Jürgen Hardt, foreign policy spokesman for the CDU/CSU parliamentary group in the Bundestag

Germany is the largest bilateral provider of assistance to Ukraine in Europe and one of the key pillars of broader European support for Kyiv. Berlin’s position plays a major role in shaping the scale and direction of military aid to Ukraine, maintaining EU unity on sanctions against Russia, and influencing efforts toward a future peace settlement.

Against this backdrop, political developments in Germany — and the thinking of decision-makers in Berlin — are of particular importance to Ukraine. This applies above all to the Christian Democratic Union of Germany/Christian Social Union in Bavaria conservative alliance, which leads the German government in coalition with the SPD and plays a decisive role in shaping the country’s foreign policy course.

Ukrinform’s staff correspondent in Germany spoke with one of the most influential conservative voices on security and foreign policy — Jürgen Hardt, a CDU member of the Bundestag and foreign policy spokesman for the CDU/CSU parliamentary group.

The conversation covered a range of key issues: whether Berlin’s strategic objective is Ukraine’s victory or merely preventing its defeat; the prospects of the pro-Russian Alternative for Germany coming to power and what that could mean for continued support for Ukraine; how Berlin envisions the path toward peace in Ukraine; and how German policymakers assess the Kremlin’s willingness to negotiate. The interview also touched on Taurus missiles, Nord Stream, “mediator” Gerhard Schröder, the prospect of a special tribunal for Vladimir Putin, and other issues.

ONLY A STRONGER UKRAINE CAN DELIVER PEACE

Ukrinform: Mr. Hardt, during his recent visit to Ukraine, Defense Minister Boris Pistorius expressed an optimistic assessment, saying that Ukraine has now seized the initiative while Russia is entering a phase of weakness — militarily, economically, and domestically. Do you share this view? And are we perhaps witnessing a turning point in the war?

Jürgen Hardt: I also have the impression that Ukraine is capable of successfully repelling Russia’s spring offensive and seizing the initiative in certain sectors of the front. That is a sign of strength.

And I am convinced that this is the only way to force Putin to agree to meaningful and fair peace negotiations — if he is compelled to recognize that the situation could turn against him. He will not allow such a defeat to become obvious to everyone. Most likely, he himself will sooner conclude that it is better to negotiate peace than to face an unmistakable defeat.

And then the conditions for fair peace negotiations would be entirely different from what they are today.

That makes me believe that strengthening Ukraine is the only path to achieving peace in Ukraine.

UI: For a long time, you criticized the government of Olaf Scholz for its indecisiveness and the vague formula that Ukraine “must not lose.” Today, the CDU is in power, and Friedrich Merz is chancellor. A direct question: what is the strategic priority of the CDU/CSU bloc — preventing Ukraine’s defeat, or Ukraine’s victory and the restoration of its borders?

JH: Ukraine’s victory means the restoration of Ukraine’s internationally recognized borders.

As is well known, Ukraine is not laying claim to a single square centimeter of Russian territory; it is simply defending its own land and its own citizens. And for me, this also includes the return of the abducted children whom Putin deported to Russia.

That is why, in this sense, I say: Ukraine must win this war.

If, along this path, Ukraine comes to the conclusion that a viable peace settlement with Russia can be achieved through negotiations — one in which, in light of future sacrifices, Ukraine may be prepared to make certain concessions — then it has every right to do so. It would have our full support.

But the ultimate objective remains unchanged: Russian troops must leave Ukraine.

TAURUS NO LONGER HAS THE URGENCY IT ONCE DID

UI: I ask this in part because there is a widespread perception that the West is supplying Ukraine with just enough weapons to prevent defeat, but not enough to secure victory. Do you agree with this criticism?

JH: I do not agree with this criticism.

As Germany — even under the government of Olaf Scholz, which gradually adjusted its policy on this issue — we became Ukraine’s most important partner in Europe. Both the German defense industry and Germany as a whole are providing substantial support to Ukraine, both from German territory and directly within Ukraine itself.

