Tomáš Pojar, former National Security Adviser to the Czech government

Tomáš Pojar served as an adviser to the prime minister and as the Czech government’s National Security Adviser from 2023 to 2025, becoming the first person in the country’s history to hold that position. Earlier in his career, he served as Deputy Minister for European Affairs, First Deputy Foreign Minister, and Czech ambassador to Israel. He also coordinated programs for post-Soviet countries at the humanitarian organization People in Need.

A regular participant in expert forums, analytical programs, and public policy discussions, Pojar is also a consistent and outspoken friend of Ukraine.

In an interview with Ukrinform, the analyst discussed the threats facing Europe, its readiness to play a mediating role in potential peace negotiations, the growing recognition of the need to strengthen Europe’s own defense capabilities, Russia’s imperial ambitions, and the importance of continued support for Ukraine.

ANYONE WHO WANTS THEIR THREATS TO BE TAKEN SERIOUSLY SHOULD THREATEN LESS OFTEN

Ukrinform: Mr. Pojar, the so-called “Victory Day Parade” in Moscow has already been analyzed extensively. Still, let me ask: in your view, how important is the connection between World War II and the war in Ukraine for Putin? Has he succeeded in convincing Russians that these wars are linked? And how do you perceive the fact that Russians marched through the streets — not only in Moscow — carrying posters reading “Our tanks will be in Prague” and calls to “do it again”?

Tomáš Pojar: I believe that part of Russian society does accept this narrative. The memory of World War II and of the Soviet Union constitutes one of the central pillars of the Kremlin’s modern ideology. For many years, it has served as a key instrument of both domestic and foreign propaganda, shaping how the regime presents itself both to its own citizens and to the outside world.

A certain degree of imperialism and chauvinism exists — and has always existed — within Russian society. From the very beginning, whether it was called Tsarist Russia, the Soviet Union, or today’s Russian Federation, the Russian state has been built around the idea of an empire that must continue expanding. In that sense, very little has changed, and I do not expect this to change in the foreseeable future.

UI: After the parade, Putin hinted that the end of the “conflict in Ukraine” is approaching. Does he sense war fatigue within Russian society, or does he still believe in a quick military solution?

TP: I do not believe a single word he says.

At the same time, I think he must recognize a certain degree of nervousness within Russian society, as well as Russia’s obvious economic difficulties. And perhaps he also has at least some understanding of what the real situation at the front actually looks like, rather than viewing everything solely through the lens of Russian propaganda — although the atmosphere of fear there is extremely strong, and very few people are willing to speak openly and honestly.

In such regimes, people often try to anticipate what the “tsar” expects from them and tell him what they believe he wants to hear, rather than describing reality as it truly is.

UI: A few days ago, Russia reportedly conducted another successful test of the RS-28 Sarmat missile, which it presents as a weapon without equal in the world. Could this intimidate the West?

TP: I do not think so. Due to the constant inflation of threats coming from Moscow, along with the endless stream of statements about supposedly “cutting-edge weapons”, such threats are now far less effective than they once were. Anyone who wants their threats to be taken seriously should threaten less often.

That said, I do not mean to suggest that there are no people in the West who take these threats seriously and are, to some extent, inclined to accommodate them. But in my view, this does not have any decisive impact.

In the end, as far as I could tell, the issue did not generate any major media resonance in Europe. Had something similar happened four years ago, it would likely have attracted far greater attention than it does today.

EUROPE HAS ENOUGH PEOPLE IT COULD MANDATE TO MEDIATE NEGOTIATIONS

UI: Russia has announced that it is withdrawing from the peace negotiations. Does this mean the Kremlin no longer feels pressure from Donald Trump? At the same time, however, Putin says he could meet with Volodymyr Zelensky.

TP: I do not think he has ever felt any real pressure from the United States, because Donald Trump never truly wanted to exert serious pressure on Russia.

At the same time, Russian officials may say one thing today and tomorrow say or do the exact opposite without perceiving any contradiction in it. That is why I would not attach too much importance to such statements, because by tomorrow the situation may already look entirely different.

