Mykola Tochytskyi, Permanent Representative of Ukraine to the Council of Europe

Mykola Tochytskyi is a Ukrainian diplomat and politician with a long career in the diplomatic service and public administration. In particular, he served as Ukraine’s Ambassador to Belgium and Luxembourg, was Ukraine’s representative to the EU, and held the position of Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs. He was Minister of Culture and Strategic Communications of Ukraine from 2024 until July 2025, and headed the Permanent Representation of Ukraine to the Council of Europe from 2010 to 2016. In August of this year, Tochytskyi was once again appointed Permanent Representative of Ukraine to the Council of Europe, and in October he assumed the duties of this post.

In an interview with Ukrinform’s correspondent in France, Mykola Tochytskyi spoke about the details of the most recent decisions important for Ukraine on the path toward establishing justice and accountability, adopted under the “umbrella” of the Council of Europe.

IN ADDITION TO RUSSIAN ASSETS, THERE ARE OTHER SOURCES OF FUNDS FOR COMPENSATING UKRAINIANS

— So, last week the High-Level Diplomatic Conference in The Hague adopted a decision to establish the International Claims Commission for Ukraine. The essence of its work will be to review claims and make decisions on the payment of compensation for damage suffered by Ukrainians. Would you explain this entire mechanism in plain language?

— Yes, on December 16, the Convention on the Establishment of the International Claims Commission for Ukraine was signed. This is the second stage of the process known as the damage compensation mechanism. As a reminder, we already have the Register of Damage, which records the harm inflicted; claims are submitted there, and as of now there are already 85,000 claims submitted. After a claim for damage has been submitted to the Damage Register, this document is forwarded to the Commission for consideration. The Commission then determines the amount of compensation to be paid. And the Compensation Fund—the third element of the mechanism—will reimburse citizens for the damage caused.

— This immediately raises the question of the prospects for funding the Compensation Fund.

— One of the avenues—the most direct one—remains relevant for further discussion and for finding a final solution: the issue of the frozen assets of the Russian Federation. From a historical perspective, as you may know, after the Second World War the aggressor state paid to the very last cent. That is, funds are recovered from the aggressor. But there are also other, additional sources—for example, the introduction of special taxes or levies on Russian energy resources in the postwar period, or the long-term management of Russia’s frozen assets.

35 SIGNATORIES AT THE START IS A VERY GOOD RESULT

— Returning to the conference, representatives of 34 countries and the European Union signed the document. Is that a lot? Is it sufficient for the commission’s work to have legitimacy?

— For full-fledged work, the Council of Europe experts had set a benchmark of 25 countries. We have 34 states plus the European Union. Clearly, that is fully sufficient to launch preparatory work. So this is a very good result, although—especially in a period of wartime diplomacy—one always wants more. It is worth noting that the conference as such was very well organized and had representation at the highest level: the Prime Minister of the Netherlands, Moldova as the Chair of the Council of Europe led by its President, our President personally, and the Secretary General of the Council of Europe. I can tell you that the very presence of the President of Ukraine underscored the importance of this process and also contributed to the outcome. Already now I can say that just four days before The Hague we had only 20 countries ready to sign the Convention.

— Yes, but at the same time, more than 40 countries and the EU had earlier agreed to work on the Damage Register. Now that they have agreed to registering the facts, why not to establish the commission, which would seem logical?

— The reason is that there is a certain legal procedure. In order to sign a particular agreement, a country must obtain the necessary authorization. Some did not manage to do so in due time. Some are hesitant for political reasons. There are countries that currently have transitional governments, and others where a new government has just been formed. They simply did not have time. And some—this is no secret—are taking a wait-and-see position in connection with the ongoing peace negotiations.

— As I understand it, these are the ten countries that signed the final act rather than the convention itself?

