Serhii Dzherdzh, Head of the Ukraine–NATO Public League

The Ramstein-format meeting held on April 15 in Berlin, attended by Ministers Boris Pistorius, John Healey, Mykhailo Fedorov, and NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte, can be seen as a stress test for the coalition. Partners were required to reassess a shifting strategic environment, adapt to emerging challenges, and refine their priorities and plans for the year ahead.

Among the key factors shaping the discussion was the war involving the United States and Israel against Iran, which reverberated across the Persian Gulf, driving up global energy prices and introducing sustained volatility. The conflict highlighted the effectiveness of asymmetric strategies, as demonstrated by Iran, and underscored the critical importance of alliances—revealing that even for the United States, reliance on a single key partner such as Israel may be insufficient. It also exposed tactical gaps and a shortfall in capabilities to counter aerial threats, as existing air defense systems proved unable to fully shield military installations and critical infrastructure.

Ukraine responded swiftly and effectively, with the experience and capabilities of its Defense Forces proving highly relevant. This creates an opening for building long-term security cooperation with countries in the region. For both the EU and NATO, such engagement is increasingly significant, particularly against the backdrop of growing uncertainty over the United States’ long-term commitment to Alliance principles.

Ukrinform discussed this broader context, along with the outcomes of Ramstein-34, in a conversation with Serhii Dzherdzh, Head of the Ukraine–NATO Public League.

Ihor Dolhov: In your view, is the importance of coordinating military assistance to Ukraine within the Ramstein format growing, or does it remain the same as it was four years ago? And how does the format function now, given that the United States has withdrawn from providing assistance? U.S. Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth has already missed participation—even online—for the second time this year, and Vice President J.D. Vance recently stated that one of the administration’s achievements is ending military cooperation with Ukraine. How is Ramstein operating without the United States?

Serhii Dzherdzh: I would argue that Ramstein’s role has not diminished; in some respects, it has actually grown—particularly in terms of structure and the systematization of its work. We remain grateful to the United States for initiating the Ramstein format in 2022, at the outset of Russia’s full-scale invasion. It was largely thanks to American persistence and diplomatic effort that more than 50 countries joined the group.

In the early stages, political support and the rapid organization of assistance—especially the supply of ammunition, equipment, and weapons—were critical. There have been different phases, but the thirty-fourth meeting confirms that this has evolved into a more systematic process. Assessments are more precise, intentions more clearly articulated, and there is a stronger understanding of Ukraine’s needs. The priorities are well established: strengthening air defense, expanding collaborative drone production, increasing output, and localizing manufacturing within Ukraine. As the President of Ukraine recently noted, the majority of weapons currently used by the Ukrainian Armed Forces are produced domestically in Ukraine—and this capacity must continue to grow.

It is also significant that this Ramstein meeting was held in Berlin. This reflects Europe’s increasing willingness to assume greater responsibility and demonstrate strategic autonomy in ensuring the security of both Europe and Ukraine. More and more, this war is being understood as a Russian–Ukrainian–European conflict.

ID: Europe, in fact, has no alternative. The war in the Persian Gulf has only reinforced existing realities: there is a shortage of weapons—particularly in key categories—and a clear absence of certain types of domestically produced systems in Europe. This makes it imperative to expand Europe’s own defense production rather than rely on the United States.

In this context, the previous meeting in February—before the Gulf conflict—was especially important. It resulted in decisions to finance the development of Ukraine’s domestic defense capabilities. For the first time, a substantial sum—$2.5 billion—was allocated specifically for this purpose. This reflects not only the success of the so-called Danish model, but also a growing recognition that Europe’s defense industrial base must be developed in partnership with Ukraine.

It seems that the latest meeting has confirmed this as well.

SD: Exactly. We are seeing new approaches under the leadership of Defense Minister Fedorov. Most importantly, Europeans are reassessing both their capabilities and their needs—largely in response to the evolving position of the United States. Indeed, the U.S. Secretary of Defense has now missed the meeting for the second time, although a U.S. representative did participate online. The war involving Iran has clearly shifted Washington’s strategic focus toward the region. Nevertheless, the outcomes of Ramstein demonstrate that Ukraine remains firmly on the agenda, and that the urgency of strengthening our air defenses is widely recognized.

ID: During his European tour, President Volodymyr Zelensky also summarized the results of the meeting. He noted: “There are important results from the latest Ramstein-format meeting. What we have agreed with leaders is now being implemented.” Referring to a report by Defense Minister Fedorov, he emphasized that partners acknowledged Ukraine’s strong battlefield position.

This reflects a broader shift over four years of war—both in priorities and in the nature of engagement with partners. As Mykhailo Fedorov stated, “Our Defense Forces are not only holding positions but increasing pressure. Russia’s losses have exceeded its mobilization capacity. We are making every meter of Ukrainian land extremely costly for the enemy. Russia loses 254 personnel per square kilometer, and in Donetsk region—428 on average.”

