Drivers of the Current Slowdown in Russian Offensive Operations

Experts Explain the Enemy’s Tactics, the Geography of the Front, and What to Expect in the Spring

According to the results of the first week of January, occupying forces managed to seize 48 square kilometers of Ukrainian territory. On the scale of a front line stretching thousands of kilometers, this amounts to near-standstill—especially when compared with the pace observed in November 2025. What lies behind this apparent “slowdown”? It is certainly not a change in the enemy’s strategic objectives, nor a “gesture of goodwill,” but rather the outcome of a complex equation in which weather conditions, the depletion of Russia’s mechanized resources, and the specifics of urban combat all play a role. The enemy general staff has not abandoned offensive operations—it has simply become bogged down in snow and concrete.

THE ANATOMY OF SLOWDOWN: WEATHER PRESSURE AND A CRISIS OF MANPOWER

The weather factor: infantry versus snow

Military analyst Oleksandr Kovalenko of the Information Resistance group is confident that the current stagnation along the front line is a direct consequence of weather conditions combined with the specifics of Russian tactics.

According to the expert, the condition of the ground and ambient temperatures play a decisive role. The Russian army of 2026 is, above all, an infantry-based force. Mechanized columns of the type seen at the start of the invasion have long since become rare due to equipment shortages and the battlefield saturation with Ukrainian drones. For infantry units, winter operations are therefore doubly challenging.

“Russia is currently forced to conduct offensive operations primarily through manpower—infantry. Under present conditions—frost, snow, and difficult terrain—conducting infantry assaults is extremely challenging. The mechanized component is used only minimally and sporadically, which significantly affects the overall situation on the front. It is precisely the combination of these factors that has led to a temporary reduction in the enemy’s rate of advance,” explains Oleksandr Kovalenko.

Freezing temperatures and snow do not merely slow a soldier down—they turn him into an easy target. Against a white snow-covered background, a dark assault figure can be visible from kilometers away to UAV operators, while deep snow makes rapid maneuvering or taking cover in vegetation impossible, as such cover simply does not exist in winter.

The mathematics of attrition: losses versus replacement

However, attributing everything solely to weather would be an oversimplification. The second, deeper reason is the Russian military machine’s inability to replenish losses at the pace at which they are being eliminated by the Ukrainian Defense Forces. The attritional “conveyor belt” set in motion by the Kremlin is increasingly working against its own forces.

Dmytro Zhmailo, the executive director of the Ukrainian Center for Security and Cooperation, cites specific figures illustrating this imbalance.

“The overall rate of Russian troop advances along the front line has declined significantly and currently stands at around seven square kilometers per day. The enemy is forced to accumulate reserves, as the rate at which its personnel are being eliminated exceeds its ability to replace those losses,” Zhmailo emphasizes.

This assessment is also supported by observations from the battlefield. Russian command is increasingly forced to pause between so-called “assault waves” in order to bring up fresh forces. Experts note that, given minimal territorial gains combined with exceptionally high personnel losses, the adversary risks undermining the launch of its spring campaign. Oleksandr Kovalenko adds an important strategic factor: “They may approach spring with a critical imbalance—excessive losses paired with negligible territorial gains will prevent the formation of the necessary conditions for launching a full-scale offensive, even in a more favorable season.”

The urban deadlock: the agglomeration factor

The third component of the slowdown is geographic. Russian forces have run into what military professionals describe as an “urbanized landscape.” The battlefield has changed: instead of forest belts, it is now dominated by concrete ruins of cities, where every basement can become a strongpoint and every window a firing position.

Kovalenko emphasizes that the enemy is bogged down in urban combat across most key sectors of the front.

“The occupiers are effectively stuck in urban fighting. If we look at the Pokrovsk–Myrnohrad agglomeration, a massive enemy grouping is concentrated there, yet we do not observe any significant changes. A similar situation exists around Kostiantynivka. The same applies to Chasiv Yar,” the expert explains.

