Oleh Shamshur, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of Ukraine

As 2025 draws to a close, it stands out as a difficult year—much like those that preceded it. We routinely return to the same formulation: a year marked by hardship, intense developments, tangible achievements, and painful losses. In that sense, nothing appears out of the ordinary.

And yet, 2025 was different.

What, precisely, defines this distinctiveness? How did it manifest itself, how was it perceived, and how will it be remembered? These questions form the basis of our conversation with Oleh Shamshur, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of Ukraine, who previously represented the country in the United States and France.

— It seems that nearly everything that was supposed to happen this year has already occurred, with the exception of Russian shelling, which, regrettably, continues on a daily basis. There is much to reflect on and much to recall. Which events of 2025 stand out most clearly for you?

— I believe that for the majority of those who closely follow international relations and Ukraine’s foreign policy, the defining development was, undoubtedly, Donald Trump’s return, his assumption of office, and the actions he subsequently undertook. I am not inclined to overestimate the role of individual personalities in history, yet credit must be given where it is due: he has indeed overturned—or at least attempted to overturn—many of the established pillars and reference points of global politics.

Some of his initiatives succeeded; others, fortunately, did not. Nevertheless, he set in motion a process that accelerated the tectonic shifts already under way in the international system. In this sense, I am convinced that the central factor of 2025 was Trump and his policies. Naturally, from our perspective, foreign policy is of primary concern.

— So, would it be fair to call it “the year of Trump”?

— Despite my—putting it mildly—critical attitude toward him, yes: it was indeed the year of Trump.

— One could say that he took the traditional geopolitical chessboard of classical diplomacy, overturned it, removed the pieces altogether, and replaced it with a far less predictable style of play. We will return to Trump later—there is no avoiding that.

However, there were also developments that unfolded independently of his will, contrary to his plans and vision, and which were important for Ukraine. What events of that kind would you highlight?

— It is clear that our attention is now, quite naturally, almost entirely focused on the war. In essence, I would agree that the developments of this year, albeit with certain differences, to some extent replicated what we witnessed last year—this has been yet another year of endurance. Regrettably, we must acknowledge that President Putin achieved certain advances, both on the battlefield and in the foreign-policy domain, and that Ukraine had to search for ways to counter them.

At the same time, important developments took place in Europe, including the recent decision to allocate €90 billion in support for Ukraine. This decision is ambiguous. Simply stating that it is insufficient would probably be inaccurate, as these resources are undeniably significant and necessary. Yet it would also be difficult to argue that this is fully in line with what Ukraine had expected. In other words, the reaction is mixed. Nevertheless, it was an important step.

There were also notable regional developments, particularly in the Middle East. What we observed in Gaza is, once again, connected—directly or to a considerable extent—with Trump’s policies.

— For Ukraine, this “year of Trump” was also a year of searching for peace and of expectations regarding a ceasefire. Throughout the year, there were hopes and efforts aimed at achieving one, yet the war is grinding on. It is important, in my view, not to lose sight of the fact that during these peace-seeking efforts—whether under Trump’s leadership or pressure—a critically important element receded into the background: accountability and punishment.

For this reason, I consider one development of particular importance, which occurred independently of Trump or the position of the United States—namely, the establishment of an international tribunal to prosecute Russian leaders for the crime of aggression.

At some point, the issue of responsibility—of Putin and the broader Putinist system—was pushed to the margins.

— This is undoubtedly important, because a troubling negative trend has emerged: the issue of accountability for Putin and the broader Putinist system has gradually been pushed to the margins. Accountability must extend to all those involved in war crimes, crimes against humanity, and the killing of Ukrainians, including civilians. This is a critical component if we are to speak of a just peace on terms acceptable to Ukraine.

Moreover, if we do not lose sight of the overarching objective—to deprive Russia of the capacity to threaten Ukraine, Europe, and the rules-based international order as a whole—then accountability is not merely a moral imperative, but a strategic necessity.

I would like to connect this to a broader—and perhaps even more painful—issue for us. At present, all negotiations are focused on halting hostilities and stopping the war. However, it is essential to understand that if this is achieved on the terms currently forming the basis of discussions, such a peace will be neither just for Ukraine nor durable for Ukraine, Europe, or the wider world.

