered 2026 in the midst of a perfect storm. While global leaders focus on the glow above Iran’s nuclear facilities and the deployment of U.S. aircraft carriers in the Persian Gulf and the Mediterranean, Ukraine once again has to remind the world of a simple truth: our war with Russia remains central to the future of global security.

Yet the geopolitical landscape is shifting. Vladimir Putin—whose strategic bets on Syria, Venezuela, and Iran are steadily unraveling—appears to be approaching a strategic dead end. For him, Ukraine and its future may represent the last major card in a global all-in gamble, the arena where he will attempt to demonstrate the viability of his regime despite the loss of key partners.

This raises an uncomfortable question. In the pursuit of “Middle Eastern stability,” could the West reduce its support for Ukraine, which is already operating under severe strain? Could Kyiv find itself without critically important interceptors for Patriot air defense systems? And could the inevitable rise in oil prices become the “golden rain” that allows the Kremlin to sustain yet another bloody phase of its war?

IS THE WAR AGAINST UKRAINE NOW PUTIN’S LAST BET?

Amid the devastating strikes against Iran, a growing number of analysts argue that Ukraine has become one of the final strategic cards in Vladimir Putin’s geopolitical game. It is a card the Russian leader will try to play in order to prove that Russia remains capable of dictating terms and shaping the international order.

At first glance, this interpretation may seem exaggerated. Yet the Kremlin’s traditional foreign-policy assets are clearly eroding. Russian influence in Syria and Venezuela has effectively collapsed. Iran—one of Moscow’s most important military-technical partners—has come under devastating pressure. Cuba may well be next.

Has Putin truly found himself in a strategic corner? And more importantly, are Ukraine and its partners strong enough to turn this potential “last battle” into his final defeat?

Political analyst Ihor Reiterovych believes we are witnessing the collapse of the illusion of Russia as an “alternative pole of power.” According to him, modern Russia has proven incapable of acting as a reliable security guarantor for its partners—a key difference from the Soviet Union.

“From the beginning it was clear that modern Russia is not the Soviet Union. The USSR systematically supported its allies—with weapons, advisers, political backing, and even military intervention. It acted firmly and consistently.

Putin’s Russia is a different structure. It lacks both the economic and the military-political resources to guarantee security to its allies. That is why talk of ‘strategic partnerships’ has always been largely declarative. The situation with Iran confirms this.

Despite formal agreements, when Tehran requested assistance, Moscow effectively stepped aside, claiming the situation involved ‘targeted strikes’ rather than a full-scale invasion. Formally, there were no grounds for intervention. In reality, there was neither the willingness nor the capability.”

According to Reiterovych, the Kremlin’s reluctance to support Iran is a telling signal. Other regimes traditionally viewed as Moscow’s partners—such as Cuba—may face the same reality. The only relatively stable link in the so-called “axis of evil,” he argues, remains North Korea, largely because of its nuclear arsenal.

Meanwhile, in relations with China, Russia has effectively accepted the role of a junior partner, forced to adapt to Beijing’s strategic calculations.

“The Iranian episode essentially ends Putin’s ambitions to create an alternative center of power—whether through BRICS or military-political structures such as the CSTO.

The chain of abandoned partners—Venezuela, Armenia, Syria, and now Iran—demonstrates that deep alliances with Russia guarantee nothing. Moscow simply does not fulfill commitments when doing so requires real costs.

In that sense, Ukraine remains for Putin an opportunity to prove his relevance. The invasion was meant to demonstrate that the empire could still break the international order. For a time, fear of Russia did grow. But with each year of the Russian-Ukrainian war, that myth has steadily collapsed.

Today Ukraine has become, for the Kremlin, more of an instrument—one that allows Moscow to maintain dialogue with Washington and remain, at least symbolically, part of global politics.”

UKRAINE’S STRATEGIC POSITION

Can Ukraine withstand this pressure? Reiterovych believes the answer is yes.

Ukraine has already proven its resilience. Despite immense challenges, the country continues to move forward strategically. The real problem, he notes, is that some Western partners still underestimate Russia’s weakness.

“Russia today is a ‘skinny bear’—it growls loudly but lacks the resources for a large-scale confrontation with the united West.”

Once this reality becomes fully understood, the geopolitical balance will inevitably shift. Alternatively, the shift may occur naturally—through Ukraine’s continued resistance and the Kremlin’s inability to achieve even minimal political goals.