— Yes, but the reasons vary. They range from purely legal ones—such as not having formalized powers. You probably noticed that among the signatories there were many delegated envoys. Under international law, only three categories of officials are empowered to sign without separately granted authorizations: the head of state, the head of government, and the minister of foreign affairs. All others must obtain authorization from their respective governments to sign. Some may not have received it. More ambassadors participated than actually signed. Those who joined the final act included so-called observers. For example, observers came from Costa Rica and Ecuador. And this does not prevent them from later joining both the commission and the tribunal.

— What was surprising was Georgia’s participation—not just participation, but the fact that its foreign minister signed the Convention…

— The fact is that, whatever the current internal situation in that country may be, you know perfectly well that both Georgia and the Georgian people have likewise suffered from Russian aggression. In this situation, as they say, I am not inclined to comment further, but I will say that every country that has been a victim of the crime of aggression and has suffered damage as a result understands that a compensation mechanism must exist. Therefore, I believe that the Georgian government was guided precisely by this motive.

THERE ARE NO ANALOGUES TO THE COMPENSATION COMMISSION IN MODERN HISTORY

— Who and what are supposed to further encourage other countries to join the circle of signatories? How can Ukraine expand it?

— We have three permanent, full-fledged drivers behind this process. First, the Council of Europe itself as an institution. Second, the Netherlands as the country that is hosting the Register of Damage and where the Commission and the Special Tribunal will be located. And, of course, the third driver is Ukraine itself.

As a rule, in every organization there are so-called leaders. In the European Union, as in the Council of Europe, these are usually those who are the largest contributors to the budget. And they are basically interested in having more participants engaged in the process, because then the financial burden on them becomes somewhat lighter.

The Council of Europe also serves as the principal architect of and legal advisor on these processes.  It is here where the mechanisms are developed that will later operate in the Netherlands. There are many similar precedents — for example, the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, created within the UN framework, functions as an institution on the territory of the Netherlands. At the same time, there are no modern historical analogues to the creation of a compensation commission; what the Council of Europe is doing now is, in a way, a unique path.

— So, at this stage we are moving in the right direction. But are we moving at a sufficient pace?

— Overall, the process is moving according to the timeline envisaged by Ukraine, although the pace could be higher. But again, there is no limit to perfection, and, of course, we would like to see faster progress. However, much depends on the financial dimension, since the lion’s share of this burden is borne by the same countries — from armaments to the establishment of justice. In addition, countries whose legislation requires it must still complete the ratification procedure for the Convention. So this process is quite complicated. And also, do not forget that countries whose legislation requires it must still ratify the signatures under the convention.

FOUR ADDITIONAL STATES COMMITTED TO JOINING THE SPECIAL TRIBUNAL

— At what stage is the implementation of what is arguably the most important project established under the auspices of the Council of Europe—the Special Tribunal for the Crime of Aggression?

— As regards participation, we currently have a situation in which four additional states have expressed their readiness to join the Tribunal. That is, they have indicated—in one form or another—that once the Enlarged Partial Agreement is approved and a governing committee is established, they will become direct participants.

Our objective remains to secure participation from at least twenty-five states, preferably including major countries—most notably the host country, France, as well as Italy, Germany, and the United Kingdom.

— At the most recent meeting of the Council of Europe’s Committee of Ministers, a decision was taken for the working group tasked with preparing the tribunal to begin its work in January.

— Yes, and at the same time a decision is expected on the Enlarged Partial Agreement establishing the tribunal’s governing committee. Our plan is to adopt it early in the year, during the first meetings. Importantly, the document itself has already been fully finalized, contains no outstanding comments, and is ready for approval. It constitutes the legal framework on which basis the tribunal will subsequently be established.

Any state may accede to the Enlarged Partial Agreement. Throughout the negotiations on the agreement, representatives from Canada, Australia, and Japan regularly participated in the meetings. We would very much like to see them formally join the process.

— EU High Representative Kaja Kallas has pledged €10 million from the European Union to support the tribunal’s work. Are these start-up funds, and how and when will they be used?

