The April Followers of the Cruiser Moskva

April 2026 became one of the most successful months of the war for Ukraine’s Defense Forces in terms of strikes against Russia’s most expensive and technologically sophisticated military assets. Over the course of the month, Ukrainian forces confirmed the destruction of at least 25 surface-to-air missile systems and related components, around fifteen radar systems, seven aircraft, two helicopters, and five naval vessels.

Equally significant was the expanding geography of these strikes. Attacks on the Russian army’s high-value targets were no longer confined to the front line or the immediate combat zone. In April, Ukrainian long-range weapons increasingly reached deep into Russian territory, hitting targets not only in occupied Crimea, but also in the Belgorod, Rostov, Bryansk, Voronezh, and even Chelyabinsk regions.

These operations demonstrated more than a series of isolated successful raids. What emerged over the past month was a systematic campaign aimed at dismantling the core elements of Russia’s military-industrial and air-defense capabilities — the very systems long portrayed by Kremlin propaganda as untouchable “superweapons.”

How this became possible, and why Russia’s most prized military assets are proving increasingly vulnerable, is the focus of Ukrinform’s latest review of the enemy’s most painful losses over the past month.

NOT JUST “ANOTHER DRONE”

April did not begin in particularly “resort-like” fashion for the Russians in occupied Crimea. On the night following April Fool’s Day, Ukrainian long-range drones struck the Kirovske airfield, where Russia’s newest Orion strike-reconnaissance UAVs were stationed. According to Ukraine’s Unmanned Systems Forces and military intelligence (HUR), the attack destroyed four drones of this type, a transport An-72P aircraft, and a Soviet-era P-37 “Mech” radar system.

The most notable aspect of the strike was the destruction of the Orions themselves. These UAVs are among the few Russian-made MALE-class systems — medium-altitude, long-endurance drones broadly comparable to the American MQ-1 Predator. An Orion can remain airborne for up to 24 hours, operate at a distance of 250–300 kilometers, and carry up to 250 kilograms of payload, including guided bombs and missiles.

In other words, this was not merely the loss of several conventional drones. The Orion has played an important role in Russian operations in southern Ukraine, conducting reconnaissance missions, adjusting missile strikes, and tracking Ukrainian logistics routes. Its main advantage lies in its ability to patrol over the Black Sea or rear areas behind the frontline for hours while providing real-time targeting data.

The cost of a single system is estimated at $4–5 million. Yet Russia’s main problem is not financial, but industrial. Moscow has still failed to establish large-scale production of these UAVs. The Orions are manufactured by the company Kronshtadt, which in recent years has struggled with shortages of electronic components and repeated Ukrainian strikes against its production facilities in Dubna, near Moscow.

One such attack took place on May 28, 2025, when drones operated by Ukraine’s Special Operations Forces and the Security Service of Ukraine struck a Kronshtadt plant. At least eight impacts and a major fire were reported. A second strike followed on July 11. Against this backdrop, the company finished 2025 with losses totaling 4.6 billion rubles and faced more than 150 lawsuits over failed contracts. By the spring of 2026, Kronshtadt had effectively approached bankruptcy. At the end of April, the company replaced its CEO and launched an emergency restructuring effort.

As a result, the destruction of four Orions at once represents far more than another $20 million in battlefield losses. More importantly, it reduces Russia’s long-range aerial surveillance capabilities over the southern theater of war and strikes at a weapons program that Moscow is currently unable to replenish quickly.

FORECASTS FOR THE BEACH SEASON

Particular attention should also be given to the strike against the An-72P patrol aircraft — a specialized modification of the An-72 transport plane originally developed for border guard roles. Russia uses these aircraft to patrol maritime areas, monitor coastlines, and search for uncrewed surface vessels operating in the Black Sea.

Unlike the baseline transport variant, the An-72P also possesses strike capabilities. It can be equipped with a container-mounted 23 mm GSh-23L cannon, carry pods loaded with S-5 unguided rockets, and deploy FAB-100 aerial bombs. In addition, the aircraft is fitted with an optical-television surveillance system designed for detecting and engaging maritime targets at night.

