Today, Ukrinform turns its attention to one of Ukraine's—and Europe's—most important partners: the United States. It is an indispensable ally, though not always an easy one, particularly under President Donald Trump.
This has become evident not only in Ukraine and across Europe, but around the world. Against that backdrop, it is important to understand where Ukraine's relationship with its strategic partner stands today.
Why strategic? Because without U.S. military, financial, and political support—especially during the first years of Russia's full-scale invasion—it would have been extraordinarily difficult for Ukraine to withstand Russia's aggression. In 2025, however, President Trump shifted much of the responsibility for supporting Ukraine, both militarily and financially, onto Europe's shoulders.
Europe stepped up, providing Ukraine with substantial financial assistance, military equipment, and weaponry. At the same time, President Trump's stance toward Russia's war against Ukraine—and toward Ukraine itself—has been inconsistent. More recently, however, Washington's approach appears to be evolving in a more favorable direction.
To assess the current state of Ukraine-U.S. relations and the prospects for future defense cooperation, Ukrinform spoke with Major General (Ret.) Volodymyr Havrylov, who served as Ukraine's Defense Attaché to the United States from 2015 to 2018 and later as Deputy Minister of Defense from 2022 to 2023.
Ukrinform (UI): So, what changed? Why did President Trump alter his approach toward Ukraine, particularly in the area of defense cooperation?
Volodymyr Havrylov (VH): Clearly, the decisive factor influencing President Trump and his inner circle has been the situation on the battlefield. Ukraine's ability to strike deep inside Russian territory, coupled with the stabilization of the front and a clearer understanding of how the war is likely to evolve, has increasingly undermined Russia's position.
This has made a strong impression on Trump's team. Only a few years ago, many of its members viewed the war largely through the lens of Vladimir Putin's narrative. Until quite recently, Moscow continued trying to convince them that Russia was steadily advancing, citing territorial gains, battlefield successes, and other purported achievements.
At the same time, U.S. intelligence has been providing the administration with a far more accurate assessment of the battlefield, making it increasingly clear that the reality differs markedly from the picture Putin had been presenting to Trump in phone calls and private conversations. As a result, much of the trust that once existed between the Russian and American leaders has eroded.
Against the backdrop of Ukraine's battlefield successes and its demonstrated technological capabilities, a growing consensus has emerged in Washington that Ukraine is on a more favorable trajectory in the war. Consequently, defense cooperation has begun moving in a more positive direction, particularly with regard to access to advanced technologies. This shift is already evident in the delivery of Patriot interceptor missiles, the accelerated approval of U.S. weapons purchases financed by European partners, and the highly efficient logistics for delivering American equipment procured on Ukraine's behalf.
UI: The pace of these developments has indeed been remarkable. Just a month ago, at the G7 summit in Evian, President Zelensky raised the issue of obtaining a license to manufacture Patriot missiles. Then, at the NATO summit in Ankara, President Trump publicly stated that the United States was favorably disposed toward granting such a license.
This is certainly encouraging. At the same time, we have learned that circumstances can change very quickly. How soon do you think this intention to grant Ukraine a Patriot missile production license could actually become reality?
VH: With the Trump administration, we have to remain realistic and avoid assuming that everything has already been decided. At this stage, these are political declarations rather than binding commitments. They still need to be formalized through official documents and concrete agreements.
That said, the uncertainty surrounding U.S. military assistance has had one positive effect: it has forced us to rely more heavily on our own capabilities while also recognizing Europe's growing potential because, quite simply, there are no other viable alternatives.
Even so, the United States remains indispensable in several areas involving highly advanced military technologies. These include air defense—particularly ballistic missile defense—as well as the continued supply of HIMARS, ATACMS, and certain counter-battery systems. At present, neither Europe nor Ukraine can fully replace these capabilities.
At the same time, the war has entered a phase in which relatively inexpensive unmanned systems—most of them now produced in Ukraine—have become increasingly decisive. As a result, our dependence on the United States has diminished, allowing us to prepare for different scenarios without being entirely at the mercy of decisions made by the Trump administration.
Today, the only truly critical capability on which we remain dependent is ballistic missile defense—specifically, access to the Patriot PAC-3 interceptor.
So far, the PAC-3 is the only interceptor that has consistently proven effective against ballistic missile threats. That is why it is essential for Ukraine to secure formal, legally binding approval at every level for the transfer of a license to manufacture PAC-3 interceptors.
We understand that this will not be a quick process, nor is it something Ukraine can accomplish on its own, since it requires an integrated production chain. We have already seen a similar model in Japan, so it is reasonable to expect that the licensing arrangement will ultimately take the form of a hybrid production scheme, possibly involving German companies that already manufacture PAC-2 missiles and possess the necessary industrial expertise and know-how.
