Vsevolod Chentsov, Representative of Ukraine to the EU

Since the outset of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the European Union has undergone tectonic shifts in its perception of our country and its role in safeguarding the security of the entire continent. Without hesitation, the EU granted Ukraine candidate status in 2022 and played a critically important role in providing assistance to help repel the military aggression. Russia’s invasion accelerated Europe’s recognition of profound geopolitical change and compelled the European Union to reassess its place on the global stage and respond to emerging challenges.

Ukrinform spoke with the Head of Ukraine’s Mission to the European Union about the prospects and possible mechanisms for Ukraine’s accession to the EU, including a “phased” approach; future formats of assistance; sanctions pressure on Russia; immobilized Russian sovereign assets; Europe’s defense planning; Brussels’ efforts to prevent abuse of the veto right; and the EU’s involvement in peace negotiations concerning Ukraine, among other issues.

THE EU OVERLOOKED THE MALIGN TRANSFORMATION UNFOLDING IN RUSSIA SINCE 2007

Q: The fourth year of the war is drawing to a close. In your observations, how has Europe’s perception of the Russian threat evolved since the start of the full-scale invasion?

A: The transformation has been profound. Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine became a watershed moment for Europe. The perception of Russia shifted from that of a “problematic partner” to a systemic military threat. European security policy has undergone structural changes — from rearmament and NATO enlargement to energy diversification and strengthened sanctions. This transformation is long-term in nature and will shape Europe’s political and security landscape for decades to come.

Before 2022, a significant share of European elites regarded Russia as a difficult yet rational partner with whom dialogue and economic cooperation remained possible. However, the first warning signs emerged around 2007, including after President Putin’s speech at the Munich Security Conference. Prior to that, Russia had still signaled interest in cooperation with the EU. In the context of visa liberalization, it even moved ahead of Ukraine at times.

At a certain point, however, Russia came to perceive itself as sufficiently strong and prosperous to begin consolidating integration processes around itself. The concept of a Eurasian Union was first promoted assertively and later pursued in an increasingly coercive manner.

However, the EU unfortunately failed to recognize these malign shifts in Russia’s foreign policy — or chose to deliberately overlook them. An illusion of normalcy prevailed, particularly in certain member states such as Germany, that deep economic interdependence would prevent Russia from going all in. That illusion persisted even after 2014.

At the same time, Ukraine continued to be viewed as lying on the periphery of Europe’s strategic interests, not fully associated with the collective West. In practice, there was an informal veto on even contemplating Ukraine’s accession to the European Union.

Following Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine on 24 February 2022, however, a genuine reassessment occurred. Russia came to be perceived as a revisionist power waging an aggressive war against the European security order itself.

In 2022, NATO formally identified Russia as “the most significant and direct threat” to Allied security in its new Strategic Concept.

EU member states intensified coordination of defense policy and significantly increased military assistance to Ukraine. Nevertheless, even after the full-scale invasion, long-standing perceptions of Ukraine did not change overnight. The shift was gradual. Today, however, it is fair to say that the point of no return has been reached.

A symbolic milestone was the speech known as Zeitenwende (“turning point”), delivered by Chancellor Olaf Scholz in the Bundestag. Germany created a €100 billion special fund to modernize its armed forces and abandoned its long-standing policy of restraint in arms deliveries, while Finland and Sweden became NATO members.

There has also been a marked increase in attention to cybersecurity, information warfare, and sabotage activities. European countries have stepped up efforts to counter Russian propaganda and interference. Sanctions regimes, export controls, and efforts to combat sanctions circumvention have been reinforced accordingly.

Recognizing the full spectrum of current and emerging threats, as well as the urgent need to enhance defense capabilities, the EU has launched a series of institutional reforms. In 2024, for the first time in its history, the European Commission appointed a Commissioner for Defense and Space, with Lithuanian politician Andrius Kubilius assuming the role. In parallel, the European Parliament established a dedicated Committee on Security and Defense.