For Russian aviation, the An-72P is a relatively rare platform. Russia’s Aerospace Forces and the FSB Border Service together operate no more than several dozen of these aircraft. The estimated value of a single plane exceeds $50 million.

The destruction of the P-37 “Mech” radar station was equally revealing. Despite its Soviet-era origins, the system is still used by Russia to cover secondary air-defense sectors. The radar is capable of detecting aerial targets at ranges of up to 300–350 kilometers and transmitting targeting data to command posts.

What matters here is not only the loss of another radar station, but what its deployment says about the broader state of Russia’s air-defense network. The war increasingly demonstrates that after the systematic destruction of more modern systems such as Nebo-M and Podlyot, the Russians are facing growing shortages of contemporary radar equipment. As a result, Moscow is being forced to return systems designed in the 1970s to active service.

That is hardly reassuring news for those residents of the Russian “swamps” who once hoped to spend the summer holiday season on the beaches of occupied Crimea.

“TORS” AT THE TOP

The “arrivals” at Kirovske certainly added a certain flavor of “greatness” to the Russian military — albeit at a very high price — but they marked only the beginning of the month’s losses.

On the night of April 3, Ukrainian drones destroyed a Buk-M1 air-defense system near Liubymivka in occupied Luhansk region. The following day, several more critical elements of Russia’s air-defense network came under attack: a multifunctional radar belonging to an S-400 system in Feodosia, a Tor air-defense system near Zachativka in Donetsk region, and a ZU-23-2 anti-aircraft gun mounted on an MT-LB chassis near Lozivskyi in Luhansk region.

The pattern was already becoming evident. Ukrainian forces were no longer targeting isolated pieces of equipment, but systematically degrading the layered structure of Russia’s air-defense architecture — from long-range detection systems to short-range tactical protection assets.

Judging by a post from Unmanned Systems Forces commander Robert “Magyar” Browdy, the Russians in Feodosia likely lost a 91N6E “Big Bird” radar — the primary surveillance radar of the S-400 Triumf air-defense system. It is this station that detects aerodynamic and ballistic targets at distances of several hundred kilometers, simultaneously tracks dozens of objects, and transmits targeting data to other components of the complex. In practical terms, it functions as the “eyes and brain” of an entire S-400 regiment.

The estimated value of a 91N6E radar together with a 55K6E command-and-control post ranges from $80 million to $110 million. These figures are based on Russian export contracts with India, Turkey, and China, since the radar itself is not sold separately on the international market.

For years, Moscow promoted the S-400 as an “impenetrable shield” and the crown jewel of Russia’s defense industry exports. Yet the war against Ukraine has demonstrated that even the much-advertised Triumf systems can be successfully penetrated and disabled by Ukrainian drones.

The April statistics concerning Tor systems are particularly revealing. The Tor-M2 air-defense system destroyed near Zachativka on April 4 became the first of ten systems from the Tor family lost by Russia over the course of the month.

The Tor-M1 and Tor-M2 complexes form the backbone of Russia’s short-range air-defense network. They are widely used to intercept Ukrainian UAVs, HIMARS rockets, aircraft, and cruise missiles. For this reason, the Russian command concentrates Tor systems along the most critical sectors of the front.

The results of this strategy became clearly visible in April’s battlefield statistics. Among the Russian air-defense systems destroyed by Ukraine’s Defense Forces, Tor complexes appeared more frequently than any other category, confidently taking first place among the failures of Russia’s supposedly “unmatched” weapons systems.

TECHNICAL DINOSAURS AND THE REST OF THE ZOO

The destruction on April 4 of a ZU-23-2 anti-aircraft gun mounted on an MT-LB chassis illustrates another increasingly visible trend within the Russian military: the growing reliance on improvised air-defense solutions. Soviet-era 23 mm anti-aircraft guns are now being mass-installed on tractors, trucks, and armored vehicles in an attempt to counter Ukrainian drones.