We must be prepared for this reality. Our partners must clearly understand it—and, importantly, our own citizens must understand it as well. This, in my view, is critically important, because we are witnessing a distinctly negative trend: the notion of Russia’s profound military defeat has virtually disappeared from political and strategic discourse.

- Yes, this is critically important: without accountability, it is impossible to establish a just and lasting peace. That is precisely why, in my view, the process of creating a tribunal is itself a clear demonstration of Europe’s political agency. All the relevant documents have been developed within the framework of the Council of Europe. European countries understand the necessity of this step and are acting autonomously.

Now let us return to the U.S. National Security Strategy and discuss how Trump views the world, because this document is, in essence, his vision of the international order and the direction in which he seeks to steer it. I cannot recall a single U.S. national security strategy in which an official document was so explicitly personalized—so closely tied to the personality of Donald Trump himself. Is that a fair assessment?

Yes, I have never before seen such an extreme personalization of foreign policy in the United States. At this point, it is more accurate to speak not about American foreign policy as such, but about Trump’s America’s foreign policy. All actions and plans are tied to how well they align with Donald Trump’s political, personal, and business interests, as well as those of people close to him. This is the reality we must acknowledge and work from.

As for the National Security Strategy itself, many argue that its operational significance should not be overstated, since it is largely a declaratory document. That is true to an extent. However, as a tool for understanding Trump’s priorities and his worldview, it is highly revealing.

During Trump’s first term, the National Security Strategy attempted to address broad questions within the framework of great-power competition. The current doctrine, by contrast, reflects Trump’s effort to establish cooperation among major powers—specifically with Russia and China. This approach is fully consistent with his worldview: one set of rules for the strong, another for the weak, with the latter expected to accommodate the interests of the former.

From here, however uncomfortable it may be for us, it is easy to draw a direct line to the idea of spheres of influence—and to the conclusion that, in Trump’s perception, Ukraine does not belong to the category of countries or regions of strategic importance to the United States.

- I was struck by a one-sentence assessment of this strategy by Timothy Snyder: “It is strikingly similar to Russia’s own national security doctrine.” That remark, I think, captures the essence of Trump’s strategy rather well.

It is not coincidental that the Kremlin reacted positively. Dmitry Peskov openly stated that Trump’s worldview—particularly regarding Europe and relations with Russia—largely corresponds to Russia’s own approaches. In this context, it is hardly surprising that Trump’s 28-point “peace plan” appears to have been drafted on the basis of Russia’s original negotiating framework.

There is ample evidence that Washington’s current conceptual approach and Moscow’s strategic vision overlap. The most illustrative example is Europe, which is historically and ideologically closest to the United States—above all, NATO.

What does Trump’s National Security Strategy say about NATO? It portrays the Alliance as an organization that has expanded excessively and without clear limits. What does Putin and his ideological circle argue? That NATO must be rolled back to its 1994 borders, that NATO itself provoked confrontation with Russia, and that the Alliance bears responsibility for the current conflict.

This convergence raises a fundamental question: what is NATO’s future under a Trump presidency? Will the Alliance enter a period of strategic stagnation—effectively lying low for the duration of Trump’s term—only to attempt a revival afterward? Or does Trump’s approach signal a deeper structural shift in the transatlantic security architecture, one that could permanently weaken NATO’s role as the cornerstone of European security?

- At this stage, it is impossible to predict how this will ultimately unfold. One may hope that the current period is temporary, but there is no full confidence in that assumption. Donald Trump does not act in a vacuum; he also reflects underlying currents within American society. There is no guarantee that he will be succeeded by a more pro-Atlantic leader, nor that the Democrats—or a Reaganite wing of the Republican Party—will prevail in future elections.

Notably, many commentators now attempt to identify “positive elements” in this National Security Strategy. Some argue that Trump’s rhetoric toward Europe should not be overinterpreted and that it reflects a temporary emotional phase in transatlantic relations. Such interpretations, however, appear overly optimistic.

Trump is openly opposed to further NATO enlargement, a position that directly aligns with long-standing Russian demands. More broadly, he does not appear to view the United States as the backbone or guarantor of the Alliance. This logic is also reflected in the 28-point plan, which envisages a NATO–Russia dialogue mediated by Washington. In this framework, Trump positions himself as an actor sufficiently distant from NATO to serve as an “honest broker” between the Alliance and Vladimir Putin’s Russia.

