Stanislav Kravchenko, Chief Justice of the Supreme Court

Ukraine’s judiciary has been in a state of continuous reform for more than a decade now. For many citizens, the very word “reform” has become synonymous with endless vetting, high-profile corruption scandals, and a persistent shortage of personnel. Yet beyond the political debates, thousands of judges continue their daily work—handling hundreds of thousands of cases in the midst of a full-scale war, from war crimes and disputes with the government to divorces and routine civil matters.

Is judicial reform truly a failure, or are tangible changes simply going unnoticed? How is the Supreme Court addressing the reputational fallout from the corruption case involving Vsevolod Kniaziev? Is Ukraine’s judiciary prepared for a potential return of military tribunals? Why do high-profile cases take years to resolve, and how does the broader information environment shape public trust—when even lawful rulings are often perceived as mere chance?

Ukrinform spoke with the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, Stanislav Kravchenko, about these challenges.

Q: You recently argued that the narrative “judicial reform has failed and must be restarted” is harmful. Instead, you suggest focusing on the development of the judicial system—particularly on specific areas—rather than on reform as a whole. Why, then, after 12 years of transformation, does public dissatisfaction persist?

A: If we begin our conversation with this question again, it is clear the problem exists. However, I would like to shift the emphasis. I sincerely hope that a large share of our society—especially those who have received effective protection in the courts—holds a different view. This includes a broad spectrum of cases, from the 700,000 people who have brought claims against the Government to matters of criminal liability, internally displaced persons, and compensation for war-related damage.

From the most complex cases to the most routine—everyday disputes, divorce, child support—I believe that a significant portion of society has, in fact, received a high standard of judicial service.

As for the claim that public sentiment is purely negative, I would challenge that assumption—I believe there are positive perceptions as well. That said, if a negative component exists and we are discussing the situation through the lens of “reform,” then clearly we must improve performance and work toward increasing the share of positive public trust in the courts.

Q: Which areas, specifically, require improvement?

A: In one of my previous interviews, I spoke critically about certain stages of the reform, and I believe that not only I, but society as a whole, have the right to do so.

For eleven years, not a single judge was appointed to the appellate courts. It was not until December of last year that we saw the first appointment, although the overall shortfall remains. If we are discussing what reform should entail—whether improvement or disruption—then the key question is: who is best positioned to assess the real situation within the courts?

It is precisely in this context that we should define our priorities. First and foremost is staffing—it is fundamental. Second, I have long emphasized the importance of high-quality legislation. Court decisions are often criticized without recognizing that judges are simply applying the law as written. Even in recent months, we have seen multiple instances where the Supreme Court merely articulated the legal norm, yet faced criticism. In such cases, the issue should be addressed to parliament, if the law itself is unsatisfactory.

Another critical area is judicial independence, which is widely discussed. This is essential: without an independent judiciary, there is no democracy. The principle is self-evident. Yet it is often interpreted narrowly—through the lens of accountability mechanisms, complex appointment procedures, and disciplinary measures. Where does this lead? Clearly, this approach needs to be reconsidered.

During the wartime period, when the High Council of Justice resumed its work, approximately 20,000 complaints against judges were recorded—an average of four to five per judge, which appears significant. However, a closer look at their structure shows that most are simply expressions of disagreement with court decisions, sometimes used as a form of retaliation. Such complaints likely account for 80–90 percent of the total. For comparison, the European Court of Human Rights declares a similar proportion of applications inadmissible. This phenomenon therefore needs to be assessed in context, without rushing to categorical conclusions based solely on headline figures.

Q: Returning to the issue of public distrust in judges and the judiciary—this is a widespread phenomenon globally, including in Europe. How can trust in Ukrainian courts be restored during wartime, especially when some law enforcement agencies have managed to rebuild it?

A: I would not entirely agree with the premise of distrust as a given. Framing the issue in this way creates the impression that distrust is an established fact. At the Supreme Court, we approach this matter with great care, because the judicial profession is inherently demanding: there are few professions in which every decision must be perceived as both lawful and fair—and this is precisely where trust is formed or undermined.

That is why we are introducing new evaluation methods.

What do these entail? Last year, with the support of the Council of Europe, we commissioned the Razumkov Centre to conduct an independent assessment of the courts. The findings differed markedly from the narrative that has prevailed for years. Most notably, more than 70 percent of respondents surveyed across Ukraine—immediately after court hearings—described the decisions in their cases as lawful and well-reasoned.

At the same time, it is important to recognize that every case involves opposing parties—someone wins, someone loses; there is an accused and a victim. These inherent conflicts of interest inevitably shape perceptions. Against this backdrop, a 70 percent approval rate is a strong result.

However, the study also revealed a striking contrast. When the same respondents were asked whether they trusted the judiciary as a whole, only 30 percent answered in the affirmative.