In practice, one of the world’s largest armies is being forced ever deeper into “field modernization” — reviving weapons systems dating back to the era of “Tsar Pea” and supplementing them with similarly improvised battlefield innovations.

Further confirmation of this reality appeared in a General Staff report published on April 6, which mentioned a strike on a Be-12 amphibious aircraft near Kacha in occupied Crimea.

Once again, the target was effectively a museum exhibit: a Soviet anti-submarine amphibious aircraft designed in the 1960s. Yet due to shortages of modern naval aviation assets, Russia continues to employ the Be-12 for Black Sea patrol missions, the search for Ukrainian naval drones, and coastal surveillance operations.

By April 10, the number of destroyed elements of Russia’s air-defense network had already reached eleven. On that day, Ukrainian drones destroyed another Tor-M1 near Mariupol and struck a Pantsir-S1 gun-missile air-defense system near Zuhres.

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The pattern was becoming increasingly difficult to ignore. Alongside the destruction of modern systems such as the S-400, Tor, and Pantsir, the Russians were simultaneously being forced to rely on equipment developed decades ago to compensate for mounting battlefield losses. The contrast between propaganda narratives about “next-generation” weapons and the reality of resurrected Soviet-era platforms was becoming ever more striking.

The same contradiction would soon become evident in the fate of another supposedly advanced Russian system — the Buk-M3 air-defense complex.

At the same time, the systematic destruction of Russian radar systems continued across multiple sectors of the front. One of the most significant episodes occurred on April 7, when Ukrainian forces struck a Zoopark-1M counter-battery radar alongside a Tor-M2 system in Donetsk region and a Buk-M3 air-defense complex in Zaporizhzhia region.

The Zoopark-1M is one of the key components of Russia’s counter-battery warfare capabilities. The system is specifically designed to calculate the trajectory of incoming shells or rockets within seconds and determine the firing positions of Ukrainian artillery, mortars, and multiple-launch rocket systems. In essence, it functions as an artillery “hunter” — a critically important asset in modern battlefield warfare.

The cost of a single Zoopark-1M system is estimated at roughly $25 million, while production remains limited due to chronic shortages of electronic components and other critical parts. As a result, the Russian military is increasingly forced to redeploy these radars between different sectors of the front, effectively patching holes in its surveillance network.

Consequently, the destruction of every Zoopark system represents far more than a localized tactical loss. Each strike weakens Russia’s overall counter-battery architecture, forcing the command to expose other sectors or stretch already limited resources even further.

The broader pattern was becoming increasingly clear: Ukraine was not simply destroying individual pieces of equipment, but methodically eroding the interconnected systems that enable the Russian army to detect, track, coordinate, and respond on the battlefield.

BLINDED SKIES

By mid-April, Ukrainian drones had begun systematically targeting key nodes of Russia’s radar coverage network.

On the fourth anniversary of the “reformatting” of the missile cruiser Moskva into a submarine, the AFU General Staff reported strikes against a Nebo-U radar in Feodosia and a Kasta-2E airspace surveillance radar in Russia’s Belgorod region.

The Kasta-2E is a modern low-altitude surveillance radar designed to detect aerial targets even under conditions of heavy electronic interference and jamming. Depending on its configuration, the value of a single system is estimated at roughly $60 million.

An even more painful blow for the Russians was the destruction of a Nebo-U radar. This is one of the few long-range strategic radar systems capable of monitoring airspace across hundreds of kilometers and providing early warning against a wide range of aerial threats. The estimated value of the complex approaches $100 million.

Yet the main problem for Russia is not even the financial cost. The real issue is the extremely limited number of such systems available. Unlike tactical air-defense assets, strategic radars cannot be quickly replaced, mass-produced, or easily redeployed without weakening coverage in other regions.