UI: Putin also hinted that he is prepared to negotiate with Europe, although he had previously rejected that idea. Has the moment truly come for Europe to enter the game and become a mediator between Russia and Ukraine?

TP: That is possible, but not in a scenario where Russia itself appoints a collaborator to represent the European side in negotiations — someone like Gerhard Schröder, who for many years defended rather Russian interests, perhaps narrowly defined German interests, but certainly not broader European interests, and definitely not our Czech interests.

If Russia is truly serious about this and genuinely seeks some kind of agreement, then it should clearly indicate who will represent the Russian side. Europe, for its part, would certainly be capable of finding someone to represent the European side. But Europeans themselves must choose their own negotiator, because only under those conditions can such a person possess a genuine mandate for negotiations.

UI: And which European politician could become such a figure — someone acceptable to all sides?

TP: I think Europe is large enough and has more than enough people capable of fulfilling such a role. Personally, I would consider it preferable for this person to represent the so-called “coalition of the willing,” rather than serving exclusively as a representative of the European Union or some other formal European structure.

But the problem is not the lack of potential negotiators. The central issue is the absence of any genuine willingness on the Russian side to conduct negotiations in a way that could realistically lead to a successful outcome.

THE GREATEST THREAT TO EUROPE’S STABILITY IS RUSSIA’S EXPANSIONIST POLICY

UI: In your opinion, what is the greatest security challenge facing Europe in the coming years? And how high is the risk that the war could spread beyond Ukraine?

TP: I do not believe the war necessarily has to spread beyond Ukraine. And if I were to place a bet, I would prefer to believe that this is not merely naïve optimism.

In any case, the greatest challenge facing Europe is to once again become a power that is taken seriously in the world — and above all by its immediate neighborhood, especially Russia. This means Europe must become far more self-sufficient in its defense capabilities, fully restore the strength of the European defense industry, and simultaneously strengthen European armies to the point where any potential aggressor perceives them as a genuine force and a formidable opponent. In other words, any potential predator should think very carefully before deciding to test Europe or any individual European country.

And the greatest predator Europe faces today — the one standing before us every day — is Russia.

Of course, Europe also faces other very real security challenges, including terrorism. But the greatest threat to Europe’s stability today is the expansionist policy pursued by the Russian Federation. The war in Ukraine is the largest war the European continent has witnessed since World War II. Frankly, I do not understand how anyone today could claim that there is a greater threat to European security.

UI: Do Europe and the United States perceive these threats differently?

TP: Absolutely. For Europe, this is the number one security threat because it is a war taking place directly on the European continent. For the United States, it is a geographically distant conflict — one of several major crises. At the same time, the U.S. is a global power, which means it is simultaneously engaged with multiple conflicts and security challenges in different parts of the world.

Right now, that includes the Middle East, but the United States is also closely monitoring developments in Asia and, in line with its traditional geopolitical doctrine, remains focused on the Western Hemisphere as well. We have seen this reflected in tensions and American involvement surrounding Venezuela, as well as in Washington’s long-standing policy toward Cuba.

So I believe this is exactly how we in Europe must approach the situation realistically and shape our expectations accordingly. If we ourselves do not address this conflict primarily through our own efforts — if we fail to strengthen our own defense capabilities and help Ukraine defend itself — then we cannot expect others to do it on our behalf.

UI: Looking at the situation realistically, can Europe in the foreseeable future guarantee its own defense without the United States?

TP: We neglected defense investments for thirty years. So if we systematically strengthen our own defense capabilities over the next ten — and preferably twenty or thirty — years, then yes, Europe may eventually become capable of ensuring its own defense independently.

UI: The United States has announced plans to withdraw part of its troops from Germany. Could it, at least theoretically, happen that a certain contingent of American troops would instead be stationed in the Czech Republic?

TP: Personally, I do not view the U.S. announcement about withdrawing 5,000 troops from Germany as some fundamentally significant development. It is not that I welcome it, but similar adjustments have occurred many times in the past. The number of American troops stationed in Europe has long fluctuated depending on circumstances — sometimes increasing, sometimes decreasing.

