One Month of War with Iran: The Collapse of Classical Victory Paradigms

For more than a month now, the Middle East has been caught in escalating, large-scale military turbulence. The campaign by the United States and Israel against Iran—initially conceived as a limited operation with ostensibly clear objectives—has rapidly evolved into a complex, multi-layered crisis with unpredictable dynamics. Its repercussions are already extending far beyond the region, affecting everything from global energy markets to the strategic calculations of major powers.

The first weeks of fighting have exposed a defining feature of modern warfare: a widening gap between military outcomes and their political translation. Despite the technological superiority of the United States and Israel, the absence of a coherent endgame has turned even tactical successes into elements of a protracted and highly uncertain process. Each new escalation raises the stakes without bringing a resolution any closer.

At the same time, the conflict is catalyzing broader geopolitical shifts. Washington’s position is under growing strain; Russia is gaining additional room for maneuver; China is balancing economic pragmatism against strategic considerations; and Ukraine is operating in an increasingly volatile external environment, even as it seeks diplomatic openings. The world is gradually entering a phase in which traditional notions of victory are losing relevance, and conflicts are increasingly defined by attrition rather than decisive outcomes.

In this context, Ukrinform turn to expert assessments to examine the interim results of the war, analyze its impact on the global balance of power, and outline the scenarios likely to shape the coming weeks.

INTERIM MILITARY AND POLITICAL ASSESSMENT

Analyzing the current situation, political scientist Volodymyr Fesenko underscores the absence of any quick or clear solutions. In his view, “the interim results of this campaign amount to the fact that the United States has become drawn into a war with entirely uncertain timelines and strategic prospects.” He also highlights the macroeconomic reverberations of the conflict, noting that “this war has already triggered destabilizing trends in global oil and gas markets, and so far no one sees a clear or realistic scenario for its rapid conclusion—regardless of how optimistic Trump’s statements may be.”

A similar assessment—though with a more pronounced focus on the dichotomy between military effectiveness and diplomatic outcomes—is offered by political scientist Ihor Reiterovych. He argues that the campaign is unfolding in a fundamentally paradoxical manner:

“Washington and Tel Aviv are demonstrating undeniable technological superiority, delivering devastating strikes against Iran’s military infrastructure; however, this military effectiveness is not translating into a coherent political outcome, which is becoming increasingly complex and ambiguous… Put simply, from a purely military-technical perspective, the interim results for the United States and Israel can be considered successful. These are large-scale strikes that have significantly degraded Iran’s capacity to conduct active combat operations. In effect, its ability to function as a full-fledged regional threat has been substantially weakened.”

At the same time, the expert adds an important caveat: “This does not mean that Iran has ceased to be a factor of instability—it still retains the capacity to influence the regional situation, albeit in a more limited and targeted manner. In this sense, one can speak of a certain degree of military success for the United States and its allies.”

Trump and Netanyahu

However, it is precisely the political dimension that has become the “bottleneck” in which military achievements are stalling. Reiterovych emphasizes that the head of the White House clearly expected a different—faster and more straightforward—trajectory. “Instead, he has found himself in a situation where no clear exit strategy is visible,” the political scientist notes.

He captures this trap succinctly:

“This is a case where ‘getting into the situation’ proved far easier than figuring out how to exit it with minimal reputational losses. (…) For Israel, the political consequences of this war are more or less predictable; for the United States, they are not—and that is the key problem. Trump’s public statements only underscore that he is not fully prepared for the reality he now faces. It appears he currently lacks a clear plan for minimizing political risks. While the situation may still look manageable in military terms, politically it is close to critical—and, importantly, highly unpredictable.”

At the same time, the White House retains tools for informational maneuvering:

“Formally, Trump can go before the press at any moment and declare that all objectives have been achieved. However, without a convincing political foundation, such a statement will remain empty rhetoric—neither the international community nor the American electorate will believe it. It appears that Washington is now engaged less in securing victory than in managing its own losses.”

As for next steps, Ihor Reiterovych leans toward a potential force-based scenario:

“The deadline Trump gave Iran—until April 6—does not appear accidental. If we correlate it with the movement of U.S. military assets, including transport aviation and airborne units, this roughly corresponds to the time required to redeploy them to the region… In this context, there are increasing indications that the White House may be considering a limited operation—for example, around the strategically significant Kharg Island. The logic is likely straightforward: deprive Iran of critical oil infrastructure and thereby force it into concessions. Therefore, one cannot rule out that Trump may go all in. In a ‘make-or-break’ logic, he could opt for escalation… In that case, the conflict would enter a qualitatively different phase—with higher stakes and far less predictable consequences.”

WHAT HAS CHANGED—AND IS CHANGING—FOR THE U.S., CHINA, RUSSIA, AND UKRAINE?