As a result, every successful strike against systems such as Nebo-U or Kasta-2E gradually creates new blind zones within Russia’s air-defense architecture. The cumulative effect of these attacks is becoming increasingly apparent: Ukraine is not merely reducing the number of Russian weapons systems, but steadily degrading Moscow’s ability to see, track, and control the airspace over both occupied territories and parts of Russia itself.

According to military analysts, during the peak production period between 2006 and 2011, Russian industry manufactured as few as 17 Nebo-U radar systems. In total, before the start of the full-scale war, Russia likely possessed no more than 25–35 such stations, distributed among military districts to provide strategic coverage of the country’s borders.

Later, Moscow shifted toward the upgraded Niobiy and Nebo-M systems, while the original Nebo-U effectively became a scarce and difficult-to-replace asset.

The following day, April 15, Ukrainian strikes reached two more critical radar systems: a 96L6 radar belonging to an S-400 air-defense complex in Zaporizhzhia region and a Nebo-SVU radar in occupied Crimea.

The 96L6 radar is one of the key elements of the S-400 system. If the above mentioned 91N6E functions as the system’s “eyes,” then the 96L6 effectively performs target tracking and missile guidance functions. The destruction of this radar means that an entire S-400 battalion temporarily loses its combat engagement capability. The estimated export value of the station reaches up to $60 million.

The Nebo-SVU, meanwhile, is a three-coordinate radar station developed for the ground forces and designed to detect and track aerodynamic targets under difficult electronic warfare conditions. Although less publicized than the S-400 family of radars, it remains an important component of Russia’s layered air-defense network.

Just two days later, on April 17, the General Staff confirmed strikes against two additional modern radar systems: a Nebo-M radar in Russia’s Belgorod region and a Podlyot radar in Rostov region.

The Nebo-M represents the next generation of the Nebo family and belongs to Russia’s most advanced class of multi-band radar systems. These complexes are used for strategic early warning, aircraft tracking, and the integration of data into unified air-defense command networks.

The Podlyot performs another critically important role — detecting cruise missiles and drones flying at low altitudes while attempting to mask themselves behind terrain features. This radar is also one of Russia’s relatively recent developments, entering service only after 2015. The estimated value of the system is approximately $5 million.

Taken together, these strikes amounted to the systematic “blinding” of entire sectors of Russia’s air-defense architecture. And it was precisely this gradual erosion of radar coverage that later enabled Ukrainian drones to strike not only frontline targets more effectively, but also strategic facilities deep inside Russia and occupied Crimea.

WHY AREN’T THE ISKANDERS LAUGHING?

Confirmation of the Ukrainian military’s new capabilities did not take long to arrive. On April 16, Ukraine’s Defense Forces simultaneously struck three air defense systems — a Pantsir-S1 in Feodosia, an Osa-AK near Vodiane, and a Buk system near Bahativka. However, the primary targets that day were the deployment area of Bastion coastal missile systems near Sevastopol and two bases of Iskander operational-tactical missile systems near Mizhhiria and Kurortne, also in occupied Crimea.

The Iskander system is one of Russia’s principal instruments for long-range strikes. These are the very complexes regularly used to launch ballistic missiles against Ukrainian cities, energy infrastructure, and rear-area facilities. Therefore, the very fact that their deployment sites in Crimea were successfully struck demonstrated something increasingly obvious: Russian air defenses no longer guarantee protection from Ukrainian deep-strike operations, even for elements of Russia’s strategic strike architecture.

On April 18, Ukrainian drones destroyed a TOS-1A Solntsepyok heavy flamethrower system in Zaporizhzhia region — one of Russia’s most feared thermobaric weapons systems. Depending on its configuration, the value of such a vehicle is estimated at between $6.5 million and $15 million.

At the end of the month, yet another high-value system came under attack — a Tornado-S multiple-launch rocket system struck in Melitopol on the night of April 27. This is Russia’s most advanced 300 mm rocket artillery system, an extensively modernized version of the Smerch capable of using precision-guided munitions with satellite navigation. The value of a single launcher exceeds $15 million.