As before, Trump insists that European states must significantly increase their contributions to their own security. Yet the tone of the Strategy’s European section is, in essence, dismissive—bordering on contempt. This, once again, echoes recent statements from the Kremlin. In sum, there is little in this Strategy that can be interpreted as positive for Europeans, for NATO member states, or for the Alliance as an institution.

That said, Trump is not entirely wrong when he argues that Europeans often engage in extensive rhetoric while failing to deliver concrete decisions or tangible outcomes. In this sense, the only potential benefit for Europe may lie in the Strategy’s function as a form of shock therapy—a harsh but clarifying signal that compels European governments to confront their own strategic inertia and assume greater responsibility for continental security.

- Thus, we observe the emergence of “Trump the peacemaker”—a leader who increasingly presents himself as standing above institutions, alliances, and political groupings. This self-perception is clearly reflected in the case of Ukraine. The U.S. position has undergone a notable evolution: from a strategic partner in 2022—when full-scale aggression began, Washington mobilized an anti-Putin coalition, provided large-scale military assistance, and assumed clear leadership—to a posture under Donald Trump that emphasizes mediation rather than alliance or partnership.

Trump seeks to portray the United States not as a committed ally, but as an intermediary. At times, this mediation takes on characteristics that suggest a degree of asymmetry—or even dependency—vis-à-vis Moscow. The United States, in this framework, no longer anchors a coalition but positions itself above the conflict, implicitly equating the aggressor and the victim.

The critical question is where such an evolution leads—for the country itself and for leaders long regarded as reliable partners. A shift from alliance-based leadership to transactional mediation risks eroding trust, weakening collective security mechanisms, and normalizing spheres-of-influence thinking. For smaller states and frontline democracies, this trajectory raises fundamental concerns: when partners redefine themselves as “honest brokers,” the guarantees once derived from shared values and commitments may be replaced by contingent, interest-driven calculations.

In strategic terms, this approach does not merely reshape U.S. foreign policy—it recalibrates expectations across the international system, signaling that even long-standing partnerships can be subordinated to personal diplomacy and great-power bargaining.

- Speaking as a former ambassador to Washington who was directly involved in shaping the framework and mechanisms of the U.S.–Ukraine strategic partnership, I find it deeply troubling to state this—but it must be acknowledged. At least at the political level, Ukraine has lost the United States under Donald Trump as a strategic partner.

It is no longer credible to argue that Trump’s policy is grounded in the logic of a strategic partnership with Ukraine. Such an interpretation simply does not align with observable reality. The current U.S. approach is driven by a fundamentally different set of priorities—ones that place transactional interests, personal diplomacy, and great-power accommodation above long-term alliance commitments.

In this context, the notion of strategic partnership has been hollowed out. While elements of cooperation may persist at the institutional or technical level, the political foundation that defines a strategic partner—shared threat perception, long-term commitments, and readiness to incur costs for an ally—is no longer present. This represents not a temporary tactical adjustment, but a structural shift in how Washington under Trump conceives its relationship with Ukraine.

To anticipate how Donald Trump’s policy toward Ukraine may evolve, it is essential to identify the constants that remain unchanged despite his characteristic volatility. Two such constants stand out.

First, Donald Trump is determined to end the war as quickly as possible. His priority is to free political bandwidth for issues he personally considers more important, and he has demonstrated a readiness to pursue this objective at the expense of Ukraine’s national interests. Speed, rather than sustainability or justice, appears to be the dominant criterion shaping his approach.

Second, Trump does not regard Ukraine as a strategically significant country for the United States. This perception is closely linked to the absence of a coherent strategic worldview in his foreign policy thinking. Rather than assessing Ukraine through the lens of long-term security architecture, deterrence, or the stability of Europe, he tends to view it instrumentally—as a peripheral issue that can be traded off in pursuit of short-term deals or broader great-power arrangements.