And if you look at how European states are currently increasing their defense spending, that alone should at least partially compensate for the withdrawal of several thousand American troops.

I certainly would not underestimate the situation, but at the same time I do not believe it carries the kind of fundamental significance it is sometimes portrayed as having. Besides, this has not actually happened yet, and we will still see what the situation looks like in one, two, or three years. At this point, nobody truly knows.

As for the Czech Republic, we are not a frontline state in the same sense as Poland or the Baltic countries. It is precisely in those countries that the presence of allied troops is logical, because they are located on NATO’s external border and therefore require visible allied support. Incidentally, the Czech Republic itself also deploys troops to Poland and the Baltic states, and previously did so in Slovakia as well.

In the Czech Republic today, there is no comparable sense of direct threat to what exists in NATO’s frontline states, and Czech society does not feel a need for the long-term presence of foreign troops. Likewise, our allies have never seriously sought to permanently station their forces here or finance deployments in a location where they do not perceive any fundamental strategic advantage.

If resources are to be invested in maintaining a military presence in Europe, then it makes far more sense to deploy troops to Lithuania, Poland, or Romania, where such a presence carries significantly greater military importance. Incidentally, in the past there were negotiations about deploying an American radar system on Czech territory, but that project was ultimately canceled by the American side itself.

RUSSIA COULD TEST NATO NOT ONLY IN THE NORTHWEST

UI: Do you believe Russia could launch a conventional attack against one of the Baltic or Scandinavian countries?

TP: Of course it could. The question is whether it would actually choose to do so.

We tend to focus first on the weakest links and assume that if Russia ever decided to test NATO’s unity, it would do so in the Baltic region. The Baltic states do have certain geographical vulnerabilities and are relatively small countries, but at the same time, in my opinion, they are fairly well prepared today.

Perhaps it is worth considering whether such a test could occur somewhere entirely different. From that perspective, the Black Sea region may prove even more interesting.

Some countries there may be perceived as easier targets — for example, Bulgaria. It is a NATO member, yet it spends significantly less on defense than the Baltic states. In addition, the allies do not devote the same level of attention to Bulgaria as they do to the Baltic states. On top of that, the country has experienced prolonged political instability. It seems that over the past several years Bulgaria has held something like eight elections. Economically, it is also among the poorest countries in the European Union.

So from Moscow’s perspective, Bulgaria may appear to be a place where it would be easier to “test” something than in the Baltic region.

That is why I believe we need to view the situation more broadly and assume that if some form of testing of NATO or European security ever occurs, it may not necessarily happen where we currently expect it.

Another important point is that Russian rationality differs significantly from ours. Russia launched the war against Ukraine believing it would capture Kyiv within a matter of days and install a pro-Russian government that would allow Moscow to control the entire country. Yet more than four years have passed since the assault on Kyiv, and Russia continues to exhaust itself — militarily, economically, and politically.

I am convinced that if they had known from the outset what this war would actually look like, they would have tried to act differently. I think every Russian leader — including Putin and any potential successors — will draw lessons from this war.

That is why I do not believe the next potential test or operation would necessarily follow the same scenario, meaning a direct invasion of a NATO or European Union member state. Such testing could take other forms — hybrid, political, economic, or something entirely new.

But if you examine long-term Russian strategic thinking and its traditional modus operandi, it becomes clear that history often repeats itself and that Russia repeatedly returns to similar patterns of behavior.

UI: Let me express some skepticism regarding Bulgaria, because due to the war in Ukraine Russia has practically lost its fleet in the Black Sea…

TP: Yes, but I am referring to something slightly different.

I spent quite a long time in Chechnya during the First Chechen War, and at that time Russia effectively lost that first war. But at the same time, it learnt lessons from the experience and later, already under Putin, re-established control over Chechnya. Putin subsequently used this as a symbol of consolidating power and the beginning of a new era of Russian stability and prosperity.