On April 20, Ukrainian drones even struck a Tor-M2KM shipborne air defense module, which the Russians had redeployed to land positions near Melitopol. As one might guess, the very use of a “naval” version of the system to protect rear ground areas is itself revealing evidence that the so-called “second army of the world” is now simply running short of standard land-based air defense assets.

At the same time, near Novooleksandrivka, Ukrainian forces destroyed a 50N6A multifunctional radar belonging to the S-350 Vityaz air defense system. This station serves as the “eyes” of the complex, responsible for target detection, tracking, and missile guidance. Its estimated value is between $40 million and $50 million.

Separately, in occupied Sevastopol, Ukrainian intelligence operatives destroyed a Podlyot-K1 radar worth approximately $5 million.

On April 23, Ukrainian UAV crews eliminated three air defense systems at once — two Tor-M2 systems and one Osa system in occupied parts of Donetsk and Zaporizhzhia regions. Another Tor-M2 was later struck inside Russia’s Bryansk region.

By this stage, the pattern had become unmistakable. Ukraine was no longer conducting sporadic raids against isolated targets, but systematically dismantling the layered structure of Russia’s air-defense and strike architecture across the entire theater of war — from Crimea to the Russian border regions themselves.

At the same time, the General Staff confirmed a strike against a P-18 radar near Yevpatoria. Despite their considerable age, these Soviet-era meter-band radars are still actively used by Russia to detect low-observable aerial targets and drones.

The following day, Ukrainian strikes hit a Kasta-2E1 radar in Melitopol and a Pantsir-S1 gun-missile air-defense system in Mariupol. A standard two-coordinate Kasta radar is estimated to cost approximately $15–20 million — roughly comparable to the value of a Pantsir system.

On April 29, Unmanned Systems Forces commander Robert Browdy reported the destruction of yet another Tor-M2 system, along with a modernized 39N6 Kasta-2E2 three-coordinate radar in Russia’s Belgorod region. The estimated value of such a station exceeds $60 million. At the same time, reports emerged of a strike against a radar installation operated by a radio-radar battalion on Mount Ai-Petri in occupied Crimea.

THE SEA IS STIRRING… FIVE!

Amid April’s ongoing “air-defense-ocide,” Ukrainian forces also destroyed an MR-10M1 Mys-M1 coastal mobile radar. Russian forces used this X-band radar station to detect surface vessels and small aerial targets, particularly those flying at low altitudes.

The system transmitted targeting data to Bal and Bastion coastal missile complexes. However, following yet another wave of Ukrainian strikes in Crimea, the toxic radar — valued at approximately $20 million — permanently ceased “irradiating” its surroundings.

At the same time, Ukrainian attacks delivered painful blows to several other high-value Russian assets. Among them were the large landing ships Yamal and Nikolai Filchenkov, the intelligence-gathering vessel Ivan Khurs, and a MiG-31 fighter aircraft at Belbek airfield.

The case of the Ivan Khurs deserves particular attention. This is not merely another naval vessel, but one of the key electronic intelligence assets of Russia’s Black Sea Fleet. The Project 18280 ship is designed for signals interception, electronic intelligence gathering, operational support, and monitoring NATO activity in the Black Sea region.

In effect, the Ivan Khurs functions as a floating electronic warfare and surveillance platform packed with highly classified systems. Owing to its sophisticated radar and intelligence equipment, various estimates place its value between $60 million and more than $80 million.

The cumulative effect of these strikes was becoming increasingly apparent even at sea. Ukraine was steadily eroding not only Russia’s frontline combat capabilities, but also the reconnaissance, surveillance, targeting, and command infrastructure that enables the Black Sea Fleet to operate effectively.Початок форми

The Project 775 large landing ship Yamal, commissioned in 1988, is a vessel measuring 112.5 meters in length and capable of transporting up to 500 tons, including armored vehicles and amphibious assault troops. The estimated value of the ship exceeds $80 million.