During the presentation of the results, I asked the experts: why is that? The answer is simple. When a person exists in a negative information environment, even after receiving a positive and fair decision, they tend to believe that they were simply lucky. Because the overall background is negative.

We can talk a lot about studies and statistics, but the issue is not only about numbers. If you ask someone who has never encountered the judicial system, their answer should not be used as the basis for such conclusions. At the same time, we are fully open and hide nothing. Unfortunately, as in society as a whole, negative phenomena do occur within the judicial system, and they are then exploited. A single bad case out of thousands or millions is taken and used to portray the entire system as negative. In my view, that is, at the very least, incorrect.

Q: You mentioned negative cases. For example, your predecessor, Vsevolod Kniaziev—the corruption scandal, with proceedings still ongoing. To what extent has this affected the reputation of the Supreme Court? And how have you addressed it? I imagine taking office in the aftermath was not without difficulties.

A: Within the Supreme Court—where else, if not here—we are bound by both the law and the Constitution. As for the Kniaziev case, the presumption of innocence applies, and I would therefore refrain from commenting. The case is being considered by the High Anti-Corruption Court, and once a verdict is delivered, it will be clear to the public.

As for the events of two and a half years ago, I would prefer not to revisit them. Considerable effort—both by the Court as an institution and by myself—has gone into ensuring that this episode remains in the past. At the time, we openly acknowledged how painful it was. While many criticisms of the judiciary over the past decade could be debated, the Kniaziev case—and the way it entered the public domain—undoubtedly caused significant reputational damage.

But both then and now, the same question arises: what comes next? Total collapse, or consolidation and continued work? It is essential to understand what the Supreme Court represents—the scale of its work, the number of people involved, and the responsibilities they carry. Our collective effort has been to demonstrate that this was an isolated and unfortunate incident—one that must be overcome in order to move forward and continue developing.

Q: More broadly, is it possible to eradicate corruption within the judiciary? Reports of judges taking bribes still emerge from time to time, and this inevitably undermines public trust.

A: I am not certain there is a definitive answer. There are examples of European countries that claim to have eradicated corruption entirely. If Denmark says it has not faced this issue for 300 years, then clearly it existed before that. In reality, international experience shows that various forms of corruption exist everywhere. Perhaps this is rooted, at least in part, in human nature.

From my perspective as a judge with many years of experience, the answer lies in a system built on the inevitability of punishment—although achieving this absolutely is impossible. But the issue is not limited to punishment; it is also about fostering an environment in which such behavior is socially unacceptable.

I believe that Ukraine—and the judicial system in particular—has already made significant progress. We have strong law enforcement institutions. However, it is often perceived as if they operate on one side and the courts on another. In reality, this is not the case. Every decision made by law enforcement bodies is subject to judicial oversight under our legal framework.

To be clear, the entire investigative process—including cases involving judges—is under judicial control: from preventive measures to searches and seizures. This is carried out by investigating judges, who ensure the legality of investigative actions. I would not frame this as opposing sides. The judiciary is an integral part of the system as a whole.

From the initial stages of investigation to final review in the cassation court—the third instance—the courts are involved at every step, including in corruption-related cases.

At the same time, this should not be interpreted as an excuse. Corruption exists across all sectors of society—legislative, executive, military, even healthcare. This reflects the stage our society is currently at. However, I am confident that effective mechanisms to combat it will emerge. The key is to establish a culture of zero tolerance—where such conduct is unequivocally unacceptable.

Q: There is another negative issue—the Russian citizenship of some judges. Is it possible to conduct checks without the involvement of the Security Service of Ukraine?

A: Over the years of my work in the High Council of Justice during wartime, I have encountered only isolated cases. They have arisen in different ways. For example, journalists have sometimes provided information, although the manner in which it was presented has, at times, appeared questionable—even within the High Council of Justice itself. In one instance, a decree published on the website of the president of the aggressor state—Russia—regarding the appointment of judges to the so-called “Luhansk People’s Republic” was used to draw the conclusion that, since only a Russian citizen could hold such a position, the individual in question must therefore be a Russian citizen.

There was also a case involving a judge who had already retired and chose to take such a step. But the key issue is this: aligning oneself with the enemy in such a manner may constitute treason or collaboration. The judge’s retirement status was revoked, but that is not the only consequence. Anyone who sides with and cooperates with the enemy falls under disciplinary liability—whether they are an active judge or a retired one.

That said, the issue of citizenship itself remains complex. I have previously worked on this topic, including questions of jus soli (“right of the soil”), jus sanguinis (“right of blood”), dual citizenship, and the recently adopted law on multiple citizenship. In the context of war, Russian citizenship is understandably highly sensitive and is immediately perceived negatively. However, we must either treat this category separately or assess it within a broader legal framework.