Taken together, these constants suggest that U.S. policy toward Ukraine under Trump is unlikely to be driven by alliance logic or strategic foresight. Instead, it is shaped by immediacy, personalization of decision-making, and a narrow understanding of national interest, all of which significantly constrain Ukraine’s room for maneuver.

A third factor that has become particularly evident in recent months is Trump’s effort to exclude Europeans from the negotiating table. In his view, European states are not actors capable of shaping outcomes; rather, they are perceived as impediments to his self-styled “peace-making” initiatives. This reflects a broader dismissal of Europe as a meaningful strategic interlocutor.

The fourth element is Trump’s attempt to envision an economically prosperous future built on cooperation with Russia. While this vision rests largely on illusion, it nonetheless shapes Trump’s behavior, the interests of his inner circle, and the calculations of business figures surrounding him. Russia is seen not only as a potential economic partner but also as a tool for reshaping the rules of global politics in a manner more favorable to Trump’s transactional worldview.

- In Trump’s conceptual framework, the transatlantic bond retains a certain symbolic or emotional value for him personally and, by extension, for the United States. This, however, does not extend to the European Union, which he increasingly portrays as an illegitimate structure that has stripped power from its member states and is governed by unelected leaders. In this narrative, the EU is depicted as a declining entity facing an uncertain future.

Notably, this rhetoric closely mirrors that of Vladimir Putin, who has long portrayed Europe as stagnant and in decay. Thus far, the European Union has responded with restraint and patience. The sustainability of this approach, however, remains an open question. As Romano Prodi has argued, there may come a point when Europe must find the political courage to articulate and defend its own position, rather than merely accommodating or echoing Trump’s views.

- This assessment is largely accurate. The U.S. National Security Strategy contains a striking and controversial formulation suggesting that Europe faces the risk of the disappearance of European civilization. In effect, Donald Trump positions himself not merely as an external observer but as a self-appointed arbiter of how Europe should organize its political, social, and strategic future.

At the same time, and this is understandable given Trump’s personal style and political psychology, European actors—both within the European Union and North Atlantic Treaty Organization—have largely pursued a strategy of accommodation. Their primary objective has been to induce Trump to soften these positions and to behave in a manner that would at least allow for the resolution of concrete, practical issues.

This dynamic, however, exposes a deeper structural problem. The mere fact that Trump happens to be in a “good mood” is increasingly portrayed as a diplomatic success in itself. From an analytical standpoint, this represents a profound distortion of diplomacy: policy substance, institutional commitments, and long-term strategy are subordinated to the emotional state of a single political leader. Such an approach is not only unsustainable but fundamentally undermines the credibility and agency of Europe’s collective foreign and security policy.

In this respect, I fully agree with Romano Prodi: the current approach has indeed become counterproductive. Donald Trump does not perceive Europeans as his equals, and Europe’s excessively conciliatory behavior only reinforces this perception.

For this reason, European leaders must demonstrate political courage and articulate positions that are not merely convenient but necessary. Crucially, however, such rhetoric must be underpinned by a fundamental change in Europe’s mode of action. Words alone are no longer sufficient. What is required are concrete, firm, and potentially costly measures—steps that may be uncomfortable but are strategically unavoidable.

If Europe follows this path, Trump will be compelled to take it more seriously. Moreover, if Europeans seek to secure a permanent seat at the negotiating table, this can only be achieved through demonstrable action. Only by proving its capacity to act decisively can the European Union convince Washington that it is not a political abstraction or illusion, but a genuine political, economic, and security actor.

- This is a separate and very large topic: the European Union in today’s conditions and the direction of its future development. We will return to this discussion next year. For now, I would like to conclude our review of the year and of Trump’s approach to the world by focusing on Ukraine. What future awaits us? How will we position ourselves in Europe, and how does Trump see this through his own lens? In the previous U.S. National Security Strategy, when Trump served as the 45th president, Ukraine was mentioned—if I recall correctly—only in one context: Russia as an enemy and a threat, having demonstrated its aggressive nature by attacking Ukraine and annexing Crimea. That was essentially it.

In the 2025 strategy, Ukraine is now presented as a country that should preserve its sovereignty in the future and where the war should come to an end. But why? Trump explains this as follows: only because ending the war and maintaining Ukraine’s sovereignty would help enable Russia to resume dialogue with Europe. This is the role he assigns to us. Have I interpreted this correctly?

