Jarosław Kraszewski, former commander of Poland’s Rocket Forces and Artillery

Poland is one of Ukraine’s closest partners. It was among the first countries to extend a helping hand after the start of the full-scale invasion and continues to support Ukraine today. Warsaw remains ready to assist further, including through logistics and the experience it has gained within NATO structures.

In an interview with Ukrinform’s correspondent, Polish retired general — and now CEO of the private defense industry company RBL Defence Polska — Jarosław Kraszewski shared his views on how Poland could help strengthen Ukraine’s air defense even now, and how Warsaw and Kyiv could deepen their defense partnership, including through the capabilities of his own company. The Polish general also outlined his assessment of Russia’s strategic intentions and evaluated the likelihood of a Russian armed provocation against NATO in the near future.

LET US HAVE NO ILLUSIONS THAT MOSCOW WANTS THE WAR TO END QUICKLY

Q: General, the fourth anniversary of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine has recently passed. At what stage of the war are we now?

A: We are at a critical moment. The time has come for Western countries to make key decisions. First and foremost, this concerns Europe’s security, and secondly, the real end of the war.

We must stop speculating about the war ending in a day, a month, or a year. Instead, everything possible must be done to ensure that it truly ends as soon as possible. This winter has been another serious test for Ukraine. It seems that Putin had been waiting for such a harsh winter for years, hoping to exhaust the Ukrainian people.

Russia is playing a game with everyone, including the Americans, as can be seen from the course of the negotiations. We should have no illusions that Moscow genuinely wants the war to end quickly. Russia expects Ukraine to make major concessions — abandoning Donbas, Crimea, and other territories. But such concessions would only lay the groundwork for future aggression. The only realistic option for ending the war would be restoring Ukraine’s borders as they were in 2014.

Q: In your opinion, what is the current situation on the front line?

A: The harsh winter has significantly affected the course of hostilities. For Ukraine, the key challenge remains human resources. We are currently witnessing the culmination of what can be called a drone war. Ukraine critically needs drones in the immediate contact zone. At the same time, the demand for artillery shells remains high, and Ukraine also requires a significant number of air defense systems.

But just as important is the need for personnel. Ukraine needs sufficient mobilization to allow for the rotation of units that have been on the front line for extended periods. Soldiers on the front line need rest in order to recover. Without this, maintaining the defense will become increasingly difficult.

The war has become more technological. Today, unmanned systems play a decisive role. To a large extent, this is driven by economic factors. An FPV drone costs significantly less than a 155 mm artillery shell. For just a few hundred dollars, a drone can be purchased that, in the hands of a well-trained operator, can accurately strike a dugout, combat vehicle, or command post. Achieving such precision with an artillery shell is far more difficult.

Indeed, an artillery shell carries a more powerful charge and affects a larger area. However, the mass use of relatively inexpensive drones — particularly in swarm formations — can produce comparable or even greater effects. A swarm of drones is cheaper than a single ATACMS missile and at the same time increases the chances of penetrating air defenses, even if some of the UAVs are shot down.

The use of FPV drones by both sides indicates that the war has entered a new stage. This is already a different logic of warfare. At the same time, the current phase of fighting on the front line in many ways resembles the First World War: positional warfare, slow advances of hundreds of meters or one or two kilometers, and no strategic breakthroughs.

The situation may change with the arrival of spring, when soil conditions allow heavier equipment to be used more actively. Ukraine must be prepared for such a scenario. Russia is likely using the winter period to accumulate reserves and prepare new forces in order to intensify offensive operations in the spring. For the Kremlin, it is crucial to achieve at least some visible military success. That is why Russia is not yet demonstrating any genuine readiness to end the war on terms that would involve a full cessation of hostilities.

THE SIMPLEST SOLUTIONS ARE THE MOST EFFECTIVE IN COUNTERING DRONES

Q: Ukraine critically needs air defense systems to protect its skies. This became particularly evident during the winter, when Russia launched massive attacks on Ukraine’s energy infrastructure, creating an extremely difficult situation for the country. Kyiv has been appealing for assistance from its Western partners and allies, including Poland. During Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk’s visit to Kyiv in February, the issue of military support was also discussed.

In particular, the possibility of postponing the transfer of MiG-29 aircraft to Ukraine in exchange for faster delivery of air defense systems was raised. In your opinion, how exactly could Poland help Ukraine right now?

A: In the fight against drones, the simplest solutions are often the most effective. Ukraine has already demonstrated the effectiveness of mobile air defense groups — pickup trucks equipped with heavy machine guns of 12.7 mm caliber, such as the DShK, fitted with upgraded thermal and laser sights. Poland also has similar systems, including Soviet-era heavy machine guns of 12.7 mm and 14.5 mm caliber, such as the KPVT, which may still be stored in warehouses.