The battlefield dynamics were also highlighted by UK Defence Secretary John Healey: “Drones have become the primary driver of Russian losses on the front. In March alone, Russia lost more than 35,000 troops in Ukraine, and 96% of those losses were caused by drones.”

So, can we conclude that drones have become the top priority?

SD: Yes, that is clearly the case today. Not long ago, our main concern was the shortage of 155 mm artillery shells for partner-supplied systems. This led to Czech President Petr Pavel’s initiative to provide one million shells—a goal that has since been achieved. Today, however, that shortage is no longer as acute, largely because the nature of warfare has shifted toward the expanded use of drones.

These include both aerial and ground-based systems, which help preserve soldiers’ lives and sustain defensive positions. The key task now is to continuously improve and adapt these capabilities to keep pace with the evolving demands of the battlefield.

ID: In preparation for the meeting, Ukraine’s Defense Minister also held talks with his counterparts from Belgium and Spain, aiming—as he noted—to synchronize key areas of cooperation: strengthening air defense, expanding drone capabilities, and advancing the Czech initiative to supply long-range artillery.

These engagements reflect a broader transition toward a win-win model of cooperation, where deeper integration with partners enhances Ukraine’s ability to deliver long-range strikes against Russia’s economic and military infrastructure.

So, the discussion is increasingly shifting from assistance to cooperation. Can we say that a turning point has already been reached, or are we still moving toward it?

SD: I believe we are still on the way. However, the synergy is already clearly mutually beneficial. Where such cooperation is in place—where there is an exchange of experience and scientific and technological expertise—it strengthens both Europe and Ukraine.

At the same time, it is crucial that we do not become merely suppliers of individual components or isolated weapons systems. It is evident that representatives of European and American companies, when working in Ukraine, study our solutions and may later attempt to replicate or adapt them domestically. Therefore, our objective is not simply to export specific types of drones in limited quantities, but to demonstrate that we have developed a comprehensive system—integrating reconnaissance, deployment, and operational use across various drone platforms. This reflects a broader military ecosystem and an evolving methodology.

In other words, this is not a standalone product that can be sold and forgotten. The key is to retain added value. This approach has already been evident in our engagements with Arab countries: by offering a full capability chain—for example, integrated protection systems—we secured more than payment for equipment. We obtained long-term security guarantees, sustainable cooperation frameworks, investment, and opportunities for collaborative defense production.

ID: The competitive advantage of our weapons systems lies in their cost-effectiveness. For example, a U.S.-made interceptor drone may cost around $20,000, whereas a Ukrainian equivalent can be up to ten times cheaper. This means that simply exporting weapons will not generate the same level of revenue as for larger producers such as the United States. That is why it is more advantageous for us to focus on long-term strategies and integrated solutions—and this approach is already being implemented.

The war in the Gulf demonstrated that even advanced and costly air defense systems—relied upon by both the United States and Persian Gulf countries—were unable to fully withstand Iran’s aerial attacks. Both U.S. military bases and critical infrastructure were successfully targeted.

This underscores that Ukraine’s key value lies in its systemic experience: the integration of drones, counter-drone technologies, and a comprehensive understanding of the modern battlefield. This has been recognized by Gulf states, which is why Ukraine immediately stepped forward with its proposals. During his tour of the region, President Volodymyr Zelensky offered Ukraine’s know-how and operational experience in strengthening air defense.

Following this, President Zelensky visited several European capitals, where he advanced discussions on cooperation and strategic partnership. The priority now is clear: to translate these political agreements into concrete, practical cooperation.

SD: I would describe this as the highest level of foreign policy craftsmanship: leveraging the capabilities we have—limited as they may be—to achieve greater outcomes. This is the approach and the set of tactics we are applying. Notably, Ukraine was among the first to respond to requests from Arab countries for enhanced protection. It is also important to recognize the contrast: Iranian weapons have been used to kill Ukrainians, while Ukrainian systems are now helping protect civilians in Arab states from external threats. This reflects fundamentally different approaches to warfare and the use of military force.

ID: That said, more traditional mechanisms remain essential. In preparation for Ukraine’s participation in the Ramstein meeting, President Volodymyr Zelensky held a phone call with NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte. The primary focus was the continuation of agreements under the PURL program—specifically, the procurement of weapons for Ukraine using NATO partners’ funding in the United States. This primarily concerns missiles for Patriot systems. Following the meeting, Rutte stated that NATO currently sees no obstacles to implementing these agreements. However, potential risks remain.

