Since the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion, African countries have shown growing interest in Ukraine, while the positions taken by states across the continent — from active support to abstentions in international votes — have become an increasingly important factor on the global stage. Attention toward Ukraine was further amplified by the food crisis triggered by Russia’s blockade of the Black Sea shipping corridor, which had a particularly severe impact on African nations.

On the eve of Africa Day, observed annually on May 25, Ukrinform spoke with Liubov Abravitova, Director of the Department of Africa and Regional African Organizations at Ukraine’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, about Ukraine’s evolving approach to cooperation with the continent, the recruitment of Africans to fight in Russia’s war against Ukraine, Russia’s “blood diamonds,” and what the diplomat misses after returning from an eight-year posting in Africa.

AFRICA IS ALSO STRATEGICALLY IMPORTANT FOR UKRAINE’S EUROPEAN INTEGRATION

Ukrinform: At the end of March, the Office of the President hosted a strategic meeting on the priorities of Ukraine’s foreign policy toward the African continent. Ukrainian officials have been emphasizing the importance of Africa for at least the past five years. Have Ukraine’s priorities in this area changed recently?

Liubov Abravitova: The world is changing, and with it our objectives and approaches must evolve as well. That is why this coordination effort has long been overdue — to jointly define where we want to move and what mechanisms and instruments are needed to get there.

We have already achieved several breakthroughs on the African track, and now, as the global order undergoes rapid transformation, it is important to assess what should be adjusted or strengthened.

The first-ever “Strategy for the Development of Relations Between Ukraine and the States of Africa” in the history of independent Ukraine was approved in January 2022. We are now preparing a follow-up strategy for Ukraine’s engagement with Africa, which will cover the period beginning in 2027.

Over the past few years, Ukraine has opened a number of embassies across Africa, most of which are already fully operational. At the same time, it is important to identify priority regions, assess the readiness of individual countries for deeper cooperation, evaluate the existing mechanisms of engagement, and develop new formats for entering African markets and implementing large-scale projects.

UI: Could you elaborate on Ukraine’s priorities in Africa?

LA: In my view, they should encompass several areas. One of the key priorities is strengthening Ukraine’s agency in Africa.Початок форми

The fact is that Russia continues to appropriate the legacy of the Soviet Union and portray itself as its sole successor and an anti-Western force, which creates a serious challenge for us.

Another major area is Ukraine’s postwar reconstruction. Africa’s resources — not only natural, but also human and technological — can help build joint supply chains, contribute to Ukraine’s economic recovery, and support its long-term sustainable development.

Promoting peace and security is also one of the key global strategic objectives. Drawing on its own experience in upholding international law, sovereignty, and territorial integrity, Ukraine can contribute to conflict prevention and the strengthening of security, including in Africa.

At the same time, it is important to build a sustainable network of political and economic support through humanitarian, cultural, and especially educational initiatives that help create a broad circle of Ukraine’s partners and supporters around the world.

The African track is also important for Ukraine’s European integration. The EU is expanding cooperation with Africa through large-scale initiatives; for example, the Global Gateway initiative alone plans to invest more than €150 billion in sustainable development projects across Africa this year. Ukraine can integrate into these processes as well by offering its own expertise, technologies, and innovations — from the agricultural sector to crisis response and security-related solutions.

This requires a coordinated effort involving the government, businesses, and civil society, as well as the development of Ukraine’s own expert base focused on training a new generation of African affairs specialists.

UI: Last year, as part of structural changes within the Foreign Ministry, the responsibilities of the Special Representative for the Middle East and Africa were separated, with plans for a dedicated representative focused exclusively on the African track. However, that appointment has yet to be made. Is the idea still under consideration?

LA: I am not aware of any formal legal decision establishing such a division of the position. At the same time, the Middle East and Africa departments have been separated. Today, the Department of Africa and Regional African Organizations (Sub-Saharan Africa) operates independently from the Department of the Middle East and North Africa.

There is clear logic behind this structure, since the countries of North Africa are deeply integrated with the Middle East through cultural, religious, and political ties, whereas the countries of Sub-Saharan Africa are oriented toward the African Union, regional economic blocs such as ECOWAS, and security and development challenges specific to that region.

UI: So does that mean the position of Special Representative for Africa is no longer necessary?

LA: On the contrary, the institution of a Special Representative for Africa is a critically important instrument.