Russia may temporarily hold some occupied territories. But it will not emerge from this war as a state that inspires unquestioned fear.

“The world has already seen its weakness,” the analyst concludes.

Another variable is Donald Trump, who appears eager to resolve the Iranian issue ahead of a planned visit to Beijing and arrive there as a victor.

“Are breakthroughs in the Russian-Ukrainian war possible after a meeting between Trump and Xi Jinping? I think so. If Washington achieves tangible results on the Iranian track, Beijing may become more inclined to adjust its position. This war no longer provides China with the same financial, political, or strategic dividends as before. In that sense, a Trump–Xi meeting could become a turning point. Publicly, China will not pressure Moscow, but certain signals may emerge. And from those signals it will be possible to understand whether Beijing is ready to reconsider its approach to ending this war,” Reiterovych concludes.

RUSSIA’S BROADER GEOPOLITICAL AMBITIONS

Diplomat Vadym Tryukhan offers a more cautious assessment. In his opinion, it would be a mistake to overlook other vectors of Moscow’s ambitions—particularly Belarus, which is slowly but steadily being absorbed into Russia’s orbit—as well as the external “donors” sustaining Russia’s war machine: China and North Korea, both of which continue supplying technology and ammunition.

“Putin is indeed experiencing geopolitical setbacks. He has lost several key allies and opportunities, and his position no longer appears as solid as it once did. But that does not mean Ukraine is his final bastion or his last wager. He will continue looking toward Central Asia, dreaming of a comeback in the Caucasus, and keeping Moldova and the Baltic states in his sights. For him, these are not abstract territories but elements of an imagined ‘sphere of influence’ he is determined to restore,” Tryukhan notes.

The diplomat outlines two possible scenarios for the development of the Middle Eastern crisis.

“The first scenario is a rapid end to hostilities, as Trump hopes. Yet even in that case the world would face turbulence: disrupted logistics and rising energy prices. That, in turn, could allow Russia to re-enter the ‘big game’ as an energy power. Under pressure from an energy crisis, some Western countries might reconsider sanctions or seek indirect ways of purchasing Russian oil through third countries. For Moscow, this would provide an opportunity to patch up its finances and continue the war against Ukraine with renewed resources,” he explains.

The second scenario is significantly more dangerous. If Iran mounts prolonged resistance and limited strikes escalate into a major regional conflict with the risk of global escalation, the United States and its allies may simply have little capacity to focus on Ukraine.

“In strategic terms, Russia would benefit from such a development. Ukraine could temporarily find itself face to face with the aggressor—supported only by those European countries that understand that Ukraine’s fall would pose a direct threat to their own security. Do we have sufficient resources and strength? That is a difficult question. But we have significantly expanded our domestic production and are rapidly adapting to new challenges. That gives grounds for cautious optimism,” Tryukhan says.

THE MYTH OF RUSSIAN POWER

Military-political analyst Oleksandr Kovalenko adds a note of irony to the discussion of Russia’s supposed “power,” arguing that overestimating Putin’s capabilities has been one of the West’s most persistent strategic mistakes over the past decades. He also notes that developments in the Middle East have revealed how unprepared many countries remain for Shahed-type drone attacks—an experience Ukraine has been confronting for years.

“During Putin’s rule, Russia has not evolved—it has degraded. Despite enormous revenues from energy exports, Russia chose a different path: not modernization, but special operations. In essence, the logic of the KGB simply continued,” Kovalenko argues.

“Putin has never been—and is not—a modern politician in the Western sense. He thinks in terms of territory, ‘gathering lands,’ and spheres of influence. For him, dominance is measured in square kilometers, not in innovation, finance, or technology. That raises a simple question: can a state that for four years has been unable to capture Ukraine truly claim to be a global power? Ukraine has not only held out—it forced Russia’s Black Sea Fleet to abandon its base in Sevastopol and relocate to Novorossiysk.”

RUSSIA CORNERED

In other words, there is no “blank check” for the Kremlin.

“On the contrary—Putin is cornered. Strategically, Russia has not grown stronger; it has weakened. Its economy is militarized, its resources are being depleted, and its international reputation is shattered. The only thing left is an attempt to intimidate Europe. That is why a scenario of demonstrative escalation against European countries may appear as Putin’s potential ‘last battle.’ But it will not mark the beginning of a new era of Russian power. It will be a convulsion,” the analyst concludes.