I was recently asked how I view retired judges who remained in territories not controlled by Ukraine. We received information from the head of the Security Service, which was formalized as a disciplinary complaint. If such individuals are not yet formally retired, the issue is addressed through disciplinary proceedings—there is already established practice, and they cease to hold judicial office in Ukraine. However, where an elderly person, due to circumstances—such as the rapid occupation of a territory—was unable to leave for health reasons, each case must be considered individually.

At present, there is no widespread phenomenon, particularly among sitting judges. It would be incorrect to assume that the mere fact of holding citizenship automatically constitutes a negative factor. In the isolated cases that have been identified, the Security Service, law enforcement agencies, and the High Council of Justice are responsible for responding—and they do so promptly when relevant information emerges.

Q: There is another equally important issue: military courts and military jurisdiction more broadly. How relevant is this in the current wartime context?

A: Military courts existed in independent Ukraine for many years—initially as tribunals, later as courts. In 2010–2011, it was decided that such institutions were no longer necessary, and the system was abolished.

With the outbreak of war, however, the issue has become highly relevant again. Discussions resumed, and two draft laws have been introduced, although neither has yet been adopted. Prior to the war, I believed that the existing system of general jurisdiction courts—that is, civilian courts—could handle such cases without the need to reintroduce military courts. I had sound arguments for that position. However, the war significantly expanded the armed forces, and consequently the volume and nature of cases increased, including offenses related to military service.

The issue is not limited to criminal liability; it also encompasses the social protection of service members and their families. When, during the war, members of the military themselves raised the need to establish specialized courts—courts that would inspire greater trust—I supported this, at least out of respect for those defending our country.

At the same time, there has been considerable debate within the military itself. The Deputy Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, Oleksandr Mamalui, is also a serviceman—a major in the Armed Forces. When I asked him how the military view the creation of such courts, the responses varied. Some perceive military courts as a potential risk—similar to tribunals that may exhibit an accusatory bias. This concern is particularly pronounced if military judges were to be subordinated, for example, to the Minister of Defense.

Q: So this could potentially be used against the military?

A: Yes. That is precisely why the issue proves far from straightforward. The first question is: what kind of system should be created? What jurisdiction would it have? Criminal cases and administrative offenses—clearly, yes. But what about civil cases? Which categories specifically? Social protection issues? And this could extend further, even into commercial matters such as military procurement.

The second question concerns structure and geography: where would these courts be located, and on what principle? Our current system is based on districts, regions, and a three-tier hierarchy. But the military—especially in wartime—is highly dynamic: units are constantly moving, redeploying, rotating. Designing a stable court network under such conditions is extremely challenging.

There are also particularly sensitive issues at the appellate level. Those familiar with the system understand that this includes, among other things, criminal chambers of appellate courts and investigating judges who handle highly sensitive matters such as covert investigative measures. Where should such courts be based? These are time-critical decisions that directly support ongoing investigations. If the court is geographically distant, can this function effectively?

In practice, we have found that there are more questions than answers. A draft law has been submitted to the Plenum of the Supreme Court, and we have observed a similar division of opinion: roughly half of the judges support the creation of military courts, while the other half believe the existing system is capable of handling these cases.

Q: Presumably, the issue also concerns personnel—who would serve as judges?

A: Yes, staffing is a key challenge. As I have already noted, the situation with judicial appointments is highly complex.

Q: Could you explain why the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal by the State Service of Ukraine for Ethnopolitics and Freedom of Conscience against the ruling that refused to impose a freeze on the property and accounts of the Kyiv Metropolis of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church (Moscow Patriarchate)?

A: As far as I am aware, the case is still pending before the courts. Once proceedings are complete, a fully reasoned decision will be issued. So, to your question—no, I cannot explain it, regardless of whether I personally agree or disagree. A court decision is binding on me, just as it is on all citizens of Ukraine.

Moreover, if we are discussing interim measures, it is important to understand their purpose. These are procedural tools designed to ensure the proper conduct of proceedings—to prevent the destruction of evidence or the concealment of assets. In each case, the judge assesses the level of risk and determines whether such measures are necessary. As I understand it, the ruling in this case clearly stated that the claimant failed to substantiate why such measures were required or how their absence would impede the proceedings. Therefore, I would not equate procedural decisions with notions of “betrayal.”

Q: Nearly two years ago, media reports suggested that Viktor Medvedchuk had filed a lawsuit with the Supreme Court seeking the restoration of his citizenship, parliamentary mandate, and the lifting of sanctions imposed by the National Security and Defense Council. What is the current status of this case?

A: As far as I am aware, there are several cases filed by the individual you mentioned—if I am not mistaken, around six.

Q: So, no decisions have been issued yet?

