Aleksander Kwaśniewski, former President of Poland

The significance and influence of former Polish President Aleksander Kwaśniewski on the course of historical events in Ukraine over the past three decades are undeniable. Few influential foreign politicians know and understand Ukraine as well as he does, having made considerable efforts over the years to strengthen Ukrainian-Polish relations. He was one of the key mediators during the Orange Revolution and later, as part of the Cox–Kwaśniewski mission during the Yanukovych era, made significant efforts to preserve Kyiv’s European prospects.

The former Polish leader, who continues to command considerable respect both in Poland and elsewhere, remains closely engaged in Ukraine’s political processes, including in his capacity as chairman of the board of the international platform the Yalta European Strategy (YES).

In a conversation with Ukrinform, Kwaśniewski shared his views on Ukraine’s 35 years of independence, spoke about internal developments in Russia and the prospects for ending the Russian-Ukrainian war. He also assessed the situation surrounding Kyiv’s integration into the EU and NATO, discussed domestic political developments in Poland, and spoke about the prospects for further Ukrainian-Polish relations.

PUTIN HAS SIGNIFICANTLY STRENGTHENED UKRAINIAN IDENTITY

Ukrinform (UI): Mr. President, Ukraine marked the 35th anniversary of its independence at the end of August. What achievements of Ukraine do you consider the most important during this period?

Aleksander Kwaśniewski (AK): The greatest achievement is that Ukraine is now independent and is defending its independence against an aggressor that is many times stronger and is using every means at its disposal against Ukraine, including military, political, and psychological methods.

Ukraine has not had much luck in the past when it came to building its statehood: it spent hundreds of years fighting for its own independence, but periods of independent existence remained relatively short.

Now, 35 years of independence is already a fairly long period. The achievement is that today, the Ukrainian people have a much stronger awareness of their identity, culture, and roots than ever before. I will say something paradoxical: to a significant extent, this is Putin’s doing, as he has greatly accelerated and intensified this explosion of Ukrainian identity.

Another fact is obvious to me: Ukraine has unequivocally chosen a Western path of development, democracy, a free market, and the protection of fundamental values such as human rights, minority rights, and so on. Of course, it is still far from perfect, but nobody is perfect. The best example is the United States today.

And finally, I visit Ukraine several times a year, and this is already the fifth year of the war. I am impressed by how, under these extremely difficult circumstances — of course, with enormous assistance from the rest of the world, because without Western money and weapons this would not have been possible — Ukrainian society and the Ukrainian state have maintained such a high level of resilience.

Trains are running, roads are open, gas stations are operating, and people are not going hungry. I see that Ukraine is capable of finding solutions even under extremely difficult conditions. This is evident both in the development of drone production and in the emergence of new types of weaponry. And in my view, this is not simply resilience or an ability to adapt to difficult circumstances. There is also a special kind of ingenuity here — and that is truly impressive.

UI: And how has the West’s perception of Ukraine changed over these 35 years, and how has Russia’s aggression against Ukraine affected it?

AK: It has changed significantly. This applies to Poland to a lesser extent, since we are close neighbors. But for many Western countries, Ukraine was “terra incognita.” So these 35 years have been, on the one hand, a process of trying to make itself known and, on the other, a process in which the West came to recognize that Ukraine exists, that it has the right to its own sovereignty, and that Putin’s claims that it is supposedly some kind of “Little Russia” are false. Instead, the title of former President Leonid Kuchma’s book, Ukraine Is Not Russia, is the truthful one.

Of course, the war has intensified many things, because Ukraine has found itself on the front pages of newspapers, while Ukrainian refugees have simultaneously become both an opportunity and a problem for many societies. In the West, there is a certain war fatigue and an expectation that it would be good if it were all over by now. But there is still no end to the war in sight. At the same time, anti-Ukrainian narratives are increasingly being exploited by politicians not only in Poland but in many Western countries as well.

So a great deal has happened, but one thing is certain: after 35 years of independence, Ukraine has become firmly established in people’s consciousness and on the map of Europe, which is extremely important. In my view, Ukraine is not a temporary phenomenon; it has definitively and permanently become part of the global and European consciousness.