And we see that, thanks to its experience, immense military effort, and the perseverance and courage of its people, Ukraine has built a highly capable domestic defense industry of its own.

What we now hear from Ukraine is that the key issue is primarily financial resources to sustain this production, rather than weapons in the broader sense. The massive EU funds allocated to Ukraine, together with bilateral contributions from individual member states, are critically important.

That said, however, the need for external arms supplies remains enormous — particularly in the field of air defense, to protect cities and soldiers at the front. There are still significant gaps here. But Germany cannot fill them alone; this will only be possible through expanded production, especially of systems such as Patriot missile system and IRIS-T. And that takes time.

UI: Here I also have to ask about Taurus missiles…

JH: The Federal Chancellor has decided, as a matter of principle, not to discuss such matters publicly. I believe that the issue of how to approach the Taurus question is being discussed between the Ukrainian and German governments in a spirit of mutual understanding.

Germany is doing everything possible to ensure that Ukraine can seize the opportunity it now has — namely, to gain the upper hand in this war and place Putin in a position where he himself concludes that it is wiser to enter peace negotiations before he is forced to come to terms with an obvious defeat. Because, in my view, that would seriously destabilize his political position at home.

UI: But is the Taurus issue a matter of debate within the coalition or not?

JH: We regularly reaffirm to one another that we do not discuss this publicly.

I believe that Taurus KEPD 350 no longer carries the same significance today that it would have had two or three years ago, because other weapons systems and forms of warfare have emerged that Ukraine is using very effectively. This applies in particular to drones — an obvious element of Ukraine’s growing momentum and strength — both in the use of UAVs and interceptor drones.

That is why this issue no longer has the same urgency it once did.

But I believe it is right that Volodymyr Zelensky and Friedrich Merz do not discuss it publicly.

THE PRO-UKRAINE MAJORITY IN THE BUNDESTAG GOES BEYOND THE COALITION

UI: A bit about domestic politics. Polls show considerable dissatisfaction with the performance of the federal government, while the media continue to report tensions between the coalition parties. Will the government last until the end of its term? And will support for Ukraine remain stable during that time?

JH: First of all, I am confident that the government will hold together. A whole series of important reform measures will be implemented this year.

We understand that not every aspect of these reforms is popular. Reforms are generally supported by the majority because people recognize their necessity. But when it comes to the specific details, everyone feels that reforms inevitably involve change — and possibly restrictions. That is why they become unpopular.

All the more reason, therefore, to stay the course now and use 2026 to implement reforms so that their effects become tangible in 2027–2029: strengthening the economy and easing the burden on businesses and employees.

As for foreign policy, I can say that there are very few disagreements within this coalition — and those that do exist are not fundamental — in assessing the international situation, whether regarding Russia, relations with the United States, or NATO.

And when it comes to policy toward Ukraine, there are no differences whatsoever between the positions held by Boris Pistorius, Lars Klingbeil, and Bärbel Bas, and those held by Friedrich Merz and Johann Wadephul. The same applies to foreign policy spokespersons.

Moreover, I have the impression that this policy toward Ukraine is also supported by a significant part of the opposition — above all by Alliance 90/The Greens. In other words, the base of support for Ukraine in the German Bundestag is broader than the current governing coalition. Only Alternative for Germany is clearly opposed to assistance for Ukraine.

THE RISE OF THE “ALTERNATIVE FOR GERMANY” TO POWER IS EXTREMELY UNLIKELY — THEY HAVE NO PARTNERS

UI: My question is also driven by a certain concern. In the event of the collapse of the coalition and the government, followed by possible snap elections, the far-right and pro-Russian Alternative for Germany, which currently leads in the polls, could come to power. Do you see this danger? And what would it mean for Germany, Europe, and Ukraine?

JH: I believe that scenarios in which the AfD gains decisive political influence at the federal level are exaggerated. That will not happen.

The AfD does currently enjoy strong poll ratings, but it still remains far from a position where it could either form a government on its own or do so together with coalition partners — simply because such partners do not exist.

