Magnus Hjort, Director General of Sweden's Psychological Defense Agency

A few days ago, the international conference "Ukraine Cultural Security Forum 2.0" was held in Warsaw, where participants discussed the role of culture as an element of national security and how culture becomes one of the first targets of an aggressor. A presentation on Russia's aggressive actions in the information space was delivered by well-known Swedish expert and Director General of Sweden's Psychological Defense Agency, Magnus Hjort. The agency works to strengthen Swedish society's capacity to detect and counter harmful information influence from hostile foreign states.

In an interview with Ukrinform, Magnus Hjort spoke about how Russia's threat is perceived in Sweden, what tools Moscow uses against Stockholm, and how Swedes are increasing societal resilience against Russian hybrid activities. He also discussed Swedish-Ukrainian cooperation, Ukraine's valuable experience in countering aggression, and whether Sweden will continue to support Ukraine.

UKRAINE HAS SHOWN THE WORLD WHAT RESILIENCE IS REALLY LIKE

- Mr. Director General, how do you assess Ukraine's and Ukrainian society's resilience against Russian disinformation?

- Very highly, and it's very good. We and the rest of the world are so impressed about the resilience that the Ukrainian people has shown to this awful, tremendous aggression from Russia, and the way you have created and built resilience over the years now. Because this war now has gone on longer than the war between the Soviet Union and Germany. This is a very long war for Russia, and they did not expect that. This was a miscalculation on their part. The Russians thought that Ukraine would bend, that Ukraine would give up. But the people of Ukraine, government institutions, and of course, President Zelensky and the Armed Forces of Ukraine has shown what resilience is really like. And this is an example for the whole world.

- What lessons is Sweden drawing from the war in Ukraine regarding protection against Russian propaganda and disinformation?

- It's difficult to copy the things that you do in Ukraine, because Ukraine, the society of Ukraine, is very different from Sweden. We've had 500 years of sovereignty without occupation. We've had a very long period of stable democracy. We also have a very stable media community, but the way you've handled, for instance, securing your information data when the war started – that is a lesson for all. And also how creatively you have worked when it comes to ensuring support from Europe and other parts of the world. And I'm happy to say that we have been contributing to both civil society and government agencies in Ukraine. And we'll continue to do so.

Right now, we are learning a lot more. We are learning how you actually fight the information war. And that is something that we are trying to draw lessons. I cannot openly speak about the things that we know and the things that we learn, but I can tell you that we are learning how you can possibly fight the Russians, how you can possibly find ways of creating an impact within the Russian population, within the Russian Armed Forces. And that is something that Ukraine knows best of all, I think.

NO PART OF SWEDISH POLITICIANS WANTS TO END SUPPORT FOR UKRAINE

- To what extent does Swedish society currently perceive a threat from Russia? Has this threat increased over the last four or five years?

- I think most Swedes agree that Russia is the number one threat. This is an assessment that we share very broadly in Swedish society. At least 90% of people in Sweden agree that Russia is a lethal threat to European democracy.

On the other hand, Russia is not prioritizing Sweden as a target. I think they realize that we are a resilient people. We have a very stable democracy. There's no part of political Sweden that wants to stop supporting Ukraine or would support Russian goals. We hold a solid position: all eight parties in the Swedish parliament are behind supporting and helping Ukraine and restoring peace and democracy in Europe and Ukraine. Russia is the dominant threat actor, but we are united in supporting Ukraine and understanding that in this situation we need to fight together.

Even though Sweden is not fighting a war, we are still under attack when it comes to cyberattacks, when it comes to information attacks. There's a low-level but permanent threat when it comes to cognitive warfare against Sweden. It's not very open, but it's there all the time. But, as I already said, Sweden is not the number one target. There are other targets that are more prioritized by Russia in its resources and strategy.

- How does Russian propaganda operate in Sweden, particularly regarding anti-Ukrainian narratives? During your speech you mentioned the Battle of Poltava as an example of Russian propaganda in your country.

- The topic of the Battle of Poltava comes up a lot and most recently it came up when the Swedish King visited Ukraine.

There was Russian disinformation saying that the King wouldn't shake hands with Zelensky, which, of course, is totally untrue. So it was a false accusation. The King shook hands with him many times.