— These funds are intended to support the work of the Advance Team. This team will define the key parameters of the future tribunal: the number of judges, the facilities required, and arrangements for detention and enforcement of sentences. Beginning in January, once the Council of Europe signs an administrative agreement with the EU on the allocation of these funds, the Advance Team will commence its work. The subsequent stage will be the formal establishment of the Enlarged Partial Agreement by the Committee of Ministers and the launch of the full process.

PARLIAMENTARIANS CAN SAY MORE THAN DIPLOMATS CAN AFFORD TO SAY

— At the end of January, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE) will hold its next session. It would seem that the Assembly has already said everything it can. All of its resolutions are pro-Ukrainian, all defend justice, the rule of law, and the values of the Council of Europe, yet none of them are legally binding.

— That is true. On the one hand, the only statutory body of the Council of Europe whose decisions are legally binding is the Committee of Ministers. On the other hand, through its resolutions the Assembly provides recommendations to the Committee and lays the conceptual and political groundwork. This was precisely the case with the Register of Damage: the Assembly first adopted a resolution, and the working group subsequently established by the Committee of Ministers elaborated the instrument.

In other words, while the Assembly’s decisions are formally recommendatory, they set the direction, define priorities and narratives, and, crucially, generate the political will that enables binding decisions to follow.

— Has PACE already exhausted all the levers at its disposal?

— I do not think so. Parliamentary diplomacy has been, and remains, an essential component to this effort. Why? Because parliamentarians can sometimes afford to say things that diplomats cannot. Moreover, this is what might be called effective politician-to-politician engagement—channels where diplomats are not always able to gain traction. For various reasons, diplomats may not be received, may not be listened to, or may be constrained in what they can say, whereas members of our delegation can speak more freely. To put it shortly, I do not believe that the Parliamentary Assembly has exhausted its potential.

THE COUNCIL OF EUROPE’S SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE ON UKRAINIAN CHILDREN IS ACTIVELY ENGAGED

— At the international level, virtually all states and international institutions are raising the issue of Russia’s return of abducted Ukrainian children. The Council of Europe is also part to the international coalition on this matter. What does its work consist of?

-- There are many institutions involved, which makes coordination among them a critical issue. The Council of Europe has a Special Representative on Ukrainian children who is actively engaged, but this work spans multiple vectors. As you may recall, we coordinated efforts around the most recent resolution on children adopted by the UN in December. The Special Representative worked with a number of countries we had identified as priorities to encourage them to join. She was specifically tasked with helping to secure the necessary number of votes for the adoption of the resolution, and in this respect the work of Thórdís Kolbrún has been quite productive.

The Office of the First Lady, which coordinates efforts related to children, is handling this task effectively. Within the Council of Europe, our role is sometimes simply to illuminate the path—to provide direction and help steer the process.

— The Register, the Commission, and the Tribunal: the Council of Europe’s role there is clear. But what is the Action Plan for Ukraine? We have seen reports about this three-year plan—what does it entail, and how is it being implemented?

-- In brief, the Action Plan is designed to advance Ukraine along its European path of development. Council of Europe experts provide assessments and advisory support in areas such as the administration of justice, compliance with various strands of legislation, and the implementation of reforms more broadly. In practice, Ukrainian experts turn to the Council of Europe with requests for the specific assistance they need to draft or refine particular legislative acts.

Substantial funding has been earmarked for this work: the Action Plan’s budget amounts to €65 million over three years, through 2026. The Plan may also be extended; once 2026 concludes, preparations for the next phase will begin. Початок форми

IN THE COUNCIL OF EUROPE, GLOBAL ATTENTION REVOLVES AROUND UKRAINE—AND MUST CONTINUE TO DO SO

-- A significant share of the events organized by Ukraine’s Permanent Representation to the Council of Europe in Strasbourg falls under what is commonly described as cultural diplomacy. How effective is this instrument?

