The war in Iran has been ongoing for nearly a month now. In that time, much has changed, and the world is struggling to adapt to rapidly unfolding and deeply unsettling developments. It is now evident that when Donald Trump launched this operation, he promised to rid humanity of what he called its primary nuclear and terrorist threat. Instead, the result has been a global energy crisis.

While political rhetoric and daily updates from the Persian Gulf—particularly from President Trump—dominate the headlines, the energy dimension of the crisis requires a more expert assessment. Beyond the obvious reality of rising and volatile prices, the structural implications for global energy markets demand deeper analysis.

Ivan Plachkov, a recognized authority in the energy sector, offers such a perspective. A two-time Minister of Energy of Ukraine (under different institutional titles), author of numerous scholarly works, and a widely respected expert, his assessments carry considerable weight.

Q: Let us consider the consequences of the war in the Persian Gulf for the energy sector and its broader impact on global energy markets. To begin, a recent warning from the International Energy Agency states: “The world is facing one of the deepest energy crises in history,” calling for radical conservation measures, including remote work and speed limits. Is this assessment justified?

A: Looking back, over the past fifty years the world has experienced five or six major energy crises. Each time instability emerges around the Persian Gulf, energy markets react sharply, with prices sometimes doubling or more. Yet these spikes have historically been followed by correction. For example, in 2008, oil prices peaked at around $146 per barrel before falling to approximately $30 as the market stabilized.

The oil market, in particular, is exceptionally sensitive. Its global nature means it directly affects virtually every sector of every economy, making it one of the most critical and reactive components of the international system.

Under normal conditions, around 20% of global oil consumption passes through the Strait of Hormuz. The current situation there is highly volatile, which is driving oil prices upward—already to around $100 per barrel. Prices may rise further, but such spikes are typically temporary. Why? Because diversification remains possible.

That said, transport and logistics systems adjust slowly. Supply chains must be reconfigured, tankers redirected to alternative routes and suppliers—such as Latin America—and this takes time. Like previous crises, this one will eventually pass. Much will depend on how the military confrontation between the United States, Israel, and Iran evolves. In time, a political arrangement is likely, after which markets will rebalance and suppliers will return. As before, equilibrium will be restored.

There have been many such crises. They are disruptive because rising prices for refined petroleum products feed directly into global inflation—particularly for Ukraine. We critically depend on these products for the military, for the sowing campaign, and for maintaining transport infrastructure—all while having no domestic refining capacity and relying entirely on imports. This is in stark contrast to the past, when Ukraine processed around five million tonnes of oil annually.

Q: The situation in the Persian Gulf has now reached a critical juncture. Trump’s ultimatums are nearing expiration, and a decisive phase is expected soon. Will the operation continue, potentially including a ground component, or will a negotiated settlement with Iran be reached—and if so, on what terms?

Market pressure is clearly mounting on all parties—the United States, Israel, and Iran—to de-escalate and restore stability. Ultimately, normalization requires either a decisive outcome on the battlefield or an agreement that ensures the safe passage of oil and gas tankers through the strait. Which scenario is more likely—military resolution or negotiation?

A: I am not a political analyst, so forecasting is difficult. However, my expectation is that the conflict will conclude within one to two months. The reason is straightforward: too many countries are incurring losses, and the conflict benefits almost no one—except, perhaps, Russia. A compromise will likely be found, the Strait of Hormuz reopened, and the situation will gradually stabilize.

Q: As you noted, up to 20% of global oil flows through the Strait of Hormuz. During the conflict, however, only 144 vessels have passed through the strait—whereas before the war, that volume would have transited in a single day. According to the International Maritime Organization, more than 2,000 vessels have accumulated in the Gulf, carrying over 20,000 seafarers, and the backlog continues to grow.

Formally, Iran maintains that the strait is open to all except the United States and Israel. In practice, however, the risks are so high—and the cost of a miscalculation so severe—that shipowners are unwilling to operate under such conditions. One proposed solution has been the use of naval escorts.

A: I don’t think this is a viable measure in modern warfare: escorts offer limited protection against drones, which are difficult to counter and remain a persistent threat. Moreover, Iran likely retains domestic drone production capabilities, meaning this risk is not temporary. At the same time, insurance premiums have surged, and in many cases coverage is no longer available at all.

