Abu Dhabi Talks: Expert Assessments and Expectations for the Next Round
The February 1 Meeting Will Show Whether Meaningful Progress is Possible in the Energy and Humanitarian Domains
At the end of last week, on January 23–24, Abu Dhabi (UAE) hosted another attempt by the U.S. administration to move the negotiation track on the large-scale war off dead center. Trilateral consultations involving Ukraine, the United States, and Russia underscored the divergence in approaches: Kyiv, represented by security officials and diplomats, reaffirmed its readiness for talks without revising its “red lines,” while Moscow—having refreshed its delegation—opted for a more pragmatic tactic in place of its customary ideological lectures.
The first round proved contentious. Military representatives sought to outline technical parameters for force disengagement, but diplomats ran into the familiar “Donbas wall.” The next meeting is scheduled for February 1. What should be expected?
A Change in Russia’s Delegation and Tactics
The Abu Dhabi talks on January 23–24, 2026 marked the end of “shuttle diplomacy” and the transition to a direct trilateral dialogue. The most notable shift was the transformation of Russia’s representation. Instead of ideologues and self-styled “historians” such as Vladimir Medinsky, the Kremlin fielded professional intelligence officials.
Political analyst Volodymyr Fesenko underscores the significance of this change:
“Previously, the United States conducted peace efforts in a shuttle diplomacy format—separately and in parallel with Russia and Ukraine. There were also direct Russia–Ukraine talks in Istanbul, but on the Russian side these amounted to little more than an imitation of negotiations and a propaganda show. Now, for the first time, direct peace talks have taken place in a trilateral U.S.–Russia–Ukraine format. Crucially, senior officials from the military establishments also took part.”
According to the expert, this recalibrated the direction of the discussions. He emphasizes that the parties focused on “technical aspects related to force disengagement and ceasefire modalities, rather than Russian ultimatums, broad political demands, or pseudo-historical arguments, as was the case during the Istanbul talks in the summer of 2025.”
Comparing the current process with previous iterations, Fesenko draws attention to the figure heading the Russian delegation:
“This time around, Russia’s delegation is led by Vice Admiral Igor Kostyukov, head of the Main Directorate of the Russian General Staff (the GRU). This is clearly a status- and function-based adjustment to Kyrylo Budanov, who serves as the de facto head of the Ukrainian negotiating team. At the same time, it signals that Moscow is taking these talks seriously.”
The composition of the Ukrainian delegation also merits attention.
“It is sufficiently high-ranking while remaining functionally diverse. All Ukrainian delegates have substantial experience negotiating both with the United States and with Russia. (…) The U.S. delegation is likewise strong: Witkoff, Kushner, Driscoll, as well as Grinkevich, Commander of NATO Allied Forces in Europe and U.S. European Command.”
Such a configuration suggests, as the expert puts it, that the talks in the UAE “will certainly not be an imitation of negotiations or merely a performance staged for Trump.”
“This is a substantive attempt to move toward resolving the key issues surrounding the end of the Russia–Ukraine war,” Fesenko emphasized.
Political analyst Ihor Reiterovych reinforces this assessment:
“In fact, the composition of the Russian delegation was the main indicator even before the talks began—whether the ‘clown’ Medinsky and his entourage would show up or not. When Russia sent entirely different figures, it was at the very least a signal of a more serious approach to negotiations than we had seen before.”
Reiterovych notes with irony that Putin was forced to sideline toxic figures:
“We no longer hear outright nonsense about ‘six’ or ‘four regions,’ there is no rudeness or pseudo-historical monologues. This is a very important and telling moment—a reduction in rhetorical noise and a return to a more pragmatic mode of discussion.”
This pragmatism, Reiterovych argues, has made it possible to move on to critical details:
“Mechanisms for disengagement, monitoring, technical procedures… In fact, these are precisely the issues that are critically important. Sooner or later they would have had to be addressed anyway, and now we see that they are being worked through in a systematic way.”
In his view, the current negotiation strategy is to “discuss the maximum of what is discussable—and bring those issues to a logical conclusion.”
With one major and most painful exception: the issue of territory.
“From here, two scenarios are stemming. The first is that the parties still manage to find some form of compromise on territories at this stage, after which they move to the final phase—a political decision and the signing of agreements. The second is that all other issues are brought to full readiness, while on territories they simply wait for the moment when the Kremlin realizes that the desired outcome cannot be achieved by force. And then they will be told: ‘Everything is ready—sign,’” the political analyst added.
Diplomat Vadym Tryukhan also agrees that Moscow has changed its tactical approach. He notes:
“This time, the Russian side did not confine itself to the usual set of ultimatums and propaganda talking points. They demonstrated a willingness to engage in practical discussions on issues directly related to settlement and agreed to work in both bilateral and trilateral formats, as well as to participate in joint working groups on military and political tracks. This does not amount to a breakthrough, but it certainly does indicate a shift in tactics.”