The fact that the King of Sweden visited Ukraine was to show our support and commitment to Ukraine. And of course, that is something that Russia tries to eradicate, promoting the narrative that Sweden does not support Ukraine. But, of course, it is very difficult to make Swedes believe that because we all know that the Swedish King wouldn't go to Ukraine and not shake hands. This is ridiculous, but some people in Russia may believe this. So in this context, the Russians mentioned the Battle of Poltava again. They are totally committed to using this topic, which absolutely no one cares about in Sweden. In fact, it seems like they truly believe that we are hurt by them mentioning Poltava. But we are not, because this happened over 300 years ago.

When we applied for NATO membership, the Russians tried to stop that by accusing Sweden of being an Islamophobic country. We had a Quran burning outside the Turkish Embassy in Stockholm, which Russia used to promote the narrative that Sweden is an Islamophobic country that doesn't care about religion. Of course, the objective here was to persuade Turkey not to accept Sweden's membership in NATO, which of course Turkey did in the end. So this campaign didn't work.

THREAT FROM RUSSIA WILL NOT GO AWAY ANYTIME SOON

- During your speech you also mentioned the Russians using the case of the Danish island of Bornholm...

- That is just one of the many instances where the Kremlin tries to give their narrative about World War II history, about the fact that Soviet troops remained on the Danish island of Bornholm for one year after the war. It is very close to Sweden – it's actually situated perhaps closer to Sweden than to Denmark.

The Danish see things differently. I mean, why would they want to have Soviet troops on their soil for one year? The Russian side today wants to portray this as they were there to "stabilize the situation." I mean, the Danish people didn't need that. The Estonians didn't need their capital being bombed in March 1944. The present government of the Russian Federation calls this "liberation from the Nazis." Well, this is a "liberation" that Estonia didn't need.

- Is Sweden concerned about possible Russian aggression? What is its likelihood?

- Russia is a threat to European security, to every country in Europe. So we need to stick together within the European Union, within NATO. We need to work to strengthen our defenses and we need to contribute to Ukrainian defense. We need to be aware that this threat is not going away anytime soon. Even if the present president of the Russian Federation is replaced by someone else, this will probably be someone who shares the same idea that Russia has a right to rule and dominate "near abroad" states. The Swedish sovereignty could be harmed if this continues. So we need to strengthen our European security together.

- How is Sweden preparing for the threat from Russia?

- We have been rebuilding our total defense since 2015. This was a decision by the government and parliament, and that was, of course, a consequence of events in Ukraine – Russian aggression, the annexation of Crimea, and further events in Donbas. We finally realized that this is for real, that this is a threat that we need to take seriously. I think Sweden reacted sooner than some other countries. However, we would have reacted even earlier – during the Georgian war in 2008. We didn't understand that this was just the beginning of Russia's aggressive actions and that they are really trying to rebuild their empire. And we should have understood that other countries will also be be attacked.

- What tools does the Swedish government use to protect society from propaganda and disinformation?

- First of all, we try to build a strong educational system – from kindergarten to higher education and academia. It's important to have academic freedom, to have research to build a stable society that holds together. A society that makes every citizen feel that they belong to it, that they are listened to, that they have a voice. We also need to have a strong social welfare system. A system of society that works effectively in peacetime and can work in a worse situation.

We're also building our defenses – our military defenses, our civil defenses and psychological defenses, which is part of the civil defense activities. The media literacy system in Sweden is also part of this. So we try to build on different fronts or different levels all the time to strengthen our resilience, our knowledge, our critical thinking, so that every citizen understands that Sweden and Europe are in a different situation.

PSYCHOLOGICAL DEFENCE IS A SITUATION WHEN THE FRONT LINE IS IN YOUR HEAD

- Do you cooperate with Ukrainian colleagues on strengthening resilience against Russian propaganda and disinformation?

- Absolutely. We are visiting Ukraine all the time. This spring, we have been and will be in Ukraine several times. We have had people there in February and March, and we will be there soon, working together with civil society, with agencies like the Center for Countering Disinformation. We are working together with both civil society and government agencies.

- Say a few words about your agency. It was established in January 2022, just before the Russian-Ukrainian war. You predicted back then that the full-scale war would start in a few weeks.

- No, not as such. Our agency was reestablished. We had similar agencies during the Cold War, but after the fall of the Berlin Wall and the dismantling of the Soviet empire, Sweden and many other countries dismantled their total defenses. We thought we wouldn't need that anymore, that Russia would be democratic, that there would be everlasting peace, all that. Well, what we now know it was nonsense.