If the conflict becomes protracted, the market will adapt through diversification. Alternative suppliers and routes will emerge, partially offsetting the disrupted flows through Hormuz. It may not be possible to fully replace the 20%, but compensating for 10–15% appears realistic.

That said, such adjustments cannot happen quickly. They require new agreements, contractual arrangements, logistical rerouting of tankers, transit time, and the reestablishment of insurance frameworks. This is a complex and resource-intensive process.

However, precedent exists. Europe has already undergone a similar transformation, significantly reducing its dependence on Russian energy. The European Union’s reliance on Russian gas once exceeded 50%; today it stands at roughly 10%. These were vast volumes, yet diversification was achieved within 12 to 18 months. A comparable adjustment is likely here: if the conflict persists, the market will respond, and diversification will follow.

As for naval escorts, they are not effective in modern warfare. No one will risk deploying expensive destroyers to protect commercial tankers, especially given the evolving nature of threats. The paradigm of warfare is changing—and with it, the logic of decision-making.

Q: Indeed, as long as there is a credible risk of attack from Iran, shipping companies will simply stay away. The risks are too high, and the cost of a single mistake is prohibitive. Discussions about naval escorts—initially floated by President Trump as a U.S. responsibility and later reframed as the responsibility of oil-importing countries—will only become meaningful after the conflict ends. In an active war zone, such measures are not viable.

At the same time, experts are discussing Iran’s proposal to introduce transit fees in exchange for safe passage through the Strait of Hormuz. Is this realistic?

A: I believe it is. Iran is likely to gradually increase the number of vessels allowed to transit. The conflict is creating serious economic strain not only globally but also domestically for Iran. No country can operate in isolation indefinitely—economic deterioration risks triggering internal instability, social unrest, or even political upheaval. The situation is complex and nonlinear, so Iran will likely maneuver—seeking compromise solutions, allowing limited flows, and engaging in negotiations. There are multiple possible scenarios, but the overall trajectory will be toward easing restrictions and restoring export capacity from the Persian Gulf.

Q: At present, the Gulf countries are bearing the greatest burden. Paradoxically, Iran is capturing some unexpected gains. Meanwhile, consumers of oil from the region—and the global market as a whole—are also suffering.

What can be done to mitigate the impact? One option under discussion is the release of strategic reserves, which all major economies maintain. Temporary demand reduction measures—such as those proposed by the International Energy Agency—are another avenue, alongside accelerated diversification.

A: Strategic reserves do exist. Within the European Union, for example, regulations require each member state to hold reserves equivalent to at least 90 days of consumption. The United States also maintains vast strategic oil reserves, as do other countries. However, these reserves will be deployed cautiously, given the uncertainty surrounding the duration of the crisis.

Energy conservation is essential. Consumption will be reduced as much as possible—and, in fact, it will decline naturally as prices rise. Higher prices inevitably force both households and industry to economize. At the same time, diversification will accelerate, with greater reliance on alternative energy sources—primarily electricity, including the expansion of battery-powered transport. Gas will also play a larger role as a substitute, particularly in industry. In effect, we will see a comprehensive set of measures aimed at mitigating the impact of oil shortages and price spikes.

I am convinced that each energy crisis triggers a renaissance in nuclear energy. We are already seeing countries revising their energy strategies. China, for example, is commissioning between 10 and 20 gigawatts of nuclear capacity annually—equivalent to roughly 10–12 large-scale reactors each year. Other countries are following suit: Poland is moving toward small modular reactors, among others. This points to an accelerated expansion of nuclear power, as countries seek to reduce dependence on hydrocarbons and secure more stable energy sources.

Q: Clearly, many countries are revisiting their energy strategies. But returning to oil—there are reports that in the United States scenarios are being discussed in which prices could rise to $200 per barrel. Is that realistic?

A: No. In my view, such a scenario is highly unlikely. Ahead of elections, any U.S. administration will do everything possible to prevent extreme price spikes. This includes releasing strategic reserves, increasing imports from alternative suppliers such as Venezuela, and using regulatory tools to stabilize the market. Politically, oil at $200 per barrel would be unacceptable—it would translate directly into inflation and voter dissatisfaction.

Current data already show how sensitive this issue is: fuel prices in the United States have surged, creating tangible pressure on households and becoming a political liability.