Patriot SAM system. Bundeswehr photo

AIR DEFENSE AND MISSILES FOR PATRIOT: WILL UKRAINIAN SKIES REMAIN PROTECTED?

In the first hours following the escalation, Western media began sounding the alarm: a conflict involving the United States, Israel, and their allies against Iran and its proxies could indirectly affect Ukraine—particularly when it comes to the supply of anti-ballistic missiles for Patriot air defense systems. Some analysts warned of a possible “redistribution” of interceptors toward the Middle East. But how realistic is this threat? And is there truly a direct link between escalation in the Middle East and the security of Ukrainian airspace?

According to military-political analyst Oleksandr Kovalenko, Ukraine has recently been receiving Patriot surface-to-air missiles—especially PAC-3 variants—primarily from European countries rather than the United States.

“This is not new,” he explains. “Back in 2023, when the U.S. Congress began blocking a package of aid for Ukraine, Israel, and Taiwan—largely because of opposition from the pro-Trump wing of the Republican Party—it became clear that risks to the supply of critical weapons could arise. That was when efforts began to diversify sources. What had been delivered relatively systematically under President Biden, even if with delays, now depends under Trump on a single political decision.”

At the same time, Kovalenko notes that a tougher Western stance toward Iran weakens Tehran—one of Russia’s key technological supporters—thereby indirectly undermining Moscow’s war effort.

“Whereas Iran previously managed to rapidly rebuild its arsenal after the last escalation with Israel, the question now is whether it will still be able to restore its capacity for large-scale missile and Shahed-136 drone strikes at the same pace. This must be assessed in terms of available resources, stockpiles, and recovery rates.

“Significant U.S. naval forces are currently concentrated in the Middle East—at least two carrier strike groups led by the USS Abraham Lincoln and the USS Gerald R. Ford. If necessary, the group centered around the USS George H. W. Bush could also be deployed. Such a force would allow intensive strikes against Iran for one to one and a half months, and with careful planning perhaps up to two months. Add to this Israel’s air force and the potential involvement of Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and other regional states. Under such conditions, Iran’s capabilities are likely to be exhausted faster than the region’s air defense resources,” Kovalenko says.

Another factor is growing internal instability within Iran. A new wave of protests is emerging across the country, with opposition figures—including Crown Prince Reza Pahlavi—calling for mass demonstrations.

“The combination of military pressure from the United States, Israel, and several Gulf states, together with internal protests, could ultimately lead to the fall of the Iranian regime. If that happens, the regional security architecture would change dramatically. In that scenario, the issue of supplying additional air defense systems and missiles to Middle Eastern states would recede into the background—because the primary source of the threat would have been neutralized. This could ultimately shift the logistics and allocation of defense resources in Ukraine’s favor,” Kovalenko concludes.

Political analyst Ihor Reiterovych takes an even more pragmatic view.

“I do not think we are facing a serious shortfall of Patriot missiles,” he says. “First, Patriot batteries in the Middle East were supplied with missiles well in advance. This is not a ‘just-in-time’ situation where a battery arrives and only then do they start looking for ammunition.

“Second, supplies to Ukraine have primarily come from European stockpiles. According to open-source information, those reserves have not been depleted.

“Third, the current U.S. and Israeli strategy is not limited to intercepting attacks—it also aims to exhaust the adversary. Iran’s missile arsenal is not limitless. If it continues launching missiles at a high rate, sooner or later the number of launches will decline. As a result, the demand for interceptions will decrease as well.

“Could this theoretically affect Ukraine? Yes. But at this point I see no grounds for predicting a negative scenario.”

Diplomat Vadym Tryukhan, however, views the situation through the lens of growing competition for military resources. He warns that Iran’s strategy—relying on large numbers of drones and ballistic missiles—could drive demand for Patriot interceptors to critical levels.

“Iran has prepared seriously for this conflict,” Tryukhan says. “Its strategy is one of attrition. If the intensity of attacks remains high, air defense resources will inevitably begin to run out. That would create fierce competition for missiles stored in Europe and elsewhere. Ukraine would have to fight for every shipment.