So I consider this scenario extremely unlikely. More than that, impossible.

Moreover, and this relates to what I said above, even if the current polling numbers were to translate into actual election results, there would still be a clear majority in the Bundestag in support of Ukraine. Alliance 90/The Greens, for example, would remain committed to this policy, which they had already supported under the government of Olaf Scholz. In fact, within that coalition, the Greens were the strongest advocates of the pro-Ukrainian course.

PUTIN LIED THROUGHOUT YEARS OF NEGOTIATIONS

UI: Some representatives of Alternative for Germany speak about the need to restore good relations with Russia. According to media reports, two lawmakers are planning to travel to St. Petersburg in June for an economic forum. How do you assess such actions by legislators at a time when Russia is waging not only an all-out war against Ukraine, but also a hybrid war against Europe?

JH: I condemn this in the strongest possible terms, because it amounts to propaganda in Putin’s favor. Such actions lend him political legitimacy and weight.

After all, one cannot say there was a lack of negotiations or diplomatic efforts with Putin. From the summer of 2014 until January 2022 — for nearly eight years — we engaged intensively in negotiations with Putin under the leadership of Angela Merkel and President Emmanuel Macron within the so-called Normandy Format. We reached various agreements which, however, were never implemented — primarily because of Russia’s conduct.

For example, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe was never given the opportunity to genuinely monitor the implementation of the Minsk agreements — Minsk I and Minsk II — in the Russian-occupied territories of eastern Ukraine.

Attempts to speak with the Russian president about why such large military forces were being concentrated along Ukraine’s border — both inside Russia itself and in Belarus — continued right up until January 2022. Putin categorically rejected all accusations that he was preparing aggression and dismissed them as paranoid fabrications.

The President of the United States, European leaders — negotiations were conducted at the highest level. Efforts were made at every level, and Putin simply lied throughout all of those conversations.

That is why today there is no foundation of trust whatsoever for a reasonable dialogue with Putin. And I can only strongly warn against pretending that such a foundation exists.

Putin today is isolated — even within the geopolitical space that once comprised the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact. Hardly any leaders from post-Soviet countries still attach special importance to meetings with Vladimir Putin. Open criticism of his policies is now even coming from Central Asia.

For me, there is an explanation for why Putin has brought Russia to this point: he wanted to turn Russia into a striking example of a “third path” for the 21st century — beyond what he saw as a decadent, ineffective, and unreformable West, while also presenting it as an alternative to China’s party dictatorship. He believed that a “managed democracy” built around nationalist forces would transform Russia into a beacon of the 21st century.

The reality, however, has turned out very differently: almost all former Soviet republics are increasingly distancing themselves from Russia. Belarus became another example of this in August 2020. Alexander Lukashenko survived the rigged elections only because Putin sent security forces and support to suppress the protest movement.

Russia’s economic development has also lagged far behind what other former Soviet republics and former Warsaw Pact countries achieved after the collapse of communist planned economies.

Thus, Putin’s political, economic, and social model has failed. And he no longer has any real opportunity to fundamentally reverse this.

That is why he behaves like a wounded predator — lashing out in all directions, searching for ways to conceal his failures, while deep down he himself knows that his peak has already passed.

And all of us together must ensure that the Russian people also come to understand this — that this is not the path Russia should follow in the 21st century.

NORD STREAM’S DESTRUCTION SERVED RUSSIAN INTERESTS ABOVE ALL

UI: Nevertheless, Alternative for Germany is calling for the lifting of sanctions against Russia and a return to so-called cheap Russian gas. In this context, there are also calls to repair and relaunch Nord Stream. What is the CDU/CSU position on this, and what future do you see for these pipelines?

JH: Even before Nord Stream 2 became operational, I opposed its launch and warned against it.

I also asked the European business partners of the Russian gas companies why they were participating in the project, because I never saw any genuine economic rationale behind it. Nord Stream 2 was unlikely ever to become profitable under any normal business model. In reality, the objective was exclusive gas supplies to Germany — and thus the exclusion of other Central and Southeastern European countries from the common European energy supply network.