The African continent requires a special approach to building relationships — one that differs from traditional Western diplomatic standards. In Africa, politics is built on deep personal trust and long-term relationships. People prefer speaking with specific individuals rather than abstract institutions.Початок форми

At a time when Ukraine is finally beginning to develop a pool of Africanists and specialists with expertise in the local contexts of all 54 countries on the continent, a Special Representative should not only compensate for the shortage of our diplomatic resources in Africa through personal charisma and close coordination with partners, but also serve as a reliable “bridge” between Kyiv and African capitals — one capable of transforming dry diplomatic protocols into vibrant and mutually beneficial partnerships.

Ultimately, institutionalizing such a role would acknowledge that Africa is not a secondary direction, but a strategic player whose cooperation requires not only a well-designed strategy, but also a constant and deliberate presence on the political agenda across the continent.

RUSSIA IS NOT EVEN AMONG AFRICA’S TOP TEN OR TOP TWENTY ECONOMIC PARTNERS

UI: Five years ago, in an interview with Ukrinform while serving as Ukraine’s ambassador to South Africa, you said that Africa is often perceived in Ukraine as a single conglomerate rather than 54 separate states. What is your approach now, as Director of the Department of Africa: are you looking for common denominators or working with each country individually?

LA: Without a doubt, we approach each country individually.

I can proudly say that Ukraine is gradually changing its understanding of Africa. To a large extent, this is the result of the work of Ukrainian diplomacy, because the number of African embassies in Ukraine remains limited. As a result, there are few opportunities for systematic cultural, economic, and traditional political diplomacy that would allow Ukrainians to become more familiar with these countries.

We still lack this element of direct engagement with the diverse nations of Africa.Початок форми

This is also reflected in trade and tourism statistics: relations tend to develop more actively with countries that maintain a diplomatic presence in Ukraine.

Our diplomats are working not only to strengthen Ukraine’s positioning in Africa, but also to explain to Ukrainian society why cooperation with the continent matters.

So when we speak about Ukraine’s strategy in Africa, it may sound generalized, but in practice it will consist of multiple levels, regional processes, and economic and political centers of gravity. That is what will make the strategy not merely theoretical, but genuinely practical.

UI: Which countries are currently competing most actively for influence in Africa?

LA: Today, it would be more accurate to speak about a shift and redistribution of influence among various countries across different regions of Africa.

Traditionally, the key players remain China, India, the United States, and the European Union. At the same time, Turkey has been steadily expanding its presence — in fact, it now maintains diplomatic representation in each and every African country.

In some regions, new trends are also emerging. For example, in recent years Iran has been actively deepening ties with several states, particularly in the Sahel region.

This demonstrates that each country, guided by its own interests, identifies priority areas of engagement and develops them accordingly. As we have already noted, Africa consists of 54 states that cannot realistically be covered simultaneously — or even within the medium term.

Ukraine, too, will have to prioritize key centers of influence and strategic interest, focusing first and foremost on building relations with them.

UI: I expected you to include Russia on that list.

LA: I deliberately did not mention Russia, and I can explain why: it is neither among the top ten nor even the top twenty economic partners of African countries. Despite the Russian leadership’s loud declarations about building multifaceted partnerships with Africa, Russia’s actual investments in the continent remain marginal.

The Russian authorities do not publish consolidated investment data, but it is widely understood that Russia is not even among the fifteen most significant investors in Africa. Compared with actors such as the European Union, the United Kingdom, the United States, as well as individual EU member states — Germany in particular as a major trading partner — Russia’s economic presence in Africa is extremely limited and concentrated primarily in the political and military spheres.

THE RECRUITMENT OF AFRICANS REQUIRES A COUNTRY-BY-COUNTRY AND CASE-BY-CASE APPROACH

UI: Ukraine has repeatedly raised the issue of Russian mercenarism and the activities of Russian military structures operating in Africa. Has there been any progress in countering this influence? What is the current situation?

LA: The situation is quite complex. According to the Coordination Headquarters for the Treatment of Prisoners of War, as of May 1, 2026, at least 2,965 citizens from 36 African countries are fighting or have fought as part of the Russian army against Ukraine.

According to expert estimates, the real number is even higher. The main “donor countries” in Africa include Kenya, Egypt, Cameroon, Ghana, Nigeria, and Uganda. The trend is extremely alarming: for 2026, the Russian command reportedly plans to recruit 18,500 foreign nationals. Russia employs a variety of recruitment methods — from deceptive promises of “free scholarships” to recruitment through religious structures.