“That is why action is required now. First, negotiations with France and Italy should intensify regarding modernization of the SAMP/T air defense program. Second, there must be concrete discussions with the United States about licensing joint missile production.

“If the conflict drags on, American resources will inevitably be redistributed in favor of U.S. domestic needs and Israel. The situation is serious—but not fatal. Russia’s own production capacity is also limited. What is needed is a strategy to offset potential shortages through new industrial partnerships, licensing agreements, and expanded production,” Tryukhan concludes.

OIL SWINGS: WILL THE MIDDLE EAST CRISIS FILL RUSSIA’S BUDGET?

Amid the escalating conflict, global oil prices have predictably begun to rise—automatically boosting Moscow’s revenues. Shares of Russian oil companies have already increased by 1–5 percent, directly feeding Russia’s war economy. The key question is how long this trend might last. Is it merely a nervous market reaction that will quickly subside, as has often happened before, or is the current situation fundamentally different?

Diplomat Vadym Tryukhan believes the decisive factor will be the security of the Strait of Hormuz—the world’s most critical energy corridor.

“Some experts are already forecasting prices in the range of $100–150 per barrel if escalation continues. If the U.S.–Israeli coalition, supported by partners, manages to quickly break Tehran’s resistance and conclude the operation within a short timeframe, prices could fall back relatively quickly.

“But if the conflict drags on, the consequences will be long-term. In that case Ukraine, Europe, and the global economy will have to adapt to an era of high oil and gas prices. At the same time, it is important to keep a cool head. The coming days and the next week will be decisive: they will show whether we are witnessing a brief period of turbulence or the beginning of a prolonged crisis. For now, the situation is not critical. The world has faced price shocks before—and adapted,” the diplomat notes.

Political analyst Ihor Reiterovych broadly agrees that the markets are reacting nervously, describing such volatility as typical during wartime. He points out that traders had already priced in a margin for higher oil prices even before the conflict entered its active phase.

“It was clear that prices would rise. This is a normal systemic response to uncertainty. A separate issue is the situation around the Strait of Hormuz. Initially there were statements about closing it, but after consultations with Beijing the rhetoric changed. Formally the Strait remains open, but insurance costs for shipments have increased by about 50 percent, immediately affecting the economics of transportation.

“Most likely the market will remain volatile over the next two weeks. But once the situation stabilizes, prices should return to more typical levels. And if internal changes occur in Iran, the country could significantly increase its oil exports—which would actually push prices downward,” the analyst explains.

Military-political observer Oleksandr Kovalenko adds that Russian oil is effectively operating within what he calls a “sanctions ghetto,” meaning revenues are constrained not only by global prices but also by the G7 price cap.

“Even if the global benchmark price for Brent crude rises, that does not automatically mean Russian grades such as Urals or Sokol will be able to sell freely,” he explains.

“There is also the issue of strikes against Russian refineries. And another factor is the growing toxicity of Russian oil. Because of sanctions, reputational risks, and secondary restrictions, buyers demand substantial discounts.”

As a result, even if Russia earns more during a surge in global prices, its profits will remain far below what they would be under normal market conditions.

“If sanctions on Iran are lifted as a result of internal changes or external pressure, the region’s energy map will change dramatically. Iran holds some of the world’s largest oil and gas reserves. Its return to global markets would make it a direct competitor to Moscow. If Iran ceases to be Russia’s ally, that would strike Russia harder than any fluctuation in oil prices,” Kovalenko concludes.

The new phase of conflict in the Middle East is undoubtedly a stress test for the entire global system of security and logistics. Yet for Ukraine this scenario presents not only obvious risks—such as competition for air defense missiles or a temporary influx of petrodollars into the aggressor’s budget—but also significant strategic opportunities.

The destruction or substantial weakening of Iran’s military potential deprives Russia of one of its most important technological and resource partners. Moscow’s inability to protect its strategic ally further undermines the myth of Vladimir Putin as the “architect” of a new global pole of power.

Volatility in oil markets remains a risk factor. Yet sanctions discounts, the logistical burden of Russia’s shadow fleet, and the potential return of a transformed Iran to global energy markets could ultimately deal a serious blow to Russia’s economy.

For Ukraine, the task in this turbulent moment is clear: remain level-headed, ensure uninterrupted arms supplies from European partners, and press the advantage against a weakened adversary.

Myroslav Liskovych, Kyiv