THE EU IS UNDERTAKING A STRATEGIC REASSESSMENT OF ITS SECURITY

Q: How would you assess the idea of establishing a European Defense Union, as well as a European Security Council and unified European armed forces? It appears that meetings of defense ministers within the format of the EU Foreign Affairs Council (Defense) are not sufficiently effective.

A: The concept of a European Defense Union — along with proposals for a European Security Council and unified European armed forces, advanced by the EU Commissioner for Defense and Space, Andrius Kubilius — remains at the conceptual stage. Nevertheless, it represents a logical response to the profound transformation of Europe’s security environment amid Russia’s ongoing full-scale aggression against Ukraine and evolving dynamics within the transatlantic partnership.

Today, the EU is a formidable economic power, but its defense architecture remains fragmented and heavily reliant on NATO and, above all, on the United States. Establishing a European Defense Union could involve deeper coordination of defense spending, joint procurement mechanisms, harmonization and standardization of armaments, and the development of credible joint rapid reaction forces under EU auspices.

Such a framework would not necessarily constitute an alternative to NATO; rather, it would strengthen the European pillar of the Alliance. In the current strategic environment, the capacity to take decisions more swiftly and with greater operational coherence is indeed essential.

The establishment of a European Security Council could provide a mechanism for faster strategic decision-making in times of crisis, reducing reliance on lengthy intergovernmental coordination. However, this raises a fundamental question of sovereignty: are all EU member states prepared to delegate part of their control over their armed forces to the supranational level? Without firm political commitment from the Union’s leading states, such an initiative risks remaining merely declarative.

Ukraine should also be integrated into this process in the context of its future membership. Defense is precisely the domain where we can contribute from day one. A new reality has emerged: Ukraine is no longer merely a recipient of assistance. With a capable, battle-tested military, we are in a position to strengthen the European Union itself. While we currently require support, defense will become a central pillar of our future engagement with the EU.

PHASED ACCESSION: A PRACTICAL MECHANISM TO FAST-TRACK UKRAINE’S EU INTEGRATION

Q: Ukraine’s accession to the Union is widely regarded as a key security guarantee for our country. A so-called phased process is now under discussion, taking into account geopolitical realities that dictate urgency. Is such an option suitable for Ukraine, and how can we ensure that Ukraine does not become stalled at an interim stage on the path to full membership?

A: Let us begin with the premise that accession constitutes a security guarantee for Ukraine. But it is equally a security guarantee for the European Union. This is a matter of mutual strategic interest. In practical terms, Ukraine already serves as the frontline of Europe’s defense.

It is also a question of consistency in the EU’s own policy. In 2022, the European Union made a historic political decision by granting Ukraine candidate status. Given the unprecedented scale of investment — through multiple instruments, including the recent €90 billion loan — it would be strategically short-sighted for the EU to leave Ukraine at a crossroads.

The concept of phased accession is not novel. Similar approaches were applied during previous rounds of enlargement, including the major expansion wave of the 2000s. Transitional arrangements were introduced to allow candidate countries to prepare for full membership, while ensuring that integration into specific sectors of the internal market was accompanied by legislative alignment, institutional readiness, and the capacity of economic actors to compete effectively.

In our case, the objective is to accelerate the process without compromising its quality. A phased accession model should not be viewed as a compromise for Ukraine, but rather as a pragmatic instrument to expedite integration — provided that the process is designed properly.

Such a model could envisage gradual economic integration into the EU internal market, alongside synchronized access to EU policies and instruments, aligned with the completion of commitments under the respective negotiation clusters.

This approach does not weaken the merit-based principle — progress based on performance — but instead strengthens it. By establishing indicative timelines, it introduces political discipline and creates additional incentives for reform.

Ukraine has already demonstrated its capacity to operate within such a framework. The screening process was completed in record short time, reform roadmaps have been developed, and the technical benchmarks required to open several negotiation clusters have been met. Notably, even the absence of the formal opening of Cluster 1 (Fundamentals) has not slowed the reform momentum.