Q: In fact, President Trump’s approval rating is already below 40%, while fuel prices have risen by around 20%. And this is in a country that is largely energy self-sufficient and holds significant reserves. Trump came to power with the slogan “Drill, baby, drill!”—expand oil and gas production, revive industry. Yet the current situation has produced the opposite effect: instead of stabilizing markets, the outcome has been a global energy shock. Moreover, recent calls to roll back support for electric vehicles and renewable energy sources have further complicated the policy landscape.

A: I cannot fully explain President Trump’s actions—the logic is difficult to reconcile. But from a simplified perspective, he appears to have fallen into a strategic trap. His decisions often seem reactive, situational, and insufficiently grounded in long-term planning. This contributes to systemic instability at the global level.

That said, political feedback mechanisms will inevitably come into play. There is already growing pressure to de-escalate and adjust course. The immediate priority is to end the conflict as quickly as possible. After that, attention will likely shift back to fulfilling broader political commitments, including those related to the war in Ukraine, particularly in the run-up to elections.

If political self-preservation prevails, we may yet see a significant recalibration of policy. But I would stress—this is not a political forecast, only an observation from a broader systemic perspective.

Q: Of course, politicians—especially presidents—make decisions under pressure from voters, markets, international partners, and other leaders.

Returning to Europe: as you noted, the EU has largely reduced its dependence on Russian energy, though it still imports limited volumes of LNG and some oil. However, the current crisis reveals a new vulnerability—dependence has, to some extent, shifted toward liquefied natural gas, much of it originating from the Middle East. As a result, the issue has again become highly relevant for the European Union, which has even postponed final decisions on setting deadlines for a complete phase-out of Russian energy.

Is there a risk that this crisis could push the EU—or individual member states—toward renewed energy cooperation with Russia?

A: At this stage, the situation is not critical enough to force such a reversal. Doing so would mean abandoning the principles and policies Europe has pursued consistently over the past four years. In terms of natural gas, alternative supplies are available—primarily LNG from the United States, as well as pipeline gas from Norway and other sources. Oil can also be sourced elsewhere, including from Latin America.

A particularly sensitive issue for Ukraine remains the transit of oil through the Druzhba pipeline to Hungary and Slovakia—approximately 10 million tonnes annually. Currently, this transit has been suspended, while Hungary is simultaneously blocking financial support for Ukraine, making this a complex and politically charged issue that requires resolution.

Overall, I do not expect Europe to return to Russian gas and oil this year, particularly as it prepares for the next heating season. LNG remains a more uncertain variable, but the political will to avoid renewed dependence is strong. In principle, European countries have sufficient capacity to navigate the coming winter relatively smoothly. Ukraine’s situation, however, is more challenging.

Q: For Ukraine, the crisis is further complicated by the fact that Russia has emerged as a short-term beneficiary. First, the United States has temporarily lifted the embargo on Russian oil already in transit, allowing it to reach the market over a 30-day period. While volumes may be limited, the signal effect is significant. Second, rising global oil prices are generating substantial additional revenues for Russia—estimated at over $500 million per day. These figures are approximate but illustrate the scale of the windfall.

This is particularly frustrating given that Russia’s economy had only recently begun to feel the cumulative impact of sanctions, with budget deficits widening. As President Zelensky noted, Russia’s deficit reached $83 billion by the end of 2025, with an additional $19 billion carried into early 2026. Projections suggested a deficit of around $100 billion for 2026—an outcome that would have significantly constrained Russia’s capacity. That scenario now appears less likely.

At the same time, Ukraine’s Defense Forces are actively countering this dynamic. Drone strikes have forced Russia to suspend oil exports through its key ports—Primorsk and Ust-Luga—reducing export capacity by an estimated 40%. This is a substantial and effective response.

A: We must do our job—just as the military is doing. As for President Trump’s decision to ease certain sanctions, I would have been more surprised had he not helped Russia in this situation. His particular approach to Russia is well known: he tends to find various reasons and pretexts not to support it directly, but to reduce pressure. If the goal had been to trigger a full-scale economic crisis in Russia, this could have been achieved earlier through tighter sanctions.