The geopolitical shock triggered by the campaign in the Persian Gulf has set off a chain reaction, directly affecting the interests of major global actors, including Ukraine.

Analyzing the U.S. position, Volodymyr Fesenko points to a marked deterioration. Washington is facing a classic boomerang effect, in which foreign policy ambitions rebound against the domestic economy.

“In the United States, gasoline and diesel prices are rising rapidly, and with that—criticism of Trump, even from segments of his own support base. His approval ratings are also declining. And despite his optimistic rhetoric, there are still no clear military successes for the U.S. in the confrontation with Iran, nor any tangible progress in peace negotiations,” the political scientist argues.

Moreover, the war has disrupted Washington’s diplomatic agenda:

“One of the consequences of the Iran war for the United States has been the postponement of Trump’s planned visit to China until mid-May. In any case, his position ahead of this visit will be weakened.”

Fesenko’s overall assessment of America’s global standing as a result of the conflict is unequivocal:

“It has deteriorated. Problems in U.S. relations with European countries have either emerged or intensified; trust in America—and in its security guarantees—has declined among Arab allies, and likely among U.S. partners in other regions as well.”

For China, the situation is markedly ambivalent. As Volodymyr Fesenko explains, Beijing is facing a serious economic challenge due to disruptions in Persian Gulf logistics, from which it previously sourced up to half of its crude oil imports (45–55%).

“Due to hostilities and the partial blocking of the Strait of Hormuz, maritime exports from the region to China have decreased by 70–80%,” the analyst notes. “Russia has effectively become China’s primary oil supplier. According to unofficial data, deliveries have increased to 2–3 million barrels per day. (…) However, oil prices have surged sharply, and this is currently the main problem for China.”

As a result, a prolonged conflict in the Middle East poses a significant economic risk for Beijing—particularly if rising energy prices trigger a broader global recession. Politically, however, China stands to benefit from the weakening of U.S. global influence and from Washington’s setbacks in the confrontation with Iran.

Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin

According to Ihor Reiterovych, China now finds itself in a strategic bind—caught between its partnership with Iran, a key element of the anti-Western axis, and its critical dependence on stable energy prices.

“Any turbulence in oil markets directly impacts the Chinese economy. China has effectively been forced to choose between political expediency and economic reality. As a result, its position is highly pragmatic: not to side decisively with either party, but to push for the fastest possible de-escalation by any means. The priority is simple—to end the conflict and stabilize the markets,” the political scientist explains.

The Russian Federation, by contrast, has emerged as perhaps the only clear economic beneficiary of the first month of the war. Experts largely agree that Moscow has secured a situational windfall.

Volodymyr Fesenko characterizes this as a temporary “jackpot,” driven by the easing of secondary U.S. sanctions on Russian oil, a sharp rise in global energy prices, and the resulting surge in revenues—used both to finance its war against Ukraine and to offset budget deficits. By his estimates, Russia earned an additional $12–15 billion in just the first month of escalation.

At the same time, Fesenko notes that Moscow must maneuver carefully, seeking to balance its relations with Iran, Arab states, and Israel simultaneously.

Commenting on the Russian factor, Ihor Reiterovych highlights a fundamental divergence of interests between Moscow and Beijing. In his view, Russia has a strong incentive to prolong instability in the Middle East in order to sustain high oil prices, whereas China, by contrast, is fundamentally oriented toward stability. “This divergence of interests partly constrains Russia. It cannot act with complete freedom or confidence, as it must take Beijing’s position into account. In this sense, for Ukraine this serves as a restraining factor: such an asymmetry between two key players prevents Russia from fully ‘untying its hands,’” the political scientist emphasizes.

As for Ukraine, the situation creates a complex balance between risks and emerging opportunities. Volodymyr Fesenko cautions:

“For Ukraine, a prolonged conflict in the Middle East creates risks related to the supply of interceptor missiles for Patriot air defense systems, diverts attention from the Russia–Ukraine war and ongoing peace negotiations, and is also highly unfavorable given the substantial economic gains Russia is receiving.”

At the same time, he notes that Kyiv has demonstrated a high degree of agency by offering Gulf states its unique expertise in countering Iranian drones—an initiative that has already translated into new security agreements.

Assessing Ukraine’s broader prospects, Ihor Reiterovych argues that the country is navigating this phase with relative stability and minimal direct losses.

“There has been no critical disruption in weapons supplies—but largely because those supplies were already limited,” he notes.

Although the shift of global attention is undeniable, Ukraine has prior experience operating under such conditions. The analyst sees a positive dynamic in Kyiv’s proactive search for new opportunities:

“In particular, engagement with Persian Gulf countries has intensified—through meetings, agreements, and the exploration of new formats of cooperation. This can be seen as a net positive: even amid crisis, Kyiv is actively seeking additional points of support.”