At the same time, we need to continue building our own capabilities so that, within the framework of Europe's integrated ballistic missile defense initiative, we can eventually develop a long-term solution of our own. Even if Ukraine were granted a PAC-3 production license tomorrow, it would not result in additional missiles rolling off the production line anytime soon—certainly not within the next year. That much is clear.
UI: President Zelensky has said it is essential that Patriot missiles bearing the label Made in Ukraine become a reality as soon as possible. Naturally, that is an objective we all share. But obtaining a production license is a highly complex undertaking that requires extensive preparation. What would Ukraine need to do to make that happen?
VH: It is an extremely complex process, not least because Raytheon is not the only company involved in manufacturing the PAC-3 missile in the United States. Critical components are supplied by Boeing and several other manufacturers, meaning licensing agreements would have to be negotiated with each of them. How quickly those agreements can be concluded and implemented will ultimately determine how soon the first missiles could roll off the production line.
Even if we begin the process now and do not produce a finished missile within the next 12 months, it will still be immensely valuable for Ukraine's defense industry. It will allow us to master critical technologies and join the relatively small group of countries capable of manufacturing such advanced systems.
From that perspective, this is first and foremost a long-term strategic project. I am not convinced that we will be able to produce a finished missile—particularly one manufactured entirely in Ukraine—within a short timeframe. There are numerous challenges to overcome, including security considerations, such as where the missiles would be assembled, the sourcing of components, and a wide range of technological issues—from engineering expertise and specialized materials to production infrastructure.
Ukraine will undoubtedly move faster than almost any other country because we are working around the clock and have an extraordinary sense of urgency. Even so, some aspects of the process simply cannot be accelerated. Manufacturing rocket motors, producing seeker heads, and fabricating other highly specialized components all require time. Ultimately, you remain dependent on sophisticated industrial supply chains.
So, in the short term, obtaining a production license will not produce immediate results. Its real significance lies in enabling Ukraine to accelerate the development of its own industrial base and technological capabilities in the field of ballistic missile defense.
UI: So, obtaining the license would essentially give Ukraine a seat at an exclusive table. Once you're part of that club, many things become easier, particularly access to advanced technologies. At least initially, however, the focus would likely be on assembling missiles rather than manufacturing them from scratch.
VH: Exactly. If we have access to the necessary components, we will be able to carry out final assembly. A modular assembly line could be established relatively quickly, although it would still take several months. Even then, production volumes would remain limited because we would continue to depend on imported components, whose supply is constrained.
Take Boeing, for example. It manufactures the seeker heads for the PAC-3 interceptor and already has contractual commitments to supply them to the Pentagon, Japan, and likely several Gulf states. Production capacity is finite, so the availability of key components will remain a bottleneck.
UI: President Zelensky recently said that Ukraine needs 300 Patriot interceptors simply to get through the winter, and winter is still months away. Where can those missiles come from in the meantime?
VH: One option is the Franco-Italian SAMP/T air defense system. It has recently undergone a major upgrade incorporating lessons learned from its operational use in Ukraine, particularly in the area of ballistic missile defense and the performance of the Aster interceptor. France has also agreed to grant Ukraine a license to manufacture these missiles.
That provides another important avenue for us. Europe could now devote greater effort to scaling up production of both the SAMP/T system and its interceptors. It will not replace the Patriot—that much is clear—but it would add another layer to our air and missile defense architecture and significantly strengthen our overall capabilities.
We should also work with other partners to help bridge the gap. South Korea, for example, deployed an advanced ballistic missile defense system in 2025.
At the same time, we need to maintain a sustained dialogue with the United States. If Washington is unable to supply the number of interceptors Ukraine requires, it should help us gain access to comparable systems available elsewhere. That is an argument the Americans understand, and it should remain part of our ongoing discussions.
UI: You sound quite confident that we're talking about the PAC-3. Are we certain that this is the missile variant under discussion?
VH: When I refer to the PAC-3, I mean the production license. The PAC-2 is a less sophisticated missile and is already manufactured in several countries. Germany, for instance, has production facilities for the PAC-2.
Japan also has the capability to manufacture PAC-3 interceptors, although only in relatively limited numbers. It also produces PAC-2 missiles and could potentially expand that production. The PAC-2, however, was not designed to intercept ballistic missiles. Its primary mission is defending against aircraft and cruise missiles.
The real challenge, therefore, is the PAC-3 interceptor—the missile specifically designed to defeat ballistic threats. That is the capability Ukraine must develop: strengthening its ballistic missile defense, securing additional interceptors, building its own production capacity, and pursuing every viable alternative.
Ultimately, the most important long-term objective is for Ukraine to develop its own ballistic missile capability, so that Russia understands that every ballistic missile it launches could eventually be met with a comparable response.