For me, the political intentions behind Nord Stream 2 became apparent fairly early on. Incidentally, they were clear to others in the Bundestag as well. But at the time, we had no support. Neither the Free Democrats nor the Greens backed us. Instead, they warned against so-called dirty shale gas from North America.

And in the end, President Donald Trump announced sanctions against companies involved in Nord Stream 2, which we naturally regarded as unacceptable interference in European autonomy. After that, the political basis for arguments against Nord Stream 2 largely disappeared.

I wish Nord Stream 2 had never gone into operation. From that, you can draw the conclusion that I also have no problem with the fact that the pipeline has now been destroyed.

As for who is responsible, I believe the final word has not yet been spoken. Because, in my view, the biggest beneficiary of the destruction of Nord Stream is the Russian owner itself.

For political reasons, Russia was already no longer able to supply gas through this pipeline. But after its destruction, an additional opportunity emerged to claim that it was technically incapable of fulfilling its contractual obligations at all — and thus potentially avoid penalties. Moreover, the owner may even receive insurance compensation.

Therefore, in my view, the economic benefit of the pipeline’s destruction lies with its Russian owners.

I am not a criminal investigator and have no access to information other than what is publicly available. But if one looks at motives, the strongest motive for destroying the pipeline may well have existed among those who owned it. Although, of course, this remains speculation.

A CEASEFIRE MUST PRECEDE MEANINGFUL PEACE NEGOTIATIONS

UI: There are now also discussions about how relations with Russia should develop after a possible peace in Ukraine. Is it even conceivable — and desirable — to restore economic cooperation with Moscow? And under what conditions might Berlin consider this?

JH: If there is a genuine and just peace between Russia and Ukraine — and this is only possible if Ukraine negotiates from a position of strength — then we would, of course, support such a peace agreement, provided Ukraine itself supports it. For us, that is the decisive criterion.

But such a peace agreement would inevitably also require a fundamental change in Russian policy — above all in military policy and large-scale rearmament.

Against this backdrop, other processes could also become possible. In the event of a complete change of course by Russia, the European Union could certainly once again make certain offers — for example, regarding closer economic cooperation of the kind we offered Russia 20 years ago.

But all of this would only be possible on the condition of a profound change in Russian policy. And I consider such a transformation entirely plausible as the result of a genuine peace agreement. Otherwise, I cannot imagine Ukraine agreeing to peace at all.

If Russia continues its massive rearmament, if missiles, drones, tanks, and aircraft remain stationed along Ukraine’s borders, or if significant Russian forces continue to occupy Ukrainian territory, then this is not a basis on which Ukraine could accept peace. But the final decision must be made by Kyiv.

UI: Russia has recently suspended the trilateral negotiation format involving the United States, Russia, and Ukraine, while demanding that Ukraine withdraw its troops from the Donbas. How do you assess this new initiative — or rather, this attempt at blackmail? And how should Ukraine’s partners respond?

JH: Ukraine and its partners have already given a clear response to these so-called peace efforts by the President of the United States — most recently in the form of 20 points jointly agreed upon by Ukraine and the Europeans. In my view, this was a response to an absolutely unacceptable 28-point plan which — whoever drafted it — evidently found its way onto the negotiating table from Florida.

I believe Ukraine must continue to insist that a ceasefire must precede peace negotiations. Otherwise, peace talks can neither be credible nor conducted on an equal footing.

Putin categorically rejects this — and that, too, was one of the reasons the negotiations collapsed.

A POSSIBLE EUROPEAN MEDIATOR SHOULD BE CHOSEN BY ZELENSKYY

UI: Putin recently also mentioned former Chancellor Gerhard Schröder as a possible mediator. How is such a proposal perceived within the CDU/CSU?

