“Christmas” talks at Mar-a-Lago: No bad news? That’s already good news!

The same “90% agreed” plan and yet another Kremlin U-turn: Moscow again rejects an “election ceasefire” and lies about an “attack on Putin’s residence”

Commentators have already begun to lament that predictions of a Christmas lull on the diplomatic front of the Russia–Ukraine war did not materialize. At first glance, that assessment seems fair. On 28 December, at the height of the Christmas holidays, President Volodymyr Zelensky traveled to the United States for what was presented as a decisive conversation with President Donald Trump. The talks lasted two and a half hours, yet ended in a familiar way: publicly, neither side said anything new. As President Zelensky put it, there were still “90% of the 20-point plan agreed.” Journalists, no longer surprised by anything, then heard from Trump: “I believe Putin,” “Putin wants peace,” “Putin wants to see Ukraine successful.”

This requires little commentary. Trump did, in fact, say these things, and diplomats around the world were compelled to “not notice” them. The diplomatic contest between Kyiv and Moscow—each seeking to shift responsibility for the collapse of “peace talks” onto the other—continues and will continue. In this process, the U.S. president is personally acting as the arbiter.

European capitals have not fallen silent, but their activity has clearly entered a “Christmas slowdown.” Even Friedrich Merz, the German chancellor who has recently emerged as a locomotive of a more genuinely united Europe—one that recognizes its adversary and is preparing to respond decisively to Russia, including by force if necessary—has been less visible. At present, European leaders’ participation in video calls with Trump’s Mar-a-Lago residence looks more like a gesture of courtesy by the U.S. administration (which still deserves appreciation) and the result of persistent efforts by the Ukrainian side. Overall, prime ministers and presidents did not spare compliments for Trump.

How should this be assessed from the perspective of Ukraine’s interests? A definitive answer will require some patience. The Mar-a-Lago meeting was the next tactical move; it was agreed there that working groups would begin in January to refine the document’s provisions. Judging by what was said at the joint press conference, the current round ended in a draw. Although Ukraine initially held the advantage, it is no coincidence that Donald Trump spoke with Vladimir Putin by phone shortly beforehand. We have no ability to influence the U.S. president’s conclusions quoted above; all that remains is to “not notice” them and organize a counter-game.

Why did Ukraine have the initial advantage? We were right to interpret last week’s public disclosure—at the level of the President of Ukraine—of a “90% agreed” 20-point plan as a tactical move to seize the initiative. This, in turn, largely forced the aggressor—at least rhetorically, and in order not to antagonize Trump—to accept the idea of an “election-referendum” ceasefire.

Several fundamental conclusions follow. It is long past time to change our analytical lens—both for us and for Europe, and for the United States if that is still possible. Putin does not want “just Ukraine.” The Kremlin has already realized that subjugating Ukraine no longer guarantees achievement of its primary objective: dismantling the existing world order in favor of an empire that is “rising from its knees.” The Kremlin cannot restore relations with the West “as they were,” nor with the United States—Trump is equally incapable of delivering that. The only option Putin sees is to force others to “love” Russia through coercion. Yet coercive power is no longer sufficient either.

Accordingly, all speculation of the type “what if we offer him this or that concession?” is entirely futile. In Europe, this is largely understood—although voices of the so-called Putin-versteher camp can still be heard and will likely persist.

Still, did the presidents in Florida actually reach—or nearly reach—some form of agreement? Let us assume they did. Even so, Putin, sensing that he is losing the momentum of the game, has already stated that he will not sign a peace agreement involving the “demilitarization” of Donbas by both sides. He also publicly contradicted remarks by Sergei Ryabkov, Lavrov’s deputy, who had suggested that Russia might agree to a temporary ceasefire to allow elections or plebiscites to be held in Ukraine.

Moreover, after several days of conspicuous absence from the information space, Sergei Lavrov suddenly reappeared to effectively reaffirm Putin’s position and to claim that Ukraine had allegedly attempted a drone attack on Putin’s residence in Valdai. Lavrov argued that after such an incident, Russia could no longer remain on its previous “negotiating position.” Ukraine has categorically rejected these accusations, and European officials have reasonably suggested that this may have been a classic “false-flag” provocation. Yet this does not alter the substance of the situation: the aggressor has de facto declared its intention to abandon its own 28-point plan, as well as the adapted 20-point version that emerged from U.S.–Ukrainian consultations.

Lavrov added another significant signal: in the event of a military clash between China and Taiwan, Russia would support Beijing as its ally. This statement is hardly coincidental, coming at a moment when China—unlike the United States—has decisively imposed sanctions on key U.S. defense-industrial base companies following Washington’s approval of an $11 billion arms sale to Taiwan. Thus, while one might attempt to explain Lavrov’s temporary disappearance by internal frictions among competing Kremlin factions, it is far more plausible that the “peace plan” dynamics reflect a pre-planned script employing a classic “good cop / bad cop” strategy.