UI: So, production licenses would come not only from the United States, but also from France and Italy. Can Ukraine realistically absorb all of this and establish serial production?
VH: There will undoubtedly be significant challenges, ranging from engineering expertise to manufacturing capacity and industrial infrastructure. At this stage, however, the announcements that Ukraine will receive these production licenses carry enormous political and psychological significance.
They reflect a high level of confidence in Ukraine and in the direction the war is taking. They also demonstrate that international support is not weakening but deepening. Granting a production license represents a new level of trust between partners—one extended to only a handful of countries.
It is also a powerful signal to Russia that the transfer of advanced defense technologies to Ukraine will continue.
For the first time in Ukraine's history, we are embarking on the licensed production of an advanced air and missile defense system on our own territory. We have never undertaken a project of this kind before. Naturally, we lack institutional experience in managing such a program, so we will have to build the necessary processes as we go, drawing on the expertise of companies and engineering teams that already possess relevant experience.
We are prepared to invest whatever time and effort is required. One of Ukraine's greatest strengths is its ingenuity. We often find unconventional and more cost-effective ways to solve technical challenges that foreign developers have simply never had reason to explore. We work under constant pressure to develop affordable, scalable solutions that can be fielded rapidly.
UI: That is beyond question. But another equally important issue arises. When we say that "Ukraine" is capable of doing this, who exactly do we mean? Who would actually receive the license—the government, the Ministry of Economy, the Ministry of Defense, or the State Export Control Service? Who would coordinate the project and assign responsibilities?
VH: In the United States, for example, the master license for a system developed under a Pentagon contract is typically held by the Department of Defense. In Ukraine's case, the framework could take the form of an intergovernmental agreement establishing the overall structure of the project and designating the Ukrainian entity responsible for its implementation.
One possible model would be to appoint a single lead company to serve as the prime contractor and systems integrator. That company would receive the principal license and then obtain the additional licenses required for individual components from the respective intellectual property holders.
Another option would be for Ukraine's Ministry of Defense to become the primary license holder. Under arrangements agreed with the U.S. side, the ministry could then delegate specific production rights and responsibilities to enterprises within Ukraine's defense-industrial base.
Whichever model is chosen, it will need to be clearly defined and legally enshrined in bilateral agreements between the two countries.
In reality, there are only two viable options: either the Ministry of Defense or a company designated under the bilateral agreement. That company would serve as the prime contractor responsible for implementing the project. Ultimately, however, that will be a political decision.
UI: Let's turn back to Europe. What about the Anti-Ballistic Coalition and the FREYA project? Could they deliver results sooner than establishing licensed missile production in Ukraine?
VH: It is an intriguing option because Ukraine has already begun developing its own indigenous ballistic missile defense capability. We have made significant progress toward creating a Ukrainian interceptor. Fire Point has unveiled the FP-7X, an interceptor designed to engage ballistic missiles. The company has demonstrated the missile itself—a prototype capable of reaching the speeds required to intercept incoming ballistic targets.
However, the prototype currently lacks a guidance system, and in any ballistic missile interceptor, the guidance package is the most critical and technologically demanding component.
Traditionally, systems of this kind have taken many years to develop, primarily in the United States and the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union never fully solved the problem of achieving consistently high interception probabilities. Technological limitations prevented its systems from delivering the level of reliability required. The United States advanced much further and, with the PAC-3, developed an effective solution against a specific class of ballistic missile threats.
Perhaps Ukraine can approach the guidance challenge differently—more creatively—rather than simply following conventional design concepts. We should explore whether advances in electronics, software, artificial intelligence, and nanotechnology make it possible to develop such a capability more rapidly.
If we succeed, Ukraine could ultimately field its own guidance system with performance comparable to that of the PAC-3 or the SAMP/T, while being significantly less expensive and far easier to manufacture at scale.
I hope that, by concentrating our efforts in this area, the FREYA project will deliver a breakthrough Ukrainian interceptor.
UI: As I understand it, unlike unmanned systems and counter-drone technologies, when it comes to ballistic missiles—or missile technology in general—there is no commercial marketplace where you can simply source off-the-shelf components, as you can for drones. Virtually every component in a missile is purpose-built to military specifications. That makes it far more difficult to find the kind of inexpensive yet effective solutions that have transformed the drone sector.
VH: That's true. The reason is that neither the United States nor Europe has ever really approached the problem from that perspective. These systems have traditionally been developed under government-funded programs. States allocated enormous budgets, and no one seriously considered using commercially available components. Instead, entirely new systems were designed from the ground up to meet highly specialized military requirements.
As a result, the end products were technologically sophisticated, highly complex, and extremely expensive—but they achieved the required performance standards.
Until now, very few people have seriously explored whether key elements of the guidance system—particularly its sensors—could be built using lower-cost commercial technologies while still delivering comparable performance. That is an area where Ukraine may have an opportunity to challenge conventional thinking.
