Austrian Military Expert Gustav Gressel

Russia’s full-scale aggression against Ukraine has now passed the four-year mark, increasingly evolving into a war of attrition, where the decisive factor is the resources available to each side. A common assumption is that the far more “resource-rich” Russia holds a clear advantage in such a confrontation.

However, Austrian military expert Gustav Gressel cautions against treating this pessimistic view as inevitable. According to him, the claim that Ukraine has no chance of withstanding a war of attrition should not be regarded as an axiom.

Gressel points to a number of systemic problems the Russian army has faced after years of intense combat. These include heavy losses, the exhaustion of military units, and the gradual deterioration of Russia’s economic situation. In his view, the coming summer could become a decisive period. If Ukrainian forces continue to increase Russian losses, Moscow’s difficulties could escalate rapidly.

In an interview with Ukrinform, Gustav Gressel — currently a researcher at the Austrian National Defense Academy, the country’s leading intellectual center for the armed forces — assessed the results of Russia’s winter campaign and Moscow’s possible plans for the summer. He also shared his views on the prospects for peace negotiations and possible security guarantees for Ukraine, and commented on how a new escalation in the Middle East could affect Russia’s war against Ukraine.

A PROLONGED ESCALATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST PLAYS INTO PUTIN’S HANDS

Q: The United States and Israel are conducting a military operation against Iran. Tehran is responding with retaliatory strikes, including against countries in the region. What is your forecast for how the situation may develop further?

A: It is difficult to say, because the political objectives of the United States are not clearly defined. For Israel, the situation is straightforward: it wants to weaken Iran’s military potential as much as possible so that Iran ceases to pose a threat for a long time.

What exactly the United States is aiming to achieve, however, is less clear. Overthrowing the regime of the mullahs would be impossible without ground troops. Fully verifying the abandonment of Iran’s nuclear program would also be impossible without at least a temporary presence on the ground. But who would provide such a force? For how long? And will it happen at all?

Iran’s strategy also appears somewhat puzzling. An Iranian attack on American bases in the Persian Gulf was expected. But strikes against British and French bases in Cyprus and the UAE, as well as against Turkey, Azerbaijan, and Oman? Oman had served as a patient mediator, while Turkey had maintained neutrality. By doing so, Iran is effectively rallying even the initial critics of the U.S.–Israeli operation around Washington’s position.

Q: How will this escalation in the Middle East affect Russia’s war against Ukraine?

A: Much will depend on how long the escalation lasts. High oil prices benefit Putin. The first wave of Russian rearmament was financed by high energy prices following the 2003 invasion of Iraq, and unfortunately the world never fully managed to move beyond that era of elevated energy prices.

Putin is already beginning to actively play the energy card. China and India previously received most of their oil from the Persian Gulf, and now both countries will increasingly turn to Russia. That is not a favorable development.

In addition, the supply of Patriot systems is likely to become more complicated. First, a portion of the missiles has already been  consumed. Second, if instability in the Persian Gulf persists, long-term demand for these systems from countries in the region will increase. This could become a serious challenge during the next wartime winter. Neither the United States can ramp up production of Patriot systems quickly enough, nor can European manufacturers significantly accelerate production of Aster-30 missiles.

Ukraine has also not yet advanced far enough with systems such as FP-5, FP-7, and Hrim-2. In general, to get through the next wartime winter, Ukraine will need to destroy roughly a quarter of Russian missiles before they are even launched — and this percentage will likely have to increase further. This is difficult, first because of the limited number of strike capabilities available, and second because of the speed at which targets must be detected. Locating an Iskander launcher is not easy.

Even for the United States and Israel, it took two days in Iran to fully disable the country’s air defense network. Only after that did it become possible to deploy drones at high altitude to detect targets and maintain round-the-clock surveillance. Russian air defenses, however, are a completely different matter — both qualitatively and quantitatively — so such an approach would not work in the same way.

BY AUTUMN IT WILL BECOME CLEAR WHETHER RUSSIA RETAINS ITS OFFENSIVEPOTENTIAL

Q: How do you assess the battlefield situation in Ukraine? Have the Russians achieved their winter objectives?

A: No. Russia’s objectives for the winter campaign were to create favorable staging positions for the encirclement of Sloviansk, Kramatorsk, and Kostiantynivka. In this regard, they have made only limited progress — some, but not much.

What has become evident near Kupiansk, and now also in the area of the 36th Army, suggests that Russian forces are already significantly exhausted. This is compounded by internal organizational problems. For political reasons, the Russian army must always appear victorious and advancing — even when this is not actually the case. As a result, the situation is often embellished in official reports.

Corruption is another factor. The misappropriation of the salaries of fallen soldiers by senior officers is part of this system. Consequently, the true scale of losses is never acknowledged.