Ukraine has set an ambitious yet measurable objective: to complete its internal preparations for EU membership by the end of 2027. Greater clarity regarding the accession timeline does not contradict the merit-based approach; rather, it reinforces it.

Q: European Commissioner for Enlargement Marta Kos has repeatedly emphasized that reforms are an essential criterion for accession. How is Ukraine’s reform progress currently assessed within the EU, particularly with regard to the rule of law? What do you see as the main challenges in this regard?

A: The assessments contained in the most recent EU Enlargement Report are the most positive for Ukraine since 2023. At the same time, the EU clearly recognizes that reforms in the areas of the rule of law and anti-corruption remain decisive for both the opening and closing of Negotiation Cluster 1 (Fundamentals).

The European Commission places particular emphasis on the irreversibility of reforms, their effective implementation, the resilience of institutions during wartime, and the preservation of political unity around the reform agenda.

Importantly, the EU evaluates not only the legislative framework but also tangible results — judicial decisions, transparent appointment procedures, and actual convictions in corruption cases.

Ukraine is demonstrating that even amid war it can advance reforms in a rapid and systemic manner. That is precisely why it is now essential to align this reform momentum with a clear political signal from the EU regarding the irreversibility and strategic inevitability of Ukraine’s membership.

EUROPE IS SENDING A MULTITUDE OF POSITIVE SIGNALS TO UKRAINIAN BUSINESSES

Q: What signals is Ukrainian business receiving regarding prospects for access to the EU internal market during the transitional period?

A: The issue is multifaceted. As of today, a significant share of Ukrainian products can be exported to the European Union without barriers, and the EU is Ukraine’s largest trading partner.

However, the EU internal market is structured across specific sectors. At present, positive signals are emerging in many of them. For instance, in telecommunications, Ukraine has joined the EU roaming area — an integral component of the internal services market. Another example is transport: cargo transport liberalization and the Open Skies regime are already in force. These developments are often referred to in Kyiv as “visa-free regimes”: trade, transport, energy, customs, and digital visa-free arrangements.

Within the framework of accession negotiations, EU law is divided into 35 thematic chapters, which are grouped into six clusters to streamline and accelerate the negotiation process.

When a particular chapter is provisionally closed and provides for sectoral integration, this effectively opens access to the corresponding segment of the EU internal market. Naturally, certain sectors may be subject to transitional periods, which in some cases can be lengthy.

Within the framework of the negotiations, transitional periods may be introduced — granting additional time after accession for the practical implementation of relevant EU norms.

However, such transitional arrangements must be clearly defined and properly substantiated. In this context, the real sector must already assess its readiness to implement European legislation and articulate its needs to the government in a structured manner.

Thus, while Ukrainian businesses are currently receiving numerous positive signals and there are tangible examples of integration into the EU market, this process remains sectoral and uneven. The differing pace of progress is attributable to multiple factors — both economic, such as the need for capital investment and infrastructure development, and political.

Q: Turning to the €90 billion loan: at what stage is the preparation of the technical documentation for the release of the first tranche? When can it be expected, and what steps must Ukraine take on its side, given that we are responsible for developing the relevant financial strategy?

A: Preparations for the first tranche under the Ukraine Support Loan are proceeding in a standard technical format, in close coordination with the European Commission. In parallel, both the budgetary and defense components of the facility are being elaborated in line with agreed priorities.

The adoption of the Regulation establishing the Ukraine Support Loan is expected by 24 February. Following its approval, the necessary formal procedures to activate the financing mechanism will be finalized.

According to the current schedule, the first tranche is tentatively expected in April 2026, provided that all technical procedures are completed on time.

Ukraine is actively preparing a consolidated financial strategy for 2026, aligned with the IMF’s macro-financial program. The Ministry of Finance is leading this process. Simultaneously, substantive consultations are underway between the Ministry of Defense and the relevant institutions in Brussels regarding the defense component of the budget. In practical terms, this means we are maintaining direct engagement with our partners and advancing preparations in parallel, rather than awaiting the formal completion of documentation.