He also separately addresses the situation in Kharkiv Oblast: “Kupiansk is, quite frankly, one of the enemy’s major failures of late 2025—an area they are now attempting to return to.”

Thus, the overall picture shows that in open terrain Russian forces are being slowed by weather conditions, while in urban areas they are constrained by dense development and determined resistance from Ukrainian defenders.

THE GEOGRAPHY OF THE FRONT: WHAT IS HAPPENING AT THE EPICENTERS OF CONFRONTATION

Whereas the above discussion addressed the question of “why,” this one focuses on “where” and “how.” Despite the general slowdown, certain sections of the front remain highly active even in January’s freezing conditions. Pokrovsk, Myrnohrad, Huliaipole, and Lyman are names that continue to dominate daily situation reports.

Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad: Life in the “Grey Zone” of Reality

The situation around Pokrovsk illustrates how political statements can diverge from tactical realities. The city, which has become a symbol of Ukrainian resistance, continues to hold out, although its current status remains a matter of debate.

Military expert and former officer of the Security Service of Ukraine, Ivan Stupak, offers a sober—though painful —assessment. According to him, formally the city has not fallen, but actual control over it is a complex issue.

“Theoretically, Pokrovsk has not yet been captured by the aggressor’s forces. However, the part of the city that remains under Ukrainian control is no longer large. Ukraine controls only certain outskirts of Pokrovsk. Yes, there have been Ukrainian raids deeper into the city; at times in December, units even re-entered previously lost positions. However, this is not done to restore full control over Pokrovsk, but rather to create problems for the enemy and then withdraw,” Stupak explains.

The expert stresses the enormous imbalance of forces: approximately 170,000 Russian troops are involved in the assault on the city.

“So, formally we are still holding Pokrovsk, but actually… In any case, Pokrovsk continues to fulfill its role: our forces have carried the defense of the city on their shoulders for 16 consecutive months, thereby buying time for Ukraine and for Europe,” Stupak concludes.

Dmytro Zhmailo confirms this assessment: “In Donetsk Oblast, the occupying forces are bogged down in the area of the Pokrovsk–Myrnohrad agglomeration, while Ukrainian troops continue to hold the line under extremely difficult conditions.”

Oleksandr Kovalenko characterizes the situation in this sector as consistently challenging but predictable. The enemy, he says, is acting largely on the momentum established back in the autumn.

“In the Pokrovsk sector, the enemy continues attempts to infiltrate the northern part of the city, employing small groups and a tactic of gradual penetration, pressure, and attrition. On a parallel track, in Myrnohrad, Russian forces are trying to push the Ukrainian Defense Forces out of the central, eastern, and northwestern districts,” Kovalenko notes.

This represents what experts describe as a “neutral scenario”: no breakthroughs, but constant, exhausting pressure.

The head of security programs at the Strategy XXI Center for Global Studies, Pavlo Lakiichuk, adds that the fighting here has strategic significance for the entire Donbas region.

“Fierce fighting continues in the Pokrovsk direction because this area is a ‘key’ to the enemy’s attempt to envelop the entire Siversk salient—a line of fortified towns to the south, Kostiantynivka and Druzhkivka that are currently under heavy pressure. From there, through Pokrovsk, the adversary is trying to repeat its previously unsuccessful offensive toward Dobropillia, which was entirely predictable,” Lakiichuk explains.

Huliaipole: A New ‘Meat Grinder’ in Zaporizhzhia Oblast

While Pokrovsk represents an old wound, Huliaipole is emerging as a new epicenter of fighting. The city associated with the name of Nestor Makhno, which had remained relatively intact for years, is now being reduced to ruins amid intense street battles.

Vladyslav Voloshyn, the press officer for the Southern Defense Forces, describes the situation as critical.

“The most intense fighting is taking place in the Huliaipole area, where Russian forces are attempting to bypass the city from the north and south but are unable to consolidate their positions. Huliaipole now more closely resembles a grey zone,” Voloshyn says.