Meanwhile, the older Project 1171 large landing ship Nikolai Filchenkov, commissioned in 1975, can carry up to 1,000 tons of cargo. Despite its age, the vessel also represents a highly valuable naval asset, with an estimated worth exceeding $70 million.

In addition, during the final ten days of April, a Russian Project 22460 patrol ship belonging to the FSB Border Service was struck in Sevastopol, with confirmed damage to its combat bridge. The market value of a standard Project 22460 Okhotnik-class patrol vessel is estimated at approximately $40–45 million — equivalent to roughly 2.5 billion rubles under early Russian state contracts.

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Even the current flagship of Russia’s naval grouping in the Black Sea, the frigate Admiral Makarov, failed to avoid damage. On the night of April 6, during a Ukrainian strike on the Sheskharis oil terminal in the port of Novorossiysk, the successor to the cruiser Moskva reportedly received an unwelcome “delivery” from two strike UAVs.

A “NEGATIVE” FLIGHT

Russian aviation also suffered substantial losses over the course of the month. In addition to the above mentioned An-72P and Be-12 aircraft, on April 26 a MiG-31 fighter — likely a carrier platform for Kinzhal hypersonic missiles — was struck at Belbek airfield in occupied Crimea.

On April 29, Ukraine’s Unmanned Systems Forces reported the destruction of Mi-28 and Mi-17 helicopters in Russia’s Voronezh region, approximately 150 kilometers from the frontline. Importantly, this was not a frontline airfield, but a temporary operational staging area where the helicopters were undergoing refueling and maintenance between combat sorties.

The Mi-28 is one of Russia’s primary attack helicopters and is actively used for nighttime strike missions, anti-tank guided missile launches, unguided rocket attacks, and assaults against Ukrainian positions. The Mi-17, meanwhile, serves as a critical transport helicopter used for logistics, troop deployments, casualty evacuation, and supply operations.

Perhaps the most illustrative aviation episode of April was the strike against the Shagol airbase in Chelyabinsk. According to Ukraine’s Unmanned Systems Forces, the April 25 attack put two Su-57 fighters, one Su-34, and another aircraft from the Su family out of action. The latter was reportedly blown apart so completely that it proved impossible to determine the exact modification from the remains left at the burn site.

What makes this episode particularly remarkable is geography: Chelyabinsk lies roughly 1,700 kilometers from the Ukrainian border.

And once again, the issue extends far beyond the sheer financial cost of the losses, although that alone is substantial. The Su-34, valued at approximately $35–50 million, serves as Russia’s principal frontline fighter-bomber and has become one of the key instruments of Russian aerial pressure along the front line. Ukraine’s Defense Forces have destroyed these aircraft before.

But the reported disabling of two Su-57s belongs to an entirely different category of losses within the growing pantheon of neutralized Russian “wonder weapons.”

The Su-57 remains Russia’s most advanced and expensive serially produced combat aircraft — the flagship prestige project of the Russian defense industry and one of the very few platforms Moscow attempts to present as a true fifth-generation fighter. For years, the Kremlin showcased the Su-57 at international air shows as a symbol of technological superiority and as Russia’s answer to the American Lockheed Martin F-35 Lightning II.

And then reality intervened.

The symbolic impact of the strike may ultimately prove even more painful than the material losses themselves. The Su-57 program has long suffered from limited production rates, technological bottlenecks, sanctions-related component shortages, and chronic delays. Russia possesses only a small number of operational aircraft of this type, meaning that every damaged or destroyed airframe immediately becomes a strategic and reputational problem.

Moreover, the strike on Shagol demonstrated something else that would have seemed almost unthinkable just a few years ago: Ukrainian drones are now capable of threatening not only tactical aviation near the front line, but also Russia’s most prestigious military assets deep inside the country’s strategic rear.

Ivan Stupak, Kyiv

Photos are representative from publicly available sources