At this point, it is difficult not to agree with analysts who fundamentally reject the possibility of reaching a peace agreement with Putin that does not amount to Ukraine’s capitulation. In practice, any genuine peace would constitute Putin’s defeat. The core issue the Kremlin cannot accept is Ukraine remaining outside Russia’s sphere of influence. Recent notions of Ukraine becoming a “grey zone,” voiced by Hungary’s loyal prime minister Viktor Orbán, are likewise illusory. This will not be allowed—not only by Ukraine itself, but also by Europe, which has recognized Russia as its primary threat and sees Ukraine as a protective shield.

This reality became unmistakably clear last week in the memorable speech delivered by German Chancellor Friedrich Merz at the CDU party congress in Munich. The statement by French President Emmanuel Macron on the need to restore channels of communication with the Kremlin should be understood in the same context. Europe does not wish to remain voiceless in the shadow of contemporary American diplomacy.

The conclusion is therefore straightforward: Putin will be fundamentally unable to present any such peace agreement as a “victory” to the radicalized Russian domestic audience.

How were the “Christmas” negotiations perceived in Ukraine? Let us quote several assessments.

According to Ukrainian political analyst Vadym Denysenko, the key achievement of the talks is that the security guarantees would be ratified by the U.S. Congress. In other words, unlike the Budapest Memorandum—which was a political commitment—these guarantees would apparently take the form of an international treaty, legally binding and enforceable.

“If this is indeed the case, it would be a truly significant plus for us. That said, for now we are hearing only general outlines, without concrete details. This includes the fact that in the ‘first draft’ the United States reportedly offered these guarantees for only 15 years. (President Zelensky has already stated that Ukraine insists on extending this term to 25–30 years — ed.). In short, we need to wait for the final document, although at the level of declarations this looks positive,” Denysenko wrote on Facebook.

Political analyst Oleh Saakian offered the following assessment on Facebook:

“He (Trump) would gladly blame Ukraine for sabotaging the negotiations—but he cannot. (…) Zelensky and Ukraine are managing to maneuver: agreeing to secondary concessions, conditional concessions, while leaving safeguards in place (referendums, elections, congressional approval of guarantees). (…) In effect, Ukraine has managed to secure the core structure of the 20-point document. These points are bad for us, but unacceptable for Russia in the version that was proposed. (…) Putin secured the launch of working groups. He won the overall logic (the ‘philosophy’) of the document at the outset, but lost on specific provisions. At the same time, he has now gained an opportunity to impose his own interpretation.”

By contrast, political analyst Ihor Reiterovych expressed a more skeptical view:

“This is not the first time Trump has made statements suggesting a certain cognitive dissonance—such as claims about Russia supposedly wanting Ukraine to prosper or displaying a ‘normal’ attitude toward Ukrainian strikes on Russia. Clearly, on key issues the situation has not fundamentally changed.”

If Russia strongly rejects Ukraine’s proposals—for example, regarding a demilitarized zone—the scenario, in Reiterovych’s view, is straightforward: “We will simply continue fighting. In fact, Trump said exactly that yesterday.”

Former Ukrainian Ambassador to the United States Valerii Chalyi emphasizes that the mere absence of negative news following the meeting is, in itself, a positive signal.

That assessment from an experienced diplomat is difficult to dispute.

Political analyst Oleh Saakian recently made an apt reference to Pushkin’s fairy tale of the Golden Fish. The analogy is telling. The fact is that Russia has already missed the moment most favorable for exiting the war. That moment came in early 2025, when Donald Trump assumed office in the United States, followed a month later by the historic Zelensky vs Trump row in the Oval Office in late February.

The causes of that episode are still often framed as a mistake by the Ukrainian president. But if one revisits February 28 without prejudice, it becomes clear that it was the product of the real mood and level of understanding of Ukraine within the new U.S. administration at the time. Washington still genuinely believed in the possibility of a rapid “peace” achieved at Ukraine’s expense. It was precisely then that Kyiv found itself in its weakest position vis-à-vis those who had supported it, in one form or another, throughout the Great War.

At that point, Ukraine did not yet have behind it the Europe that has since “woken up” and begun to act as it does today.

Now the Kremlin finds itself facing a dilemma. Ending the war threatens Russia with a destructive internal cataclysm, having failed to achieve its objectives. Continuing the war, however, risks a different outcome: the “Golden Fish” that appeared to the Kremlin as a savior on January 20, 2025 may yet “swish its tail” and return Putin to a “broken trough”—that is, force Russia to downgrade the war to a low-intensity conflict.

But the fundamental question remains unanswered: is such an outcome even possible for a Russia gripped by what can only be described as a form of dark collective madness, having driven itself into a strategic dead end?

Oleh Novychenko, Maryna Dmytriv, Kyiv