He also points to a shift in enemy tactics of aerial warfare: Russian forces have begun using precision guided aerial bombs (KABs) not against the city itself—which has already been largely reduced to ruins—but against rear areas and logistics.

“The enemy has effectively stopped striking Huliaipole with KABs and is instead hitting nearby settlements—Zaliznychne, Zelene, Varvarivka, Dorozhnianka, and Pryluky,” the spokesperson adds.

Oleksandr Kovalenko offers his most concerning assessment precisely for this sector. He explains why Huliaipole is more difficult to defend than cities such as Bakhmut or Avdiivka: the lack of heavy industrial facilities and multi-story residential blocks makes the city inherently more vulnerable. Moreover, according to the expert, throughout the years of the war—and especially over the past year—the city was not systematically prepared for prolonged defense. A full-fledged defensive infrastructure capable of withstanding sustained and intense pressure from the enemy had been never established.

“There, Russian occupaying forces are gradually beginning to form and expand their own zones of control. In fact, almost the entire eastern part of the city is already under their control… I want to emphasize: the situation in Huliaipole is significantly more difficult than in Pokrovsk or Myrnohrad. And, frankly speaking, I do not see a realistic prospect of this city holding out for another six months or a year. Huliaipole is already operating at the very limit of its defensive capacity,” Kovalenko warns.

At present, the city is effectively holding on thanks to people—the defenders who are doing everything they can to slow down and exhaust the enemy. And, for now, they are succeeding.

“It is indicative that Russian forces, using only units of the 5th Combined Arms Army, were unable to achieve their stated objectives. They were forced to bring in additional resources, including units from the 29th Combined Arms Army and the 36th Combined Arms Army, to reinforce the grouping of the 5th CAA. This, in itself, is an indicator of how intense and exhausting this axis remains for the enemy,” he added.

He then describes the enemy’s tactics in detail: Russian occupaying forces are gradually forming and expanding their own zones of control. In practical terms, almost the entire eastern part of the city is already under their control. Beyond the Haichul River, along the eastern bank, the enemy is actively infiltrating along Velyka Street, as well as through the area of the Central Cemetery toward the Silmash district—that is, directly toward the central part of the city. In parallel, Russian forces are attempting to take control of the northwestern part of Huliaipole, particularly the neighborhood of private houses.

Ukrainian forces, for their part, are holding onto what is referred to as the “road of life”—the T0814 highway, effectively the main access route into the city near the DT-75 tractor monument. This location, the analyst emphasizes, remains critical: “Through it, our units are able to operate against the central part of the city—Shevchenko, Trudova, and Spartakivska streets, as well as the area around the Central Market—conducting localized mop up operations with small groups.”

Dmytro Zhmailo describes the enemy’s tactic as an attempted encirclement: “At present, Huliaipole has effectively turned into a large ‘grey zone.’ Ukrainian forces have divided it into sectors and are holding positions, while Russian units are trying to spread through the city. The overarching Russian plan is to form ‘pincers’ around Orikhiv and Huliaipole, bypass defensive nodes, and infiltrate deeper.”

The enemy’s strategic objective for this sector is clear: establishing a bridgehead for an advance toward Zaporizhzhia. Kovalenko explains that Huliaipole and the settlement of Pokrovske in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast form an “ideal square” for deploying an offensive toward the provincial capital.

Lyman and Siversk: A Threat from the North

Another hotspot is the Lyman direction. For now, the situation here is relatively calmer compared with Huliaipole, but analysts caution against complacency. Pavlo Lakiichuk notes that Russian forces are building up their presence in that area and have already achieved limited tactical advances near Siversk.

“The fall of Siversk would be a serious setback for us. However, the fighting around Kostiantynivka and the frontal pressure toward Siversk indicate that the Russians’ plan for a large-scale flanking encirclement of our forces is not proceeding as planned,” Lakiichuk comments.