Transferring such systems together with ammunition could significantly strengthen Ukraine’s ability to counter drones, especially during massive attacks on critical infrastructure It would also make sense for Poland to increase production of 12.7 mm and 14.5 mm ammunition to ensure steady supplies to Ukraine. These munitions are produced by the Polish arms manufacturing company Mesko, which could expand or adapt its production to meet Ukraine’s requirements.

Such relatively simple mobile systems make it possible to effectively shoot down various types of drones, including during swarm attacks.

Q: Doesn’t Mesko produce this ammunition now?

A: Production continues, but the rates are not sufficient to meet Ukraine’s needs. There are also other solutions, and we should not delay implementing them. I am referring to jammers — devices that use electromagnetic interference to disrupt wireless communications like Wi-Fi, GPS, and cellular, often causing denial of service. Ukrainians should use them as often as possible.

Jammers have one drawback: within their range they disrupt any wireless communications, including mobile communications. But if the choice is between five to ten minutes without mobile service and saving lives, the decision is obvious. Naturally, jammers should not operate continuously. They should only be activated when drones are already approaching, as their range is limited.

Ukraine already uses electronic warfare systems. As far as I know, the Polish side also proposed such solutions, but the Ukrainians rejected them because of the side effect — disruptions to mobile communications. Perhaps it would be worth revisiting this issue. I certainly would, because it is an inexpensive solution, and Polish companies are ready to supply such systems to the battlefield.

THE COALITION OF THE WILLING SHOULD DEPLOY A CONTINGENT IN UKRAINE AND PROVIDE AIR COVER

Q: General, is it realistic for allies to secure the skies over western Ukraine? This issue resurfaced after the so-called drone incident in Poland on September 10 last year.

A: There is a format of action known as “peace enforcement,” which is used when one side lacks the will to conclude peace. In this case, Ukraine has demonstrated its readiness to achieve peace on reasonable and fair terms. Russia, on the other hand, is misleading the entire world.

Therefore, if a Coalition of the Willing has already been formed, its troops should be deployed in Ukraine. What you are referring to would essentially provide air cover for the forces of that coalition.

These troops must be deployed in a way that ensures freedom of maneuver and decision-making. For this, they need proper air defense protection capable of destroying aerial threats. Such a step would significantly limit Russia’s freedom of action and send a powerful signal to Putin: enough games.

Q: But Russia warns that Western allied troops would become legitimate targets...

A: Of course they will try to intimidate. But Russians are also afraid of strength. Europeans must state clearly: we are not afraid, and if there are provocations, we will respond immediately and decisively.

Q: The Polish government has declared that in the event of a peacekeeping mission there will be no Polish troops deployed in Ukraine. In your opinion, is this the right strategy?

A: Poland has never said “no.” From the very beginning, we have served as a logistical hub for military assistance to Ukraine. Poland should also send liaison officers to the commands and headquarters of the Ukrainian armed forces. We must make all our training grounds available for preparing the next rotations of servicemen who will carry out tasks under the mandate of a peacekeeping mission. Their training for these tasks should take place on our territory.

Poland should also become the place where Ukrainian combat experience is systematically shared with Western allies. This is already happening to some extent, but the process needs to be further developed and strengthened.

At the same time, we must understand that if Russia dares to stage provocations against NATO, Poland will be on the front line. Therefore, Polish troops must prepare for possible aggressive actions by Russia on Polish territory.

Q: What should be the size of the peacekeeping contingent deployed in Ukraine?

A: At least 30,000–40,000 troops as a demonstration of force. Without a doubt, this must be done. In my view, the West must stop applying “aspirin and band-aids” and end the phase in which Russia provokes all of us while we convince ourselves that we are supposedly moving closer to decisions through peace negotiations.

Those negotiations may never happen, while the Russians will continue shelling and attacking. Too much time has already been wasted. Ukraine waited six months for rifles, then another six months for tanks, then for howitzers, and only later for aircraft. All of this is happening far too slowly. The war must be stopped through decisive action now, in order to create conditions for Ukrainians to return home and begin rebuilding their country.

A JOINT UKRAINIAN-POLISH PLATFORM FOR COOPERATION BETWEEN RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT CENTERS SHOULD BE CREATED

Q: General, in February Ukraine and Poland signed a letter of intent on cooperation in weapons production. What opportunities does this create for the Polish defense industry?

A: It opens up significant prospects. First of all, it marks the beginning of cooperation in an area that is relatively new for all of us — drones. In this context, it is essential to make full use of Ukraine’s experience and to exchange technologies, as research, design and development programs are underway in both Poland and Ukraine. This cooperation should be mutually beneficial — a true win-win.

Q: What exactly could the two sides offer each other?

A: Poland has a great deal to offer. We have strong infrastructure that Ukrainian companies could already integrate into in order to expand production capacity. A joint platform should be created for cooperation between research and development centers in order to generate a real synergy effect.