Similarly, despite various difficulties, from Moscow’s perspective the operation in Georgia ultimately succeeded. The occupation of Crimea was also viewed by them as a success. Donbas proved more complicated. Even then, however, it served as a kind of warning for them. But overall, after the Chechen war and after Putin came to power, Russia spent many years accumulating experience, learning from its mistakes, and simultaneously cultivating the belief that it was winning.

Putin likely believed that the assault on Kyiv would simply become another continuation of those earlier successes. But that is not at all what happened.

UI: In recent days, Putin and Russian propagandists have openly threatened Armenia. So other states of the former Soviet Union are highly vulnerable.

TP: I am deeply convinced that the Russian empire looks first and foremost toward the former Soviet republics. Only afterward does it turn its attention to other neighboring countries and the former Soviet bloc.

Armenia was for a long time a highly loyal Russian vassal. But today it is trying to pursue a more independent course and, to a certain extent, is already distancing itself from Moscow — especially after its defeat in the conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh. Azerbaijan has effectively weakened Russian influence by pushing Russian military forces out of the region.

Armenia, which for many years was regarded as a reliable and obedient ally of Moscow, is no longer perceived that way today. So I understand why this creates significant anxiety in Moscow and deeply irritates the Kremlin.

INTERNATIONAL LAW RESTRAINS DEMOCRACIES, BUT NOT AUTHORITARIAN REGIMES

UI: In your opinion, what is the greatest illusion held by Europe’s elites?

TP: In my view, it is the lingering belief in some kind of international order and international law as something that functions automatically on its own. But international law becomes, to a certain extent, a fiction the moment there is no force capable of enforcing it.

And this, in many ways, restrains us, whereas for authoritarian or aggressive regimes — for whom international law effectively means nothing — it actually makes things easier. As a result, we become more cautious, less capable of decisive action, and ultimately weaker, while they are free to do whatever they want.

Another illusion, in my opinion, is the belief that it is sufficient to develop only defensive capabilities. Europe rarely speaks about the other side of the same coin — namely, offensive capabilities. But if we lack not only the ability to stop a potential aggressor, but also the capacity to deter them through the ability to inflict damage or conduct military operations beyond our own territory, then we will remain only half-protected.

Today, Europe speaks extensively about air defense, and that is undoubtedly important. But if an adversary sees that we are investing enormous resources exclusively in defense while they retain the ability to wear us down economically and militarily over the long term — and at the same time understand that we are incapable of responding to their attacks — they will inevitably perceive us as the weaker opponent.

That is why I believe Europe still operates under certain illusions about how the world actually functions. Many continue to underestimate the extent to which diplomacy, on its own, is ineffective unless it is backed by economic and military power. We often imagine diplomacy as something driven primarily by skilled negotiators sitting around a table and resolving disputes through dialogue alone. But when no real power stands behind them, their words carry only limited weight, and negotiations with an adversary cannot truly take place on equal terms.

Europe must remain competitive and possess not only strong defenses, but also a strong economy, because without that no sustainable long-term security architecture can function.

At the same time, we need to place greater emphasis on ensuring Europe’s own stability and prosperity, while becoming less susceptible to various messianic ambitions about saving the entire world from global warming or every other global challenge.

Changing a strategic mindset, however, always requires considerable time and political commitment. Nevertheless, I remain optimistic and believe that Europe will eventually begin to view the world in a more realistic way.

UI: What kind of support should Ukraine receive in order to maintain strong positions in diplomatic negotiations?

TP: I have always believed that Ukraine must be supported to the maximum extent possible — financially, through the supply of weapons, ammunition, and other forms of material assistance.

Intelligence support is also critically important, of course. Recently, European assistance in this area has improved, but American intelligence support remains absolutely indispensable and will likely continue to be so for some time.

Ukraine must remain economically viable, which means it needs both financial support and the ability to export its products to European markets. That is a far more sustainable solution than relying indefinitely on subsidies or various redistribution mechanisms.

