Nataliia Butyrska, Senior Analyst at the New Europe Center

The North Korea issue today extends far beyond the confines of regional security. Once viewed as an isolated and relatively predictable “anomalous” state, Pyongyang is now emerging as an increasingly active player in global affairs.

Not only has Kim Jong Un’s regime demonstrated resilience under sustained sanctions pressure but has also capitalized on shifting geopolitical dynamics to strengthen its positioning. Deepening cooperation with Russia, expanding military capabilities, and accumulating combat experience are elevating North Korea to a qualitatively new level of influence—creating risks not only for Asia, but for Europe as well.

At the same time, North Korea remains one of the most closed societies in the world. This combination of internal isolation and outward assertiveness makes it an especially dangerous actor in contemporary international politics.

In an interview with Ukrinform, Nataliia Butyrska—Associate Senior Analyst at the New Europe Center and an expert on the Asia-Pacific—discusses how Kim Jong Un has turned isolation into a strategic asset, assesses the real risk of renewed conflict on the Korean Peninsula, explains why the North Korean leader conceals his age, and examines what it means that his 13-year-old daughter has been tasked with overseeing the missile program.

SANCTIONS PRESSURE NO LONGER DRIVES KIM’S NEED FOR U.S. TALKS

Q: Ms. Butyrska, Western analysts suggest that Kim Jong Un’s regime is now in its strongest position in years. Do you agree?

A: Absolutely. First and foremost, Kim Jong Un’s international standing has strengthened significantly. Prior to 2018, he was seen as the leader of a completely closed state with minimal engagement with the outside world. That perception changed after his June 12, 2018 meeting in Singapore with U.S. President Donald Trump, which effectively granted him international legitimacy.

For both his grandfather and his father, a direct meeting with a U.S. president had been an unattained goal.

Q: So, was that legitimization largely enabled by Trump?

A: To a certain extent, yes.

However, Kim Jong Un ultimately failed to achieve his primary objective—sanctions relief—at a time when North Korea urgently needed economic support.

It is important to recall that following North Korea’s 2017 nuclear test, both Russia and China formally joined the sanctions regime. At that point, Russia played only a marginal economic role for Pyongyang, accounting for just 1–2% of trade. China, while continuing to support the DPRK, did so cautiously—providing only enough assistance to prevent a destabilizing economic collapse that could have affected its own security.

The negotiations with Trump ultimately broke down. Kim Jong Un proposed a phased approach, offering to dismantle key plutonium-production facilities at Yongbyon in exchange for reciprocal steps.

Washington, however, insisted on full denuclearization upfront as a precondition for any sanctions relief.

This failure dealt a significant blow to Kim Jong Un and, to some extent, reshaped North Korea’s approach to external engagement.

Q: But both sides failed, as neither achieved its objectives. Why did it affect Kim Jong Un so strongly?

A: That is true. However, for Trump, these talks were just another round of negotiations—hardly decisive for U.S. foreign policy. For North Korea, by contrast, their collapse meant the loss of a real opportunity to ease economic pressure. Kim Jong Un drew serious conclusions from that experience.

Soon after, the COVID-19 pandemic began, and the country effectively sealed itself off for three years. Nevertheless, it avoided a large-scale famine like that of the 1990s and managed to preserve relative economic stability.

As a result, Pyongyang reassessed its strategy: any future negotiations with the United States must be substantive, while North Korea’s nuclear status—now enshrined in its constitution—is no longer negotiable.

Kim Jong Un now treats this as a precondition: denuclearization is not on the table.

Q: How has the Russia–Ukraine war affected North Korea’s global posture?

A: It has created a major opportunity for Pyongyang. Faced with an acute shortage of ammunition, Russia effectively opened the door to cooperation.

According to various estimates, Moscow received between 12 and 15 million artillery shells from North Korea—an extremely significant contribution to its war effort.

North Korea is now supplying a range of weapons, receiving in return not only financial compensation and food supplies, but also access to technology.

This access to Russian resources has enabled Kim Jong Un to relaunch the military-industrial base, modernize the armed forces, and establish long-term defense cooperation through arms exports. It has also helped reduce North Korea’s overwhelming dependence on China, which previously accounted for roughly 90% of its foreign trade—a vulnerability long recognized by both the current leadership and its predecessors.

At this stage, Pyongyang has clearly strengthened its position: diversifying external ties, securing critical resources, partially mitigating the impact of sanctions, and enhancing its international standing.