SD: There have already been disruptions in delivery timelines and consistency. Assistance has often arrived in batches, lacking the continuity and systematization required for sustained defense planning. In some cases, countries have made commitments that were later delayed or not fully honored for various reasons. As for Patriot missiles, existing supplies remain insufficient, particularly given the scale of Russia’s ballistic attacks and the resulting civilian casualties.

At the same time, a broader strategic question arises: why has Europe, over the course of the war, not established production of analogous systems despite clear and growing demand? Spain, for instance, reportedly holds a license to produce Patriot systems, yet has not met even its domestic or broader European needs—likely due to technical or industrial constraints.

This points to a critical task for Europe in partnership with Ukraine: to develop and manufacture indigenous missile defense systems capable of intercepting ballistic threats. The urgency of this challenge leaves little room for delay.

ID: As for production, the signals are rather concerning. Recently, for example, there were widespread media reports that the Pentagon and the U.S. administration are engaging with automobile manufacturers to explore scaling up military production. That is the situation in the United States—while in Europe, the challenges appear even more pronounced.

European Commissioner for Defence and Space Andrius Kubilius, speaking at a recent conference, highlighted the growing gap between Europe and Russia in arms production. Europe must accelerate its output, as Russia continues to outproduce it. He cited striking figures: last year, Russia produced approximately 1,100 cruise missiles, compared to just 300 in the European Union; for ballistic missiles, Russia produced around 900, while the EU produced none.

At the same time, Kubilius noted that Ukraine manufactured around 700 “Flamingo” missiles—an entirely domestic product that has proven effective in degrading Russia’s economic and military potential. Looking ahead, Ukraine, together with European partners, is expected to launch production of new anti-ballistic systems as early as next year.

President Volodymyr Zelensky, during his visit to Germany, also addressed this issue, stating that Ukraine and Germany plan to launch joint production of drones and air defense systems.

How realistic is it to achieve this as early as next year?

This question goes to the heart of Europe’s ability to transition from political intent to industrial execution—and whether Ukraine’s wartime innovation can be effectively integrated into a broader European defense-industrial framework.

SD: I believe this is realistic, and, in fact, the process is already underway. For understandable reasons, some of the more sensitive aspects are not fully disclosed or articulated. Nevertheless, the trend is clear. For example, Europe is now producing around two million artillery shells annually, compared to roughly 300,000 just five years ago—a five- to sevenfold increase. This demonstrates that the reactivation of Europe’s defense-industrial base is progressing. However, the key challenge today lies in anti-ballistic systems, and it is essential that this effort be pursued jointly with Ukraine.

ID: I hope these plans will be implemented and that we are approaching a genuine turning point—one where the European Union delivers on its earlier vision of joint rearmament with Ukraine. In the current environment, where NATO cannot be fully certain of continued U.S. support, this is not just a strategic option but a necessity. Where, then, is NATO heading amid growing criticism and pressure from U.S. President Donald Trump? What should we expect from the upcoming NATO summit in Ankara?

SD: As far as is known, NATO intends to use the summit to assess progress on commitments to increase defense spending. At the previous summit in The Hague, allies agreed to allocate 5% of GDP to defense—3.5% for core military spending and 1.5% for infrastructure. For Ukraine, it is particularly important that assistance can be counted within these benchmarks. This effectively facilitates continued support, as member states are already obligated to meet the 5% target. The Ankara summit should provide the first tangible indications of how these commitments are being implemented.

At the same time, NATO faces internal challenges. Statements by Donald Trump, along with remarks by Marco Rubio suggesting a possible reassessment of U.S. participation in NATO after the Middle East conflict, signal a degree of strategic uncertainty. In my view, this reflects a political misjudgment in how some American leaders assess NATO.

Even if there is dissatisfaction with specific allies—such as France, the United Kingdom, or Germany—this does not translate into a problem with NATO as an institution. NATO did not participate in the war in Iran, did not plan such involvement, and the issue was neither discussed nor approved by consensus within the North Atlantic Council. It is therefore essential to distinguish between NATO as an institution and the actions or positions of individual member states.

That said, it remains entirely possible that the United States could scale back its level of engagement within NATO—this is a scenario that cannot be ruled out.

ID: Donald Trump’s positions tend to shift quickly, and there is still time before the summit. It is possible that a reassessment will occur—one that recognizes the continued importance of allies, of Europe, and of developments on the European continent.

At the same time, another factor is equally important. One of the consequences of the Gulf war has been a sharp increase in energy prices, which has driven up the cost of virtually everything, including weapons and ammunition. This means that the same financial resources now procure less. For Ukraine—whose technologies and products are defined in part by their cost-effectiveness—this creates a window of opportunity to enter the global arms market.