Accordingly, Ukraine has to address each case individually. In some countries, there is room for substantive dialogue and joint efforts to counter this phenomenon. One example is the visit of Ghana’s foreign minister, which resulted in specific agreements on further cooperation. At the same time, in countries such as Nigeria, despite the large number of citizens recruited by Russia, there is still a lack of systematic political engagement to address the issue.

Incidentally, Africa is beginning to reassess Russia over mercenary recruitment for the war against Ukraine. In many countries, there is a growing realization that Russia’s so-called “second army in the world” is unable to cope with Ukraine and requires additional manpower, including from the African continent.

Ukraine is systematically working to inform international audiences through diplomatic channels and by facilitating visits by foreign journalists. In particular, French-speaking journalists recently had the opportunity to speak directly with representatives of the Coordination Headquarters as well as with African prisoners of war.

In our assessment, the dissemination of truthful information about recruitment conditions, the treatment recruits receive in Russia, and the realities of the front line should help reduce the flow of mercenaries from African countries.

UI: What is the current trend?

LA: There is no single overarching trend; the situation differs significantly from one country to another.

Take the Kenyan case, for example, where more than a thousand individuals have already signed contracts. The issue escalated under intense public and media pressure. Kenya’s foreign minister was compelled to open a political dialogue with the Russian side following widespread media coverage and appeals from families who had lost contact with their relatives. He traveled to Moscow, but according to available information, the visit produced no tangible results.

Afterward, the Russian side declared that it was prepared to halt the recruitment of Kenyan citizens. Nevertheless, we continue to document cases of their presence in combat zones.

It is also important to note that the Coordination Headquarters responded swiftly to this case and, through Telegram channels in multiple languages, reported that after the Kenyan foreign minister’s visit to Russia, the very mercenaries discussed during the negotiations were sent into so-called “meat-grinder” assaults.

In other words, Russia had no interest either in returning them or in allowing their stories to become public in the countries to which they might eventually return.

At the same time, it should be understood that mercenarism is prohibited by law in many African countries. As a result, for those who have already made such a choice, returning home is often difficult — and in many cases could result in criminal prosecution in their own country.

This, in turn, complicates any potential negotiations regarding their repatriation. Hypothetically, Russia could consider exchanging those who fought on its behalf and are now being held in Ukraine for Ukrainian prisoners of war. However, for these mercenaries, returning to Russia offers no guarantee of safety or eventual repatriation. A significant number of them would likely remain there or once again be drawn into combat operations against Ukraine.

That is why the issue of recruiting Africans requires an individual approach — both with regard to specific countries and to individual cases.

Some prisoners of war claim they were deceived about the nature of their contracts and promised civilian-sector employment, while others acknowledge that they knowingly chose to engage in military mercenary activity.

UI: Recently, Russia’s African Corps, which supports the Malian junta, was forced to withdraw from a third city in Mali following offensives by Tuareg and Islamist groups. How do these developments affect Russia’s geopolitical standing in Africa?

LA: Undoubtedly, this affects Russia’s position in the region, which is precisely why it is likely taking additional measures to reinforce its presence in Mali.

According to media reports, an aircraft carrying instructors and weapons recently arrived in Bamako. Ukraine’s Foreign Ministry cannot independently verify this information, but such a scenario is entirely plausible. Russia’s reputation is at stake, and losing control over its presence and image in the region would be highly undesirable for Moscow.

UI: In 2021, Russia created the so-called Patriarchal Exarchate of Africa, which now spans dozens of countries across the continent and continues to expand. Recently, the Russian Orthodox Church also officially registered its presence in the Republic of the Congo. How effective are such mechanisms in strengthening Russia’s humanitarian and religious influence, and how can Ukraine respond?

LA: The church and religion in Africa are both highly sensitive and highly influential instruments of societal influence, and Russia clearly understands this. That is why its actions in this area are deliberate and carefully calculated. At the same time, the creation of this exarchate contradicts the canonical jurisdiction of the Patriarchate of Alexandria.

The Orthodox Church of Ukraine cannot respond symmetrically. However, we are capable of engaging through religious and theological dialogue, working with partner churches in Africa to explain the broader context of historical injustices — including colonialism, neo-colonial practices, and genocide — whose consequences continue to resonate today.

In this context, it is important to develop religious diplomacy as a distinct area of engagement.

RUSSIA’S BLOCKING OF REFORMS TO THE DEFINITION OF “CONFLICT” DIAMONDS IS ERODING CONSUMER TRUST IN NATURAL DIAMONDS

UI: You recently participated in the annual meeting of the Kimberley Process in India. Ukraine has consistently advocated expanding the definition of “conflict” or “blood” diamonds so that it also includes diamonds of Russian origin. Has there been any progress on this issue?