As a result, Kim Jong Un no longer has an urgent need to engage the United States merely to seek sanctions relief—particularly as those sanctions are no longer exerting decisive pressure on the regime.

KIM JONG UN DEMONSTRATES ABILITY TO PROJECT POWER BEYOND THE KOREAN PENINSULA

Q: Does this mean that the United States, China, and Russia have effectively elevated Kim Jong Un to the level of a geopolitical actor?

A: Partly, yes. But what matters is how skillfully he has exploited the available opportunities. Whereas in the past Kim Jong Un had to attract U.S. attention through demonstrative missile launches—often in response to military exercises or high-level visits—this is no longer necessary.

Kim Jong Un has now demonstrated an ability to project power beyond the Korean Peninsula.

North Korea’s involvement in Russia’s war against Ukraine marks a new phase in the country’s evolution—and one that has taken many by surprise. Until recently, the idea that Pyongyang might deploy troops to an active conflict zone seemed highly improbable. Today, however, we are witnessing not only such involvement, but a clear willingness to expand it.

North Korean forces are gaining real-world combat experience, testing weapon systems, and—of particular concern to South Korea—mastering modern drone technologies and their deployment in warfare. Moreover, Pyongyang is acquiring the capacity to produce drones domestically, elevating the threat to an entirely new level.

According to available information, North Korean units are also adopting Russian small-group tactics and infiltration methods in so-called “gray zones.” Soldiers returning from the front transmit this experience within the system, effectively raising the overall standard of military training.

Following a recent visit to South Korea, I can say that both the public and the military take this development very seriously. In fact, only three countries today possess firsthand experience in conducting modern, technologically advanced warfare: Ukraine, Russia—and now North Korea.

Q: Is North Korea’s support for Russia driven by ideology, or is it simply “just business”?

A: There is no purely ideological component. However, a certain shared foundation does exist. Russia’s current trajectory—balancing between imperial legacy and Soviet nostalgia—helps explain domestically why the Kremlin is investing so heavily in ties with North Korea.

At the same time, the relationship has evolved beyond transactional cooperation. Bilateral engagement has deepened across multiple levels: exchanges between universities, medical and cultural institutions, as well as organized trips for children. There are even reports that children from currently occupied Ukrainian territories are being sent there.

Delegation exchanges now occur almost weekly at the local level.

For instance, at the time of this interview (recorded on April 1 — ed.), the head of TASS is visiting North Korea with a group of journalists. Russia and the DPRK have formalized cooperation between their state news agencies and agreed to jointly counter what they describe as “international disinformation” regarding their partnership (smiles).

LAVROV AND PUTIN PRAISE DPRK’S “BROTHERLY ASSISTANCE” TO RUSSIA

Q: How does Russian society perceive this shift? After all, North Korea was once seen as more of a caricature—an object of fear and ridicule.

A: In my view, Russian society—despite its considerable resources and opportunities—has not undergone a genuine transformation since the collapse of the Soviet Union.

On the one hand, Russians have eagerly embraced the benefits of an open world—traveling abroad, living in Europe, and consuming the fruits of others’ development. On the other hand, their worldview remains shaped by Soviet nostalgia and notions of “greatness” rooted in the past.

Against this backdrop, rapprochement with North Korea does not appear problematic for many; on the contrary, it evokes a sense of familiarity and even nostalgia. When Russians began traveling to the DPRK, they often remarked that “it feels like the Soviet Union,” and tended to view this positively. At the same time, they showed little concern about the strict controls imposed by North Korean authorities—restricted travel routes, supervised movement, and tightly regulated contacts. Propaganda plays a decisive role here. Russian authorities, including Lavrov and Putin personally, actively praise the DPRK’s “brotherly assistance,” emphasizing that no country supports Russia as loyally as North Korea.

For much of Russian society, this narrative is sufficient—just as it is in other contexts, including the war against Ukraine.

Q: What place does Ukraine occupy in North Korea’s worldview? Do people there even know about the war?

A: North Korean society is almost completely isolated and receives information exclusively from official domestic sources.

I doubt that ordinary citizens clearly distinguish Ukraine from the Soviet Union or fully understand the events of 1991.

They are aware of the war, but through a radically different lens—presented as a struggle against “Western imperialists” who allegedly attacked Russia.

They also know about the participation of North Korean troops. Kim Jong Un is actively constructing his own leadership narrative, distinct from that of his predecessors, emphasizing the “heroism” of North Korean soldiers who, according to official messaging, are fighting alongside Russia against “American imperialism.”

This narrative is reinforced through public rituals—memorials, ceremonies honoring the fallen, and state support for their families.