Both near Kupiansk and during the recent Ukrainian counterattacks in the south — in the Zaporizhzhia region — it became clear that Russian forces had fewer personnel on the ground than was indicated in their own frontline reports. In reality, they should already have shifted to a defensive posture rather than continuing offensive operations. But the order was different: keep moving forward, keep attacking. As a result, they became vulnerable and were hit by those counterattacks.

This is not yet a turning point. However, it shows that the Russians face an upper limit in terms of manpower that cannot simply be exceeded. It also demonstrates that corruption and the practice of telling Putin only what he wants to hear — rather than what is actually happening on the battlefield — have real consequences.

If Ukraine manages to further increase Russian losses over the summer, this problem will become even more acute. By autumn, it should become clear whether Russia still retains the capacity to sustain offensive operations.

RUSSIA IS WAGING A WAR OF ATTRITION

Q: In your opinion, what are the main objectives of the Russian army for the summer?

A: In the long term, the objective remains unchanged: the subjugation of Ukraine in its entirety. Russia seeks to exhaust the Ukrainian army to the point where it ultimately breaks, after which the country could be forced to accept a “peace agreement” that would in reality amount to capitulation.

To achieve this, Russia is waging a war of attrition. In such a conflict, the combat capability of one’s own forces must decline more slowly than that of the opponent. On the Ukrainian side, however, the situation after four years of war is far from ideal. There have been losses, equipment has worn out, and many experienced soldiers have been killed.

The key question in a war of attrition is simple: who will collapse first? The widespread pessimism that Ukraine has no chance of enduring such a conflict is not an axiom. The question remains open.

Some of the Ukrainian army’s problems may be addressed over the summer, while the structural problems on the Russian side may become more pronounced. I am cautiously optimistic.

The Russian army will continue attacking and will attempt to encircle the so-called “fortification belt” in the Donbas. But this is a year-long project — it cannot be accomplished quickly.

The units that Russia is still capable of employing in offensive operations are already committed. At the same time, restoring these forces and forming new ones is becoming increasingly difficult.

Q: But the initiative on the front line still remains with Russia?

A: Yes, the initiative is still on the Russian side, and this will likely remain the case until next winter. Ultimately, the decisive factor will be the ratio of losses.

AS LONG AS PUTIN BELIEVES IN THE POSSIBILITY OF MILITARY VICTORY, HE WILL CONTINUE MOBILIZING RESOURCES

Q: “Until next winter” — does that mean you do not believe in the prospects for peace negotiations?

A: No, I do not believe in serious peace negotiations. Negotiations will take place eventually, but the current ones are not serious. If the Russians send Medinsky, then there is nothing to expect. If they send someone else, then it will be clear that they are serious.

But the main problem is that Putin still believes he can win the war militarily. As long as he holds that belief, he will not agree to a meaningful peace settlement. Only when reports from the battlefield undermine this conviction will his position begin to change.

Q: How long, in your opinion, will the war last?

A: I do not see any fundamental changes occurring this year. The American negotiating line is inconsistent, Russia is not interested in serious talks, and at the same time efforts by Ukraine and Europe aimed at strengthening Ukraine’s warfighting capabilities are unfolding precisely this year.

For example, in 2025 Ukraine produced around 12,000 ground drones, and in 2026 the figure is expected to reach about 50,000. Interceptor drones designed to counter reconnaissance UAVs and Shahed drones are also being deployed increasingly effectively. All of this gradually affects the balance of forces.

Russia’s economic situation is deteriorating. Certain resources still remain — gold reserves and loans from China. But once these options are exhausted, the question will arise of how long Putin will be able to continue improvising.

As long as he believes in the possibility of a military victory, he will continue mobilizing resources. Only when that belief collapses will there be real willingness to negotiate.

IT WOULD BE ADVISABLE TO HELP UKRAINE DEVELOP ITS OWN BALLISTIC CAPABILITIES

Q: To break Putin’s belief in victory more quickly, Ukraine also needs powerful long-range strike capabilities. Is the issue of supplying Taurus missiles already closed, or could there still be progress?

A: The biggest problem with supplying Taurus missiles is that Merz, as a candidate for chancellor, promised this very loudly. From the Russian perspective, it could appear that Moscow managed, through its threats, to shift the mood in Germany. That damages trust.

Taurus is a cruise missile, and it would certainly help Ukraine. But in the end it is similar to Storm Shadow or SCALP. If Germany were to conduct a “ring exchange” with the United Kingdom and Ukraine received additional Storm Shadow missiles, that would also be beneficial.

The most important thing for Ukraine is to have reliable munitions capable of striking deep inside Russia. Ballistic missiles have the best chances of penetrating Russian air defenses. In fact, it would make sense to help Ukraine develop its own ballistic capabilities and produce such missiles on a large scale.