UI: And what failures of our state would you single out over these 35 years?

AK: First, unfortunately, Ukraine failed from the very beginning of independence to achieve what Poland managed to do: build cross-party consensus on the most important strategic goals. Poland integrated into NATO under two presidents — Lech Wałęsa and myself — and during the terms of office of many prime ministers. In Poland, the left, the right, and the center all held power, but when it came to NATO and the EU, we had no doubts whatsoever.

In my view, Ukraine lacked this, and with the arrival of each successive president, new question marks appeared along this path. Yet achieving the main goals required unity on these issues.

Second, many reforms, especially the difficult ones, could have been carried out more effectively, so that today we would have more substantial results. I am talking about the judiciary, the fight against corruption, and social protection — in other words, greater fairness for people.

Ukraine is also, to a significant extent, an example of an oligarchic system. This element of social inequality was less pronounced in Poland or the Czech Republic than it was in Ukraine. But overall, Ukraine has changed. If we sum up the 35 years since independence, it amounts to enormous progress, an obvious change for the better.

EVEN A SIGNED PEACE AGREEMENT WILL NOT MEAN THE END OF HYBRID WARFARE

UI: Mr. President, how do you assess the resilience of Russia’s political system today? Can the September elections to the Russian State Duma show any signs of change (the interview was conducted before the elections in Russia — Ed.)?

AK: It is worth assessing Russia’s political, economic, and psychological resilience. As for the resilience of its political system, it is high. Over 26 years in power, Putin has managed to consolidate power to an extraordinary degree.

This may sound strange, but he is in a stronger position today than Stalin was in his time. Stalin may have had a much more powerful system of repression, but he also had a Politburo that had some influence and that he was wary of, and therefore had to take into account. Putin, by contrast, now operates without any parliamentary oversight, without media scrutiny, and without civil society oversight, because civil society does not exist in Russia.

So the political resilience of this regime remains high for now. But a great deal depends on Putin himself — his physical condition and biological limitations. Even the best doctors cannot make him younger.

As for economic resilience, it should also be said that Russia’s transition to a war economy has proved successful: they have been able to wage this war for a fifth year now, despite the enormous costs. The sanctions are having an effect, but their impact is limited. Trump’s attack on Iran, as well as rising oil prices, was another “gift” that Putin received.

If we assess the situation politically, I consider the system’s resilience high, whereas economically, I would rate it as more moderate. And with each successive year of the war, the situation in Russia will deteriorate.

The third component — psychological resilience — is, in my view, the most interesting. How long will society be willing to accept this “special military operation,” which is in fact a real war and is costing thousands of lives? This is not just about those who have been killed, but also those returning wounded.

The war has become tangible in Russia. Thanks to the development of Ukrainian technologies, residents of Moscow, St. Petersburg, or somewhere in or beyond the Urals have suddenly realized that this is not something they can simply watch on television. This is not a TV series. It is something they are now experiencing themselves.

And the question is how long this society will be willing to simultaneously accept a worsening economic situation, casualties, and a direct threat. I think this is Russia’s main vulnerability today.

Perhaps it is precisely Ukrainian attacks and the shattering of the state of splendid isolation — a certain detachment, or the attitude of “my house is on the outskirts” — that could eventually have certain consequences.

As for the elections... I do not think they are of much significance, since their results are known in advance. Perhaps they will have some significance in terms of turnout, but we will not know what the actual turnout is anyway.

Instead, it may be psychological changes and shifts in public sentiment in Russia that could prompt Putin to accelerate his search for a ceasefire. Because there is no point talking about peace at all — under Putin’s rule, it will not happen on any fair terms. He wants to have all of Ukraine within his sphere of influence, and he will not change this mindset because it is part of his worldview.

Putin does not simply want Crimea — he already has it — and he wants the Donetsk region in its entirety, which he is close to achieving. Putin wants Ukraine, as a buffer between the Russian Federation and Europe, to be within his sphere of influence rather than that of the West.