UI: Just a few days ago, reports emerged about a European initiative to develop a space-based ballistic missile interception capability. Leading European defense companies—not governments—including MBDA, Thales, Safran, and Airbus announced plans to collaborate on the Bliksem EXO project. Is that a realistic prospect, or could it end up resembling Europe's long-running efforts to develop a fifth-generation fighter?
VH: They certainly possess the technological capability. The real questions are whether they have the necessary time, funding, and political commitment. These major defense companies have the expertise and industrial know-how required to undertake a project of this complexity.
The initiative is clearly being driven by growing uncertainty in Europe over the long-term reliability of U.S. security guarantees. At present, Europe's ballistic missile defense architecture relies heavily on the American THAAD system. Deployed in Romania and Poland, those U.S. assets protect both European and American interests, primarily against potential ballistic missile threats from Iran.
Europe, however, has no comparable indigenous capability. There were attempts to develop one in the 1990s, but they never came to fruition.
Whenever Europe embarks on large multinational defense programs, coordination inevitably becomes challenging. Each participating country has its own priorities and industrial interests, and the final product does not always meet everyone's expectations. Along the way, governments change, economic crises intervene, and political commitments are reassessed. As a result, Europe has relatively few examples of truly successful multinational defense-industrial cooperation.
Airbus is perhaps the best-known success story. It has evolved into Boeing's only genuine global competitor in commercial aviation.
A space-based ballistic missile defense system represents an entirely new technological frontier, one with virtually no established competitors. Europe will have to develop such a capability largely on its own. If sufficient funding is available, the consortium will almost certainly produce some form of hybrid solution. How effective it ultimately proves to be, however, remains to be seen.
What is clear is that European countries have little choice but to pursue such a project collectively. No single European nation possesses the financial resources, technological base, or industrial capacity to develop a comprehensive space-based ballistic missile defense system on its own.
UI: Well, let's hope they succeed. We wish them every success.
It appears that, by the summer of 2026, Ukraine had reached a strategic turning point. At the NATO Summit in Ankara, the Alliance formally recognized Ukraine as a contributor to Euro-Atlantic security. In effect, NATO's member states acknowledged that Ukraine is already carrying out one of the Alliance's core missions—deterring Russian aggression.
At the same time, Ukraine has concluded roughly a dozen so-called drone agreements, the latest with the European Union just yesterday. According to President Zelensky, a similar agreement with the United States is also in the works. These agreements represent Ukraine's own contribution to collective security.
Ukraine is no longer simply asking its partners for artillery shells, tanks, or aging Soviet-era aircraft. It now has advanced capabilities of its own to offer.
Ukraine's defense technologies are closely aligned with the realities of modern warfare, whose character has undergone a fundamental transformation. Today's battlefield is increasingly defined by technology. Traditional front lines are becoming less decisive as long-range precision strikes, unmanned systems, and counter-drone capabilities reshape the very nature of war.
But at this stage, what Ukraine urgently needs most is a robust ballistic missile defense capability. We need more than production licenses from the United States—important as they are, and encouraging as it is that concrete work has already begun. We also need sustained U.S. support and a clear understanding in Washington that pressure on Russia must continue to increase.
That is why the next crucial step should be the passage of the sanctions bill introduced by the late Senator Lindsey Graham. How likely is that now?
VH: As things stand today, particularly following Senator Graham's death, I believe the bill stands a very good chance of being enacted. Senator Graham's death has had a profound emotional impact on both the House and the Senate. Personal relationships also matter, and President Trump had a close relationship with Lindsey Graham. Symbolism plays an important role in American politics, so I would not be surprised if the legislation ultimately moves forward.
If the bill is adopted, implementation is likely to begin very quickly. It will probably come to be known as the Graham Act. The only caveat is that certain provisions of the sanctions regime will likely be modified by the Trump administration, as the President wants to retain broad discretion over how and when those sanctions are imposed.
We will have to see what the final version of the legislation looks like. The key point, however, is that the bill itself sends a powerful political message to Russia: the President of the United States will have a full range of tools at his disposal to increase economic pressure not only on Russia, but also on any countries that continue to support it.
UI: Even taking into account the amendments already made to the bill—which give President Trump greater flexibility in implementing its provisions—it would still represent a major step forward.
And until that legislation is enacted, it may be even more important that President Trump simply refrain from calling Vladimir Putin.
Thank you for this conversation. We wish every success to everyone involved in what is arguably one of the most important defense projects in Ukraine today—the future production of the PAC-3 interceptor in Ukraine.
Ihor Dolhov led this conversation
Photos by Danylo Antoniuk / Ukrinform
Watch the conversation in full on Ukrinform's YouTube channel