Oleksandr Kovalenko predicts an intensification of fighting around Lyman in the first quarter of 2026. The enemy, he says, is focused on the area’s railway hub.

“As for Lyman, the situation there remains more or less under control at present. At the same time, it must be understood that this is largely a matter of time. I believe the enemy will attempt to expand its main infiltration efforts during the first quarter of 2026,” the expert says.

He identifies specific axes for potential future attacks, first and foremost Masliakivka, a village located on the southeastern outskirts of Lyman. In effect, the enemy is already establishing a foothold there for further advances.

“Another infiltration axis is likely to be the territory of the former, now inactive Chervonolyman Airfield. It is through this area that Russian forces may attempt to enter the southeastern part of the city, gradually expanding their presence. Their key tactical objective there is reaching Svobody Street. This is fundamentally critical for them, as it would create conditions for taking control over several critically important assets at once—primarily the T0513 Highway and T0514 Highway, as well as railway infrastructure, including the rail lines, Lyman station, and the railway terminal,” Kovalenko says.

For Russian command, gaining control over rail routes is one of the key objectives for this sector, as it directly affects logistics, maneuverability, and the ability to apply further pressure on adjacent sectors of the front.

“That is why, throughout the entire first quarter of 2026, the enemy’s primary focus will most likely be on infiltrating the southeastern part of Lyman. This is the direction where we should expect a gradual increase in activity and attempts to alter the current, relatively controlled balance of forces,” the expert emphasizes.

A Strategy of Survival: Mines Against Mass Assaults

How can Ukraine counter this creeping advance in 2026? Experts stress the need to adjust approaches to engineering support. Given the enemy’s reliance on masses of infantry, Ukraine must respond with extensive mine warfare. This is not only a tactical issue, but also a matter of the economics of war.

Oleksandr Kovalenko provides calculations that, in his view, should form the basis of the defensive strategy for this year.

“We must prepare anti-infantry barriers and defensive lines. The average cost of the simplest pressure-activated anti-personnel mine ranges from USD 3 to USD 5. The simplest form of mine-laying is a single belt with a density of 100 mines per hectare, or a three-belt configuration—300 mines per hectare. At the same time, this is far from the upper limit of mine density; there are examples of minefields laid at a density of up to 1,000 mines per hectare. In practical terms, passive control of one hectare can cost between USD 3,000 and USD 15,000. If desired, this amount of money can be converted into an equivalent number of FPV drones. However, the transition to pressure-activated anti-personnel mines should become a priority for us when forming defensive lines in 2026,” Oleksandr Kovalenko argues.

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The logic is straightforward: the most cost-effective way to stop mass infantry assaults is through passive means, thereby freeing up FPV drones and artillery for the destruction of equipment and high-priority targets.

The first weeks of 2026 have shaped a new frontline reality: a war of attrition in its harshest phase, where kilometers are no longer the primary measure of success. The slowdown of the enemy’s advance is an undeniable fact, but its causes lie in physical constraints—weather, terrain, and resources—rather than any abandonment by Moscow of its aggressive intentions.

For the Ukrainian Defense Forces, this period of “frozen” active maneuvering presents both an opportunity and strict requirements. First, it is essential to make maximum use of the time during which enemy infantry is constrained by winter conditions to conduct extensive mining of threatened axes—an approach that is economically more efficient than engaging in direct counterattacks. Second, the situation in Huliaipole requires immediate attention, as the loss of this node would create a direct threat to the provincial capital, Zaporizhzhia. Third, the relative stability around Pokrovsk represents time bought at the cost of extraordinary human effort—and it must not be squandered.

According to expert assessments, 2026 is likely to remain a year of Russian offensive operations. However, whether the enemy will be able to restore momentum in the spring after the winter “meat grinder” offensive campaign in urban ruins is a question being answered right now—on the snow-covered fields of the Donbas and Zaporizhzhia regions.

Myroslav Liskovych, Kyiv