At the same time, Reiterovych underscores Ukraine’s response to Russia’s energy windfalls:

“Ukraine is attempting to offset this primarily through strikes on Russian oil infrastructure—and, by all indications, quite effectively. So much so that some international partners have already begun signaling a preference to reduce the intensity of such attacks… In this context, Kyiv’s approach appears rational: if changes in our behavior are expected, there must be a clear answer to the question—what do we receive in return?”

WHO IS WINNING—AND IS THERE A WINNER AT ALL?

Identifying a winner in a conflict characterized by a high degree of systemic uncertainty is inherently problematic. Experts largely agree that classical criteria of victory are no longer applicable.

Ihor Reiterovych emphasizes:

“From a military-technical standpoint, the advantage clearly lies with the United States and Israel—this is a fact.”

However, he immediately turns to historical analogies, noting that while the U.S. military has consistently demonstrated an ability to win battles, it has faced persistent difficulties in converting those victories into sustainable political outcomes.

“If we look at the post–Korean War period, the question inevitably arises: where is the line between military success and political result? Even in the case of the Iraq War, formal military victory did not translate into a stable political outcome. In the current situation, the same logic is repeating itself,” the political scientist observes.

Outlining the situation surrounding Israel, Reiterovych argues that Tel Aviv currently appears to be the primary beneficiary. Israel is effectively pursuing its core objective—critically weakening Iran’s regime and buying strategic time—while operating within a framework in which its political risks are significantly lower than those faced by the United States.

Analyzing Iran’s “strategy of victory,” the political scientist highlights the specific way in which autocracies interpret outcomes. For the ayatollah regime, the mere fact of survival under sustained strikes by the world’s most powerful military is itself tantamount to success.

“Iran will say: we endured—therefore, we won. The United States will say: we set the adversary back by years—therefore, we achieved our objective. And formally, both positions will have their own internal logic,” Reiterovych concludes.

Pavlo Lakiychuk, head of security programs at the Strategy XXI Center for Global Studies, offers a deeper philosophical and strategic framing. In his view, there are no classical winners in this conflict—and there cannot be.

“Who is winning? No one: Trump is holding Tehran by the throat, while ‘the one with no head’ is firmly gripping him where it hurts. This year’s Shevchenko Prize laureate Yurii Shcherbak coined the oxymoron ‘victory–defeat.’ The current situation in the Middle East closely resembles such a ‘victory–defeat’—for all sides. But this does not mean the war will end tomorrow or within weeks, as Donald Trump suggests. He may withdraw from the region and declare ‘victory’ at any moment—but that will not end the war,” Lakiychuk notes.

For Ukraine, Trump’s Middle Eastern venture also represents a “victory–defeat.”

“It presents numerous challenges, but if managed competently and with sufficient flexibility, it may also create opportunities. The actions of Ukraine’s military and political leadership in the ‘Middle Eastern theater’ are aimed precisely at this: converting new challenges into gains. This is asymmetric strategy in practice,” the expert emphasizes.

Volodymyr Fesenko supports the thesis that there are no clear triumphs in this war. He argues that the ambitious objectives of the United States and Israel—whether regime change in Iran or the complete dismantling of its defense capabilities—have effectively reached an impasse.

“Although Iran has not lost this war, it has already suffered significant destruction and economic damage. These losses are likely to increase if the conflict drags on. Given the fragile state of Iran’s economy even before the war, its post-war challenges will be far more severe. In the absence of external actors capable or willing to support rapid recovery—Russia will have neither the resources nor the priority; China will not act without strategic compensation, and any investments would likely come in exchange for control over infrastructure and resources—Iran risks entering a prolonged socio-economic crisis.”

FROM UKRAINE TO THE MIDDLE EAST: SHARED DYNAMICS OF MODERN WARFARE

Drawing parallels between the largest continental war in Europe since World War II and the ongoing operation in the Middle East requires a nuanced analytical framework. While the contexts differ fundamentally, military science reveals converging patterns that point to a broader transformation in the nature of modern warfare.

Pavlo Lakiychuk proposes temporarily setting aside moral, ethical, and international legal considerations and examining the situation strictly through the prism of military strategy. From this vantage point, he identifies several striking parallels.

“First, as in our case, the aggressor state—and here, whether we like it or not, that role is being played by the United States—did not initially frame its actions as a ‘war.’ For the White House, this is a ‘military operation.’ The resemblance to Putin’s “special military operation” is unmistakable. In both cases, this is not about domestic legal formalities, but about intent. Planning was based on expectations of a swift, decisive blitzkrieg, without sufficient consideration of alternative scenarios or the adversary’s likely countermeasures. Overconfidence,” Lakiychuk states bluntly.