The loan represents a key instrument for strengthening Ukraine’s macro-financial stability and security resilience under wartime conditions, and both parties are committed to ensuring its timely and effective implementation.

THE EU’S POST-WAR RUSSIA POLICY: A STRATEGIC IMPERATIVE

Q: Europe seeks to secure a stable seat at the negotiating table on peace in Ukraine. Do you see prospects for such participation under the current circumstances, and who, in your view, could be entrusted with such a mandate?

A: The European Union has consistently underscored its intention to play an active role in shaping the future peace architecture of Europe. The extent of its political, financial, and security assistance to Ukraine, the sanctions imposed on Russia, and the EU’s anticipated leadership in post-war reconstruction logically give rise to expectations of its meaningful participation in the relevant negotiation process.

At the same time, the EU’s involvement at this stage remains clearly circumscribed. For example, European Commissioner Dubravka Šuica participated in the Peace Council meeting in Washington in an observer capacity on behalf of the EU, and solely in the segment devoted to the situation in Gaza.

This underscores the EU’s broader engagement in international peace efforts. However, a formalized EU mandate for participation in negotiations requires the unanimous consent of all member states.

At present, the Coalition of the Willing is playing a leading role in shaping security guarantees for Ukraine, and this engagement may also be viewed as a form of European involvement. Moreover, at the institutional level, the EU is involved in the process: certain meetings have been attended by the President of the European Commission, Ursula von der Leyen, and the President of the European Council, António Costa.

It is likely premature to identify who might be entrusted with a formal mandate at the EU level, although such discussions are indeed taking place.

In a broader context, the EU must also define its long-term approach to relations with Russia. Securing peace and sustaining support for Ukraine are immediate priorities, but the fundamental question remains: what follows? The stability of the European Union — and its future relationship with Russia, which is not going anywhere — will largely depend on the terms under which the war concludes.

Q: Some EU member states are currently seeking to re-establish contacts with President Putin. Are such contacts appropriate at this stage, and is the EU capable of articulating a unified position on a just peace for Ukraine and providing credible security guarantees?

A: It is essential that any such contacts initiated by individual leaders be coordinated and reflect a common European position. Engagement should not occur merely for the sake of dialogue. It must serve a concrete objective: advancing the peace process, strengthening our position, and being aligned not only with other member states but also with Ukraine. Under these conditions, such contacts may be useful.

At present, the European Union remains united in its principled stance on Ukraine, grounded in respect for international law, sovereignty, and territorial integrity. Individual bilateral contacts between certain member states and Putin do not alter the Union’s consolidated position, as reflected in European Council conclusions and its consistent sanctions policy.

Ultimately, it is through the EU’s institutional mechanisms that a common position on a just peace and the parameters of security guarantees for Ukraine is shaped. Unity does not preclude debate, but it does ensure the capacity to adopt decisions that reflect Europe’s collective security interests.

THE EU MUST MAXIMIZE SANCTIONS PRESSURE ON RUSSIA

Q: What can be expected from the new package of European sanctions against Russia, and has Ukraine proposed targeting specific sectors of the Russian economy?

A: We expect the 20th EU sanctions package against Russia — prepared by the European Commission in February 2026 and scheduled for adoption ahead of the fourth anniversary of the full-scale invasion — to focus on three principal sectors: energy and the so-called “shadow fleet,” the financial sector, and trade sector.

We anticipate the package to be aimed at reducing Russia’s revenues from energy exports, closing sanctions circumvention channels, and intensifying economic pressure in advance of potential negotiations.

Ukraine has consistently maintained that sanctions pressure and restrictive measures must be comprehensive and maximal in scope in order to compel the Kremlin to negotiate. On our side, we are exerting kinetic pressure on Russia’s oil and gas infrastructure, while simultaneously working to prevent Russia from gaining access to critical technologies needed by its military-industrial base.

Priority areas for further targeting include metallurgy, raw material exports, the IT sector, the financial system, and the nuclear energy industry. The nuclear energy dimension remains particularly sensitive, as certain EU member states continue cooperation with Russia in this field and maintain long-term contractual commitments. We are actively communicating the security risks inherent in preserving such channels of interaction.