And this needs to be said loudly to the world, because the impression is that people there do not fully understand what this war is about. It is precisely about this: not about a quarter or half of Ukraine, but about all of Ukraine, which, in Putin’s view, should be part of “Greater Russia,” that is, remain within Russia’s sphere of influence.

That is why I do not believe that even if some kind of peace agreement is signed, it will mean the end of hybrid warfare. I do not think that further political manipulation or the exploitation of Ukraine’s vulnerabilities will cease.

However, Putin will face something he did not expect then and does not expect now — the Ukrainian consciousness that he himself has helped create. He will not succeed in subjugating Ukraine, for example, through political manipulation. Terror can be used to subjugate part of a territory, but not an entire country.

UI: Recently, there has been a lot of talk about the risks of a new wave of mobilization in Russia. The Kremlin is reportedly planning to mobilize an additional 600,000 people...

AK: This is an extremely risky situation for Putin, because so far he has tried to mobilize people mainly outside the major urban centers — that is, people who are less educated and have limited access to the internet.

If he is forced to mobilize young people from Moscow — or even not necessarily from Moscow, but, say, from Omsk or Irkutsk, large cities with populations of over a million — I think this would be extremely risky for him politically.

THE PROBLEM OF “KILLED BROTHERS AND SISTERS” IN UKRAINE-RUSSIA RELATIONS WILL LAST FOR GENERATIONS

UI: What do you think the war will look like in the near future?”

AK: I think it will remain much the same. When old political partners from around the world called me immediately after the full-scale invasion began and asked, “How long will it last — days or weeks?”, I would say: “Don’t listen to anyone. This war will last for years, and the conflict will last for generations.”

The full-scale war has already been going on for almost five years. The conflict, however — that is, the level of hatred, grievances, pain, tragedy, and suffering that exists today — will persist for generations. That cannot be changed.

Even if some wonderful leaders come to power in Russia, the process of reconciliation will still take many, many years, because something like this is not easily forgiven.

And Putin is making a fundamental mistake by constantly calling Ukrainians “brothers and sisters.” From the Ukrainian side, the question arises: if we are your brothers and sisters, why are you killing us? Why are you taking our children and Russifying them? Why are you setting fire to and attacking our cities and villages? Why are you forcing us to freeze to death by shelling our power plants?

For any ordinary person, this is false, a lie, something unacceptable. If we are brothers and sisters, you have no right to treat us this way. You may love us more or less, but you cannot treat us this way.

And this problem of “killed brothers and sisters” will last for generations. It cannot be resolved with one, two, or three gestures. It will remain a difficult issue in Ukrainian-Russian relations for a long time to come.

UI: So you do not see the possibility of the war ending in the foreseeable future?

AK: The political situation may change. I do not rule out the possibility that, under additional U.S. pressure or as a result of Putin’s own calculations, we could see some form of ceasefire, with the fighting halted along the current front line. Putin may conclude that a new mobilization would be too risky for him.

He would then use the pause to regroup and reorganize his forces, while Ukraine would use it to ramp up the production of drones and other weapons.

The only question is when this ceasefire would end and the fighting resume. In my view, such a scenario would be risky for Ukraine.

UI: What risks, specifically, are you referring to?

AK: I understand that this may sound somewhat cynical, because any cessation of hostilities is better than people dying on the front line. But if a ceasefire is seen merely as a pause rather than a lasting solution to the problem, it will give Putin time to prepare new forces, including North Korean ones.

At the same time, the question will arise: will international support for Ukraine continue? The world may decide that if the fighting has stopped, the need for funding Ukraine is no longer as urgent.

Yet negotiations with the EU on membership will continue, and they may take two, three, five years, or even longer. Ukraine will have to hold elections in a fully democratic environment. And I have always said that Ukraine is a democratic country because, in presidential elections, nobody knows in advance who will win. In Russia, by contrast, the outcome is known in advance. The West understands this well: these are the kinds of elections that show where democracy exists and where it does not.

At the same time, democracy has its own risks: political confrontation, mutual accusations, an election campaign, a divided parliament, and difficulties in forming a coalition. Obviously, Russia will try to exploit all of this.

