Oleksandr Alfyorov, Head of the Ukrainian Institute of National Memory

A landmark event in the preservation of Ukrainian national memory took place on May 19 in Luxembourg. At Bonnevoie Cemetery, a ceremony was held to transfer to Ukraine the exhumed remains of Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN) leader Andriy Melnyk and his wife, Sofiia Fedak-Melnyk, for reburial in their homeland. The initiative is part of a state program launched by President Volodymyr Zelensky aimed at reburying prominent Ukrainians who died abroad.

In Luxembourg, Ukrinform spoke with Oleksandr Alfyorov, head of the Ukrainian Institute of National Memory and a veteran of the 3rd Separate Assault Brigade. He discussed the concept behind the Pantheon of Outstanding Ukrainians, the challenges of preserving national identity and historical memory amid Russia’s full-scale war against Ukraine, and the persistence of Russia-centric interpretations of Ukrainian history in certain Western academic and cultural circles. Mr. Alfyorov also spoke about the renewed momentum within the Institute following its upgraded status, which, in his words, has made possible a historical “offensive” or “Reconquista.”

THE INITIAL REBURIAL PROCESS WAS PRECEDED BY THOROUGH PREPARATORY WORK

Ukrinform: Today’s ceremony marks an important milestone in the creation of the Pantheon of Outstanding Ukrainians. What preparations preceded this process, what challenges had to be overcome, and what further steps are planned in this area?

Oleksandr Alfyorov: The idea of establishing a pantheon is not new to Ukraine. Discussions on the subject have surfaced several times before, although some earlier initiatives were fairly marginal. This, among other things, led to confusion, as the concepts of the National Pantheon and the Memorial to the Heroes gradually became conflated. Many people now imagine the pantheon primarily as a burial place for fallen soldiers, while various “people’s pantheons” have appeared in different regions. However, these are fundamentally different concepts and should be clearly distinguished.

The National Pantheon is envisioned as a site with a limited number of burials. It is not intended to function as a cemetery, but rather as a symbolic space designed to sacralize Ukraine’s historical continuum. In this sense, it affirms Ukraine’s place in history — from roughly the 10th century to the present day — while serving as a source of national inspiration and a central venue for state ceremonies of the highest level.

The Memorial to the Heroes, by contrast, is specifically dedicated to honoring those killed in the ongoing war. The same principle also underpins the Museum of the Russian-Ukrainian War and the War for Ukraine’s Independence.

It is important to emphasize that, unlike previous discussions surrounding the pantheon, this initiative evolved in a fundamentally different manner. Extensive preparatory work was undertaken from the outset to assess the Ukrainian state’s institutional capacity to carry out reburials. This included evaluating whether the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ukrainian Institute of National Memory, the Office of the President, and other state institutions were capable of effectively implementing such a process.

Incidentally, President Volodymyr Zelensky began raising the issue of reburials quite some time ago. As a result, the initiative was carefully prepared, and today we are witnessing the reburial of Andriy Melnyk and his wife on Ukrainian soil.

UKRAINE IS WAGING A WAR FOR ITS RIGHT TO EXIST

UI: You touched upon the issue of the ongoing war. Does the Institute have sufficient resources to balance the archiving of the current war — including veterans’ oral histories, the documentation of war crimes, and the digitization of battlefield artifacts — with its traditional mandate of historical research?

OA: In reality, resources are limited, but we understand that Ukraine is waging a war for its very right to exist — for its statehood.

That is why we have no alternative: we must dedicate ourselves fully to achieving victory. And victory will come, because Ukraine has a future, whereas the Russian Federation does not.

Naturally, the Institute faces numerous challenges. We do not have a large staff, and many of the tasks we confront today simply did not exist in previous decades. We are working on reburials, contributing to the Pantheon project, and this May we are commemorating the 100th anniversary of Symon Petliura’s death through conferences, international assemblies, and other events. Recently, we also organized the first congress to bring together a large number of Polish and Ukrainian historians, and for the first time in a decade we succeeded in restoring dialogue among specialists in 20th-century history.