— You have, and this aligns with what I said about the four elements that consistently define his attitude toward the Russia–Ukraine war, toward how it might end, and toward his own objectives. Unfortunately, these elements have not improved for us. At present, I am convinced that he sees his plan—whether it consists of 28 points or 20—as the only viable option. He approaches this like a real-estate developer negotiating a deal: his primary interest is to stop the fighting and, however ironic it may sound, to secure the Nobel Peace Prize—this clearly matters greatly to him. Trump has no intention of prioritizing our interests; he will clearly seek to preserve the ability to speak with Putin as a partner in order to pursue the idea of building a “bright future” together with him.

At the same time, there is a crucial question: what will Trump do if Putin continues to behave just as brazenly? This would irritate Trump and could lead to serious reputational losses for him. We have already seen moments when Trump’s criticism of Putin intensified. Yet he has always left some room for continuing partnership—or at least non-confrontational—relations with Putin.

There are two points that, in my view, are absolutely critical for us. First, the continuation of strict sanctions, primarily against Russia’s energy and financial sectors. Second, the normal functioning of mechanisms for procuring U.S. weapons for Ukraine using European funds. This, however, is also a question for the Europeans. If these two elements are preserved, that is what matters most to me.

As a result, in the negotiation process we have very limited—and at times almost no—room for maneuver to defend our interests. Overall, I believe that what has been proposed to us is bad, and that the current process is about making something bad slightly less bad; under no circumstances will it become good for us. Nevertheless, there are not just red lines but “deep red” lines that we cannot cross. European partners need to act more proactively so that we always have a European fallback option to fill any gaps.

Finally, there is another factor that also matters to Trump: genuine, profound changes within Ukraine itself. When there is real synergy between external factors and internal transformation, only then can we truly endure—and speak credibly about the possibility of Russia’s military defeat.

— So, in summary, 2025 also became the year when Europe—hopefully—finally woke up.

— Not only woke up, but actually went to brush its teeth.

— And that is already a positive development. The Coalition of the Willing is also a positive sign: it reflects a European position that is taking shape around a vision of future security—one that is impossible without Ukraine. I therefore believe that certain European–Ukrainian frameworks have now been established that strengthen both Ukraine’s position and Europe’s position in these rather unconventional negotiations.

Finally, it is worth assessing how successful 2025 was for President Trump in implementing his strategy, since this is essentially about reshaping the global order. Transforming and replacing the international order within a single U.S. presidential term is extremely difficult. The question is whether he is, in fact, moving in that direction.

— I believe that Trump was fairly successful in creating a high degree of chaos in international relations, but it is clear that this cannot be considered a positive development. In my view, he pushed contradictions among partners to their limits, which is again a negative outcome. The only positive aspect is that this acted as a form of shock therapy for Europeans: they are now compelled to wake up fully, get dressed, and act.

At the same time, if we look at concrete results, the overall balance appears mixed. There are apparent achievements—for example, a ceasefire between Israel and the Palestinians in Gaza—but it is extremely fragile. All of Trump’s efforts to present himself as a peacemaker must, once again, be taken with quotation marks. In the Russia–Ukraine war, these efforts have also failed to produce results, primarily because of Putin’s policies and stance. However, the lack of success is also due to the absence of strategic vision in Trump’s peace proposals; he is, to put it mildly, under very strong influence from the Russian position. In my assessment, this is a dead-end approach.

If we consider relations with China, despite tariff wars, Xi appears to have prepared much more thoroughly for this confrontation and, overall, looks more resilient than Trump. As usual, Trump will claim that he is winning, that he is a peacemaker, that he is ending conflicts. Yet it is difficult to identify even a single case or policy area in which Trump has genuinely succeeded in implementing his ambitions. His principle is always to declare victory—but we need to remain realistic.

— We need to be realistic, and therefore we are entering the next year with a clear understanding that it will not be easy, that the war will continue, and that our main strength lies in the Defense Forces of Ukraine, which are defending our sovereignty, our independence, and our future. No one will do this for us except ourselves.

Ihor Dolgov led this conversation

Watch the conversation in full on the Ukrinform YouTube channel.

Photo: Kyrylo Chubotin