But there is no other way: Ukraine must remain a democratic country if it is to become a member of the European Union.

CHINA AND TURKEY COULD EXERT INFLUENCE ON RUSSIA

UI: How do you assess the peace mission of Witkoff and Kushner, who recently visited Moscow and Kyiv, given that Ukraine wants its European allies to be at the negotiating table?

AK: Ukraine’s position is justified. Europe should be at the negotiating table, because we must remember that Europe is financing almost 100% of the assistance to Ukraine, whereas America is not. I have lost all hope in this American mission.

Witkoff says that when he retires, he will remember his meetings with Putin as the best thing that ever happened to him, and that he has “full trust” in him. How can anyone say such a thing? How can you speak of “full trust” in a person who is responsible for this war, makes decisions to attack civilian targets, and is even responsible for the abduction of thousands of Ukrainian children and their Russification?

Of course, it is not Witkoff and Kushner but Putin who is the main actor here. Trump also plays an important role, while two other leaders — Xi Jinping and Erdoğan — could potentially have some influence.

If we are talking about who could be relatively effective in exerting influence on Russia today, it is the Chinese and the Turks. One thing must be acknowledged: partly thanks to them, the nuclear rhetoric has subsided somewhat, although it resurfaces periodically.

This is risky, but as far as I know, the Chinese have made it clear that they do not agree even to the purely verbal use of this threat by the Russians.

UI: How do you assess the extent and effectiveness of Russia’s hybrid activities — acts of sabotage and subversion carried out in Europe?

AK: Unfortunately, these activities are effective, and they carry them out at a professional level. But the greatest danger for us is that, by unofficially supporting various political forces, they are changing Europe’s political landscape.

The AfD party, which is gaining strength in Germany and is clearly oriented toward Russia, is a problem. The rise of anti-Ukrainian forces in Poland is another.

Elections will soon be held in France, where it may also turn out that Marine Le Pen wins, in which case we would have a politician who is significantly more sympathetic toward Russia.

The situation may develop in different ways, but Russia absolutely must not be underestimated. Its actions need to be monitored closely.

There are governments that are responding to Russia’s actions with increasing firmness and without illusions. Germany, for example, especially after the attempted drone attack in Leipzig. Now the Hungarian government is expelling ten Russian diplomats from the country.

UI: Illusions are fading, and that is a good thing...

AK: At the same time, Russia’s potential for hybrid influence over European countries remains significant, and this must not be underestimated.

UI: Could next year’s elections in France and Poland, as well as the growing strength of the far right in Germany, completely or partially change Europe’s attitude toward Ukraine?

AK: Yes, they could. One achievement — not to mention Poland, which is a special case — is that even in the West, in Germany and France, people have come to understand, through Putin’s actions, who the aggressor is, who the victim is, who brought the war, and who is suffering from it. This is a major change in people’s perceptions.

Of course, today all the anti-Ukrainian forces are gradually trying to change these attitudes, but the fact that this shift has taken place remains in people’s consciousness.

I think that even Marine Le Pen, if she were to win the presidential election, could not announce the next day that France would no longer help Ukraine because, supposedly, Russia is right.

If today we say that we want to end the war on Putin’s terms, we must openly acknowledge that we want a sovereign Ukraine, which has just celebrated 35 years of independence, to surrender and effectively become part of Greater Russia, to come under Russian flags. There is no support for that.

In short, some kind of “Yalta redux” or, if we dig deeper, “Trianon redux,” where everything is decided without the participation of Ukrainians themselves, would be too much. I think even pro-Russian forces in Europe would not allow themselves to go that far.

Overall, however, this political shift in Europe could work against Ukraine. Apart from Hungary, I do not currently see similar favorable trends.

THE MOST IMPORTANT THING IS TO MAINTAIN THE BELIEF IN THE EU THAT WE NEED UKRAINE

UI: In your view, what are the prospects for Ukraine’s European integration under the current circumstances?