Yes, Russia is currently benefiting from increased exports and substantial revenues. However, this is only part of the picture. Ukrainian forces continue to strike effectively, while Russian refineries are operating at reduced capacity due to sustained attacks. As a result, processing volumes are declining. In my view, Russia is already facing a serious crisis in its oil and gas sector: Gazprom is operating at a loss, and maintaining stable operations across the system is becoming increasingly difficult. Structural problems are also intensifying in the oil sector. There may be short-term stabilization, but overall trend remains negative—this will simply prolong the economic pressure on Russia rather than reverse it.

Q: We will see how the situation evolves. Ideally, it would end within 30 days, with sanctions fully restored.

Another question: what should Ukraine do in the context of a global energy crisis? On March 23, President Zelensky discussed potential gas supplies with the President of Mozambique. Meanwhile, Danylo Hetmantsev, head of the relevant parliamentary committee, has called for more active engagement with Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan to secure additional energy resources. How necessary is this?

A: It is not just necessary—it is critical. In fact, it has been necessary throughout the entire war. Ukraine has already demonstrated its ability to accumulate sufficient gas reserves to get through the winter. At current consumption levels, we need at least 13 billion cubic meters (bcm) of gas in storage, and ideally 14–14.5 bcm for greater reliability.

However, the situation is complicated by ongoing drone attacks on gas infrastructure—transmission systems, production facilities, and storage sites—which may reduce domestic output.

With sufficient domestic production, we can secure those 13 bcm. The remaining volumes must be sourced from European hubs and transported through all available import corridors.

Hungary has signaled potential restrictions on transit, but this is not critical given the relatively small volumes involved. Even if challenges arise with Slovakia, alternative routes remain available—particularly via Romania and the Trans-Balkan corridor, which could facilitate supplies of Azerbaijani gas. This is precisely why the President is emphasizing the need to deepen cooperation with these countries, enabling imports via Turkey and Romania into Ukraine.

Given the current condition of the gas transmission system, it is technically feasible to inject 13–13.5 bcm into storage. However, significant uncertainty remains due to the risk of further attacks. As a result, the outcome of the coming winter will depend on three key factors:

Weather severity – a colder winter would require more than 13 bcm; under average conditions, this level should be sufficient.

Intensity of attacks – both on transmission and distribution infrastructure.

Effectiveness of air defenses – the decisive factor in protecting all energy infrastructure, not only gas but also electricity.

Ukraine must do everything possible—and beyond—to safeguard its gas infrastructure.

Q: In other words, we have the experience, the technical capacity, access to markets, and reliable partners. But the key factor remains Ukraine’s Defense Forces, which ensure the protection of critical infrastructure and make it possible not only to import the necessary energy resources but also to store and use them effectively.

And finally: when the war in Iran ends, will oil prices return to pre-war levels, as has happened before?

A: Basically, yes—oil prices are inherently cyclical. As I noted, they have fluctuated dramatically in the past, from $140 down to $30 per barrel. Before the current crisis, prices were in the range of $60–70. Crucially, oil pricing is heavily influenced by political decisions—particularly those of OPEC and the United States.

I recall discussions at the International Energy Agency in Paris, where a senior official remarked that oil prices have effectively become an instrument of policy. If OPEC increases production by even 5–10%—which it is fully capable of doing—prices can fall sharply. Conversely, if the United States signals plans to purchase 200–300 million barrels for its strategic reserves, prices will rise immediately. In other words, market dynamics are shaped as much by expectations and political signaling as by physical supply.

Gas markets function in a similar way, though with greater inertia due to the scale of storage infrastructure. Oil markets, by contrast, are more reactive. The U.S. Strategic Petroleum Reserve remains the single most influential buffer in the system; its sheer scale—combined with limited transparency—allows the United States to shape market expectations simply by announcing purchases or pauses.

Looking ahead, the energy sector will undergo structural transformation. We will see expansion in gas and electricity, but the long-term trajectory points toward nuclear energy and hydrogen. Hydrogen is likely to play a growing role across transport—rail, maritime, and aviation—while nuclear power, both large-scale and small modular reactors, will form the backbone of energy systems by the mid-21st century.

Q: Hopefully, each crisis makes the world not only more resilient, but also more prudent. Thank you for this important and timely conversation. The current crisis will eventually pass—but the war in Ukraine will not end with it. We must therefore clearly understand what lies ahead and where our strategic anchors are, particularly in global energy markets.

Ihor Dolhov led this conversation

The conversation can be watched in full on Ukrinform’s YouTube channel

Photo via Ivan Plachkov’s Facebook page