It is noteworthy that just ahead of the Ramstein meeting, on February 13, Ukraine marked Defense Industry Workers’ Day—an especially significant occasion in wartime. Even before that, President Volodymyr Zelensky had stated that Ukraine should enter the global arms market. The occasion served as a moment to assess what Ukraine can offer. The Head of the Presidential Office, Kyrylo Budanov, went even further, arguing that the defense sector should become the backbone of a new Ukrainian economy.

In your view, can the development of the defense-industrial complex serve as a driver for Ukraine’s post-war industrial recovery?

SD: Absolutely. The defense industry can act as a catalyst, as it drives growth across multiple adjacent sectors—metallurgy, chemicals, electronics, and others—creating a foundation for broader industrial development. Moreover, innovations and technologies developed within the defense sector often transition into civilian applications over time.

Historically, the defense industry has served as a powerful engine of economic transformation. This was evident in the United States during World War II, when it triggered a major technological leap. A similar dynamic is entirely plausible for Ukraine—especially given that, under current conditions, this is not just an opportunity but a strategic necessity. In peacetime, the trajectory may evolve differently, but for now, the role of the defense sector is decisive.

ID: So, it appears that the conditions are aligning this year for Ukraine to enter the arms market with a competitive offering. Demand is clearly present, and Ukrainian products are needed. Crucially, this should translate into tangible support for Ukraine’s Defense Forces—ensuring that exports are not merely outward flows, but generate a feedback effect that strengthens domestic capabilities.

Arms exports, however, remain a highly competitive and specialized domain. As Kyrylo Budanov recently noted at a business summit, Ukraine risks losing its position in the global arms market if it does not actively develop exports now. As you pointed out, American and other foreign companies are closely observing Ukrainian innovations and industrial practices—and could replicate them relatively quickly. This reinforces the urgency: Ukraine must capitalize on its current advantages while they still provide a competitive edge.

So there is little room for delay: the global market is highly competitive, and any existing advantage must be leveraged while it still holds. President Volodymyr Zelensky put it starkly: “Already this week, we will hold talks with Europeans on creating a joint air defense system. I am convinced: either Ukraine becomes an integral part of Europe’s security system, or some in Europe risk becoming part of the ‘Russian world.’” Is the situation truly that binary?

SD: These are strong but accurate words. They concisely capture both the current trajectory and the risks ahead. Either Europe and Ukraine act together—recognizing that Ukraine’s security is inseparable from Europe’s and must be built collectively—or they face the scenario the Kremlin has long pursued: fragmentation and the exploitation of weak links within the European Union and NATO.

For Russia, identifying and leveraging a single vulnerable point capable of blocking collective decisions is a strategic objective. This is pursued through a full spectrum of tools—corruption, financial influence, coercion, espionage, and political manipulation. Without a coordinated response, and without fully integrating Ukraine’s battlefield experience, parts of Europe could indeed drift into the orbit of the so-called “Russian world.”

ID: Compared to three or four years ago, Ukraine is in a fundamentally different position. We are stronger, more capable, and able to offer tangible contributions to our partners within the Ramstein framework. As President Zelensky has emphasized, Ukraine is not merely seeking support—it is offering a security partnership. For us, the essence of that partnership is victory.

SD: Precisely. This is about interoperability, mutual reinforcement, and shared strategic benefit—without which progress is impossible. European countries must consolidate their efforts. Even recent developments in Hungary suggest that public sentiment remains aligned with the broader European trajectory and with Ukraine as part of a common European space.

At the same time, European leadership itself appears to be evolving. In the past, comparisons were often drawn with the decisive leadership of the World War II era—figures such as Winston Churchill or Charles de Gaulle, who were willing to assume responsibility and act with strategic clarity. Contemporary European leaders, by contrast, were frequently seen as cautious, reactive, and constrained by domestic political considerations.

I believe this is beginning to change. Decisions on support for Ukraine—particularly those coordinated through the Ramstein format—are fostering a growing sense of strategic awareness and responsibility across Europe.

At the same time, it is important to distinguish between values and cost. Recently, the United States has placed greater emphasis on the cost dimension—specifically, the price of weapons supplied to Ukraine. Yet values carry far greater long-term weight than financial considerations alone. They shape alliances, sustain cooperation, and ultimately determine strategic outcomes. NATO and the European Union were built as communities of shared values, and it is precisely this foundation that enabled their development and global influence. Had they been driven solely by cost calculations, such cohesion and impact would hardly have been possible. This is why a return to a value-based framework is essential.

ID: In this context, Ukraine today is effectively defending European and Euro-Atlantic values. We are doing so with the support of our partners, but it is crucial that this partnership continues to deepen—delivering tangible, mutual benefits.

SD: Exactly. This is how we see it, and it is an approach widely supported by Ukrainian society. That support is expressed most clearly through backing for the Armed Forces of Ukraine, which stand on the front line of this struggle.

Ihor Dolhov led this conversation