The second key characteristic highlighted by the expert reflects a divergence in strategic approaches.

Paraphrasing Lakiychuk, Ukraine, on the eve of the full-scale invasion in 2022, pursued diplomatic avenues to preserve peace until the very last moment. By contrast, the Iranian leadership, recognizing the inevitability of confrontation, appears to have deliberately prepared for a prolonged and existential confrontation.

Aware of the overwhelming technological and firepower superiority of the United States, Tehran implemented a strategy of Decentralized Mosaic Defense. This concept enables dispersed forces to maintain operational effectiveness even in the event of the destruction of centralized command structures. As a result, the anticipated rapid “disintegration” of the regime did not occur.

The third trend identified by Lakiychuk is universal to both conflicts: a systemic shift toward asymmetric warfare under conditions of structural imbalance.

“In such circumstances, the analogy of David versus Goliath is entirely appropriate. Faced with an adversary of vastly superior capabilities, both Ukraine and Iran have adopted asymmetric strategies… In effect, this is ‘Gerasimov’s hybrid war’ turned on its head—you expected to protect the head, when in fact you should have been protecting far more vulnerable points. After 2022, military theorists should have abandoned operational models based solely on quantifiable metrics—manpower counts, stored armor, or deployed aircraft… Instead, qualitative factors have proven decisive: resilience, adaptability, and what might be termed a ‘pain threshold.’ These cannot be measured in conventional terms. That is why Ukraine, which was given three days to collapse, continues to hold the line into its fifth year—while reshaping the battlefield. And that is why Trump’s ‘brilliant’ plan has unraveled,” the expert concludes, capturing the paradoxes of contemporary military thought.

THE COMING WEEKS THAT WILL DECIDE EVERYTHING

The situation has reached a bifurcation point, where any tactical move could either contain the crisis or escalate it into a regional—or even global—catastrophe.

Volodymyr Fesenko argues that the next two weeks will be decisive for the trajectory of the entire campaign. The initiative now lies with Washington:

“President Trump must choose between two strategic options—either pursuing a ceasefire agreement with Iran or escalating the conflict through targeted ground operations,” the expert predicts.

At the same time, Tehran faces an equally consequential choice. Iran’s leadership (though it remains unclear who precisely holds decision-making authority) must decide whether to accept painful compromises and enter into an agreement with the United States, or to continue a war of attrition.

In the latter scenario, Fesenko warns, the United States, Israel, and the Persian Gulf monarchies would likely converge around a shared objective: the definitive dismantling of the current Iranian regime in order to remove this geopolitical challenge once and for all.

Ihor Reiterovych further elaborates on these two baseline scenarios. The first involves a shift to a negotiation track. This would not entail immediate peace, but rather a “fragile truce”—marked by periodic violations, localized strikes, and sustained brinkmanship short of full-scale war.

The second scenario, however, is significantly more dangerous:

“A limited ground operation. At that point, an entirely different escalation dynamic comes into play. Formally, it may remain localized and short-term, but the risk of expansion is ever-present. Many wars have begun as ‘limited’ operations—designed for quick results—only to spiral beyond control.”

Assessing the military balance, Reiterovych notes that the approximately 50,000 U.S. troops currently deployed in the region are objectively insufficient for the occupation of a country as large and populous as Iran. These forces are configured for precision, limited-scope interventions rather than large-scale campaigns.

“But the key issue is not the scale of the initial move, but whether the operation begins to expand as it unfolds. History offers clear parallels: both the Vietnam War for the United States and the Soviet-Afghan war for the USSR began as limited interventions with expectations of rapid success. The outcomes are well known.”

The central question, therefore, is whether Trump will take this step—and, if so, whether he will be able to contain the operation within its intended parameters.

“Based on indirect indicators, the scenario of a limited ground intervention now appears more plausible than it did just a few weeks ago.”

Another critical variable in the coming weeks is the evolving diplomatic interplay between the United States and China. Reiterovych points to the anticipated meeting between Donald Trump and Xi Jinping—strategically inevitable, yet unlikely to occur in the immediate term.

“The reason is straightforward: neither side currently feels sufficiently strong. The paradox is that both possess leverage over the other. Xi Jinping can point to U.S. entanglement in the Iranian conflict and its domestic political constraints. Trump, in turn, can exert pressure through the energy dimension… In such a configuration, neither side is inclined to enter negotiations from a position of relative weakness.”

In effect, global leaders have entered a phase of tactical pause—waiting to see which direction the Middle Eastern confrontation will take before engaging in high-level negotiations with stronger geopolitical leverage.

As a result, the coming weeks represent a decisive inflection point: the world will witness either a gradual, managed de-escalation, or a transition into a new phase of forceful intervention with the potential to ignite the entire region.

Myroslav Liskovych, Kyiv