In Europe, essentially only Turkey produces short-range ballistic missiles, while the United Kingdom has only recently launched its own project. This means there is a significant capability gap. It would be reasonable to close this gap together with Ukraine and, after the war, produce such missiles in Europe as well — both as an element of deterrence and as a response to the threat from Iskander missiles.

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EUROPEANS COULD HELP WITH GUIDANCE SYSTEMS FOR “FLAMINGO”

Q: What is your assessment of the “Flamingo” system?

A: Essentially, it is also a cruise missile, which comes with both advantages and disadvantages.

The advantage lies in its long range and highly lethal warhead. The drawback is that it is very large and heavy. As a result, it must fly at a relatively high altitude, which makes it vulnerable to air defenses or fighter patrols, such as MiG-31 or Su-35 aircraft.

There is little photographic evidence of successful strikes. In some images, the “Flamingo” appears not to have hit its targets precisely. In addition, the targets often lie outside cities — typically large industrial facilities located beyond urban areas.

There may also be a political motive behind this. If a missile were to deviate from its target and hit a city, Putin could go to Trump and claim that Ukrainians are bombing Russian cities. This suggests that there may indeed be certain accuracy issues.

This raises the question of whether Europeans could help by providing more advanced guidance systems that would make the Flamingo more accurate. Many research institutes and arms factories are located within cities, and striking such targets requires extremely high precision.

Q: Another question concerns security guarantees for Ukraine. Do you believe Europeans will send troops to Ukraine?

A: I think this has already become almost an academic debate. The so-called American backstop guarantees simply do not exist. Without them, many proposed concepts carry little real weight.

For Ukraine today, the most important security guarantee is continued European support for the Ukrainian army so that it can wage this war as effectively as possible.

After the war, it will be necessary to determine how to organize deterrence jointly.

This could involve tripwire forces — small military contingents deployed on the territory of an ally or in a high-risk area, where an attack on them would automatically trigger a large-scale response from the main forces. But above all, it should involve deeper defense-industrial cooperation, closer integration of drone technologies, and potentially a shared European nuclear umbrella, possibly even with Ukraine’s participation.

Many existing security concepts still assume that the United States remains a reliable guarantor of European security. But that assumption no longer holds.

EUROPE’S NUCLEAR SHIELD IS TECHNICALLY POSSIBLE, BUT VERY DIFFICULT TO IMPLEMENT IN GERMANY

Q: Some politicians in Europe argue that Russia itself should provide such guarantees…

A: In fact, that hardly matters. Russia has already promised not to attack Ukraine. Russia promised to accept NATO’s eastward expansion. Russia promised to withdraw its troops from Moldova and Georgia. Russia has made many promises. If we lived in a world where Russian promises were kept, it would be a rather peaceful one. But that is not the world we live in.

Q: You mentioned deterrence. There are currently discussions about a joint European nuclear umbrella, with Germany and France debating the issue. How realistic is this?

A: Technically, it is entirely possible. Politically, however, it would be extremely difficult to implement in Germany.

The reason Macron sometimes appears somewhat like a “gambler” is that he must convince the Russians that, in an extreme situation, he would actually push the button. In other words: “I’m crazy enough.”

The problem is that in Germany, especially where it comes to nuclear issues, many people instinctively step back and say: “Oh no, not escalation.”

But nuclear deterrence works only if you are prepared to demonstrate clearly that, in an extreme situation, you would even be willing to use a limited number of nuclear weapons. The opponent must have the sense that he is crazy enough — that he might actually press the button.

And this is precisely what is difficult to reconcile with German political culture. Technically, financially, and even militarily it would be possible. Politically, however, it is extremely difficult.

A German chancellor who fully supported the French nuclear strategy and adopted such rhetoric would face serious domestic political challenges — and the Alternative for Germany (AfD) would immediately benefit from it.

Q: Should Europeans also conduct their own negotiations with Russia about ending the war? The French have already sent a special envoy.

A: I don’t think anything will come of it.

For now, it is rather striking to observe how the Americans are somewhat embarrassing themselves with these pseudo-negotiations.

Military support should first be strengthened, and negotiations should begin only when Putin is genuinely under pressure and no longer able to continue the war. That is when negotiations begin to deliver results. At that point, it would also make sense for the Europeans to exercise stronger control over the process so that Trump does not simply “give something away” to the Russians. When the moment comes, negotiations must be conducted firmly and from a position of strength.

But this should happen only when the right moment arrives.

Q: The fourth anniversary of the war has recently passed. What would you like to say to Ukrainians on this occasion?

A: Thank you.

Vasyl Korotkyi led this conversation. Berlin

Photos via Author, the New Europe Center, and Stephan Röhl / Flickr

(This conversation is given here translated from Ukrainian)