At the same time, we are seeking to broaden the chronological scope of the Institute’s work by looking back across a millennium of Ukrainian history. After all, the Russian Federation does not rely exclusively on myths and propaganda tied to the 20th century.

Russian narratives continue to penetrate Ukraine through various channels, including distorted interpretations of Cossack history, narratives about “the tsar’s serfs,” and concepts tied to the ancient Rus’ “principality,” “Russia-Rus’,” and “Novgorodian Rus’.”

Only now is Ukraine’s institutional memory framework beginning to expand its presence in a truly meaningful way. We have no alternative — we must prevail.

UKRAINE CAN HAVE ONLY ONE VICTORY — A FUTURE VICTORY

UI: Ukraine recently marked another anniversary of the Day of Remembrance and Victory over Nazism on May 8, finally breaking with the Soviet tradition of celebrating May 9. How successfully has the Ukrainian Institute of National Memory managed to transform public perception — from the Soviet “cult of weapons” to a European model focused on commemorating human loss?

OA: In the Russian Federation, Victory Day is framed as “a holiday with tears in the eyes.” A “holiday.”

But a celebration of what exactly? Even the origins of the Russian word prazdnik and the Ukrainian word sviato reflect fundamentally different concepts. Sviato is associated with holiness — with something sacred — whereas prazdnik derives from the notion of idleness or inactivity. For us, it is difficult to comprehend how people can publicly celebrate the deaths of their fathers or children.

For years, the Ukrainian Institute of National Memory has worked to promote the European understanding of May 8–9 as a commemoration marking the end of one of the most devastating wars in human history. Today, Ukrainians have clearly come to understand that Ukraine can have only one true victory — a future victory. From this perspective, people naturally begin asking themselves: what exactly was this so-called “Victory Day celebration”?

Since 2014, we have watched the “Victory Day” narrative evolve into one of the central myths of the so-called “Russian world.” Ukrainians increasingly understand that this is not our day — that it was artificially constructed and serves as an instrument of Russian propaganda.

Although many of us were never taught in school about the broader European understanding of May 8–9, Ukrainians have shown a remarkable capacity for adaptation and self-education. Today, even older generations are increasingly coming to recognize that victory cannot be equated with happiness when it comes at the cost of immense human suffering.

That is why Ukraine is now undergoing profound changes in public consciousness. We support this transformation through exhibitions, publishing initiatives, and advocacy projects.

THE WEST IS BEGINNING TO AWAKEN TO THE REALITIES OF THE 20TH CENTURY

UI: It is encouraging to see such transformations taking place in Ukraine. At the same time, however, Ukrainian history is still frequently viewed through a Russia-centric lens in certain Western cultural and academic circles. Has the Institute managed to pursue a more assertive form of cultural diplomacy in Western European capitals in order to eliminate these blind spots?

OA: It is difficult. But the paradox is that, much like in Ukraine, many people abroad were simply never taught these things in school. For example, the force that fought on the Eastern Front is referred to in Ukraine as the “Red Army,” while in the West it has traditionally been described as the “Russian army.” We need to open the world’s eyes to the fact that it was not a Russian army, but a multinational one, and that Auschwitz was liberated by the Ukrainian Front — not by some mythical “Russian soldier Ivan.” Those were mobilized Ukrainians. Europeans are gradually beginning to understand this, although the process remains slow.

They are beginning to view the events of the 20th century within a broader historical context.

Incidentally, while I would not presume to accuse anyone, I would still note that after the First World War, the Entente powers chose to divide a nation of 40 million people and create a buffer zone rather than support the establishment of an independent Ukrainian state. That was a mistaken course of action, and they too are gradually beginning to recognize it.

RUSSIA’S AGGRESSION HAS BROUGHT ANOTHER TRAGEDY TO UKRAINE’S INDIGENOUS PEOPLES

UI: Given that the law on the fundamental principles of state policy on national memory, adopted in August 2025, is now fully in force, how is the Ukrainian Institute of National Memory integrating the historical trauma of Ukraine’s indigenous peoples and ethnic communities into the broader national narrative, particularly regarding territories that remain under Russian occupation?