LA: First of all, two important points. The Kimberley Process is an independent intergovernmental initiative established by diamond-producing countries, the diamond industry executives, and civil society organizations, with Ukraine among its founding members. The work of the Kimberley Process is integrated into the UN’s broader strategy for conflict prevention and peacebuilding.

The Kimberley Process helps implement UN Security Council requirements concerning embargoes on diamond trade originating from specific conflict zones. However, because its definition did not clearly address the issue of agency — namely, the distinction between state and non-state armed actors — a gray area emerged. As a result, when a state uses diamond exports to finance external aggression or occupation, such actions do not fall under the classical interpretation of the Kimberley Process.

Since any changes to the Kimberley Process require consensus, Russia has simply blocked every attempt to update the definition in a way that could encompass its actions in Ukraine. Consequently, the vagueness of the mandate has effectively become a mechanism for shielding the aggressor.

In this context, the central problem is Russia’s obstruction of reforms to the definitions themselves — specifically, efforts to broaden the definition of “conflict diamonds.” This is already producing wider consequences: declining consumer confidence in natural diamonds and the growing expansion of the synthetic diamond market.

Importantly, this issue extends far beyond Russian diamonds alone. It has global implications, particularly for African countries such as Botswana, whose economy depends heavily on diamond mining. Countries across the entire supply chain are also affected — from extraction and processing to cutting and polishing centers.

In fact, although Ukraine has been raising this issue since 2022, the world is only now beginning to fully feel the broader consequences of Russian aggression, including the reputational risks it creates for global commodity markets. The diamond industry is particularly vulnerable to such shifts, as it depends heavily on consumer trust and emotionally driven demand.

WE HAVE THE AMBITION TO SCALE UP AGROHUBS BASED ON THE MODEL LAUNCHED IN GHANA

UI: Ukraine recently opened its first agrohub on the African continent — in Ghana. The model envisions combining humanitarian assistance with the development of the local economy and long-term partnerships. Does Ukraine plan to expand this format to include other African countries?

LA: This is the first practical and successful step toward creating a platform capable of bringing together a range of large-scale initiatives. The launch of the hub in Ghana was the result of agreements reached during the Grain from Ukraine summit in Kyiv, and it now operates as a platform for processing and packaging Ukrainian agricultural produce.

We view it as a foundation to which additional components can gradually be added — including processing capacities, exchanges of expertise, and educational projects in the agricultural sector. That is how it can evolve into a fully-fledged multifunctional hub.

A similar agreement has also been signed with the Democratic Republic of the Congo, so we absolutely have the ambition to scale up this format.

After the first successful cases are implemented, we expect these initiatives to expand across a number of countries. They may take different forms — from humanitarian responses to crises and natural disasters to medical operational hubs involving Ukrainian specialists.

Another promising direction is educational projects, particularly in vocational and technical education, which make it possible to quickly acquire practical skills. This applied model of education and partnership appears especially promising for both Africa and Ukraine.

UI: France advocated granting the African Union permanent membership status in the G20 and is now promoting the idea of African representation among the permanent members of the UN Security Council. What is Ukraine’s position on strengthening Africa’s representation in global institutions?

LA: Ukraine consistently supports reform of the UN Security Council. This is a complex and lengthy process that requires broad international consensus. If the African Union were to consider putting forward its candidacy for permanent representation, such an idea could certainly warrant discussion. At the same time, there are a number of legal nuances involved.

For example, the question arises as to whether voting rights in the UN Security Council can be granted to international organizations under the UN Charter and existing institutional framework.

Within the broader context of reforming the UN system, such issues could be discussed alongside the modernization of its institutions. For now, however, the discussion primarily concerns the aspirations of individual African states to obtain permanent seats on the UN Security Council.

UI: And finally, on a personal note: you returned to Ukraine a little more than six months ago after eight years of work in Africa. What do you think about most often, and what do you miss the most?

LA: You know, many people ask me what exactly I miss, but I do not really feel a sense of loss. I believe it is impossible to miss something that has permanently become part of who you are. Africa is an experience I did not leave behind there — I brought it back with me. Just like my love for Ukraine, it lives within me. When something becomes an inseparable part of your inner world, it can never truly be far away.

So I do not miss Africa — I continue to carry that experience within me and share it every day.

Sometimes I even think that perhaps Africa should be the one missing me instead (laughs).

Nadiia Yurchenko led this conversation, Kyiv

Photos by Yevhen Kotenko / Ukrinform