A robust sanctions response to the illegal occupation of the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant is also essential. Targeted restrictive measures have been proposed against individuals directly involved in the unlawful administration of the facility, based on documented evidence submitted to partners.

We support the introduction of a comprehensive ban on the provision of maritime services to vessels associated with the shadow fleet, as well as concrete operational measures to restrict their passage through the Baltic Sea and the Danish Straits. For the sanctions coalition, this presents an opportunity to transform sporadic vessel detentions into a coherent and systemic strategy aimed at constraining Russian energy exports in 2026.

In our assessment, it is equally critical to strengthen oversight of European companies and their subsidiaries operating in third countries to prevent critical goods, technologies, and services — including components used in the production of missiles and drones — from reaching Russia. Ukraine advocates formalizing a mandatory “no Russia clause”.

We also expect Estonia’s initiative to introduce a comprehensive entry ban to the EU for Russian citizens directly involved in the aggression will be implemented. We propose extending this approach across the entire EU and the Schengen Area.

Visa restrictions targeting participants in the aggression should complement individual financial sanctions and form part of a broader strategy of imposing a tangible “personal cost” for involvement in the war. Ukraine further underscores the necessity of expanding targeted restrictive measures against oligarchs and beneficiaries of the war, as well as against individuals in third countries who assist Russia in circumventing sanctions.

Third countries should recognize that by allowing sensitive materials or components for weapons production to transit through their territory to Russia, they expose themselves to serious risks — including the potential loss of access to resources or technologies. It is, in fact, highly noticeable when a country’s exports of certain goods increase severalfold within a year, and it is extremely difficult to justify such growth by reference to domestic production or consumption needs. At present, the European Union is prepared to take tough decisions against such countries, even though these decisions are politically complex, as they affect bilateral relations.

Russian celebrities who openly support the war should not be granted entry to the territory of the European Union.

There must be no easing of sanctions or delisting (removal of specific entries or names from sanctions lists) until a genuine peace is reached. In this context, attempts by certain member states to secure the removal of specific Russian oligarchs from sanctions after 15 March 2026 are unacceptable.

Third countries must clearly understand that by allowing sensitive materials or components used in weapons production to transit through their territory to Russia, they expose themselves to serious risks — including the potential restriction of their own access to critical resources or advanced technologies. Sharp, multi-fold increases in exports of specific goods within a single year are readily detectable and difficult to justify on the basis of legitimate domestic production or consumption needs.

The European Union is prepared to take tough decisions against such countries, even where these decisions carry political costs and may affect bilateral relations.

Russian public figures who openly endorse the war should not be granted entry into the European Union.

Furthermore, there can be no easing of sanctions or delisting (removal of specific entries or names from sanctions lists) of individuals and entities until a genuine and sustainable peace is achieved. In this regard, efforts by certain member states to secure the removal of specific Russian oligarchs from sanctions lists after 15 March 2026 are unacceptable.

THE OPTION OF REVISITING A REPARATIONS LOAN REMAINS OPEN

Q: What are the prospects for the use and confiscation of immobilized Russian assets for the benefit of Ukraine? Will the Reparations Loan be revisited?

A: With regard to the use of immobilized Russian assets, EU legislation provides that central securities depositories within the Union — including Euroclear — continue to transfer windfall profits generated by these assets to the EU budget. These funds are subsequently allocated to Ukraine through EU-financed programs (95%) and the European Peace Facility (5%).

As for the confiscation of approximately €200 billion in immobilized Russian sovereign assets, it is important to note that neither the Reparations Loan nor the €90 billion loan extended to Ukraine is considered equivalent to outright confiscation.

The question of full confiscation may therefore need to be examined through the framework of collective self-defense or on the basis of binding decisions by international judicial bodies.

In this context, EU member states should ensure that their national legislation provides for the possibility of lifting the immunities of an aggressor state on the basis of relevant UN and EU decisions — even where those states are not direct parties to the conflict but act within the doctrine of collective self-defense.