However, in the absence of access to alternative sources of information, North Koreans’ understanding of global events remains extremely limited.

RISING COOPERATION AMONG RUSSIA’S ALLIES TIGHTENS PRESSURE ON UKRAINE

Q: On March 26, the leaders of North Korea and Belarus signed a treaty of friendship and cooperation, pledging to expand ties across sectors—from agriculture to IT. Does this increase risks for Ukraine?

A: The initiative came from Lukashenko. If we look at the broader trajectory, Minsk has been attempting since last year to re-establish ties with North Korea and open a new chapter in bilateral relations.

Lukashenko is seeking to strengthen his geopolitical role and retain at least a degree of agency amid growing pressure from Moscow. To balance this dependence, he is actively developing relations with Beijing, Tehran, and now Pyongyang.

Such contacts can also be seen as additional “cards” in Lukashenko’s dealings with the United States—and his ties with Kim Jong Un even as a potential backchannel to Donald Trump.

At the same time, this rapprochement creates additional risks for Ukraine. Belarus’s defense-industrial base is already deeply integrated into Russia’s war effort and remains a critical component of its war infrastructure.

North Korea plays a similar role—through arms supplies to Russia and the deployment of troops to the battlefield.

More broadly, a network of cooperation is taking shape among Russia’s aligned regimes, collectively increasing pressure on Ukraine.

In this sense, the expansion of ties among pro-Russian actors only further complicates the strategic environment.

Q: Why did Kim Jong Un sharply escalate his rhetoric toward South Korea after a period of relative rapprochement?

A: This largely reflects his disappointment with South Korea’s lack of strategic autonomy.

During the 2018–2019 diplomatic process with the United States, then-President Moon Jae-in played a key mediating role. Representing a political force committed to engagement with Pyongyang, he sought avenues for cooperation and de-escalation. In turn, North Korea expected concrete economic concessions from Seoul—particularly unilateral sanctions relief and material support.

However, constrained by its alliance with the United States, South Korea was unable to act independently.

As a result, the collapse of negotiations with Washington effectively closed what remained of the inter-Korean engagement process—even if it had largely existed on paper.

NORTH KOREA SEES WIDENING GAP WITH SOUTH AS A GROWING THREAT

Q: But that was nearly eight years ago. Why has escalation occurred now?

A: A key factor was the political shift in South Korea. Conservative governments have traditionally taken a harder line toward the DPRK, and former President Yoon Suk Yeol followed that pattern.

Consequently, most provisions of the 2018 Panmunjom Declaration on Peace, Prosperity, and Reunification of the Korean Peninsula—signed by Moon Jae-in and Kim Jong Un—were never implemented. This included plans to establish demilitarized security zones along the border, at sea, and in the air.

North Korea eventually withdrew from the agreement, while the previous South Korean administration suspended its implementation.

Tensions were further exacerbated by a series of incidents, including a drone intrusion over Pyongyang, which the DPRK used to reinforce its claim that Seoul is not a trustworthy counterpart.

That being said, North Korea has grown markedly more confident in its position. Cooperation with Russia provides it with resources and support, reducing its reliance on humanitarian assistance from South Korea. This, in turn, allows Pyongyang to pursue a tougher line and no longer view Seoul as an equal partner.

There is also a deeper ideological dimension. After the Korean War, both states formally committed to reunification—a goal even enshrined in their constitutions. Yet over more than 70 years, they have evolved along fundamentally different trajectories—economically, politically, and culturally.

North Korea’s leadership increasingly sees this widening gap as a threat. The steady diffusion of South Korean cultural influence —through television, music, and media—has exposed North Koreans to a reality in which living standards in the South far exceed official propaganda narratives.

In response, Kim Jong Un is advancing a new conceptual framework: the two Koreas are not one nation, but separate states. Accordingly, he is moving away from the traditional rhetoric of reunification.

At the same time, this shift does not imply a rejection of force-based options. On the contrary, the designation of South Korea as a “hostile state” is being formally entrenched, with the implication that all means may be used in the event of a perceived threat.

There is also a crucial psychological dimension. Where South Koreans were once portrayed as compatriots—members of a divided nation—they are now increasingly framed as a distinct and hostile people.

This reframing lowers the threshold for conflict by making it easier for the regime to present any future confrontation as a struggle against an external enemy.

Q: Against this backdrop, how real is the threat of a new war on the Korean Peninsula?