A: As far as I am aware, no decisions have been issued. But the Supreme Court alone handles around 93,000 cases—I do not review them individually, and certainly not the Medvedchuk case.

In many instances, I learn about specific cases by name from the media, depending on the level of public attention they attract. Even then, that may simply prompt me to look into them more closely. It is not our practice for the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court to be briefed on or oversee which cases are filed or considered. That would run counter to the principles of judicial independence and democracy.

Q: Recently, the public discourse was stirred by reports that the Supreme Court upheld a lower court’s decision recognizing that the cohabitation of activists Zorian Kis and Tymur Levchuk constituted a de facto marital relationship. Could this be seen as a first step toward the legalization of same-sex relationships in Ukraine?

A: Let us be clear: the judiciary does not create legislation. Citizens elect representatives to parliament, and it is parliament that adopts laws. If this decision has provoked public debate, it is because there are both supporters and opponents of such relationships. In this case, the Supreme Court simply applied the law and established a specific legal fact.

For the Supreme Court, this decision is likely the first of its kind and is therefore significant for the development of case law. I reviewed it personally and found no controversial aspects in terms of current legislation—the courts applied the law as it stands.

Q: You have repeatedly referred to parliament. What legislative changes do you expect from lawmakers? Which bills should be prioritized?

A: Parliament has a very heavy workload. They regularly submit draft laws to us for review—covering procedural rules, legal codes, the judiciary, and other areas. In the past year alone, we issued around 130 opinions.

One issue that has sparked considerable debate—and even led to consultations with the Venice Commission—is the improvement of procedures for verifying judges’ integrity declarations and declarations of family ties. Ukrainian judges are subject to particularly stringent oversight: mechanisms of both criminal and administrative liability are in place—there are no “untouchables.” In addition to asset declarations submitted to the National Agency on Corruption Prevention (NACP), judges must also file two additional declarations with the High Qualification Commission of Judges—on integrity and on family ties.

The European Union has called for these procedures to be simplified—for example, by consolidating them. However, under the guise of reform, proposals sometimes emerge to re-screen judges of the Supreme Court or the High Anti-Corruption Court. These are individuals who have already undergone rigorous vetting and remain under continuous oversight. The draft law has passed its first reading, but more radical proposals—such as expanding the role of foreign experts beyond existing mechanisms—have not been supported. We are now awaiting the second reading.

Another major issue concerns military courts. Beyond that, there are more than a hundred legislative initiatives covering a wide range of areas. We provide our assessments based on practical experience—what works and what does not. Not all of our recommendations are adopted, but the process continues. We must keep working at it.

Q: Another persistent problem is the length of proceedings. Some cases take years to resolve—such as those involving Kniaziev or Judge Oleksii Tandyr. Is it possible to address this? In some instances, individuals in pre-trial detention spend as much time in custody as they might have received as a sentence if convicted, while proceedings are still ongoing.

A: You have touched on one of the most serious challenges. It stems from a combination of factors. First, if delays result from poor organization of a judge’s work, this may constitute grounds for disciplinary action, including dismissal. Anyone may file a complaint, and the High Council of Justice will review it. However, a judge’s capacity is not unlimited—quality adjudication is impossible under excessive workload. Therefore, adequate staffing is the primary and most fundamental factor.

The second issue is the abuse of procedural rights, which has remained unresolved for years. For example, a defense lawyer may claim illness or request additional time to prepare. Under current law, a defendant in criminal proceedings may have up to five lawyers. If all five insist on being present, but one is unavailable due to another hearing or illness, the proceedings are delayed. In such circumstances, it is difficult for the court to impose limits on these procedural rights.

We must also consider the role of prosecutors. There have been years when 7,000 to 8,000 instances of prosecutors failing to appear at hearings were recorded. In such cases, the party responsible for maintaining the prosecution on behalf of the state simply does not show up.

Another factor is the absence of participants—victims and witnesses. Victims, particularly those who have already received compensation, are often unwilling to relive the experience. Witnesses, meanwhile, may fail to appear for years. In some cases, individuals from other cities cite the cost of travel as a barrier, and these expenses are not covered by the state.

I fully agree that justice must be both timely and continuous. Once all parties have been assembled and the evidence examined, a decision should follow without undue delay. This is essential to the public perception of justice. Particularly concerning are cases in which proceedings are prolonged to the point that statutory limitation periods expire.

Q: Can this be addressed through legislation?

A: That is precisely where the difficulty lies—it is ultimately a matter of legal culture. At the legislative level, certain measures can be introduced: for example, increasing penalties for failure to appear or strengthening the responsibility of parties to ensure the attendance of their witnesses—the prosecution for its witnesses, the defense for its own. Such mechanisms are possible, but the issue is more complex than legislation alone can resolve.

Maryna Shashkova led this conversation

Photo via Supreme Court