AK: No one can outline a clear timeline, because in the European Union it is generally difficult to talk about dates. That is simply how things work there: everything simmers for a very long time, and then, once certain procedures begin, things move relatively quickly toward a positive outcome.

I believe the most important thing now is to preserve the conviction within the European Union that we need Ukraine. Pope John Paul II once said about Poland: “Poland needs Europe, and Europe needs Poland.” In my view, this is the message that needs to be politically conveyed today: “Europe needs Ukraine, and Ukraine needs Europe.” That is the first point.

Second, experts should already be working on several difficult issues in relations between Kyiv and Brussels. These include agriculture, the services sector, and transport, particularly freight transport.

There are several such issues where leading experts need to look for solutions. And, as far as I know, because I speak to people involved in these matters, solutions can be found.

Poland is also a good example here: there were concerns about Polish agriculture as well. At the same time, there were fears on both sides: the West feared that we would undermine its agriculture, while Poles feared that the West would absorb us. In the end, everyone has benefited from the process.

Let us remember that Ukraine has enormous potential and very good natural conditions. You produce what the world needs, especially in places where there is hunger — grain, sunflower oil, and so on.

It is not necessary for all of this to go to Europe — the products can go to Africa, where there are genuinely enormous needs, using European funding and transport infrastructure. So difficult issues need to be discussed at the expert level so that we have ready answers when the time comes.

At the same time, let me be completely frank: the biggest problem at the final stage will not be technical issues, but the transition from wartime to mature democracy.

This could be the main challenge, because it is obvious that wartime is not a time for developing democracy, and everyone agrees on that. But the war will end, and then Ukraine will have to show that Parliament is functioning, that there are free media, that a system of checks and balances and mutual oversight among institutions is in place, and that corruption can be effectively fought, among other things.

And this could indeed become a problem. My outlook for Ukraine is as follows: some kind of veterans’ party or movement, so to speak, will probably become a significant political force after the war.

And the military and veterans are not, so to speak, a group with a great deal of experience in democratic governance. These are people who are accustomed to operating within a different system.

So I would pay attention to this: if Ukraine conducts the talks relatively quickly and ultimately wants to join the European Union, it will have to meet democratic standards.

UI: The European Union recently adopted its 21st package of sanctions against Russia. Each successive package is becoming increasingly difficult for Europe to agree on. In your view, will the EU be able to continue its policy of pressure on Russia and impose new sanctions?

AK: The stronger pro-Russian forces become in Europe — and France could be the first example of this — the more arguments we will hear along the lines of: “We have imposed sanctions, this is already the 21st package, and nothing has happened — the war is still going on.” So, unfortunately, we can expect to hear such voices in Europe going forward.

But I am not so pessimistic as to believe that the two most influential players in European politics — France and Germany — will suddenly come completely under the control of pro-Russian forces.

In Germany, this certainly will not happen quickly. But lessons need to be learned from the CDU’s defeat in Saxony-Anhalt. We cannot pretend that nothing happened. No, something did happen, and we need to acknowledge it.

UI: NATO is needed by Ukraine, but does NATO need Ukraine today?

AK: I have a personal view on this which, frankly speaking, is not realistic today. I believe that if we are serious about talking about the future — both ours and yours — then Ukraine’s NATO membership should be on the table.

First, to a significant extent, Ukraine is already making use of NATO resources — intelligence, weapons, training, and so on. That is itself a kind of benefit. Your country is already so deeply integrated into cooperation with NATO that it would simply be wrong to speak of Ukraine as some kind of “foreign body.”

Second, if we look at our security system, my argument is quite simple: it is better to have a nearly one-million-strong army with experience of modern warfare and 21st-century combat operations on our side than to leave it in some kind of political vacuum.

Third, Ukraine is currently a source of inspiration for NATO and the Alliance’s armed forces. We should already be analyzing Ukraine’s experience — in conducting conventional military operations, defending its airspace, and using modern drones and other technologies.

Ukraine knows more than all of us put together. Perhaps only the Americans have more experience in certain areas.

And I would not be afraid of Putin’s reaction here. He was categorically opposed to both Finland and Sweden joining NATO — and they are already members of the Alliance.