Responding to the question of why Russia changed the composition of its delegation, Tryukhan suggested that this may have been the result of a direct recommendation from the Americans:
“The Kremlin is perfectly aware of how toxic figures like Medinsky or Slutsky are. The American side would have seen through this instantly. I would not rule out that Steve Witkoff, via Ushakov, may have directly or indirectly advised Putin to change the delegation’s composition so that, at least formally, Russia would not look as if it was unwilling to engage in any meaningful dialogue from the outset.”
The territorial deadlock and U.S. pressure
Despite some progress on the military track, the political dimension of the talks runs into a fundamental disagreement over the future of Ukraine’s territories. The United States, in its attempt to broker a rapid solution, has found itself in the difficult role of mediator that at times appears inclined toward concessions at Ukraine’s expense.
Volodymyr Fesenko explicitly identifies the core challenge:
“The key problem of the current negotiations is the issue of withdrawing Ukrainian forces from Donbas. The Kremlin insists on this. Unfortunately, the Americans partially support this position.”
The expert stresses that for Kyiv such a demand is absolutely unacceptable, and that the parties’ positions here are “directly opposed and can hardly be reconciled within any compromise formula that the Americans are persistently trying to find.”
Another major problem, ccording to Fesenko, is Vladimir Putin’s lack of genuine willingness to end the war against Ukraine:
“For Trump, Putin is demonstrating a readiness to negotiate, which is why the talks in Abu Dhabi are taking place. In reality, however, he seeks to continue the war against Ukraine—and we see this every day. Negotiations are needed for his diplomatic game with Trump and as a tool to force Ukraine into accepting Russia’s terms for ending the war.”
In this context, Kyrylo Budanov’s role takes on particular significance. His deep understanding of the adversary “from the inside” deprives the Russian side of room for bluffing and tactical manipulation.
Political analyst Ihor Reiterovych explains:
“Budanov has had—and continues to have—direct contacts with the individuals who now represent the Russian side. They have interacted before, and that is always important for any negotiation process. Second, he is perceived much more positively by the Americans, and that is an obvious advantage for us. There is no point in hiding it—this configuration has worked to Ukraine’s benefit.”
The expert adds with irony that Budanov quite literally “triggers” Russian propaganda:
“They are hysterical. And that means there are good reasons to believe that the process itself is unfolding very differently from how Russia would like it to.”
Diplomat Vadym Tryukhan, however, sees a serious risk in the current configuration stemming from the absence of European partners at the table. In his view, the Ukrainian delegation has effectively found itself in a “one-against-two” situation—facing both Russia and the United States. The latter, he argues, are clearly in a hurry: they have a direct political mandate from Donald Trump to deliver some kind of agreement at almost any cost, given the upcoming congressional elections in November, where most forecasts suggest Trump could lose control of both chambers. Within this logic, Washington is objectively more inclined to pressure Ukraine than Russia.
Tryukhan adds that the current logic of “compromises” appears distinctly one-sided. The United States and Russia are effectively pushing Ukraine toward withdrawal from Donbas—an option that is absolutely unacceptable for Kyiv. “At the same time, Moscow is offering nothing in exchange,” he stresses. “In the Russian understanding, a compromise means ‘you agree to our terms,’ not mutual concessions.”
Expectations ahead of 1 February — the next round of talks
The second round of negotiations, scheduled for Sunday, is expected, among other things, to clarify whether a so-called “energy ceasefire” is feasible. However, Russia’s actions between the meetings—continued mass missile and drone strikes—do little to inspire optimism.
Political analyst Ihor Reiterovych takes a skeptical view of the prospects for any de-escalation in the air. “I am fairly restrained in my expectations,” he says. “There is a sense that Russia is not yet ready to abandon large-scale strikes—at least until weather conditions change decisively and until it becomes clear that they are not getting the results they counted on.”
He adds that Russian propaganda machine continues to cynically amplify the narrative of a “cold genocide,” which, in his view, signals the Kremlin’s lack of any real willingness to make concessions on this issue.
Instead, Ihor Reiterovych proposes focusing on prisoner exchanges. “It would be right and logical to return to this issue, because it is one of the few areas where a tangible humanitarian outcome is possible to achieve even in the absence of broader political agreements,” he argues.
Vadym Tryukhan, for his part, stresses that only hard power considerations can compel the Kremlin to take real steps on 1 February.
He points to two key factors. First, the systematic degradation of Russia’s ability to wage war: “This means strikes on critical infrastructure, primarily energy facilities. If it becomes possible to reach Moscow or Saint Petersburg, then the Kremlin will begin to seriously reconsider its position.” Second, a sharp increase in Russian military losses: “The objective is to eliminate around 50,000 Russian troops per month. Once losses begin to exceed replenishment rates, the shortage will become tangible—not only at the front, but also in the rear.”
Volodymyr Fesenko likewise does not expect a rapid breakthrough. “Without pressure from the United States on Russia—rather than on Ukraine—there will be no breakthrough in the negotiations,” he says. “At the same time, the fact that technical aspects of ending hostilities have begun to be addressed is extremely important for the future.”
In sum, the next round on 1 February will demonstrate whether the parties are capable of taking concrete steps in the energy and humanitarian domains, or whether the Emirates will become just another stop in a prolonged war of attrition.
Myroslav Liskovych, Kyiv
Headline photo via EPA/UPG