Our agency being reestablished was a direct consequence of the annexation of Crimea and war in Donbas. That's when Sweden started to restart total defense. And we also started a discussion about reestablishing an agency for psychological defense. But things moved slowly, and even in Sweden it took its time. The Swedish prime minister was on stage in January 2018, stressing the need to create a new agency for psychological defense, because we saw what had happened before the war started in 2014, how the build-up was with cyberattacks, hybrid warfare, staged "referendums." Because we saw how Russia was using all the tools in the toolbox already. Back then, we realized that we needed to step up and have a better preparedness for psychological warfare. In 2019, I received an assignment from the Swedish government to try to assess how we should build this agency and we reported to the Swedish government in May 2020, and in March 2021, I was given the assignment to set up the agency. So it took some time.

We also saw the build-up in 2021, troops all around Ukraine. I think many of us realized this war was coming. But there is no way you can say that you are prepared for war. Until the minute the bombs start dropping and the troops are invading, you still have some sort of hope that this will not come. Even though we are sure that it will come. So we were prepared. But we were only two months old, and we also had simultaneously a campaign against the social services in Sweden. This was from Islamist actors in the Middle East, saying that Sweden is Islamophobic, that Sweden is kidnapping Muslim children, giving them to Christian families, etc. So we had to deal with these two instances simultaneously. But immediately we got the call from Ukrainian partners saying. 'The war started. We need your help.' And of course, we stepped up immediately, trying to do the best we could.

- How important is the aspect of psychological defense within Sweden's national security system, as well as in the global context?

- It's part of the aggression that countries like Russia are using psychological warfare, cognitive warfare, information warfare. And we need to have the infrastructure, the tools to defend ourselves. And in that way, psychological defense is the defense that we are trying to create in all agencies, in all our population, in civil society. So we are not the psychological defense of Sweden. We are just the agency. All actors in Sweden, all people in Sweden, are part of the psychological defense.

Psychological defense is basically something that the front line is in your head, the way you perceive reality, the way you react to stimuli from social media, what you see in your phone. If you are aware that someone is manipulating things, then you're better prepared. It's harder if you don't know anything and think that everything you see in your phone must be true. If you are aware of how Russia is using this and how algorithms are created and designed to make you see more stuff, that gets you agitated and worried. If you're aware of this, you're better prepared. And this is a work that never stops.

- What do you use to better reach Swedish society: social media, traditional media, or other tools? How can society best be protected from hostile propaganda?

- Right now, we have developed an information package for local government, the municipalities in Sweden. This year is an election year in our country. Elections at the local, regional and national level will be held in Sweden in September. Russia has already tried to interfere. But as we see it right now, Sweden is not a priority. But we are prepared. We see things happening. We detect stuff. And we need to be prepared.

We work in the election with the national election network, together with the election authority, the security service and different agencies, including the National Cyber Security Center, in order to be as prepared as possible. At present, we are not forecasting worst-case scenarios, but different things can happen. For example, could be a hack and leak operation that they will try to use. So we are on our toes. So this is the information package that we have just released for the local level. It's out now, and I see response. I see media recognizing this and this is good because it gives local municipalities an opportunity to be agents of their own defense, to be able to not rely on someone else, but together in the local community, read more, learn more, and be aware of threats that could appear. Thus, they are better prepared themselves. So we cannot be up there meeting every municipality in Sweden, as we are only 85 people and our resources are limited. So we need to work through regional county boards, work through people we can train people who train others. So we try to work as broadly as we can.

- Do you cooperate with other Scandinavian countries in this area, including Norway, Finland, and others?

- Yes, and not only with them. We cooperate with Poland, Ukraine, and we have partners in Germany and France. In particular, we worked a lot with the French agency VIGINUM, which counters foreign digital interference. If Russia works creatively and finds new ways to undermine us, we need to be creative as well. We need to find new ways of influence. And I think it's interesting.

The Baltic countries are much more exposed to Russian propaganda than we are. So working together with Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania is, of course, very important. In the United Kingdom, there has recently been a proposal to establish an agency similar to ours, or one like Ukraine's Center for Countering Disinformation.

- And finally, perhaps the most important question. Will Stockholm and Swedish society continue to support Ukraine in the medium term?

- Definitely. We will support Ukraine for as long as it takes, with whatever means it takes. That's my take on this, and I think this is what the Swedish politicians are saying as well. We have to stop Russian aggression today, tomorrow. And this is the number one challenge.

Yuriy Banakhevych, Warsaw

Photos provided by the author