Especially if it ultimately turns out that Donetsk and Crimea remain within Russia’s sphere of influence, then, in my view, Ukraine’s NATO membership will be absolutely crucial from the standpoint of the West’s security.

But there is another problem: NATO’s leader, the United States. And as long as Donald Trump is president, I think everything I have said remains highly unrealistic.

NAWROCKI HAS NOT SHED HIS ROLE AS HEAD OF THE INSTITUTE OF NATIONAL REMEMBRANCE WHEN IT COMES TO UKRAINE

UI: Let us move on to Ukrainian-Polish relations. In your view, how can we reverse the negative trends currently evident in our relations? Can we still speak of a strategic partnership between Kyiv and Warsaw?

AK: We are and will remain strategic partners. People can say whatever they want, but certain things cannot be changed. We cannot change the fact that we are neighbors, nor the fact that one million Ukrainians live in Poland today, work here, and are important to the Polish economy.

And if we look at our “hard” interests, then, of course, an independent Ukraine — a pro-Western state located between Poland and Russia — is of strategic importance to Poland. From the standpoint of Polish security, the logic of this is quite obvious.

How can we reverse the negative trends? First, once again, we need to talk more about the positives — about what Ukrainians bring to Poland and Polish society.

Second, and this is addressed directly to Ukrainians themselves, it is worth avoiding behavior in Poland that is irritating and unnecessary and can then fuel negative attitudes toward Ukrainians in general.

For example, even incidents such as conspicuously driving expensive cars while significantly exceeding the speed limit can create unnecessary resentment in Polish society.

UI: Here you are talking more about the behavior of individual Ukrainians rather than the Ukrainian people as a whole or Ukraine’s state policy, correct?

AK: Yes. Of course, it is difficult to control this, and you cannot get through to everyone. But I am making this appeal, so I hope Ukrainians will listen to me!

That is why I believe this is not a lost cause. On the most sensitive issues, we simply need to do what is necessary: talk about the positives, explain the actual situation to society, and at the same time not allow individual negative incidents to determine attitudes toward Ukrainians as a whole.

UI: The difficult history is also among the most sensitive issues...

AK: Exhumations need to be carried out, and the graves need to be properly maintained. The process is now moving forward.

But we need to do even more: write books, organize meetings of historians, scholars, and students, so that this knowledge reaches people.

Because when you have more knowledge, it is easier to take these things in, you see more aspects of them, and you understand different perspectives. We also need to avoid demonstrative gestures. Let Ukraine refrain from naming military units after the UPA or its heroes.

But at the same time, let our president refrain from withdrawing an award that was a gesture not only toward a particular individual, but toward the Ukrainian people as a whole.

So we need to abandon such emotional and, in my view, unnecessary actions. And, as I have already said, we need to find that new founding myth for our relations.

If it did not exist, we would have to invent one. But it does exist!

UI: What do you mean?

AK: First, there is Poland’s recognition of Ukraine’s independence in 1991. We were the first state to do so.

Second, there is our support for Ukraine during difficult moments — just think of my role during the Orange Revolution. There is also Poland’s clear position from the very beginning of Russia’s aggression in 2014.

And finally, third, there is the assistance provided to Ukrainian refugees, particularly the spontaneous, grassroots response from society. That was probably the greatest value of all. It was not organized by the government or some minister — ordinary people did it. They opened their homes, helped, and welcomed Ukrainians.

These are major things that we need to talk about, write books about, and make films about. We need to show how, despite our complicated history, this can work — how Poles and Ukrainians can help one another and build good relations.

So I absolutely do not believe that we are in a losing position. And the fact that some cynical politician uses anti-Ukrainian sentiment to get 9 percent instead of 7, or 16 instead of 15, in an election does not mean that everything is lost. It can still be changed.

UI: Since 1991, Poland’s and Ukraine’s strategic relations have largely been shaped by a model of strong personal ties at the presidential level. Obviously, that model is changing today. Is Donald Tusk’s current government capable of taking on the role that presidents previously played in bilateral relations?