-- Cultural diplomacy operates across multiple dimensions. It is not only about promoting Ukrainian culture and identity—important as that is—but also about countering disinformation. In this domain, Russia is currently acting with a high degree of sophistication. Whereas earlier false narratives were often crude and easily exposed, today they are more refined, targeted, and strategically deployed. The most important response is therefore the development of critical thinking, alongside presenting factual and authentic narratives about Ukraine.

Ideally, reading and education would be the most effective means to achieve this, but given current constraints, alternative formats are essential. This is why we are working extensively within the institutional framework of Culture Against War. We screen films—both documentary and feature-length— as a means of conveying truth through compelling, human-centered storytelling. I see considerable potential in this approach, both in Ukraine and internationally.

In this context, I am particularly encouraged by the prospect that, early next year, the Franco-German television channel ARTE will begin broadcasting Ukrainian-language content. This would be a significant development, as ARTE produces high-quality programming that does not impose opinions but instead enables viewers to form their own judgments.

In addition, I intend to launch what we are calling the Strasbourg Dialogue—a platform for engagement with diplomats, students, and the broader public—focused on dismantling myths, countering disinformation, and fostering informed discussion.

 -- You previously headed Ukraine’s Permanent Representation in Strasbourg until 2016. Nearly a decade has passed, and you have now returned to the same post. While direct comparisons may be imperfect, what conclusions have you drawn for yourself regarding how the international diplomatic environment has changed and how Ukraine is perceived within it?

-- First and foremost—and I ask all Ukrainians to forgive me for saying this—we have today achieved genuine international subjectivity. Tragically, this has come through immense suffering and pain. Yet the reality is that there is no meeting within the Council of Europe where Ukraine is not on the agenda. There is no committee without a Ukraine-related item. There is no discussion in which Ukraine is absent. In that sense, one could say that, within the Council of Europe, the world now revolves around Ukraine. This is what subjectivity means.

It is critically important to further develop this subjectivity and to ensure its quality—above all through clear explanation of why the Russian Federation behaves so aggressively, and why this aggression is not directed solely at Ukraine but reflects its true nature. This war is not only about Ukraine. If we stop resisting, Russia will move further.

UKRAINIAN WINE FROM UNDER FIRE PRESENTED AS A GIFT TO EUROPEAN DIPLOMATS

-- You have been in this position for less than two months. How satisfied are you with the initial results, and what benchmarks or standards are you setting for yourself going forward?

-- First, we have launched the process of establishing the Compensation Commission. Second, we have formalized the Enlarged Partial Agreement on the Special Tribunal. Third, we have put in place a substantial and credible cultural diplomacy mechanism here within the framework of the Council of Europe. Initiatives such as “Watch Ukrainian,” “Capable,” and “Culture Against War” have already taken root.

I would also like to emphasize what I consider the most important point: as of today, the Council of Europe is virtually the only institution—the oldest one, founded in 1949—that remains consistently committed to the principles on which it was established and to the legal order that has now been largely eroded elsewhere. Through all of its decisions, the Council of Europe upholds the very existence of international law.

Without this, one could argue that international law as such would cease to exist. When an aggressor state holds veto power in the UN Security Council and is supported by others, it becomes impossible for that body to adopt any meaningful decisions. The Council of Europe operates under a different voting mechanism, and this provides a foundation for hope—hope that justice can still be achieved.

-- At the entrance to your office, I noticed packages with Christmas and New Year gifts from other countries. What will the Ukrainian Representation be presenting to diplomats in Strasbourg this year?

-- Our Ukrainian gift consists of a commemorative coin marking the 30th anniversary of Ukraine’s membership in the Council of Europe, as well as a special set of postage stamps. In addition, we have prepared Ukrainian wine from Shabo, accompanied by a card featuring photographs of the winery’s vineyards that were damaged by Russian shelling attacks.

This is meant to convey a clear message: despite the war and the destruction inflicted upon them, Ukrainian winemakers continue to work and to produce high-quality produce. In this respect, they are no different from millions of Ukrainians who continue to demonstrate resilience and courage—qualities of which we can be proud.

Lydia Taran, France