For example, Ukrainians can identify what is currently needed to improve the effectiveness of drones, and we can check whether we have the relevant capabilities. If the Polish side does, we can quickly reach an agreement, launch production, and deliver the equipment to the military.

For understandable reasons, the process of introducing new weapons into service in Ukraine is much simpler than in Poland or in other countries. Due to civilian oversight of the military, anti-corruption procedures, and other regulations, this process in Western countries can sometimes take years.

Q: Where should joint production take place?

A: In both countries. Production is already underway in Ukraine, but the scale could be expanded in Poland.

AS UKRAINE DEFENDS ITSELF, POLAND REMAINS SAFE

Q: Let us return to military-political issues. According to media reports, since 2021 Russia’s defense industry has increased its production of artillery ammunition seventeenfold. Does this mean that Russia is preparing for a new armed conflict despite the ongoing war in Ukraine? And is Europe — and Poland in particular — ready for this?

A: We need to look at the numbers. Given the current rate of ammunition use in Ukraine, Russia would need to produce about nine million shells per year. Despite increasing production, it does not produce that many. For a long time Russia relied on stockpiles, which are now being depleted. According to current estimates, production is close to six million shells annually. That means Russia is still short by roughly three million.

Production in Europe is increasing, but do we have as much as Russia? I very much doubt it. That is why I say we need to build dozens of drone factories. In fact, they do not even have to be full factories — they can be assembly lines. Engines can be purchased, drone bodies printed on 3D printers, and then everything assembled. This is far cheaper and faster. If several dozen such facilities operate across the country, destroying them would take considerable time. And if some production lines are located underground, that would be an ideal solution.

Russian artillery has a maximum range of about 30–35 kilometers. Producing artillery shells requires steel, gunpowder, explosives, and fuses — all of which involve significant costs. Drones, by contrast, can fly hundreds of kilometers. My company, for example, produces drones with a range of 300 kilometers, and there is also a jet-powered UAV with a range of up to 1,200 kilometers. That is an entirely different scale.

Using drones, meanwhile, requires relatively little — a pickup truck, a few well-trained operators, and the courage to carry out the mission.

Q: In your opinion, is Ukraine protecting Poland and Europe from Russia, or — as is sometimes argued, including in Poland — is Ukraine only defending itself, while Poland remains safe thanks to its NATO membership?

A: By defending itself, Ukraine is also keeping Poland safe. Ukraine has demonstrated something important: even a country that was not exceptionally well armed can resist the Russian “bear.” This is the Ukrainian phenomenon — when an entire nation understood that everything must be done to save the country. We must learn from Ukrainians.

I am convinced that without this war we in Poland would not have begun rebuilding our defense potential. We would have remained with an army of around 90,000. Now, however, Poland is discussing the return of universal military conscription. I support this step and believe it will happen. We need to assess the state of society, particularly young people aged 18–25. Six months of basic service will not ruin anyone’s life.

RUSSIA MAY STAGE A PROVOCATION AGAINST NATO TO DIVERT ATTENTION FROM A NEW OFFENSIVE IN UKRAINE

Q: Are Russian provocations against one of the European countries possible in the near future, for example in the area of the Suwałki Corridor?

A: I estimate the likelihood of such a scenario at around 75–80 percent in the near future. It could occur at the junction of Poland, Lithuania, and Belarus, or in the Baltic Sea region. The goal of such a provocation would be to divert Western attention from a new large-scale Russian offensive in Ukraine.

In other words, the aim would be to tie up European forces and resources and shift attention away from Ukraine. Russia could stage a provocation against a NATO country shortly before launching an offensive in Ukraine, possibly in April or May.

Q: What form could such a provocation take?

A: It could involve attacks on energy infrastructure connecting the Kaliningrad region with Belarus. The FSB does not care about its own citizens, so it could sacrifice them to claim, for example, that Poles together with Ukrainians blew something up or cut certain cables. They would then say they must respond — perhaps in the Suwałki area.

It could be anything: an environmental disaster, damage to a chemical storage tank, or attacks on energy infrastructure. They would want there to be casualties.

Q: As Ukraine’s closest neighbor, will Poland remain with Ukraine despite political disagreements and other problems?

A: Yes. For Poland it is important that Ukraine liberates itself from Russian occupation as soon as possible and joins the European Union, because accession to NATO will likely be more complicated and take longer.

But Ukraine must first rebuild and develop its own genuine military potential. That is why cooperation between the defense industries of our two countries is so important. It will accelerate the development of Ukrainian industry and give it the necessary momentum. Our partnership must remain strong, stable, and long-term.

Yurii Banakhevych led this conversation. Warsaw

Photos via Author

(This conversation is given here translated from Ukrainian)