AK: High-level relations between Poland and Ukraine are essential — at the presidential level, between the governments, and at the ministerial level. I believe that any retreat from such engagement — whether on the Ukrainian or Polish side — would be a major mistake.

As for President Karol Nawrocki, his passivity on some issues related to Ukraine is, in my view, not in Poland’s interests.

But I also know that he is a historian, that he headed the Institute of National Remembrance, and that he has repeatedly spoken about Ukrainian-Polish history and dealt with issues surrounding the Volyn tragedy. So perhaps he simply needs to step out of his old role and move into a new one.

UI: So you believe he has not yet moved beyond his role as head of the Institute of National Remembrance?

AK: On Ukrainian issues, unfortunately, no. But in my view, all the arguments in favor of building strategic Polish-Ukrainian relations are so strong that, ultimately, even those who have serious reservations will have to accept them.

Even if we assume a fairly unfavorable scenario — that Putin does not withdraw from Donetsk and Crimea and that some form of ceasefire is eventually reached — Ukraine will still remain a major European country.

Even if its population is 25 or 30 million people, it will be a country that wants to live by the same principles as we do. It is a large market, a significant pool of human resources, and offers enormous opportunities for business and tourism.

Whether we like it or not, we cannot treat Ukraine as some temporary or seasonal phenomenon. It will be a permanent element of the new European architecture. And Poland should play a leading role in this process — as a neighbor and as a major European country capable of offering Ukraine a great deal while also gaining a great deal in return.

The difference between the policy pursued by my Ukrainian partners and me — Leonid Kuchma, for example — was that there were emotions, but they did not dominate. We looked at reality, arguments, needs, and interests. And we were able to accomplish a great deal.

Today’s politics is much more dependent on emotions, opinion polls, and social media. In this information frenzy, it is genuinely very easy to make mistakes.

UI: We are a year away from Poland’s parliamentary elections. How could their results affect Polish-Ukrainian relations if, say, the makeup of the government and ruling coalition were to change?

AK: It could change, or it might not. The result does not necessarily have to be what is being predicted today. But if you look at the current polls, one thing is certain: Tusk’s party will most likely win the election. The other question is whether it will have a majority.

But look at the relationship between the right-wing parties today. Can you imagine a coalition in which Kaczyński, Morawiecki, Mentzen, and Braun would all sit together?

UI: Do you consider such a coalition completely unrealistic?

AK: I have lived too long not to imagine things. But it would be an extremely difficult coalition to put together. Moreover, anti-Ukrainian sentiment would hardly be the glue holding such a coalition together.

Because anti-Ukrainian sentiment today means being pro-Russian, and that is no longer something that can be reconciled with Polish interests. As I have already said, anyone who opposes Ukraine is, de facto, accepting Russia’s dictates regarding Ukraine and therefore taking a pro-Russian position.

UI: So you believe that, most likely, there would be no catastrophe for Ukrainian-Polish relations if a right-wing coalition came to power in Poland?

AK: No, I do not want to talk in such terms at all. What I want to say is that the left and the liberals can still win these elections. There is a whole year ahead of us. But it needs to be used very actively, including by speaking openly about the strategic importance of Polish-Ukrainian relations.

For example, we should talk about how beneficial it is for Poland that one million or more Ukrainians want to work and live here and strengthen our economy.

UI: And how do you assess Prime Minister Donald Tusk’s policy toward Ukraine?

AK: I can say one thing about Prime Minister Tusk: I have no doubts about his pro-Ukrainian stance and experience. Moreover, during his time in European office, he had contacts with Putin. But, unlike some other European politicians, Tusk definitely has no illusions about Putin.

In this sense, Tusk is a very serious partner for Ukraine. Of course, some things could have been done better in practice. But today, in my view, he is someone who correctly assesses the importance of Polish-Ukrainian relations.

Yurii Banakhevych led this conversation. Warsaw

Photo: Ukrinform, Roxana Todea, Flickr, YES 2026, facebook.com/aleksander.kwasniewski

The conversation is given here translated from Ukrainian