At the same time, Ukraine must preserve a strong military. The West is not deploying its own troops there, but it can continue to assist through financing, training, and weapons deliveries.

It must also be acknowledged that the West, collectively, is providing Ukraine with truly substantial support. If someone had said on February 20, 2022, that more than 4.5 million artillery shells would pass through the Czech Republic over the following years, almost nobody would have believed it.

An enormous amount has already been accomplished — and this support is far from exhausted.

UI: You were one of the first foreign visitors to travel to Ukraine shortly after the beginning of the war, on March 15, together with then–Prime Minister Petr Fiala. What were your impressions of that visit?

TP: First of all, it was remarkable that the trip happened at all, because by making that visit we demonstrated to the world that Kyiv could be visited and that Ukraine could be supported not only militarily — as we were already supplying weapons at the time — but also politically, simply through a physical presence on the ground.

And for me personally, it was an honor to be part of the visit by the Czech, Polish, and Slovenian prime ministers. Some of the people I met during that trip I continued to work with professionally in the years that followed, while with others I have since developed more personal relationships.

As for my first impressions in the spring of 2022, what struck me most was President Volodymyr Zelensky’s determination. Both he and his entire team radiated an extraordinary resolve not to surrender, to resist, and to continue fighting. It was deeply inspiring and, at the same time, created a strong sense of responsibility for those of us who were there — an obligation to do everything possible to help Ukraine continue its resistance.

UI: How many times have you been to Ukraine, which places did you visit, and are you planning more trips?

TP: I had visited your country several times before, so this was not my first trip. Since the beginning of the full-scale war, I have been to Ukraine around 10 or 12 times.

At one point, two years ago, we even spent a family vacation there because I wanted to support the Ukrainian economy. We took our children — who were already adults — and spent about two weeks traveling through different parts of Ukraine. It was an extremely interesting experience, and for the children it was also deeply meaningful.

Naturally, I have been to Kyiv. I have also visited Uman, where I even planted a tree in Sofiyivka Park. On one occasion, we traveled there during the Jewish New Year.

During the war, I have mostly spent time in central and western Ukraine. But before that, I had also visited eastern Ukraine and Crimea.

I will definitely return to Ukraine someday. I have long wanted to visit Odesa, but so far I have not yet had the chance to do so. I also hope that one day I will be able to return to a free Crimea.

UI: You have described yourself as an optimist. How optimistic are you today about the prospects for ending the war? British professor Lawrence Freedman recently suggested that we may now be approaching a turning point in the conflict. Do you agree with that assessment?

TP: At this stage, I do not see any clear turning point. Perhaps when we eventually look back on the war in retrospect, we will conclude that the current period was in fact the decisive phase.

Four years ago, I would never have imagined that the war would last this long or that, even after four years, we still would not be close to its end. For a long time, I kept saying that we had already passed the halfway point, and I sincerely hope that is true.

Russia remains capable of terrorizing the Ukrainian population and striking civilian infrastructure, but on the battlefield itself it has not achieved any major successes in recent months, and the pace of its advances is no longer what it once was. At the same time, Ukraine’s ability to strike targets deep inside the Russian rear continues to improve, and I am happy that we have also contributed in a fairly substantial way to that effort.

In fact, I began to view the situation more optimistically already after the first three days of the war. I remember speaking with the prime minister shortly before his first phone call with Volodymyr Zelensky. And when I saw how Ukrainians were defending themselves — particularly in Kharkiv — I began to think that Russia would not achieve an easy victory and that the war would not end the way Moscow had expected.

It seems to me that we should avoid viewing the situation in overly simplistic black-and-white terms, as we often tend to do — namely, assuming that if every square kilometer of Ukrainian territory is not liberated, this automatically constitutes defeat. Wars are far more complex than that. And if the war can ultimately be brought to an end roughly along the current front line, I believe that one day it may well be remembered as the Great and Victorious War for Ukrainian Independence.

Olha Tanasiichuk led this conversation. Prague

Photos via Author

* This conversation is given here translated from Ukrainian