A: At present, there are no clear indications that the situation has deteriorated significantly compared to previous periods, or that the likelihood of war has materially increased. Hostility and mutual accusations have long been a constant feature of inter-Korean relations. The addition of the “hostile state” doctrine may, in theory, facilitate decision-making on aggressive actions, but it does not in itself signal imminent conflict.

For now, there are no grounds to speak of an immediate prospect of war.

That said, we are operating in a context of heightened geopolitical turbulence, where even long-frozen conflicts can be reactivated—this time with far broader global implications. In that sense, risks are indeed growing.

One key variable is North Korea’s potential role in a wider Indo-Pacific crisis. In a scenario involving a China–Taiwan confrontation, there is a credible risk of deliberate escalation on the Korean Peninsula designed to distract or tie down U.S. forces. This possibility is reinforced by Pyongyang’s close ties with Beijing, the existence of a mutual defense framework, and the additional factor of Russia.

Thus, viewed through the lens of traditional threat assessments, the situation on the peninsula has not fundamentally worsened—aside from the continued advancement of North Korea’s nuclear program, which it is highly unlikely to abandon.

However, within the broader context of global instability, risks are becoming more complex, more interconnected, and more difficult to contain.

DPRK HAS NEVER HAD A FEMALE LEADER—YET TWO WOMEN ARE GAINING INFLUENCE

Q: Kim Jong Un recently tasked his 13-year-old daughter with overseeing the DPRK’s missile program. What does this signal?

A: Broadly speaking, it is being interpreted as preparation for succession.

Q: But he is still relatively young, even if his exact date of birth remains unclear.

A: He is clearly drawing on his own experience. His father, Kim Jong Il, began involving him—and his sister, Kim Yo Jong—in official activities at an early stage. Yet when Kim Jong Il died in 2011, Kim Jong Un was not fully prepared to govern.

It is important to understand that power in North Korea is dynastic. Ensuring its transfer requires not only formally designating a successor, but also preparing both the elite and society at large. The successor must be gradually integrated into the system.

Another important dimension is gender. North Korea has never had a female leader, although women from the ruling family have held influential positions. For instance, Kim Jong Un’s aunt was part of the inner circle of power and the only woman to hold the rank of four-star general in the Korean People’s Army.

Today, however, we see two prominent female figures: Kim Yo Jong—once viewed as a potential successor, particularly amid speculation about Kim Jong Un’s health—and now his daughter, Kim Ju Ae.

Her elevation may therefore reflect a deliberate personal choice by Kim Jong Un to prepare her specifically as his successor.

Q: Why assign her to the missile program in particular?

A: Because it is a central pillar of the regime. The missile and nuclear programs underpin the survival of both the state and the ruling dynasty.

This is not about operational control, which remains firmly in Kim Jong Un’s hands. Rather, the assignment is symbolic: it signals to both the political elite and the broader public her elevated status and future role.

Q: Why do you think is Kim Jong Un’s date of birth concealed? Public sources cite different years, placing his age between 42 and 44.

A: This is rooted in the way the Kim dynasty itself was constructed.

Kim Il Sung, Kim Jong Un’s grandfather, was effectively a Soviet-backed partisan in the Far East. When the DPRK was established, he was brought via Vladivostok and installed as the country’s leader.

To consolidate dynastic rule, a mythologized biography was later devised for him. A key element of this narrative is Mount Paektu—sacred to all Koreans but located in North Korea—which is portrayed as the symbolic birthplace of the ruling dynasty.

As a result, Kim Il Sung became not merely a political leader, but the central figure of the state ideology of Juche—essentially a quasi-religious cult.

His descendants are expected to uphold this “sacred” lineage of power. Greater transparency about their personal lives or biographical details could undermine this carefully constructed mythology.

This is why even basic facts, such as exact birth dates, remain deliberately ambiguous.

Q: We often hear about strict—and at times seemingly absurd—restrictions in North Korea, from regulating emotional expression to controlling hairstyles and even clothing. How did such a system emerge in full view of the world?

A: Its origins lie in a combination of factors. Initially, North Korea was built with substantial assistance from the Soviet Union, which exported its repressive governance model. China later exerted additional influence.

This model was reinforced by an indigenous tradition—Confucian hierarchical order—which aligned well with the communist system and later strengthened both the cult of the leader and the ideology of Juche.

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, North Korea undertook a fundamental reassessment of its survival strategy. The regime chose deep isolation: severely restricting citizens’ contact with the outside world and tightening control through the security apparatus.