OA: Thank you for this important question. The Crimean Tatars, Karaites, and Krymchaks are all indigenous peoples of Ukraine. This category should also include the Urums and the Rumei, whom we more commonly — though somewhat inaccurately — refer to as the “Azov Greeks,” despite the fact that they historically originated from Crimea. Ukraine is a multinational country. We have Polish, Russian, Belarusian, Jewish, Hungarian, and many other communities. In this respect, Ukraine is no different from many other European countries.

The Institute works actively with the Crimean Tatar community and with The Presidential Representative Office of Ukraine in the Autonomous Republic of Crimea. This year, we have also intensified our cooperation with the Urums and the Rumei.

In particular, we are preparing for publication previously unknown recordings of Urum and Rumei folklore dating back to the 1920s, which are currently being studied in Paris. This, too, has become one of the Institute’s priority areas of work.

UI: A significant part of Ukraine’s national memory is now being systematically destroyed or falsified by the occupying authorities in Mariupol, Berdiansk, and Melitopol. What instruments is the Ukrainian Institute of National Memory using to preserve the memory of civic resistance in these regions before it is erased completely?

OA: We are witnessing yet another tragic chapter in history, because the ancestral homeland of the Karaites, Krymchaks, Crimean Tatars, as well as the Urums and the Rumei, is once again under temporary occupation.

UI: Again…

Yes, again. This is a tragedy because a new generation is now growing up in these communities without ever having seen its ancestral homeland. Naturally, we are cooperating closely with these communities, organizing a comprehensive range of informational and cultural initiatives aimed at maintaining ties with territories where legitimate Ukrainian authority is currently unable to operate.

IN MATTERS OF NATIONAL MEMORY, IT IS IMPOSSIBLE TO REMAIN PURELY DEFENSIVE

UI: Since January 1, 2026, the Ukrainian Institute of National Memory has been operating under a new framework that granted it a unique “special status” and a tenfold increase in funding — a transformation you yourself described as the emergence of a “small Ministry of Memory.” How has this institutional independence changed your work in practice, shifting it from a defensive posture toward what you have called a historical “offensive” or “Reconquista”?

OA: It is important to understand that this status brings not only greater authority, but also greater responsibility — and, consequently, new challenges.

At the same time, the Institute’s new mandate — shaping national memory rather than merely implementing state policy in this sphere — has given us greater mobility, since we are now reporting directly to the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine. It has also provided us with new instruments, including an expanded staffing structure. Much, of course, depends on our employees — our most valuable resource. Incidentally, I consider it an honor that twelve members of the Institute’s staff are currently serving in Ukraine’s Defense Forces.

Today we are entering a fundamentally new stage. Having assumed these expanded functions, we are beginning to operate on an entirely different level. And this historical “Reconquista” undoubtedly means that we cannot remain permanently on the defensive. We must move beyond that posture, because defense alone, sooner or later, tends to lead to defeat. More than ever, Ukraine must not merely respond to Russian propaganda or engage in counterpropaganda. We must create our own narratives capable of striking the enemy effectively in the cognitive sphere.

This also includes the issue of Russia’s decolonization. It means affirming that Rus’ was a Ukrainian state. It means explaining that Russia never conquered the Hetmanate. This is the historical truth, and it must be communicated clearly.

This is our number one task. Step by step, guided by this principle, we are developing increasingly ambitious and impactful projects. One example is our exhibition on “church rashism,” which is currently touring across Ukraine. It demonstrates how the missiles and drones striking Ukraine have, in effect, been “blessed” by the Russian clergy.

We must also dismantle the mythology surrounding the so-called Lviv Council, where the Greek Catholic Church was allegedly “reunited” with the Moscow Patriarchate. It is essential to state plainly that this was a falsification imposed through coercion.

In other words, we are now engaging audiences in an entirely different way. And from what I can see, this approach is already producing tangible results.

Yevhen Matiushenko led this conversation. Brussels–Luxembourg

Photos via Author