Paragraph 1650 of the ECtHR judgment in Ukraine and the Netherlands v. Russia explicitly states that, in delivering a future ruling on compensation, the Court will take into account the functioning of the Register of Damage and subsequent arrangements relating to a compensation mechanism.

Although the European Court of Human Rights does not directly regulate the confiscation of foreign state assets, its case law provides for the possibility of awarding just satisfaction, thereby opening the way for mechanisms to enforce such awards. In these circumstances, it is essential to establish a robust legal framework within the EU to ensure the effective implementation of any future decision.

It is also important to underscore the significance of the EU’s decision to immobilize Russian assets for an indefinite period. Previously, with each six-month extension, certain member states effectively attempted to leverage the renewal process by demanding specific concessions in exchange for their agreement. That structural vulnerability has now been removed.

The prospect of returning to the issue of a Reparations Loan remains. While we recognize that the domestic political situation in certain member states is challenging, the work must continue. The idea may yet be implemented — perhaps not in the coming weeks or months, but our contacts with EU institutions and member states indicate that the issue remains on the agenda. Work on the compensation mechanism and the Register of Damage is ongoing, and Ukraine must be prepared to utilize this instrument should it become available.

EU RESOLVE IS ESSENTIAL FOR UKRAINE’S SECURITY AND INTEGRATION

Q: The President of the European Commission, Ursula von der Leyen, has called on the EU to be ready to advance more key decisions by qualified majority voting rather than unanimity, as traditional vetoes by certain countries on issues concerning Ukraine have slowed progress. How would you comment on this? Would such a move provide additional political capital to the Hungarian prime minister ahead of elections, and would it require amendments to the EU Treaties?

A: The calls by President von der Leyen reflect a genuine internal debate within the EU about the Union’s capacity to take strategic decisions in today’s geopolitical environment.

We recall that the decision to open the first negotiation cluster for Ukraine was blocked by a single member state for purely political reasons, despite the fact that Ukraine had fulfilled all the necessary requirements and demonstrated clear political will.

From a legal standpoint, not all steps toward broader use of qualified majority voting require immediate amendments to the EU Treaties. The existing Treaties already contain mechanisms that allow for the extension of qualified majority voting without a formal revision of the treaty framework. This would be the optimal solution. However, a unanimous decision would still be required in order to activate such an extension.

For Ukraine, the key issue is not the specific legal format, but the political will of the EU to act decisively and not allow individual vetoes to block strategic decisions. The debate on reforming decision-making mechanisms is part of a broader discussion about the European Union’s readiness for enlargement and for strengthening its geopolitical role.

Q: The President of the European Commission, Ursula von der Leyen, has called on the EU to expand the use of qualified majority voting instead of unanimity, arguing that individual vetoes on issues concerning Ukraine have slowed progress. How would you assess this proposal? Could such a move provide additional political capital to the Hungarian prime minister ahead of elections, and would it require amendments to the EU Treaties?

A: President von der Leyen’s remarks reflect a substantive internal debate within the European Union regarding its ability to adopt strategic decisions in the current geopolitical environment.

We recall that the decision to open the first negotiation cluster with Ukraine was blocked by a single member state for purely political reasons, despite Ukraine having met all required conditions and demonstrated clear political commitment.

From a legal perspective, expanding the use of qualified majority voting does not necessarily require immediate amendments to the EU Treaties. The existing treaty framework already contains mechanisms that allow for broader application of qualified majority voting without formal treaty revision. This would represent the most pragmatic option. Nevertheless, activating such mechanisms would itself require unanimous agreement.

For Ukraine, the core issue is not the specific legal instrument employed, but the EU’s political commitment to act decisively and prevent individual vetoes from obstructing strategic decisions. The broader discussion about reforming decision-making procedures is inseparable from the question of the Union’s preparedness for enlargement and its ambition to strengthen its geopolitical posture.

Yevhen Matiushenko, Brussels

Photo: Yevhen Matiushenko, Mission of Ukraine to the EU