JH: I called it propaganda. Because if Putin were truly serious about a mediation process, then his interlocutor should be the President of Ukraine, to whom such a proposal should first be presented. And only afterward should President Volodymyr Zelensky explain to the West how he assesses any specific mediation proposal.

So for us, this question does not arise at all. It was a smokescreen which, in my view, was aimed primarily at shaping public opinion in Germany — and forms part of Russia’s support for Alternative for Germany.

UI: Who, in general, from the German or European side could take on the role of mediator? Some German media outlets, for example, have speculated about Federal President Frank-Walter Steinmeier.

JH: All of this is merely media speculation that has no basis in any real discussions within German politics.

I remain firm in my position: the democratically elected President of Ukraine, Volodymyr Zelensky, together with the Verkhovna Rada, must decide when and under what conditions peace negotiations begin.

And if, at that stage, there is a desire for a German representative or a representative of the European Union to also be present at the negotiating table — which I would only welcome — then it should first be discussed behind closed doors who that representative could be. Afterward, President Zelensky, acting on behalf of the Ukrainian people, would express the corresponding request, which Germany or the European Union would naturally support.

That is the proper sequence — not the other way around.

UI: You emphasize that Ukraine itself must make the decisions. Is there nevertheless any scenario in which Berlin could exert pressure on Kyiv during this peace process?

JH: We are providing Ukraine with strong support — both militarily and financially. Germany is Ukraine’s largest bilateral donor. German bilateral assistance alone amounts to nearly €12.5 billion. In addition, there is our contribution to the €90 billion package at the level of the European Union.

All of this demonstrates that we are convinced peace negotiations must be conducted from a position of strength. And we believe that Ukraine is on the path toward achieving that strength — something we very much hope will happen, for the sake of the people of Ukraine and the soldiers at the front.

The path to peace lies through a strong Ukraine backed by strong support from Germany and Europe.

IN AN IDEAL SCENARIO, PEACE SHOULD BE EMBEDDED IN INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS WITHIN THE OSCE OR THE UN

UI: One more question regarding the Coalition of the Willing and security guarantees. Chancellor Friedrich Merz has not ruled out the deployment of Bundeswehr units on NATO territory neighboring Ukraine. How far have these discussions progressed?

JH: I believe that a peace acceptable to Ukraine — which, admittedly, I still do not see, because Russia is not yet prepared for the necessary concessions — would carry significance for all of Europe. Therefore, such a peace should ideally be embedded in international agreements within the framework of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe or the United Nations.

If such a peace were anchored in international law and supported by international institutions, this could also create certain obligations for the member states of those organizations. And in that case, I cannot imagine Germany shirking its responsibility.

But that would be the third step — after a peace agreement and its formalization under international law. Security guarantees for Ukraine are among the key elements of any peace settlement acceptable to Kyiv.

Moreover, in my view, NATO would be stronger if Ukraine were to become a member of the Alliance one day. There is currently no army in Europe as strong and battle-hardened as the Ukrainian one. This army emerged out of necessity — forged in a defensive war.

Therefore, the issue of security will depend first and foremost on Ukraine itself being strong enough to defend its borders — with the support of its partners.

PUTIN IS PERSONALLY RESPONSIBLE FOR AN ENORMOUS NUMBER OF DEATHS

UI: Finally, a question of justice. On May 15, the Council of Europe in Moldova effectively launched the mechanisms for a Special Tribunal on the crime of aggression against Ukraine. Could this process acquire the same historical significance for the 21st century as the Nuremberg Trials did after the Second World War?

JH: We need mechanisms through which those responsible can be brought before international courts or tribunals — even if they place themselves outside existing international agreements.

I believe this step could become part of the path in that direction. But there is still a long road ahead in terms of international law before all those responsible are genuinely held accountable.

From the standpoint of justice, perhaps no other violation of international law in recent decades has been so clear-cut. Vladimir Putin is personally responsible for an enormous number of deaths — both on the Ukrainian side and in his own country.

Vasyl Korotkyi led this conversation. Berlin

Photos via Author

*The conversation is given here translated from Ukrainian