Decades of propaganda combined with deeply ingrained fear have proven highly effective. This is why expectations—shared both in Ukraine and among many Western partners—that North Korean troops deployed to fight alongside Russia would gain access to information, the internet, and potentially defect, did not materialize.

Instead, the opposite appears to be the case. According to Ukrainian soldiers, North Korean troops—unlike many Russian units—continue to advance regardless of losses, reflecting a markedly different level of conditioning.

A telling example comes from interviews with North Korean prisoners of war, some of whom reportedly expressed regret at having survived. They had been ordered not to be captured and, if necessary, to take their own lives, as captivity is considered a disgrace not only for the individual but also for their family.

This underscores the effectiveness of a system built on total isolation and control over individual consciousness.

THE RIGHTS OF NORTH KOREANS REMAIN LARGELY OVERLOOKED GLOBALLY

Q: Is it possible to influence such a closed state as the DPRK from the outside?

A: South Korea is making efforts, but with limited success.

One avenue has been through the defector community: approximately 30,000 North Koreans now live in South Korea and attempt, based on their own experience, to reach those still inside the DPRK.

Among the methods used is the cross-border distribution of information via balloons—leaflets, digital media, and sometimes even U.S. currency. However, such actions often provoke strong reactions from Pyongyang.

For instance, when these campaigns intensified several years ago, North Korea responded by sending balloons carrying garbage toward Seoul. Packages of unknown content landed in urban and suburban areas, causing public concern and frustration.

As a result, the current South Korean government has significantly curtailed such initiatives to avoid escalation.

More broadly, these efforts represent attempts at informational influence—but they remain insufficient. Inside North Korea, access to external information is tightly controlled. Watching foreign media or maintaining contact with the outside world is harshly punished, ensuring that the population remains both uninformed and more easily controlled.

From my own interactions, I have the impression that the international community has, to a large extent, overlooked the plight of ordinary North Koreans.

The DPRK has existed for so long as an isolated, pariah state that it is often treated as a permanent anomaly. Few seriously consider what it means to live in conditions where individuals have virtually no ability to shape or change their own lives.

At the global level, the issue of North Korean human rights is effectively sidelined. The regime’s continued existence in its current form is largely accepted as a given, while its nuclear program is treated primarily as a regional—or at most U.S.—security concern.

Even North Korea’s involvement in a war on the European continent has not fundamentally altered this perception—neither in terms of recognizing it as a broader global threat nor in acknowledging the conditions faced by its population.

Although some defectors have established organizations to advocate for the rights of their compatriots, their voices remain marginal, and the issue is largely absent from the global agenda.

Prospects for change remain limited. North Korea benefits from the backing of two key patrons—China and Russia—both of which have a vested interest in preserving the regime. They leverage their influence, and the very existence of the DPRK, as a tool of geopolitical pressure against the United States and its allies.

This strategic alignment effectively constrains the possibility of change: both countries support the regime insofar as it serves their interests, significantly reducing the likelihood of any meaningful transformation within North Korea.

Q: The cases of North Korea, Russia, and Belarus suggest that in today’s world, “bad behavior” can sometimes be more effective than playing by the rules. Does this signal the collapse of the international order?

A: What we are witnessing is the erosion of an international order that, while never perfect, at least sustained the illusion of shared rules. Today, that framework is being undermined—including by actors who once positioned themselves as its defenders.

As a result, so-called “bad actors” now see an opportunity to assert themselves within this system—and are actively competing for influence. They possess a broad toolkit to expand their leverage, while many democracies remain constrained by caution, institutional inertia, and outdated assumptions.

There is still an incomplete recognition that the global environment has fundamentally changed—and that adaptation must be both rapid and strategic. The expectation that the previous rules can simply be restored is becoming increasingly unrealistic.

Ultimately, much will depend on who adapts faster. The North Korean regime, for instance, has already adjusted to the new reality and is actively exploiting it. Iran, too, may emerge from current tensions in a stronger position. In contrast, democratic countries often appear uncertain, still searching for a coherent strategy and a clear understanding of their role.

Q: Will these “bad actors” succeed in imposing their own rules on the world?

A: Ukraine today is defending the core principles of the international order and, in doing so, is effectively containing these efforts. In that sense, we are already making a tangible contribution.

There is also reason to hope that European countries—despite their still cautious approach—will more fully mobilize their considerable potential, both in supporting Ukraine and in upholding the broader international system.

For now, however, they often continue to underestimate their own capacity to act.

Nadiia Yurchenko led this conversation, Kyiv

Photo: Volodymyr Tarasov / Ukrinform